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Map of Uganda 
 
 
 
Figure 0.2   Map of Uganda 
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Map of Liberia 
 
 
 
Figure 0.3  Map of Liberia 
United Nations (2010) 
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Map of Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
Figure 0.4  Map of Sierra Leone 
United Nations (2004) 
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Part I 
 
 
An Introduction to Child Soldiers, 
Socialization and Rebel Groups 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is about the powerful processes involved in the creation of child soldiers 
by African rebel groups. It is generally acknowledged that rebel groups recruit the 
majority of child soldiers by force, although the extent to which children are recruited 
and the degree to which they are forced to participate vary widely. Still, most of these 
children remain with these groups for lengthy periods. But why do child soldiers stay 
with rebel groups, even after having been recruited against their will? What induces 
these children to live under the severe circumstances entailed in being part of a rebel 
group? The answers to these questions appear to involve a complex myriad of 
motivating factors.  
As child soldiering has become a global phenomenon, scholars have carried 
out numerous studies on the topic. However, the focus has generally been on the 
recruitment and/or rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers. Little is known 
about the life of child soldiers while they are part of a rebel group, and that has 
resulted in a limited understanding of the active involvement of child soldiers within 
rebel groups. In this thesis I argue that it is essential to analyze thoroughly the period 
when child soldiers are actively involved with rebel groups. Building on previous 
analyses and theories on child soldiering, this can provide insights as to why child 
soldiers remain with rebel groups, and what happens to them during armed conflict.  
Why is this important? Once child soldiers have left a rebel group, they are 
often offered support to rehabilitate and reintegrate into society. Unfortunately these 
forms of support frequently mismatch the needs of these children. I hold that this is a 
consequence of our limited knowledge about the period of active involvement with 
rebel groups. An in-depth understanding of the active life of child soldiers can help us 
improve Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) 
programs. In turn, it is to be hoped that this will result in more effective aid and 
efficient use of support, producing better outcomes in rehabilitation and 
reintegration. Additionally, this thesis will help to fill the current knowledge gap in 
our understanding of child soldiers as well as of rebel groups. As yet the literature has 
not yet paid sufficient attention to why child soldiers remain with armed groups, or to 
the dynamics within such groups. Thus, this thesis should help to create a broader 
platform for knowledge development in these areas. 
In order to be able to offer recommendations for improving DDRR programs 
as well as fill the current knowledge gap, this thesis will analyze the processes 
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creating allegiance amongst child soldiers. Once children have been recruited by a 
rebel group, whether this is forced or voluntary, the rebel commanders seek to ensure 
that these children remain with the group and function as effective soldiers. A long 
and thorough process is needed to achieve this, and I will argue that the process of 
socialization is a determining factor here.  
My extensive field research among former child soldiers in Northern Uganda, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique indicates that socialization processes are an 
essential component in creating allegiance. Socialization, whereby individuals acquire 
the culture of their group, inducts child soldiers into the norms and values of the 
rebel group and results in sustained compliance. Whereas fear and a lack of 
alternatives often seem motivating factors for joining rebel groups at first, 
socialization acts to facilitate bonding within such groups and hence plays a critical 
role in creating loyalty and dependence on a rebel group. However, little is known as 
to how this is actually achieved; the literature has tended to focus on the effects that 
violence, intimidation and indoctrination have on child soldiers, failing to address the 
broader set of socialization processes within rebel groups. It should also be borne in 
mind that violence is not something that is used solely to indoctrinate and intimidate 
children: it makes children adopt violent behavior and become role models 
themselves. As such, violence is an important aspect of socialization within rebel 
groups, but the complete set of socialization processes at work within these groups is 
much broader. There is a need for research that can deal with this knowledge gap. For 
instance, ignoring the dynamics of organizational socialization that child soldiers 
experience results in a scope too narrow for explaining the phenomenon of child 
soldiers, and fails to grasp the long-term consequences of child recruitment.  
Important questions that can shed light on the dynamics within rebel groups 
and the creation of allegiance among child soldiers need to be targeted. For instance: 
what combinations of tactics and practices are used in the socialization process to 
achieve bonding within rebel groups? And how do these practices help to explain why 
many child soldiers remain with rebel groups for long periods of time, posing severe 
threats to regional peace? This thesis attempts to uncover the broader dynamics of 
socialization processes within rebel groups, using case studies among former child 
soldiers and commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia, and the Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique. However, it should be noted that this study 
should be seen as a starting point for future research on socialization within rebel 
groups. Although this study focuses on the African continent, child soldiering is a 
global phenomenon and much remains to be learned from studies of child soldier 
socialization in, for instance, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. 
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 The case studies in this dissertation were selected because each of the four 
rebel groups relied heavily on the use of child soldiers, perhaps even owing their very 
existence to the involvement of children in their armed struggle. Interviews with 
experts and former rebels indicated that between 60% and 80% of the LRA consists 
of child soldiers. Extensive research on how these children became part of the LRA 
has shown that abduction and the use of force are the main methods of recruitment 
(Blattman, 2007). However, even though the majority of child soldiers were forced to 
join the group and did not receive significant rewards, my field research indicated 
that they often remained with the LRA for quite some time (four years on average), 
and attempts to escape were rather uncommon. The same was indicated by field 
research among child soldiers who had been involved with the RUF, LURD, and 
RENAMO. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon gives rise to the question: 
exactly what is it that motivates child soldiers to remain engaged with rebel groups? 
Allegiance is relatively high among LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO rebels; many 
child soldiers become loyal to these groups and stay with their commanders—even 
though the majority were initially recruited by force.  
This indicates that the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO used efficient 
mechanisms to engage their members, facilitate bonding and create allegiance. By 
utilizing socialization mechanisms, these rebel groups remained cohesive, which in 
turn enabled them to continue their violent struggles for years or even decades. How 
did rebel groups with large numbers of forcibly recruited children manage to become 
so resilient? My field research indicates that socialization served as the “glue” that 
kept the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO together, and prevented the child soldiers 
from seeking to escape. 
In addition to challenges encountered when attempting to deal with rebel 
groups as organizations, the reintegration of former rebels into society has proved to 
be a complex process. Rehabilitation programs often mismatch the needs of former 
rebels, resulting in disappointing reintegration results (Borzello, 2007). My field 
research in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique has indicated that 
former child soldiers are generally poorly understood; they often become outsiders in 
their communities. This not only challenges their individual development: it also 
jeopardizes the development of their societies, which must struggle with a “missing 
generation” as a consequence of the war.  
When former child soldiers return to their villages, they are generally 
perceived as changed individuals: they seem to have a new identity and have 
abandoned their societal norms and values. I hold that these changes are the result of 
socialization processes within rebel groups. Previous research on child soldiers has 
not yet sufficiently addressed this phenomenon, which allows this dissertation to 
provide additional insights into the processes whereby which children evolve into 
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soldiers and stay with the rebels. So far, our limited understanding of child soldiers 
has obstructed attempts to target rehabilitation programs effectively, which 
endangers regional peace and stability. It is therefore important to conduct in-depth 
research that can shed light on the actual experiences of child soldiers, not least the 
socialization processes within rebel groups. Since the LRA, RUF, LURD, and 
RENAMO did manage to create strong allegiance among forced recruits, it seems 
logical to assume these groups used efficient mechanisms of socialization. In order to 
analyze to what extent socialization mechanisms played a role within these rebel 
groups, the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO are used as case studies in this thesis.  
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the lives of child soldiers during 
their active involvement with the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO. I will analyze the 
myriad of motivating factors for their life as a member of a rebel group. Given the fact 
that most of these child soldiers were forcibly recruited, I seek to explain their 
reasons for remaining with the rebels. Limited research on this topic allows me to 
contribute to the evolution of the research environment that concerns a persisting 
problem: children embodying the ultimate weapon in war. In this thesis, I argue that 
socialization is one of the most significant processes in the transformation of a child 
into a loyal soldier. I analyze which socialization mechanisms are at play within rebel 
groups and explore what effects they have. Moreover, I show how socialization 
creates allegiance, facilitates bonding, and makes children—many of them forcefully 
recruited—identify with the organization.  
 
My main research question is twofold, as follows: 
 
Why do child soldiers remain with rebel groups, and how does socialization play a 
role in this? 
 
This leads to the following sub-questions: 
 
• How and why are child soldiers used by African rebel groups? 
• What tactics do African rebel groups use to integrate child recruits and create 
allegiance among them? 
• What socialization processes can be found within African rebel groups? 
• Does organizational socialization play a role? If so, how? 
• What are the means of teaching used by African rebel groups? 
• What are the effects of socialization concerning behavioral patterns, values, 
skills and motivations? 
• Does socialization lead to internalization? If so, to what extent? 
• Does socialization have the potential to transform children into loyal soldiers, 
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even when they were initially abducted by a rebel group? 
• What are the similarities and differences between socialization processes 
found in various African rebel groups? 
 
Given the complexity of the phenomenon of child soldiering, this thesis seeks 
to shed light on the processes preceding the socialization period that child soldiers 
experience. In order to create a broad, well-developed understanding of child 
soldiering I will build on and include research conducted during work on my MPhil 
and PhD dissertations.  
In the first part of this thesis, I elaborate on the difficulties in defining a child 
soldier, and on socialization theory. Additionally, one section explains the research 
procedure followed while conducting field research; this section presents the 
methods used and emphasizes the importance of interviewing former child soldiers. 
Chapter 3 explains the use of child soldiers in rebel groups, the methods of 
recruitment, and the process of transforming a child into a soldier. In order to offer a 
clear understanding of how children become parts of rebel groups, I present an 
analysis of various studies conducted by prominent scholars such as Blattman (2007, 
2008), Gates (2002, 2007, 2009), Machel (2001), Rosen (2005), Singer (2006), and 
Wessells (2004, 2006). I analyze the perspectives of a range of scholars, seeking to 
address the problem broadly and to create a balanced understanding of child 
soldiering. Generally, scholars have tended to view child soldiers as either victims or 
perpetrators. That is an invalid approach, in my view: child soldiers are sometimes 
victims, but not always—and sometimes perpetrators, but not always. I will propose 
an alternative that recognizes child soldiers as social actors, albeit in a structurally 
restricted way as they are subject to the dynamics within armed groups.  
The second part of this thesis focuses on the case studies of the LRA, RUF, 
LURD, and RENAMO. Although it is not possible to do justice to all of the 
complexities and nuances of the wars in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Mozambique within the scope of this thesis, it is important to contextualize these 
conflicts in order to understand the reasons for establishing these rebel groups, and 
their motivations. Each chapter begins with a brief analysis of the conflict 
background and describes the developments during the war. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 go 
on to elaborate upon the dynamics within these rebel organizations, their use of child 
soldiers, and the creation of allegiance. These chapters include fieldwork evidence to 
provide deeper insight into the organizations and their use of child soldiers. The 
specific processes of socialization child soldiers encounter within these rebel groups 
is examined, building on my field research among child soldiers in these countries.  
The third part of this thesis highlights the differences and similarities in 
socialization that child soldiers experience in the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO. It 
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also identifies some reintegration challenges caused by socialization processes within 
these rebel groups. By explaining how socialization creates allegiance among child 
soldiers and by highlighting the challenges this leads to, I hope to develop a more in-
depth understanding of the lives of child soldiers within rebel groups. This in turn 
will enable me to indicate, in the concluding chapter, opportunities for improving 
disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former 
child soldiers. 
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2 
Studying Child Soldiers and Socialization 
Theoretical framework and research procedure 
 
 
This chapter will elaborate upon the background of the phenomenon known as 
child soldiering. It will highlight the difficulties of defining a child soldier and 
indicate which challenges this brings along. Hereafter it will focus on socialization 
theory and explain why rebel groups use socialization processes. By elaborating upon 
childhood socialization it will show why rebel groups find child soldiers useful. 
Further, process tracing in socialization is explained in order to build a foundation for 
the analysis of LRA socialization in later parts of this thesis. Lastly, this chapter will 
address the research procedure and method issues, presenting the extensive field 
research conducted in connection with this project. 
 
What is a Child Soldier? 
The existence of child soldiers is often seen as offensive and unacceptable, 
challenging people's basic assumptions about children, good and evil, and 
humankind. The generally accepted view seems to be that children should not be part 
of armed groups and that they deserve protection exercised by adults and societies. 
This view is established in national laws around the world, as well as in 
internationally ratified legal standards like the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol on Children and Armed Conflict. 
The Optional Protocol bans all child recruitment by groups outside official 
governments and sets the minimum age for participation in combat at 18 years 
(Wessells, 2006:1–2).  
Although these standards are widely recognized, reality undermines them, as 
the use of children in armed conflicts remains a global phenomenon. During the past 
decade large numbers of child soldiers have participated directly in at least 27 
conflicts throughout Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East 
(Wessells, 2006:10). This clearly demonstrates the extent of the problem. On the 
other hand, child soldiering is not something new caused by globalization: it is as old 
as mankind (Gates and Reich, 2009:2). Despite the near-global consensus that 
children should not be used as soldiers, child soldiering is an on-going phenomenon. 
For instance, according to the Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, “when armed 
conflict exists, children will almost inevitably become involved as soldiers” (2008). 
The Global Report 2008 stresses the urgent global need to combat the 
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problem of child soldiers. However, this struggle faces severe constraints: even 
defining “child soldiers” presents a range of challenges. Andvig defines a child soldier 
as “a child who participates actively in a violent conflict by being a member of an 
organization that applies violence in a systematic way” (2006:7). But what is a child? 
Definitions of childhood are culturally established and differ from one society to 
another. Whereas most developed countries as well as the CRC define a person under 
18 years of age as a child, many developing countries regard a person as an adult once 
he or she has begun doing adult work or has completed cultural rituals that lead to 
man- or womanhood. This implies that cultural phenomena, traditions, and social 
roles in developing countries lead to the perception that children become adults when 
they are approximately 14 or 15 years of age. Whereas a 15-year-old joining an armed 
group in a developing country may be perceived as a young adult by his or her own 
society, developed countries would consider this 15-year-old as a child and thus a 
child soldier. Still, despite the differing perceptions of when a child reaches 
adulthood, large portions of the populations in developing nations consider people 
under the age of 18 too young to join armed groups, and refer to them as “underage 
soldiers” or “minor soldiers” instead of using the laden term “child soldiers” 
(Wessells, 2006:5).  
The term “child soldier” does not refer only to uniformed people bearing arms: 
it applies to people with a wide range of roles in armed groups—for example, as 
cooks, escorts, porters, babysitters, sex slaves, bodyguards, spies, human mine 
detectors, or laborers. Child soldiers are used by a large variety of armed groups, 
ranging from rebel groups to government forces (Gates and Reich, 2009:3, Human 
Rights Watch, 2007, and Wessells, 2006:6–7). The lack of verifiable data further 
complicates the problem, resulting in a series of myths (Gates and Reich, 2009:1). 
Taking these considerations into account, this thesis adopts a broad definition 
of the term “child soldiers,” including the somewhat arbitrary age limit of 18 to define 
the upper limit of childhood. It will draw on Machel’s definition: “a child soldier is 
any child—boy or girl—under the age of 18, who is compulsorily, forcibly, or 
voluntarily recruited or used in hostilities by armed forces, paramilitaries, civil 
defense units or other armed groups. Child soldiers are used for forced sexual 
services, as combatants, messengers, porters, and cooks. Most are adolescents, 
though many are 10 years of age or younger. The majority are boys, but a significant 
proportion overall are girls” (Machel, 2001:7).  
According to this definition, an estimated 300,000 child soldiers participate in 
conflicts throughout the world as part of armed groups. Approximately 40% of these 
soldiers are girls (Human Rights Watch, 2007, Machel, 2001, and Wessells, 2006). 
Still, Gates points out that this estimate dates from 1994. UN estimates from 2008 
calculate the figure to be 250,000. We should keep in mind there are no accurate 
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figures available on the exact number of child soldiers (2009:1). 
Among the international community, child soldiers have often been portrayed 
as victims of adults who profit from the exploitation of children. However, this one-
dimensional portrayal has recently become the topic of heated debate, and research 
has started to develop a more anchored, broader understanding of the phenomenon. 
The fluidity and diversity within the concept of child soldiers has been highlighted, 
bringing a more nuanced view of the problem: “previous tendencies to infantilize 
children and to regard them as passive are giving way to a view of children as actors 
who have a strong sense of agency, participate in the construction of political 
discourses and social identities, and in some cases lead political action” (Wessells, 
2006).  
Still, this remains a divided field of inquiry, with scholars generally divided 
into two camps: the one describing child soldiers as victims who have been 
intimidated by adults and forced into soldiering; the second describing child soldiers 
as voluntary, ruthless perpetrators who see violence as a way to obtain respect, social 
justice, and political and economic opportunities (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:39, and 
Wessells, 2006:3). However, my field research has shown that child soldiers can be 
victims and perpetrators at the same time: like civilians were forced to take part in 
the conflicts, child soldiers were often forced to participate in the acts of war and 
gradually turned into perpetrators. Moreover, there are different types of 
perpetrators, as shown by Smeulers in her typology of perpetrators of international 
crimes (2008). Smeulers distinguishes between nine types of perpetrators that get 
involved in collective violence—ranging from criminal masterminds, to fanatics, 
sadists, profiteers, careerists, devoted warriors, followers and conformists, 
compromised perpetrators, and professional perpetrators. This typology indicates 
there is a gradation in perpetrating behavior, showing the difficulties of classifying a 
person in one particular category. When applying Smeulers’ work to the child soldier 
phenomenon, most children seem to fall either in the category of followers and 
conformists (those who get involved in collective violence by obediently following a 
leader or a current, without specific personal incentives to commit crime), or the 
compromised perpetrator (who commits crimes because of coercion or force). Others 
may get involved with armed groups and collective violence in order to gain a better 
position, status or power, and can hence be classified as a “careerist” type of 
perpetrator (Smeulers, 2008). This indicates we cannot exclusively group child 
soldiers in a particular category as their reasons for getting involved in collective 
violence vary. In addition, over time socialization may change their incentives for 
being part of a rebel group and the type of perpetrating behavior they portray. The 
effects of socialization may transform children into different types of perpetrators 
while they are part of the rebel group, making it impossible to draw broad 
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generalizations that would group child soldiers in one particular perpetrator category. 
Looking at the difficulties to establish a definition that would fit all child 
soldiers, I argue that child soldiers cannot be viewed as either victims or perpetrators: 
drawing this sharp distinction denies important aspects of the phenomenon and 
challenges our attempts to grasp the complexities of rebel group dynamics. Moreover, 
we should bear in mind that children are social actors, despite the fact that the extent 
of their agency is often structurally restricted by armed groups and the force they 
apply. Podder makes an important argument in this respect: “force exists; violence is 
an important source of establishing control over people, places and things. War is all 
about control of spaces and humans. Nevertheless, children are actors in this space, 
they navigate, they succumb and they respond” (2011:145).  
One of my informants, a 15-year-old boy soldier from Northern Uganda, 
explained how he dealt with the violence he experienced within the LRA and how he 
eventually decided to train other children to become just like him:  
 
One morning, it was early-early, I heard shouting coming from outside. I woke up my 
brother, I did not know what was happening. Then they broke open the door. There 
were loud noises and shots, and two boys with guns shouted at me to come out. They 
threatened us with the guns. When I was outside they looked at me and pushed me 
around. I was small but strong and the commander told me I was now his boy, that I 
was now coming to the camp. He told me to beat the other children, to cut them with 
the machete. I don’t know what happened, my eyes went black, my hands were full of 
blood. When I could see again the girl was already dead. I cried but the commander 
said it was ok; she was not a good girl and I was now part of them, the LRA family. 
There was no way I could go back to my village, everybody knew what I had done. So I 
stayed, and the commander was now my father who showed me how to be a man. 
When I was a good rebel I was also teaching the new children; I did not want to be 
alone, be the only one. So I showed them how to be the same like me, to be a fighter.  
 
This account is one of many examples I encountered, showing how child soldiers 
generally become subject to violence first, but eventually perform violent acts 
themselves. This indicates that they are socialized by the rebel groups but use agency 
to make decisions in this process, and can even become socializers themselves, using 
socialization to make other children part of the group. In this dissertation I seek to 
show how the power of socialization nuances a child’s agency, and that child soldiers 
cannot be portrayed solely as victims or as perpetrators.  
As Gates (2009) rightly argues, child soldiers are characteristically depicted as 
victims, but the complicating feature that they are simultaneously predators is 
generally ignored. One reason that child soldiers are often seen as victims is 
explained by Utas, who notes the active role former child soldiers may play in the 
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creation of the victim image and the logics behind it. He states it is “no surprise that 
children in front of aid donors pretend to be as innocent as possible to get whatever 
possible advantages in their fragile post-combatant lives” (2011:218). Utas calls this 
“victimcy—the agency (albeit structurally limited) of victims,” which is “a form of 
social navigation; a navigator tool used by child soldiers as tactic responses to their 
socio-economic environment” (2011:219). Utas came across this phenomenon during 
his extensive field research in Liberia (2003, 2011), and his findings highlights the 
importance of acknowledging child soldiers’ agency and their tactical responses to the 
situations they find themselves in. Viewing them as solely victims is hence too 
simplistic and even dangerous; it not only disempowers them by denying their 
agency, but also underestimates the complexities of conflict reality.  
Another reason behind the invalid reflection of child soldiers as either victims 
or perpetrators is described by Podder (2011). She points out the role media plays in 
the inconsistencies of child soldier portrayals wavering between 
innocence/vulnerability/incapacity on the one hand, and agency/capabilities on the 
other hand: “cumulatively the Western media has advanced and popularized a 
pejorative, wasted image of youth in conflict, and tended to portray a dramatized and 
sympathetic account of the processes and experiences involved in the life of a child 
soldier. For a practitioner, academic or humanitarian worker who has lived and 
worked with child soldiers these are far from the truth” (2011:141). The dichotomy 
between these lived realities and projected truths obviously leads to incomplete and 
problematic conceptualizations of the phenomenon, urging for efforts to achieve a 
more balanced and realistic understanding of the lives of child soldiers that can lead 
to better informed DDRR programs (Podder, 2011).  
 To achieve this it is important to break through the polarized views on child 
soldiers, by having a closer look at the role that (restricted) agency plays and its 
interlinkage with the socialization processes that make children stay with rebel 
groups. As Podder notes, children quickly “bond, trust and gradually forgive their 
own captors. It is their willingness to embrace the worst as best possible under 
extreme difficulty which is key to understanding agency issues of why young people 
join” (2011:145–146). Whereas this already indicates the importance of increasing 
our focus on agency and socialization processes, she goes even further by arguing that 
“child soldiering is always a choice, for some it’s an optimal choice amidst structural 
compulsions, for others it’s an exercise in tactical agency and a tool of survival” 
(2011:151). Due to a lack of research focus on the dynamics within rebel groups, we 
are currently facing a knowledge gap that does not allow us to further analyze the 
connections between socialization processes and agency. Therefore the following 
chapters will draw on extensive field research to analyze the processes that are at 
work within these groups, indicating how they influence child soldiers affiliated with 
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them. 
By analyzing the changes that occur within children due to socialization 
processes, this thesis will attempt to solidify the argument that reflections of child 
soldiers as either emotionally crippled victims or predatory killers are over-simplistic 
and invalid conclusions. With the purpose of contributing to an international 
community that is attempting to understand and address the problem of child 
soldiering, it is essential to offer a more balanced perspective that systematically 
examines rebel group dynamics and socialization mechanisms. Analyzing the process 
of socialization within rebel groups will further develop the findings offered by Gates 
(2009), Podder (2011) and Utas (2003, 2011), resulting in a better understanding of 
the complex dynamics that are part of the child soldiering phenomenon. The ultimate 
goal of achieving this is that it will offer us better tools to combat the phenomenon 
and allow for the improvement of current DDRR programs. 
 
Girl Soldiers 
Women and girl soldiers are often overlooked in conflict research. As Nordstrom 
correctly observes, “too often the girls are considered only as silent victims of (sexual) 
assault—devoid of agency, moral conscience, economic potential or political 
awareness…We need to ask girls to tell their own stories of war, its impact, and 
potential solutions, rather than assuming the right to speak for them” (1997:36). In 
another observation, Turshen and Twagiramariya (1998) argue that “the enduring 
wartime picture of ‘man does, woman is’ has depended on the invisibility of women’s 
participation in the war effort, their unacknowledged, behind-the-lines contributions 
to the prosecution of war, and their hidden complicity in the construction of fighting 
forces…It is no longer possible to maintain the innocence of all women.” As I agree 
with the significance of including girls in conflict research and the need to give them a 
voice, I have aimed for equal representation of boy and girl soldiers among my 
informants. Mainly based on my interviews with these girls, the range of experiences 
girl soldiers had within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO will be thoroughly 
discussed in this thesis.  
 The importance of addressing girls in war zones was amplified during field 
research. It emerged that girls and women played significant roles within each of the 
four rebel groups I focused on. In fact, the rebels often relied on the girls for their 
very existence. I found that the survival of the rebel groups depended heavily on the 
cooperation of female members and the contributions they made. The complex plots 
of war reality I encountered also indicated that girl soldiers—like boys—cannot be 
portrayed as either stereotypical victims or perpetrators. Even though girls are often 
portrayed as victims, girl soldiers should not be generalized as civilians who have 
been forced to fight: 41 of the 118 girl soldiers I spoke with had chosen to take up 
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weapons and become soldiers. Furthermore, my field research indicated that women 
inside rebel groups play essential roles and many girl soldiers use deliberate 
strategies to utilize their agency within the context of war. They should hence by no 
means solely be perceived as passive victims. This is shown by Turshen and 
Twagiramariya (1998), who argue that “women are also combatants; women resist 
and fight back; they take sides, spy, and fight among themselves; and even when they 
don’t see active service, they often support war efforts in multiple ways, willingly or 
unwillingly.”  
 This points out the complexity of the child soldier phenomenon: child soldiers 
may be perceived as victims, but also as perpetrators or social agents, perhaps even 
simultaneously but on different levels. There is no clear dividing line that separates 
them into such categories, even though girls in particular are often perceived as 
victims. As Mats Utas explains:  
 
The amount of individual agency or the amount of victimcy changes from situation to 
situation, from one social relation to another—whether you are a man or a woman. In 
war men and women are situated on the same sliding scale between abundant agency 
and victimcy. Even most so-called perpetrators are severely limited in their agency: to 
survive, civilians are forced to participate in war trade, while fighters are forced by 
their commanders to participate in atrocities. Likewise, the commanders are forced to 
command so as to keep their men in place and the enemy terrified” (Utas, [in: 
Honwana and de Boeck,] 2005:57).  
 
This thesis will contribute to this debate by analyzing how children are socialized for 
their role as rebels, and to what extent they internalize this role and the values that 
are associated with it. Moreover, taking the complexities of war into account, this 
thesis will also show that girl soldiers—like boys—continuously oscillate between the 
position as a victim or perpetrator, civilian or soldier. 
 
The Process of Socialization 
As rightly noted by Gutiérrez Sanín, “using children in war can be quite problematic. 
And the younger and more inexperienced the child, the more problematic it can 
become. Therefore, groups have to transform them into warriors” (2010:123). 
Moreover, “since the motivations to join an armed group are so varied, the recruits 
have to be thoroughly transformed into useful soldiers. [Compared to adults] children 
can be more easily induced into false beliefs before joining and more easily molded 
when they have become members” (2010:129). In this thesis I argue that socialization 
plays a significant role in the transformation from child to soldier. So far, little light 
has been shed to the social processes and dynamics within rebel groups. As Elizabeth 
Wood argues, limited “attention has been paid to the social processes of civil war—by 
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which I mean the transformation of social actors, structures, norms, and practices at 
the local level—that sometimes leave profound social changes at their wake” 
(2008:540). Wood argues that these processes cause transformations in social 
networks, noting the importance to further deepen the explanation of socialization. 
“These processes reconfigure social networks in a variety of ways, creating new 
networks, dissolving some, and changing the structure of others, as when the local 
clients of a patron are mobilized into an armed network with a new central figure. A 
social network consists of persons (network nodes) linked by different kinds of 
relationships (edges)” (2008:540). Wood’s argument indicates that social processes 
of civil war have a large impact on the construction of society as well as rebel groups. 
My field research showed that this was the case also when children became part of the 
LRA, RUF, LURD or RENAMO: social processes aided their transformation into 
soldiers.  
Children abducted to become part of a rebel group enter a completely new life 
from the moment they are taken away from their homes and enter the bush. The shift 
from “village life” to “bush life” encompasses changes on many levels, which require 
rigorous adjustment of the child to the lifestyle group. Field research I conducted 
among former LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO child soldiers and commanders 
indicated that socialization is used to make these children loyal members of the 
group, including those forcefully recruited. But what do we know about socialization? 
As Brim explains: “through socialization the individual acquires the culture of his 
group or groups. This includes two main divisions of culture: the traditional 
positions, or statuses, in the society and the role behaviors associated with 
them…Consider first the individual who is confronted with a new role and knows 
virtually nothing about what he should do. In such a case society will require new 
socialization” (Brim, 1968:555–556). 
Checkel sees socialization as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and 
rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the 
internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization 
implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a 
particular structure of material incentives or sanctions” (2005:804). Socialization can 
come about via various pathways. According to Checkel different socialization 
mechanisms take place and are effective (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1075). These 
mechanisms aim for the internalization of values, but some methods are more 
effective than others in achieving the goals of socialization. “Effectiveness seems to 
depend on the nature of the content being transmitted, the characteristics of the 
persons being socialized, the persons’ relationship to the socializing agent, and 
similar factors” (Brim, 1968:557). 
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Checkel (2005) distinguishes between two types of socialization: the former 
referring to the adoption of new roles, while the latter refers to changes in values and 
interests. Bearce  (2007) makes this distinction clear:  
 
Socialization is the process by which actors acquire different identities, leading to new 
interests through regular and sustained interactions within broader social contexts 
and structures. Concerning socialization depth, constructivist scholars have carefully 
distinguished between Type I and Type II socialization. The former is relatively 
shallow and describes the situation in which an actor simply learns to play by the 
rules of a new social context or institution. Type I socialization clearly implies a 
change in an actor’s behavior but not necessarily a change in the actor’s interests. 
Type II socialization is deeper and refers to the situation in which actors take on a new 
social identity, independent of any material incentives to do so, leading to a 
demonstrable change in their interests over time” (2007:706). 
 
This definition implies that Type II socialization leads to identity change. 
Checkel stresses the importance of addressing a threefold analytic challenge 
when focusing on socialization. According to his theory, one must: “(1) establish the 
presence of socialization mechanisms and the conditions of their operation; (2) assess 
whether internalization (Type I or II) actually occurred; and (3) ask whether 
socialized actors behave differently than either they did before they were socialized, 
or than non-socialized actors do” (Checkel, 2005:816). Thus, in order to analyze the 
socialization process and its effects, one must examine whether a shift has occurred 
away from a logic of consequences and toward a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 
2005). 
Checkel emphasizes the problem that scholars tend not to ask why actors 
comply with social norms:  
 
Instead, they often focused on later stages of compliance, where internalization (full 
socialization) was nearly complete. This led many scholars to bracket the process of 
reaching this end state. At this late stage, however, compliance was not an issue of 
choice in any meaningful sense: agent behavior was governed by rules and driven by 
certain logics of appropriateness. The result was a somewhat static portrayal of social 
interaction, coupled with correlational and structural arguments built on “as if” 
assumptions at the level of agents” (Checkel, 2001:557).  
 
The next chapters will show how studies of child soldiering have indeed bracketed the 
process pointed out by Checkel. Scholars like Blattman, Andvig and Gates note the 
importance of socialization, but have not systematically identified the key processes 
of how this takes place. This has resulted in limited understandings of child 
soldiering as such. To fill this knowledge gap, I will analyze the process of 
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socialization within rebel groups in line with Checkel’s suggestion for a threefold 
analysis in the case-study chapters of this thesis. 
 
Childhood Socialization 
As seen in the preceding part of this chapter, socialization is a powerful tool in the 
creation of a cohesive group by changing and assimilating the identities of 
individuals. Moreover, socialization proves particularly effective when used on 
children. As Brim states:  
 
The fact that childhood socialization is usually so much more effective than adult 
socialization can be explained partly in terms of the different types of relationships 
that typically obtain between the individual and the socializing agent or agency at 
different stages in the life cycle. The relationship between child and parent is a highly 
affective one: by contrast, the adult socialization context is likely to be far less charged 
with emotion—in Parsons’ phrase, it is characterized by “affective neutrality.” 
Moreover, the parent socializing the child is likely to make a far more open and 
continual use of power, so that the child can hardly avoid realizing that it is the 
weaker party in the situation. Agents of adult socialization, on the other hand, 
typically appeal more to the reason and self-interest of the person being socialized, 
and use power only as a last resort (Brim, 1968:558).  
 
This indicates that the socialization of children is generally both more effective and 
also easier to achieve. Rebel groups may find it particularly useful to involve children 
in their activities. 
Brim sheds light on the different effects and consequences the use of power 
has on the socialization of children compared to adults:  
 
There is at least one major consequence of this difference for the results of 
socialization: adult socialization limits itself, on the whole, to a concern with behavior 
rather than with motivation and values. In fact, it is less able to teach basic values and 
probably requires a relationship paralleling that of childhood to bring equivalent basic 
value changes. An example is the extreme one of prisoner-of-war camps. Work on 
“brainwashing” and the breakdown of resistance to enemy values shows the context to 
be one in which the captors use their extreme power in a deliberate manipulation of 
the whole range of affect, from rejection and hate, on the one hand, to support and 
positive sympathy on the other, thus bringing the prisoner into a position similar to 
that of a child with his parent (Brim, 1968:558).  
 
This argument will be complemented with evidence from field research reflected in 
later parts of this thesis, showing that one of the reasons why rebel groups recruit 
children is because molding them into loyal rebels is easier as compared to adults.  
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Since it is easier and more effective to socialize children compared to adults, “it 
would seem desirable from society’s point of view to be able to socialize an individual 
in childhood so that he could successfully handle all of the roles he would confront in 
the future” (Brim, 1968:555). This indicates that by choosing to use child soldiers, a 
rebel group has to put less effort in creating loyal members. These children have not 
yet gone through the same socialization processes that adults from the same society 
have experienced. Their sense of identity is relatively weak compared to adults and it 
is therefore easier to use socialization as a mechanism to melt their identities into the 
group identity. This is a more challenging task when it comes to adult recruits since 
experience limits the effects of socialization. Brim argues that there are many reasons  
 
why the effects of early experience place important limits on later socialization. In the 
first place, attitudes learned in childhood are especially durable because they are 
continually being taught and just as continually reinforced. Second, there is good 
reason to believe that during early socialization the bulk of the unconscious material 
of the personality is accumulated. The continuity of the individual personality (and 
probably its characteristic modes of defense as well) is therefore maintained by the 
inertia, so to speak, of unconscious forces relatively inaccessible to change by later 
socialization. Finally, it has been suggested that the human life cycle, like that of 
subhuman species, may contain critical periods at which human beings must learn 
certain things if they are to develop further. Failure to learn these things during the 
appropriate period may make it impossible for subsequent learning to take place” 
(Brim, 1968:558). 
 
This explanation shows why rebel groups that recruit child soldiers may have an 
advantage in creating a loyal, cohesive group through socialization. Although children 
do have agency, when compared to adults it is much easier to melt the identity of 
child recruits into the group identity and transform them into loyal soldiers. 
 
Culture and Organizational Socialization 
“Culture is an abstraction, yet the forces that are created in social and 
organizational situations that derive from culture are powerful. If we don’t 
understand the operation of these forces, we become victim to them.” 
Schein, 2006:3 
 
Looking at the circumstances of child recruitment into rebel groups, it may be hard 
to imagine that child soldiers can become motivated to fight with these 
organizations. Andvig holds that “intrinsic motivation cannot be bought or forced, it 
is either present or not” (2006:32)—but this assumption is incorrect. My field 
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research shows that socialization within rebel groups has made child soldiers change 
their norms, values, and even identities to such an extent that their motivations have 
become intrinsic, even after these children were forced to become part of these 
groups. The African rebel groups studied in this dissertation have created 
sophisticated socialization mechanisms that create allegiance and fierce loyalty 
among many of its rebels. Still, understanding why child soldiers stay with rebel 
groups remains a challenge, especially when trying to grasp the situation of those 
who were forcefully recruited. The next few chapters therefore seek to shed light on 
this complex question, by exploring the dynamics of organizational socialization 
processes within the four rebel groups studied here. Although it often does not make 
sense to us that child soldiers become loyal to violent rebel groups, according to 
Schein (2006) the concept of culture can help us perceive the forces that operate 
within rebel groups and decipher the organizational dynamics that lead to allegiance. 
Culture itself has been the topic of widespread academic debate (Ashkanasy, 
Wilderom and Peterson, 2000), but Schein aims to offer a precise definition by 
stating that culture is “the accumulated shared learning of a given group, covering 
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group members’ total 
psychological functioning. For such shared learning to occur, there must be a history 
of shared experience that, in turn, implies some stability of membership in the 
group. Given such stability and a shared history, the human need for stability, 
consistency, and meaning will cause the various shared elements to form into 
patterns that eventually can be called a culture” (2006:17). Group culture on the 
other hand, is defined by Schein as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems” (2006:17). 
Given the culture of rebel groups, they are likely to suffer from ambiguity 
among its members due to forced recruitment, as well as insufficient shared history 
or stability of membership. In addition, Schein points out that “all group and 
organizational theories distinguish two major sets of problems that all groups, no 
matter what their size, must deal with: (1) survival, growth, and adaptation in their 
environment; and (2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the 
ability to adapt and learn” (2006:18). This implies that rebel groups have to tackle a 
broad set of challenges in order to stick together and survive. The next part of this 
chapter will explain what organizational socialization mechanisms can contribute to 
overcoming these challenges, providing the “glue” that can aid to the creation of a 
cohesive rebel group. As Schein explains, socialization passes on the group’s cultural 
elements to new members, teaching them about the assumptions and operating 
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norms. This indicates, “culture is a mechanism of social control and can be the basis 
for explicitly manipulating members into perceiving, thinking and feeling in certain 
ways” (2006:19). This shows how closely culture, identity and socialization are 
interlinked. 
The dynamics of this process will be explained in the case study chapters. First 
I present the foundational framework for analyzing the socialization processes at 
work within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO. Viewing rebel groups through 
such lenses will assist us in developing a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
these groups. In order to analyze the dynamics within African rebel groups, this 
dissertation predominantly uses definitions of (organizational) socialization 
developed by Checkel (2005), Grusec and Hastings (2007), Van Maanen (1977) and 
Schein (2003, 2006). These theories on socialization have each been developed in 
different fields of research and have made a significant contribution to analyses of 
international institutions, organizations, and multinational companies, as well as the 
development of management theory. They have offered excellent insights into the 
functioning and sustainability of a wide array of organizations, and proved to be very 
useful for getting a better understanding of why organizations do or do not work. 
This thesis seeks out the relevance of these socialization theories for an entirely 
different context by applying them to four African rebel groups. During the course of 
this research I realized that other scholars had hinted at the importance of 
socialization in armed groups already, but did not yet develop a deeper analysis of 
the dynamics within these groups. Also, whereas the literature often reflects rebel 
groups as temporary, non-cohesive bunches of opportunistic bandits, my informants 
pointed out that these groups were actually quite well structured organizations. 
These paradoxes raised many question marks and pointed to a need for a deeper 
understanding of rebel groups as organizations in order to get to a better 
understanding of the child soldier phenomenon. Looking at the well-established 
theories of for instance Checkel and Van Maanen and their ability to unravel the 
many facets of an organization, I decided to use their organizational socialization 
lenses to look at rebel group socialization. With this “out-of-the-box” approach of 
‘mixing and matching’ theories from different fields I aim to establish an innovative, 
systematic analysis of rebel groups and their use of child soldiers that contributes to 
new knowledge development in the field of conflict research. 
To give an example, Van Maanen conducted research on organizational culture 
and its effects on group members and found that 
 
any organizational culture consists broadly of long standing rules of thumb, a 
somewhat special language and ideology that help edit a member’s everyday 
experience, shared standards of relevance as to the critical aspects of the work that is 
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being accomplished, matter-of-fact prejudices, models for social etiquette and 
demeanor, certain customs and rituals suggestive of how members are to relate to 
colleagues, subordinates, superiors, and outsiders, and a sort of residual category of 
some rather plain “horse sense” regarding what is appropriate and “smart” behavior 
within the organization and what is not. Such cultural forms are so rooted in the 
recurrent problems and common experiences of the membership in an organizational 
segment that once learned they become viewed by insiders as perfectly “natural” 
responses to the world of work they inhabit”  (1977:2).   
 
This does not mean that it is easy to transfer an organizational culture to new group 
members: they may have different norms and values, backgrounds and behavior that 
are at odds with the organization and its more experienced members. These well-
integrated members “must therefore find ways to insure that the newcomer does not 
disrupt the on-going activity on the scene, embarrassing or casting a disparaging light 
on others, or question too many of the established cultural solutions worked out 
previously. Put bluntly, new members must be taught to see the organizational world 
as do their more experienced colleagues if the traditions of the organization are to 
survive. The manner in which this teaching/learning occurs is referred to here as the 
organizational socialization process” (Van Maanen, 1977:3).  
While doing interviews with former child soldiers and rebel commanders 
across the African continent this process was shining through their accounts time and 
time again, raising my interest in (organizational) socialization theories and their 
applicability to rebel groups. Therefore, I decided to use Van Maanen’s well-
developed theoretical foundation on the six tactics of organizational socialization to 
see if it would allow for the deeper exploration of dynamics within African rebel 
groups. I argue that applying Van Maanen’s in-depth explanation of these processes 
to rebel groups can offer insights into the dynamics of these groups and help us to 
understand how organizational socialization contributes to the creation of allegiance 
among even forcibly recruited child soldiers. Checkel’s (2005) theory on the threefold 
analytical challenge and internalization will then be applied to analyze the effects of 
socialization within rebel groups. In order to provide a consistent analysis and to be 
able to draw a comparison between the rebel groups, the theories developed by 
Checkel and Van Maanen will be applied to each of the case studies in the following 
chapters.  
 
The Six Tactics of Organizational Socialization 
According to Van Maanen (1977), socialization processes necessarily involve the 
transmission of information and values. Organizational socialization consists of six 
different tactics and refers to “the process by which one is taught and learns “the 
ropes” of a particular organizational role. In its most general sense, organizational 
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socialization is then the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge 
and skills necessary to assume an organizational role” (Van Maanen, 1977:3). 
Moreover, “organizational socialization refers to the fashion in which an individual is 
taught and learns what behaviors and perspectives are customary and desirable 
within the work setting as well as what ones are not” (1977:4). Socializing agents 
employ a mix of different tactics when socializing their new recruits into the 
organization, as will be described in the sections below. It should be noted that these 
tactics can be applied simultaneously and that there is no specific order in which they 
take place. In order to analyze how organizational socialization plays a role within 
African rebel groups, Van Maanen’s theoretical foundation will be applied to each of 
the rebel groups in the case study chapters. 
 
Collective Socialization 
The first of six potential tactics described by Van Maanen is collective socialization. 
This “refers to the tactic of taking a group of recruits who are facing a given boundary 
passage and putting them through a common set of experiences together. A good 
example of this process is basic training or boot camp in military organizations” (Van 
Maanen, 1977:38). Further: “collective socialization programs are usually found in 
organizations where there are a large number of recruits to be processed into the 
same organizationally defined role; where the content of this role can be fairly clearly 
specified; and, where the organization desires to build a collective sense of identity, 
solidarity, and loyalty within the cohort group being socialized” (1977:41).  
A clear example of this can be found within the military training of rebel 
groups. After groups of children have been abducted the rebels usually order all new 
abductees to gather for military training. They are shown how to dismantle and 
assemble guns, and told what all the gun parts are called. After this demonstration 
the new abductees are given guns and have to repeat what they have learned. The 
ones who fail are punished and usually caned until they manage to complete the 
training properly. Those who are successful will eventually make the transition to 
integrated or full-fledged member, signaled by receiving a particular responsibility 
(which if not carried out correctly will result in severe punishment). Schein explains 
that “the purpose of such transitional events is to help the new member incorporate 
his new values, attitudes, and norms into his identity so that they become part of 
him…With this transition often come titles, symbols of status, extra rights or 
prerogatives, sharing of confidential information or other things which in one way or 
another indicate that the new member has earned the trust of the organization” 
(2003:289). Examples of these are the allocation of bush wives, ranks, etc. Although 
some of these events may not seem significant to outside observers, they are of high 
importance to group members. As Schein indicates, a group member “knows when he 
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has finally ‘been accepted’, and feels it when he becomes ‘identified’ with the 
company” (2003:289). This shows that this dynamic is intended to lead to 
commitment to the group by gaining the new recruits acceptance of group ideals 
(Schein, 2003). If counter-organizational behavior arises, the ‘disobedient’ group 
member will be punished to point out that group ideals have been violated and that 
obedient behavior is expected. 
However powerful this process seems, Van Maanen also acknowledges that 
collective socialization may provide a potential basis for resistance among new 
recruits. As the new recruits may face common problems overcoming the presented 
boundary passages, they may look for solutions as a group. Thus, the likelihood of 
rebellion within a collectively socialized group is relatively high, which may lead to 
collective deviation (Van Maanen, 1977:42). This is also recognized by Schein (2003), 
who describes the development of peer cultures due to heavy workloads. As Schein 
points out, these peer cultures function as a defense against the threatening 
organization and lead to a risk of counter-socializing forces that may result in 
resistance, rebellion or sabotage. However, any form of resistance or deviation is 
efficiently tackled by rebel groups through the use of extreme forms of violence 
against deviating members. An example of this is witnessing or carrying out the 
killing and beating of misbehaving fellow group members, either by integrated rebels 
or new recruits. This discourages other rebels from deviating, as they fear the same 
punishment. In addition to extreme violence to discourage deviation or resistance, 
strict rules are imposed on the group members. If a group member were caught 
deviating, extremely harsh public punishment would follow, discouraging any other 
group members from showing the same behavior. 
It is a common strategy for rebel group commanders to tackle potential 
deviation by spreading fear and carrying out punishments in public, as the next 
chapters will show. In addition, collective deviation is avoided as child soldiers within 
rebel groups are generally strictly supervised and are not given the opportunity to 
discuss discomforts among themselves. Their behavior is thoroughly analyzed and if 
rebel commanders are not satisfied with their attitude they are heavily punished. In 
most cases, fellow child soldiers are ordered to carry out the punishment. The 
inclusion in these punishments prevents them from non-compliant behavior. This 
high level of surveillance significantly limits possibilities for collective deviation.  
 
Formal Socialization 
In addition to collectively socializing new recruits, the rebel groups utilize a formal 
socialization process: the second organizational socialization tactic described by Van 
Maanen. “Formal socialization refers to those processes in which a newcomer is more 
or less segregated from regular organizational members while being put through a set 
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of experiences tailored explicitly for the newcomer” (Van Maanen, 1977:43–44). The 
segregation from regular organizational members, in this case “integrated” rebels, is 
an important aspect of the socialization process practiced by rebel groups. During 
their initiation period child soldiers stay separated from integrated rebels, sleep in 
different places, eat different food, and are not allowed to approach integrated rebels. 
They go through a set of experiences that is especially designed for new recruits in 
order to integrate them within the group. These include severe caning of each new 
recruit as a means of registration, the ritual in which new recruits are smeared with 
shea butter, the task of carrying out violence, and a strict training regime. This is 
done to teach the new recruit his or her new role and to feel and think like a group 
member. As Van Maanen describes it, formal socialization is typically found in 
organizations “where it is deemed important that a newcomer learns the ‘correct’ 
attitudes, values, and protocol associated with the new role. To put the matter 
bluntly, the more formal the process, the more concern there is likely to be shown for 
the recruit’s absorption of the appropriate demeanor and stance associated with the 
target role” (1977:45). Formal periods of socialization “serve to provide an intensive 
period in which others in the organization can rather closely judge the newcomer’s 
commitment and deference to the critical values of the occupation” (1977:46). During 
this period commanders closely monitor and supervise newly abducted children. As 
explained earlier, those who do not adhere to the demands of the commander face 
severe punishment and are likely to be killed.  
 
Random Socialization 
The processes practiced by rebel groups can also be identified as random 
socialization: the third tactic of organizational socialization. “Random socialization 
occurs when the sequence of steps leading to the target role is unknown, ambiguous, 
or continually changing…Thus, in random processes, while there may be a number of 
steps or stages leading to the taking of certain organizational roles, there is no 
necessary order specified in terms of the steps that are to be taken” (Van Maanen, 
1977:51). Generally there is no specific order of steps to be taken within rebel groups 
in order to achieve a particular organizational role. There is often a clear hierarchical 
system within these organizations, consisting of military ranks that distinguish 
between the status and roles of rebels. However, there is no structured path leading 
to the achievement of a rank or important role.  
For instance, staying with the rebels for many years does not mean that one is 
ever granted a military rank. New recruits may receive a rank much earlier than 
integrated rebels, all depending on their behavior and the personality of their 
commanders. The distribution of ranks can therefore vary greatly between rebel 
group battalions. Generally speaking, if rebels are actively engaged with group 
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activities, they earn the appreciation and respect of commanders. In some cases 
rebels will be given a rank for this reason, which often will give them the 
responsibility for their own group of soldiers. Whether ranks are distributed in this 
way seems to depend on which battalion they are part of and particularly under 
which commander they fight.  
 
Variable Socialization 
As a fourth tactic of organizational socialization Van Maanen describes variable 
socialization processes which “give a recruit few clues as when to expect a given 
boundary passage” (1977:55). Further: “variable socialization processes are most 
likely to produce custodial responses. The logic behind this proposition is simply that 
a variable situation leads to maximum anxiety and this anxiety operates as a strong 
motivator toward conformity…Variable socialization processes keep a recruit 
maximally off balance and at the mercy of socialization agents” (1977:58–59). This is 
indeed the case within rebel groups whose entire existence may be perceived as a 
variable situation. Rebel groups are often chased by government armies and thus 
constantly on the run throughout the region. These variable situations create 
maximum anxiety for recruits as they are taken far away from home, are constantly 
moving and generally do not know where they are. The sense of security children 
used to have at home is replaced by a feeling of great uncertainty and the only thing 
they have left to hold on to is the group, encouraging conformity to the group’s 
demands.  
The variable socialization process is also explained by Schein (2003), who 
refers to these variable occurrences as ‘upending experiences’. Schein defines 
upending experiences as “deliberately planned or accidentally created circumstances 
which dramatically and unequivocally upset or disconfirm some of the major 
assumptions which the new man holds about himself, his company, or his job” 
(2003:285). As also explained by Van Maanen, such experiences keep the recruit 
maximally off-balance. As Schein’s research further reveals, this uncertainty makes 
recruits turn to their leaders for advice, facilitating the establishment of a 
relationship between them. Within rebel groups, these dynamics can also be 
witnessed and are of utmost importance to keep the group together. Interviews with 
former child soldiers in the studied countries revealed that this indeed led to 
conformity, which in turn contributed to the formation of ties to the group, bonds 
between rebels and a growing sense of community. As described by Brehm and Gates 
(2008), the feeling of camaraderie and solidarity results in social cohesion, 
compliance with collective goals and high retention, reinforcing the process even 
further.   
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Serial Socialization 
The fifth tactic of organizational socialization elaborated upon by Van Maanen is 
serial socialization. “A serial socialization process is one in which experienced 
members of the organization groom newcomers who are about to assume similar 
kinds of positions in the organization. In effect, these experienced members serve as 
role models for recruits” (Van Maanen, 1977:59). According to serial socialization, 
integrated rebels and commanders would serve as role models for new recruits. This 
is indeed the case as these integrated rebels and commanders groom new recruits, as 
they will have to assume similar positions within the group. An example of this is the 
teaching of new recruits how to operate guns so they can participate in fighting like 
integrated rebels do.  
According to Van Maanen “serial socialization is most likely to be associated 
with inclusionary boundary passages. This association results because to become a 
central member of any organizational segment normally requires that others consider 
one to be affable, trustworthy, and, of course, central as well. This is unlikely to occur 
unless these others perceive the newcomer to be, in most respects, similar to 
themselves. Recruits must at least seem to be taking those with whom they work 
seriously or risk being labeled deviant in the situation and hence not allowed across 
inclusionary boundaries” (1977:62). The case study chapters of this dissertation will 
show that this is extensively tested among new recruits within rebel groups. 
Newcomers have to identify with and act as a rebel rather quickly. Integrated rebels 
and commanders test this development by asking new recruits questions that are 
often symbolic. This shows the importance of serial socialization and the 
consequences of not assimilating with integrated rebels.  
 
Divestiture Socialization 
As a final tactic of socialization, Van Maanen elaborates upon divestiture socialization 
processes. These “seek to deny and strip away certain personal characteristics of a 
recruit” (1977:64). This type of socialization is “organized explicitly to disconfirm 
many aspects of the recruit’s entering self-image, thus beginning the process of 
rebuilding the individual’s self-image based upon new assumptions. Often these new 
assumptions arise from the recruit’s own discovery, gradual or dramatic, that they 
have an ability to do things they had not thought themselves able to do previously” 
(1977:65). This type of organizational socialization is also described by Schein (2003). 
He explains that the socialization of new recruits often first involves a “destructive or 
unfreezing phase,” as their values and behavioral patterns may not be aligned with 
the organization’s expectations.  According to Schein, “this phase serves the function 
of detaching the person from his former values, of proving to him that his present self 
is worthless from the point of view of the organization and that he must redefine 
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himself in terms of new roles which he is to be granted” (2003:285).  
This type of socialization is used by rebel groups in seeking to erase the 
“civilian spirit” from its recruits and turns them into integrated rebels. Children enter 
rebel groups with a self-image that is completely rebuilt by the socialization process 
they undergo within these groups. During the time they spend with the rebels, new 
recruits discover they are able to carry out extreme types of violence, kill people, loot 
villages and so on. In addition, they generally get new names. Receiving a bush or war 
name is an important part of the socialization process: it encourages the child to 
rebuild a new identity being part of the group, leaving the old self behind. This is also 
acknowledged by Schein, who notes that in extreme cases of organizational 
socialization the old self of the new recruit “is symbolically destroyed by loss of 
clothing, name, hair, titles and other self-defining equipment. These are replaced 
with uniforms, new names and titles, and other self-defining equipment consonant 
with the new role he is being trained for” (2003:285).  
Furthermore, “in extreme circumstances, recruits are forced to abstain from 
certain types of behavior, must publicly degrade themselves and others, and must 
follow a rigid set of rules and regulations. Furthermore, measures are often taken to 
isolate recruits from former associates who presumably would continue to confirm 
the recruit’s old identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:66). “Divestiture processes are most 
likely to be found (1) at the point of initial entry into an organization or occupation, 
and (2) prior to the crossing of major inclusionary boundaries where a recruit must 
pass some basic test of worthiness for membership in an organizational segment” 
(1977:67). This is clearly seen when children are recruited by rebel groups. For 
instance, from the moment children become part of rebel groups they are generally 
not allowed to identify with their biological family anymore. They are removed as far 
as possible from their old identity, by burning all bridges with their past. They are 
often forced to kill in front of their village members when they enter the organization. 
Then, to become an integrated rebel, they have to pass the questions of commanders 
and are ordered to perform certain tasks (like killing or looting) as a test of 
worthiness of the group.  
 This highlights that “divestiture processes, in effect, remold the person and, 
therefore, are powerful ways for organizations and occupations to control the values 
of incoming members. It is such processes which lie at the heart of most professional 
training thus helping to explain why professionals appear to be so deeply and 
permanently socialized. For, once a person has successfully completed a difficult 
divestiture process and has constructed something of a new identity based on the role 
to which the divestiture process was directed, there are strong forces toward the 
maintenance of the new identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:67). This explains why 
organizational socialization is used by rebel groups: it leads to high levels of 
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allegiance because their recruits take on new identities, align with the group culture 
and become loyal to the organizations. 
Van Maanen’s theory of these six different processes of socialization shows 
that “these tactical dimensions are associated with one another and that the actual 
impact of organizational socialization upon a recruit is a cumulative one, the result of 
a combination of socialization tactics which perhaps enhance and reinforce or conflict 
and neutralize each other. It is also obvious that awareness of these tactical 
dimensions makes it possible for managers to design socialization processes which 
maximize the probabilities of certain outcomes” (Van Maanen, 1977:68). The four 
case study chapters will show that looking at the tactics used by rebel groups one can 
indeed derive that these reinforce and enhance each other, ensuring that new recruits 
are subject to effective organizational socialization, which creates motivation, loyalty, 
control, resilience and allegiance to the rebel groups.  
Still, as Schein rightly notes, the success of organizational socialization 
depends on various factors. First of all, motivation to join the group plays a major 
role: if the recruit is highly motivated to be part of the group he or she will tolerate 
distressing socialization processes. But if motivation is low, the recruit may decide to 
leave the group due to the discomforts of these processes, implying that socialization 
fails. Secondly, the success of organizational socialization is determined by the 
possibility to keep recruits captured during the process (Schein, 2003). Whether 
rebel groups are able to tackle these challenges, preventing failure of organizational 
socialization processes and making child recruits part of the group culture will be 
analyzed in the case study chapters.  
 
Process Tracing of Socialization 
As seen in the previous sections, socialization not only leads to compliance: it also 
builds bridges between the individual and the group. Membership of the group 
evokes the socialization of actors, which in turn provides them with a new 
understanding of their interests and identity. Zürn and Checkel stress the importance 
of establishing “how socialization happens (identify the socialization mechanism) and 
under what conditions (identify the scope conditions)” (2005:1049). As part of this 
process, Checkel emphasizes the necessity of exploring “complex social learning, a 
process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped through and during 
interaction” (2001:561). A useful method to achieve this is process tracing. 
This dissertation will use process tracing as a tool in order to analyze the 
interviews and discover how socialization plays a role within the LRA, RUF, LURD, 
and RENAMO. Checkel used process tracing to study causal mechanisms in 
international socialization (2008). According to Checkel “process tracing means to 
trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation” 
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(2008:115). George and Bennett define process tracing as tracing “the links between 
possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines 
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether 
the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the 
sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (2005:6). Moreover, 
“the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the 
causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005:206). Process 
tracing can be used to “focus on whether the variable of interest was causally linked 
to any change in outcome and to assess whether other independent variables that 
change over time might have been causal” (2005:221). 
According to George and Bennett, “process tracing is particularly useful for 
obtaining an explanation for deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or 
explained adequately by existing theories” (2005:215). In his work on social learning 
Checkel uses process tracing “to document the processes and motivations through 
which agents comply with norms.” Through process tracing Checkel seeks “to 
investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions are 
translated into outcomes [compliance in this case]” (2001:565). This method has 
proved to be able to identify the causal mechanism leading to socialization. According 
to Checkel “the term causal mechanism refers to the intermediate processes along 
which international institutions may lead actors toward accepting the norms, rules, 
and modes of behavior of a given society. Mechanisms connect things; they link 
specified initial conditions and a specific outcome … A causal mechanism that leads 
to socialization will be triggered under certain circumstances” (Zürn and Checkel, 
2005:1049). This can also be applied to explain how the use of socialization by the 
LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO creates allegiance among its rebels. 
Given the lack of theories on socialization within rebel groups, one of the 
central concerns of this thesis is to specify the mechanisms of socialization used 
within the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO. Process tracing seems a particularly 
valid method to use in these cases, as it will illuminate the conditions under which 
these mechanisms lead to the internalization of new roles and interests. Process 
tracing will be used to shed light on how socialization contributes to the creation of a 
sense of community and belonging, and thus allegiance within the LRA, RUF, LURD, 
and RENAMO. The broader aim of this is to contribute to the development of a more 
general theory on socialization within rebel groups. However, in order to fully 
understand the use and influence of socialization within rebel groups, it is necessary 
to understand why and how children become involved with rebel groups. Therefore, 
Chapter 4 will elaborate upon the use of children in rebel groups and create the basis 
from which I will analyze socialization within the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO. 
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The results of the interviews conducted with former child soldiers and commanders 
will be analyzed in the case study chapters, revealing how socialization plays an 
essential role in creating allegiance among rebels in each of these groups. 
 
Research Procedure and Case Studies 
In analyzing the phenomenon of child soldiering, it is essential to include child 
soldiers themselves in research. Only a “few researchers have made a consistent effort 
to include the thoughts, feelings, experiences, and specific statements of children in 
their empirical investigations” (Zwiers, 1999:127). But it is only the children 
themselves who can help us to understand exactly why they participate in rebel 
groups and remain with these groups. Including the voices of former child soldiers 
avoids the bias entailed in using solely the opinions of scholars and humanitarian 
organizations.  
The benefits of including former child soldiers can be seen in recent 
developments regarding the study of child soldiering that show how these children 
are not mere victims: there is also a perpetrating side to the phenomenon. I argue 
that the inclusion of former child soldiers in research enables the creation of a 
broader understanding of the undermined complexity and multi-faceted character of 
the phenomenon. This is essential in trying to combat the problem of child soldiering, 
as the roots of the problem must to be understood before one can reach solutions for 
this complex issue. As Hughes and Baker argue: “if one wants to understand a child's 
beliefs, perceptions, reasoning ability, attitudes and affective experiences that have 
relevance to the child's current circumstances, it is logical to ask the child to report on 
these self-processes” (1990). Nordstrom, who argues particularly for the inclusion of 
girls, also stresses this: “When I started looking for girls in numerous war situations, 
I found silences and empty spaces, punctuated only sporadically by a handful of 
researchers focusing on children in general and girls in particular. Their stories 
account only for the smallest percentage of scholarly and popular work on social and 
political violence and systems of in/justice”’ (1997:5). Therefore, this thesis uses a 
micro-perspective, focusing on the individual perspectives of former child soldiers 
(both boys and girls) obtained through personal interviews. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis will mainly be based on analyses of previous literature 
regarding the child soldiering, rebellion and socialization. Thereafter, the main 
research method employed will be interviewing. Due to the limited availability of 
studies of socialization processes within rebel groups, and particularly regarding 
socialization of child soldiers within rebel groups, field research has been the main 
method used to answer the research question. Additionally, I have used other sources 
such as surveys carried out by other researchers. I have largely used qualitative 
methods and interviews in order to conduct the essential part of my research 
  
 
51 
regarding socialization within the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO. In order to 
achieve valid, reliable results, several factors have been taken into account when 
designing and carrying out the interviews. The interviews have been designed to take 
into account major guidelines established by Adcock and Collier (2001), Frey (1995), 
Gerring (2007), Rubin and Rubin (1995), and Silverman (2003), among others. 
 
Field Research 
During field research, 65 semi-structured, in-depth, qualitative interviews were 
conducted with former child soldiers as well as with LRA commanders in Uganda. I 
interviewed 36 boy soldiers and 29 girl soldiers. These interviews were conducted in 
Gulu District, Northern Uganda, from January 2009 until March 2009. This area is 
considered to be among those most severely hit by the LRA, and its population has 
suffered numerous abductions. As abduction is the main method of child soldier 
recruitment by the LRA, it is especially pertinent to analyze, in depth, the influence 
that the process of socialization has on a child's decision to remain with the LRA.   
Further, 65 semi-structured, in-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted 
with former child soldiers and commanders of the RUF in Sierra Leone. I interviewed 
34 boy soldiers and 31 girl soldiers. These interviews were carried out in the capital 
Freetown, as well as in the Eastern region of the country, from January 2010 until 
April 2010. This region was chosen because the war started there, and many child 
soldiers and commanders still remain in the area. However, many former child 
soldiers also fled to the capital, seeking to lead anonymous lives after the war. 
Therefore Freetown was an important starting point for interviewing.  
During the same period, 65 semi-structured, in-depth, qualitative interviews 
were conducted with former LURD child soldiers and commanders in Liberia. I 
interviewed 35 boy soldiers and 30 girl soldiers. These interviews were held in the 
border area between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Many former rebels are still hiding in 
this region, retaining similar hierarchical structures to those they had within LURD. 
From April 2011 until June 2011 I conducted a further 65 semi-structured, in-
depth, qualitative interviews with former child soldiers and commanders in 
Mozambique. I interviewed 37 boy soldiers and 28 girl soldiers who had been 
members of RENAMO. Some of these interviews were conducted in Maputo, but 
most were held in the central/northern region, where many RENAMO members are 
currently located.  
The total of 260 interviews with former child soldiers and commanders aimed 
to reveal what happens during the process of socialization in rebel groups and how 
this leads to the fact that many child soldiers remain with rebel groups despite the 
difficult conditions. Except when other sources are explicitly cited, this thesis builds 
directly on these interviews. The interviews with former child soldiers and rebel 
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commanders were supplemented with 148 interviews with civilian victims of the rebel 
groups, in order to give a better understanding of the local contexts and the typical 
behavior of the rebels when they interacted with civilians. 
As the field of socialization has received very little attention, interviewing 
proved to be an essential means of gaining insights into the problem. Considering the 
shortage of information on socialization of child soldiers, the depth of the responses 
achieved was of key importance. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 
manner and consisted of thirteen open-ended questions in order to give the 
interviewee the opportunity to answer in detail. The length of most interviews ranged 
from an hour and a half up to three hours. Interviewees were selected according to 
age of recruitment, gender, length of involvement with the rebel group, whether they 
had a frontline or support role inside the group, and whether they had participated in 
any rehabilitation programs. Since these factors influence the experiences and roles 
of child soldiers that may have affected their socialization, it was essential to 
interview a large range of people and to analyze all oral accounts separately. During 
the field research several methods of sampling were used. Interviewees were 
identified and selected with the help of local leaders, local organizations and NGOs, 
as well as research assistants, which enabled verification of their backgrounds. 
Convenience sampling was used in “rebel-rich” areas such as Gulu in Uganda and 
Kenema in Sierra Leone. In addition, snowball sampling was sometimes used when 
interviewing war victims or former commanders; for instance some victims suggested 
I should speak with other village members who had fallen victim to the rebels, while 
former commanders would sometimes recommend that I speak with former child 
soldiers who had served in a particular battalion. In order to cross-check all stories I 
used triangulation. Interviewing war victims proved particularly valuable, as viewing 
the conflict from their perspective offered further insights into rebel behavior and 
crimes committed, yielding a more complete picture. 
The interviews were conducted on an individual basis, but usually with an 
interpreter present, as most interviewees preferred to tell their stories in local 
languages. In case interviewees preferred to do the interview in English, I mostly 
conducted the interviews by myself without the presence of a third person. I decided 
to work with two assistants in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique. All 
these assistants had extensive experience in working with, interviewing, and psycho-
social counseling of former child soldiers. Working with these research assistants had 
several advantages. Due to their background and gender, working with two assistants 
in each country gave me access to different age groups of former child soldiers. 
Moreover, female child soldiers and particularly young children seemed to prefer 
talking with a female interpreter, whereas male child soldiers responded well to male 
assistants. Since most of my assistants had experience working with former child 
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soldiers or had been child soldiers themselves, they had access to large groups of 
former child soldiers located in different areas. They also had a very good 
understanding of the circumstances of my interviewees, which facilitated contact, the 
creation of trust and in-depth discussions. 
Follow-up interviews have been conducted in most cases. These proved to be 
very useful, especially when the interviews were held with informants who had a 
particularly detailed insight into their rebel group. During these interviews notes 
have been taken with the consent of the interviewees. In addition, 243 interviews 
have been recorded on a voice recorder with permission of the informants, under the 
condition that the recorded material would remain confidential and their identities 
would be protected. Each of these interviews has been fully written up after 
completion. The reason for writing up the results right away was to indicate where 
data coverage was still weak. These suggestions were then used in future interviews. 
The exact location of the interviews was determined upon arrival in the region. 
All interviews in IDP camps and schools were conducted in a space determined by the 
interviewee and interpreter to create trust and comfort. The interviews in towns and 
cities were conducted in places I first discussed with the interviewee, which they then 
approved. Permission to interview my informants was given by the local authorities. 
In the case of young children, additional permission for the interviews was granted by 
the administration of the school that the interviewee attended and/or by their parents 
(in case they were still alive). The majority of my informants were footloose at the 
time of the interviews. Most of them lived in unstructured youth collectives and many 
were out of touch with their families and communities. The influence of adults in 
their lives or parental guidance seemed rather limited to non-existent, particularly for 
boys. 
As most of the interviewees were former child soldiers, particular guidelines 
for interviewing children who have experienced traumatic events have been taken 
into account. Moreover, it was of great significance to take into account that 
“information that pertains to adult-focused interviews cannot be applied wholesale to 
children. Just as cross-cultural research reveals differences in thinking across 
peoples, developmental psychology has demonstrated that many adult assumptions 
regarding thinking cannot be generalized to children” (Zwiers and Morrissette, 
1999:128). Therefore, guides on interviewing children written by Bourg et al. (1999), 
Faller (2007), Morrison and Anders (1999), Wilson and Powell (2001), and Zwiers 
and Morrissette (1999), were consulted when preparing and establishing the 
interviews. In addition, the book “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences” by George and Bennett (2005) has served as a guide to design this study. 
 
 
  
 
54 
Data Collection 
The locations in which data was collected were chosen due to the fact that the 
relevant interviewees were located in these areas. In each country I chose several 
particularly important places to evaluate the impacts of child soldiering as large 
groups of ex-combatants were still residing in these areas. This implied there was a 
large pool of potential interviewees present. Besides that, the relatively safe situations 
combined with contacts established pre-arrival created the possibility to conduct field 
research in the areas of choice.  
Several individuals served as gatekeepers during the field research. They 
assisted in identifying and gaining access to relevant individuals and organizations. 
Moreover, these people helped arranging transport to the interview sites and/or 
facilitated interpretation of interviews. These include people at local organizations 
and NGOs, other researchers and the Netherlands Embassies in Uganda, Senegal and 
Mozambique. As the majority of interviews would be conducted with former child 
soldiers I consulted with local organizations and professionals on how to proceed 
once I arrived in the research areas. The people I consulted have been/are involved 
with or knowledgeable about child soldiers and the particular rebel groups. Their 
advice has been truly helpful in deciding how to go about the topic. 
The intention was to interview a wide range of people in each country in order 
to offset bias and to highlight a wide range of perspectives. I therefore aimed to spend 
at least three months in each region as this enabled me to get access to the right 
interviewees, create trust, to set up meetings with them for follow-up interviews, and 
to travel within the country in order to conduct additional in-depth interviews. 
Internal validity and thus credibility has been sought by interviewing a wide range of 
former child soldiers and commanders. Confidence that the information provided by 
informants was genuine, was enhanced by their willingness to answer questions with 
“I don’t know,” “No,” or “I did not witness that but heard other people talking about 
it.” In order to increase credibility and to confirm findings, data sources were cross-
checked and triangulated, and follow-up interviews were conducted. Moreover, in 
order to ensure the replicability and reliability of the study, detailed records of the 
interviews have been kept and are, due to confidentiality issues, accessible by the 
researcher. 
 
Informed Consent and Treatment of Data 
Participants in this research have been informed “as fully as possible about the goals 
of the research, the necessity for the research, the manner in which the research will 
be conducted, and any possible negative or positive effects” (Zwiers, 1999:139). 
Participants have been advised that there would be no negative consequences should 
they decide not to participate, and the possibility to withdraw from the interview at 
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all times has been pointed out. Moreover, all my interview participants have been 
able to ask questions about the research. Participants were explained orally or 
provided with a document explaining these matters before the interview took place 
(see appendix I). All interviewees gave their consent that the interviews could be used 
for this study. In case the interviewee was under 18 years of age, parents, guardians, 
the school administration, or rehabilitation center gave clearance for the interview. In 
addition, local authorities and traditional leaders gave permission to conduct 
interviews in IDP camps.  
The identity of participants has been protected in a variety of ways. Code 
numbers were used to identify age, gender, location, the length of the period spent 
with the rebel group, and participation in rehabilitation programs. Transcripts of the 
interviews carry only the assigned codes. All documentation is kept in secure 
locations; raw data and transcripts are stored separately from code sheets and 
permission forms. When quotes are used, possible identifying information has been 
altered to protect the identity of the participant. Thus, only a code including the 
child’s age at time of recruitment, the child’s gender (F/M), and the length of the 
period spent with the rebels (in years) will be provided with the quote. This resulted 
in the following code style: (13F5) stands for: girl soldier, recruited at age 13, spent 5 
years with the rebels. Hence, (5M9) stands for: boy soldier, recruited at age 5, spent 9 
years with the rebels. In case child soldiers spent less than one year with the rebels, 
this will be coded as −1 (for instance: 14F-1). Since the research collected highly 
sensitive data, confidentiality of identity and thus anonymity within the research 
report has been guaranteed. Informants were ensured their information would be 
used only for the realization of this project and none of the recordings would be 
passed on to third parties. The research information, confidentiality of participant 
identity and data will be protected at all times (Zwiers, 1999:140; Brett and Specht, 
2004:144). 
 
Challenges and Limitations  
Interviewing children may be problematic, yet “interviews provide the most direct 
way to evaluate children's inner perceptions of reality” (Zwiers, 1999:128). The fact 
that the interviews were carried out in a post-conflict situation created several 
challenges. Memory, potential trauma and mental difficulties of the interviewees 
bring about potential bias and consequences for reliability. Cultural matters also 
played a role in the decisions of how to conduct the interviews and in the design of 
the questions. Some of the most important factors that were considered in this 
research are ethical aspects and working according to the “do no harm” principle 
(Wilson, 2001).  
 
  
 
56 
To overcome these challenges, I have used other case studies in post-conflict 
areas as guidelines for my research. An example of this is the work done by Elisabeth 
Wood (2000, 2003 and 2008). I have also gathered advice on how to interview 
former child soldiers through conversations with researchers and professionals 
working with child soldiers. In addition, I have approached people at local NGOs in 
each country for advice on how and who to contact for interviews. During the 
interviews I have continuously aimed to be sensitive to the feelings of the informants. 
This implied that if the informant tended to become slightly agitated we broke off the 
interview and talked about different things. It was up to the informant if he or she 
wanted to continue the interview at a later point in time or quit the interview process. 
This freedom to stop the interview was thoroughly explained to every informant and 
reassured during the interview if necessary. This happened twice: interviews were 
stopped by two of my female informants and they requested to continue at a later 
stage.  
The well-being of people involved with the research was my prime 
consideration during the entire research process. Research has potential to disrupt 
the life of children as they “may have strong feelings or disturbing thoughts stirred up 
by questions asked during the interview. Once the interview is concluded, children 
may continue to be affected by the experience and may harbor negative feelings and 
thoughts” (Zwiers, 1999:136). For this reason I chose to work with two assistants in 
each country who all had extensive experience working with former child soldiers, 
interviewing and psycho-social counseling. However, my research ethic did not allow 
me to probe too deeply into my informants’ memories of the war, as I realized I was 
not equipped to deal with possible psychological repercussions in the long run, and 
neither were my assistants. I aimed to take any possible detrimental psychological 
effects into consideration and tried to fully protect their identities in order for our 
conversations not to have any effects on the status within their communities. For this 
reason, all people who were interviewed will remain anonymous in order to prevent 
negative long-term effects and impact on their relation with society (Zwiers, 1999). 
 While discussing such sensitive topics, I considered it essential to have eye 
contact with my informants at all times. This would allow for quick recognition of any 
disturbing effects the interview could have. For this reason I decided to use a voice 
recorder instead of taking written notes; the recorder allowed me to focus fully on the 
conversation, so I could pick up small changes in speech, body language, facial 
expressions and other types of behavior that might indicate that the interview was 
disturbing the informant. Further, the fact that I did not have to concentrate on 
writing improved the quality of the interviews as I could more easily react to subtle 
details within the informants’ anecdotes. This significantly improved our interaction. 
The voice recorder was used only with the consent of my informants. 
  
 
57 
 Still, the introduction of the voice recorder entailed some challenges. The 
simple tape recorder I used proved to be an alien contraption to most of my 
informants. Most of them had never seen a tape recorder before, and were not sure 
what it was capable of: it was viewed with suspicion, and I was asked whether it was a 
camera. After I had explained it could only record sounds and no video footage, my 
informants approved my using it. They agreed to have the conversations recorded on 
the voice recorder as long as their identities were kept secret and their anonymity 
guaranteed. Still, some informants seemed hesitant due to the presence of the 
recording device. In these cases I switched off the voice recorder and put it away. This 
seemed to relieve the burden and the informant would relax and speak freely while I 
took notes by hand. I was sometimes given additional and detailed information 
during informal meetings, perhaps due to the absence of the recorder. This 
information led to valuable insights, which were further discussed during interviews. 
Even though the recorder led to some challenges, most of these were easily solved. 
Looking back, I consider the use of the voice recorder as a crucial advantage in the 
collection and storage of data during the entire research process. It allowed me to 
literally transcribe the conversations with my informants, whereas written notes 
would have undoubtedly jeopardized such detailed transcriptions of the interviews 
and important anecdotes might have gotten lost. In addition, it enabled the cross 
checking of translations, which contributed to accuracy of the interview 
transcriptions.  
 Another challenge I met during the research process was the establishment of 
trust between my informants and me. This challenge is also pointed out by Utas 
(2011), who found that his informants in Sierra Leone and Liberia would admit they 
had not been forced to join armed groups only once a deeper trust had been created. 
Trust is an essential factor between the interviewer and the informant when talking 
about such a sensitive topic as child soldiering. While doing field research it took time 
and patience to create trust, and the achievement of this is particularly owed to the 
unwavering support of my excellent research assistants.  
 What did prove difficult was researching the lives of girl soldiers within rebel 
groups. It was surrounded by numerous challenges, but as this study was designed to 
include an equal representation of boy and girl soldiers, these needed to be overcome. 
Former girl soldiers were often difficult to find, and were fearful to speak about their 
experiences, fearing retribution if they revealed their identities. Former girl soldiers 
rarely speak about their experiences at all, let alone discuss them with outsiders. To 
circumvent this problem, I worked together with one male and one female research 
assistant in each country.  My female assistants were familiar with what female 
informants had experienced, and this usually resolved the initial distrust felt by the 
informants. My assistants would elaborately discuss the research purpose with the 
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former girl soldiers and repeatedly guarantee their anonymity. Eventually, most of 
them came forward and agreed to an interview in a place where community members 
would not recognize them. When I asked about their reasons behind the decision to 
cooperate, they first of all mentioned their guaranteed anonymity, then the purpose 
of the research, followed by a wish to change the situation for former child soldiers 
and the fact they would speak only with other women (myself and the assistant), as 
the main motivators for relating their experiences. 
 Although more often, former girl soldiers were not the only ones initially 
hesitant to contribute to the research project. Former boy soldiers also approached 
me with (slight) suspicion during the first introductions. I was frequently asked if the 
International Criminal Court sent me: many of my informants were afraid I had come 
to arrest them. My research assistants proved to be invaluable in those situations, 
explaining the purpose of the research in detail while conversing in their mother 
tongue and establishing the foundations for mutual trust. To reassure my informants, 
I explained them that it was of no significance to the research project to reveal 
whether they had taken part in atrocities or which crimes they had committed while 
being part of a rebel group. I never directly asked my informants in which acts they 
were involved. Instead, I stressed it was their own choice to discuss these issues. 
Giving them the opportunity to choose proved to be reassuring to most of my 
informants, removing their hesitations and allowing them to speak freely. As a result, 
some of my informants did speak about the crimes they committed, but they 
generally downplayed their own involvement and spoke mainly about friends raping 
women, burning houses, amputating and killing civilians. They said these subjects 
were still a taboo that they did not want to be associated with, mostly out of fear of 
the community. To provide further reassurance to my informants, the interviews 
were conducted out of the sight or hearing of officials. 
 My informants had few difficulties speaking about issues related to 
socialization: discussing this subject was generally not considered to be a threat to 
their personal situation and future. However, we did discuss sensitive topics such as 
the use of violence within the rebel groups. Although this could have been perceived 
as a threatening subject, I steered away from this perception by taking a less direct 
and less personal approach. For instance: I asked my informants to tell me about 
what kind of violence had been used within the group and for which purpose, rather 
than asking what they had done personally. This may have led to biased portrayals of 
the atrocities my informants were personally responsible for. Still, it allowed my 
informants to focus on detailed accounts of the circumstances within the rebel 
groups, which were essential to this research project. The freedom to speak about 
their individual acts had little to no consequences for the outcome of the research 
project as its focus lays on socialization processes within the rebel groups. Although 
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violence does play a significant role within socialization, this thesis was never meant 
to be an investigation of the perpetrating acts committed by child soldiers as 
individuals. Instead, it focuses on the creation of allegiance through violence used by 
the group, rather than amplifying the violence used by individuals.  
 The last challenges I met were the different circumstances and life stages I 
found my informants to be in. I spoke with Ugandan child soldiers who had just left 
the LRA rebels and found temporary shelter in rehabilitation centers, and on the 
other extreme interviewed Mozambican former child soldiers who had returned from 
the bush almost twenty years ago and mostly lived a civilian life again. Former child 
soldiers who had been part of the rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Liberia fell in 
between these two extremes as most had returned from the war between seven and 
ten years ago. This implied that I had to adapt my interviewing technique in each 
case, always keeping the well-being of my informants as the main priority. The 
Ugandan child soldiers who had recently returned were to a certain extend still 
numbed by the conflict experiences they had been exposed to, their memories were 
very fresh and some of them were still very young. Their information was highly 
valuable, but I had to tread very careful during interviews in order to prevent and 
protect them from any possible disturbances. These interviews were therefore 
conducted in the presence of a social worker affiliated to the rehabilitation center that 
offered them shelter.  
 In contrast, most of my Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Mozambican informants 
had reached adulthood and this resulted in different types of interviews and 
discussions compared to those with young children in Uganda. For LURD, RUF, and 
RENAMO child soldiers in particular, many years had passed since they were part of 
the rebel groups and their memories were logically fading. This potentially resulted in 
a post-war bias and may have had consequences for the reliability of their accounts. 
In addition, one should acknowledge that interviewing people can never be 
considered as a pure fact finding mission: every informant has his or her own reality 
and their recollection of events is a reflection of these. Due to security considerations 
I have unfortunately only been able to interview former child soldiers, preventing the 
establishment of a first-hand account of group dynamics within active rebel groups. 
At the time of the interviews my informants had already exited their respective rebel 
groups. Their exits took place in different ways and for different reasons and this, in 
combination with the circumstances of their stay with the rebels, may have affected 
the way they spoke of their experience. Some of my informants were heavily 
traumatized and abused, while others considered themselves heroes for being rebels. 
This implied that, depending on their situation and ideas, certain issues were 
highlighted, while others were downplayed. In an attempt to tackle this (post-war) 
bias, the accounts of my informants were cross-checked and other research on the 
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particular conflicts and rebel groups has been used as a means of verification. Still, as 
opposed to the young informants in Uganda, the Liberian, Sierra Leonean and 
Mozambican informants were capable to analyze to larger context of the conflict and 
the rebel group. This proved to be valuable input. Yet, what further complicated the 
research in Mozambique was the fact that the war had ended almost 20 years ago, 
making it more difficult to find informants than in the three other countries. Tracing 
people was hard, as many had moved to different areas. Others were reluctant to 
speak about the war and revive their memories. This lengthened the period needed to 
complete the research.   
 Even though the research design included challenges and limitations, I 
purposely chose for this set up. As this thesis aims to analyze socialization processes 
within African rebel groups and reveals whether these achieved internalization 
among their recruits, the comparison of several rebel groups seemed particularly 
intriguing. Looking at different rebel groups, continuing and ending their struggle 
during different periods of time, allowed me to investigate the similarities and 
differences between socialization processes used within the groups, whether these 
had lasting effects, and which factors possibly contributed to this. In addition, a 
comparison would allow me to point out how long the socialization effects could 
linger and would indicate how time affects the degree and strength of internalization. 
For these reasons I chose to focus on the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO: four 
African rebel groups that fought for and during different periods of time. Although 
generalizations cannot be drawn from this research project due to limits of its scope, 
the comparison of rebel group socialization may still indicate what we could possibly 
expect in other conflict cases. As child soldiering is a global phenomenon, this study 
should be perceived as a starting point for future research that can further strengthen 
our knowledge on child soldier socialization by focusing on rebel groups in for 
instance Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. 
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3 
Life Within a Rebel Group: From Child to Soldier 
The recruitment, creation, and use of child soldiers within rebel 
groups 
  
 
This chapter offers an analysis of previous research focusing on the child soldiering 
phenomenon. It will particularly highlight the reasons why rebel groups recruit child 
soldiers, which methods they use in doing so, and which role forced and non-forced 
recruitment play. Moreover, this chapter will address methods used by rebel groups 
to transform children into soldiers and evidence from field research will be used as 
illustrations to these theories. It will illuminate the views of prominent scholars, 
analyze their standpoints, and address the weaknesses of their theories. In addition, 
it will underline the lack of focus on socialization processes within rebel groups. As 
such, it will clarify why previous research is indeed moving forward in understanding 
the child soldier phenomenon, but ignores the essential influence of socialization 
processes. This implies that this chapter will highlight the limited understanding of 
the entire child soldiering problem caused by neglecting the socialization aspect. 
 
Using Child Soldiers within Rebel Groups 
Several scholars, such as Collier (2004), have addressed the phenomena of rebel 
groups. A particularly interesting view has recently been developed by Jeremy 
Weinstein, as reflected in his book Inside Rebellion. Weinstein takes an alternative 
approach to rebellion. According to Weinstein there are two general types of rebel 
groups, which are distinguished by the availability of resources. He argues that rebel 
groups either fight for economic endowments (such as resources), or social 
endowments (such as beliefs). Weinstein claims that this availability of resources is a 
key factor in determining the character and levels of violence to be employed. In the 
case of an abundance of natural resources or external support, rebel groups tend to 
carry out high levels of indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence includes 
“exterminating particular groups, displacing people, plundering goods, or 
demonstrating a group's power and ability to hurt another group” (Kalyvas, 
2006:147). In resource-poor contexts on the other hand, rebel groups resort to 
selective and strategic violence. Selective violence “entails the personalization of 
violence and requires information that is asymmetrically distributed between 
political actors and individual civilians” (Kalyvas, 2006:173). Weinstein argues that 
looking at the distinctive levels and characteristics of violence used by rebel groups 
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one can distinguish between activist and opportunistic rebellions. Activist rebellions 
attract committed investors, participating despite risks and few short-term gains. 
Participation in opportunistic rebellions on the other hand, involves immediate 
rewards and fewer risks and thus attracts consumers (Weinstein, 2007:7). 
In establishing and maintaining an organization able to fight for its causes and 
carry out violence, rebel groups face several difficulties. For instance, the types of 
individuals to be selected to join the rebel group, strategies of violence, civilian 
support, and resource availability are all examples of what should be considered by 
rebel leaders. However, one of the most significant challenges is participation of 
individuals in rebel groups as this represents one of the fundaments of a rebel group. 
According to Gates, a rebel army’s ability to succeed depends “on its ability to recruit 
and motivate its soldiers to fight and kill” (Gates, 2002:112). It is a challenge to 
attract recruits for the difficult and dangerous tasks one gets involved in when joining 
a rebel group. Potential recruits will weigh the costs and benefits of high-risk 
collective action and often have to be motivated to join a rebel group. Therefore, 
Weinstein argues that rebel groups attempt to establish motivation by offering 
selective incentives in the case of access to economic resources, and by creating 
appeal around a set of ideas and promises in case of constrained resources. By doing 
this, they intend to obtain high-quality recruits (Weinstein, 2007:8–12). 
Besides this challenge of motivating recruits, rebel groups attract different 
types of individuals. High-commitment individuals can be considered as investors, 
being dedicated to the cause and willing to make investments for future rewards. 
Low-commitment individuals on the other hand, can be considered as consumers 
who merely seek short-term gains from getting involved with a rebel group 
(Weinstein, 2007:9–10). As rebel groups do not have access to the actual motivation 
of potential recruits, they run the risk of including the wrong people in their group, 
which can possibly undermine its existence. The third participation challenge faced 
by rebel groups is how to ensure their orders will be followed without destroying the 
support of participants. Internal discipline needs to be maintained in order to sustain 
the rebel group. Structures of internal control enable the creation of disciplined 
behavior by members of the rebel group, but these need to be carried out carefully. 
This also contributes to overcome the fourth challenge, which is the difficulty to 
achieve resilience and maintain rebel membership over time (Weinstein, 2007:9–10). 
As one can derive from these challenges, rebel groups face significant 
difficulties in achieving sufficient recruitment, control and resilience. In order to 
recruit the right people, potential recruits need to be screened. For instance, rebel 
groups need to gather information about the backgrounds of potential recruits and 
evaluate their level of commitment (Weinstein, 2007:104–105). Thereby, in order to 
achieve sustained cooperation of rebel members, sufficient training and preparation 
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for combat is necessary as well as realizing the expectations created before the recruit 
joins the rebel group. Moreover, in order to realize common objectives, rebel leaders 
need to demonstrate responsible behavior and cooperate. Thus, if leaders are 
rewarded despite violating their code of conduct, other rebel group members are 
unlikely to continue their cooperation (Weinstein, 2007:137). These are difficult and 
costly processes to carry out. In addition to this, most rebel groups “lack the formal 
structures and territorial control required to make threats of punishments credible” 
(Weinstein, 2007:158). Thus, according to Weinstein, it is a significant challenge for a 
rebel group to be successful, especially when this group consists of individuals 
weighing their costs and benefits. 
 
The Benefits of Using Child Soldiers 
When rebel groups use child soldiers, they avoid many of these difficulties. Singer 
argues: “as a new source of fighters, children multiply the potential military capacities 
of groups...this eases the difficulties groups often face in force generation” (2006:94). 
Rebel groups can thus become more successful in combat, securing their survival. 
Rebel leaders generally consider the lives of children cheaper compared to adults and 
thus riskier tactics can be used. This implies that when child soldiers are involved 
with rebel groups, conflict situations tend to emerge easier, are more difficult to end, 
and result in greater casualty numbers (Singer, 2006:95). Thus, child soldiers are 
used in 60% of rebel groups as a means to overcome their weak starting point 
regarding recruitment and organization (Singer, 2006:95). In addition, “groups 
lacking a clear ideological basis may find it easier to maintain the loyalty, and 
participation, of children” (Andvig and Gates, 2007:2). This way of reasoning was 
supported during my personal interviews with a former LRA commander. He stated: 
“it was easy to make the newly abducted children participate with us. We taught them 
to become loyal and do what we said. They listened. This was difficult with the grown-
ups; we could not change their minds easily, they were always thinking about going 
home to their families. It was much easier to make the children become good, 
integrated rebels.” This phenomenon was also noted in LRA studies carried out by 
Beber and Blattman; they found that younger children were trusted and easy to 
manipulate, while adolescents and adults were considered untrustworthy and harder 
to manipulate (2013). Still, Gutiérrez Sanín indicates that there are disadvantages to 
the use of child soldiers as well: “children can be undisciplined; their bodies and 
psychology are not prepared for the sustained hardships of war; and they do not 
stand a chance when confronting an adult force” (2010:121).  
Training of child soldiers is cursory: they learn basic combat techniques but 
are not taught to protect themselves. Short-term, inadequate training in which 
children are just taught to shoot, operate their gun, ambush, and use grenades is 
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often the norm. This training overlooks the inability of many children to appreciate 
the risks of combat and understand their mortality (Wessells, 2006:67–68). 
Interviews with former LRA rebels indicated this is indeed often the case. Vincent, a 
former LRA abductee, expressed that “sometimes we had no time for training. The 
UPDFs were chasing us and the rebels only showed us how to operate the gun. Then 
we went to the battlefield and had to shoot everything around us. We had to run and 
never stop to hide. The rebels said the bullets would not find us if we were brave. So 
we ran and shot.” This indicates that the life of a child is considered cheap, they learn 
about mortality and combat skills on the battlefield since losing a child is not as costly 
for a rebel group as losing an adult fighter. This makes it very beneficial for rebel 
groups to deploy child soldiers instead of adults. Children in rebel groups are 
indoctrinated and manipulated, securing their commitment to the group. This 
indicates that recruitment, control, and resilience are more easily achieved with 
children compared to adults. Thus, the use of child soldiers contributes to overcome 
some of the numerous challenges faced by rebel groups and is therefore beneficial. 
This explains why large numbers of child soldiers are recruited. Moreover, “such 
large proportions of young children indicate that they are employed as substitutes for 
adults and not as complements” (Andvig and Gates, 2007:4). 
As Weinstein assumes, adults are rational and “their actions reflect deliberate 
decisions designed to maximize payoffs” (Weinstein, 2007:40). This implies that it is 
a difficult task to engage and recruit adults. This is not to say that children are 
irrational actors, but rebel groups often use forced recruitment of children, which is 
accompanied by a thorough process of indoctrination. When children are abducted, 
they can more easily be shaped into rebels compared to adults who are less easily 
influenced and overpowered. This argument was indeed supported during field 
research among former LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO rebels. Furthermore, child 
soldiers are known for their resilience and ability to continue fighting for a longer 
period of time compared to adults. Whereas adults have lives to return to and often 
join rebel groups for a period of time to gain income, child soldiers are often deprived 
of other beneficial opportunities and thus stay with rebel groups, as a means to 
survive (Wessells, 2006:41).  
This argument is also reflected in a prominent study carried out by 
Christopher Blattman (2007). His paper proposes an economic rationale for 
recruitment of children by rebel groups, based on evidence from the LRA. Blattman 
argues, “when rebel groups are constrained in the number of feasible recruits (e.g. 
due to resource constraints or supervision costs) they will target individuals offering 
the highest expected net benefit” (2007:1). Interviews with rebel leaders indicated 
that the costs and benefits of recruits differed systematically with age, and that the 
recruitment of adolescents yielded the largest expected net gain. Furthermore, 
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Blattman emphasizes, “While adults appear to have been skilled guerrilla fighters, 
they were also the most likely to desert. Young children were most easily 
indoctrinated and disoriented (and thus likely to stay) but were relatively ineffective 
as fighters. Adolescents, however, appear to have offered the optimal combination of 
military effectiveness and ease of retention” (2007:1). The strong evidence Blattman 
presents explains the economic incentives for rebel groups to prefer the recruitment 
of children compared to adults. This is supported by Andvig and Gates who indicate 
“desertion is a potential problem facing any army and children often find it harder to 
desert than adults. To discourage desertion further, some groups force children to 
commit atrocities in their home villages, thus severing former bonds and limiting the 
child’s options” (2007:2). Later chapters of this thesis will provide examples drawn 
from my own field research in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique that 
support these arguments. 
Child soldiers are considered as serious or even preferred players on the 
battlefield due to their ability to fight effectively with small arms. Most wars today are 
fought in developing countries. Due to a proliferation of small, lightweight arms such 
as the AK-47 and the related reduction of costs, small weapons have become readily 
available and shape contemporary warfare. During the 1990s, 46 out of 49 conflicts 
involved only small arms (Wessells, 2006:18). Moreover, small arms have proven 
most deadly, causing 90% of all casualties in recent armed conflicts (Singer, 
2006:46). The technological developments in this area of weaponry have made it 
possible to turn large pools of child recruits into capable soldiers. Small arms such as 
rifles, light mortars, land mines, grenades and light machine guns have become 
“child-portable.” That these can easily be carried and operated by children makes 
child soldiers effective fighters who are just as lethal as adults (Singer, 2006:46). 
Also, most rebel groups use tactics and weaponry that require relatively little training 
or skills, making child soldiers useful as combatants. 
Moreover, adult recruits are not endlessly available for replacing troop losses—
but there is often an abundance of children, as they compose about half of the 
population in developing countries. Recruiters often promise money as a trigger for 
children to join armed groups. Still, this promise is generally just a ploy; once the 
children are in the group they are intimidated so they will not dare to ask for money. 
Thereby, brutality and forced recruitment is frequently used as terrorized children do 
not have to be paid and are easily manipulated. Another motivation for the 
recruitment of children is their shock value: using them creates confusion and 
terrorizes the opponent. Opposing groups are often reluctant to kill children. 
Additionally, child soldiers are pliable, easily manipulated and controlled, flexible, 
exploitable, effective, and expendable. The use of child soldiers is particularly 
effective because “through violence or threat of violence, young children can be 
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trained to obey commands that many adults would contest or find ways around” 
(Wessells, 2006:34–35). 
This indicates that the use of child soldiers is the result of deliberate choices 
made by leaders of armed groups. Children in conflict zones are often recruited due 
to convenience, impunity and low costs. According to Singer “conflict group leaders 
now see the recruitment and use of children as a low-cost and efficient way for their 
organizations to mobilize and generate force” (2006:38). It is cheap and easy to 
include children in rebel groups and thereby the costs are generally outweighed by 
the benefits. Thus, significant amounts of force are generated with little investment. 
Thereby, rebel groups who face difficulties in mobilizing support can vastly expand 
their power by using child soldiers. This is especially the case for groups fighting for 
social endowments that include few rewards, as indicated by Weinstein. Additionally, 
children are rarely paid, “they are cheaper than adults, and they can be drugged or 
conditioned more easily into violence and committing atrocities” (Singer, 2006:52–
55). This demonstrates that rebel groups fighting for economic endowments benefit 
from using child soldiers as well since children do not get paid the same way as adults 
do and thus rebel leaders can keep most of the profits gained. These factors have 
contributed to the fact that children are often systematically preferred as soldiers in 
today's armed conflicts. As Singer describes, “despite their smaller physical size and 
development, child soldiers are serious players on the modern battlefield” (2006:83). 
Andvig and Gates use a quote from a Congolese rebel leader explaining why child 
soldiers were particularly useful: “they obey orders; they are not concerned with 
getting back to their wife and family; and they don’t know fear” (2007:4). Considering 
the previously named factors that make it beneficial for rebel groups to use child 
soldiers, it becomes apparent that the use of children indeed seems to have a 
comparative advantage over adults.  
However, this argument is not complete. The theories on recruitment, 
motivation, control, and resilience within rebel groups put forth by Weinstein and 
other scholars, lack the inclusion of socialization processes. Socialization plays an 
essential role within rebel groups as it creates interests and hereby significantly 
contributes to motivation, control, resilience, and allegiance among rebels. This 
indicates that the theories developed by Weinstein and others are too reductionist. In 
later chapters of this thesis I will explain why socialization is an essential mechanism 
for rebel groups. These chapters will illuminate that socialization processes need to 
be part of research concerning rebel groups and therefore show in detail why the 
approach of scholars like Weinstein is too reductionist. 
 
Forced Recruitment 
Recruitment of children into rebel groups is a carefully planned process that may 
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include force and thus take place through, for instance, abduction. Due to their 
smaller size and the ease with which they can be intimidated, children are 
particularly susceptible to forced recruitment compared to adults (Wessells, 
2006:37). In addition, the lower mobility of children compared to adults makes them 
more exposed, which makes it easy to catch them (Andvig, 2006:20). In case of 
forced recruitment, recruiters typically target places where children are most 
vulnerable and gather in greatest numbers, such as schools, orphanages, refugee 
camps, stadiums and churches (Machel, 2001:10, Andvig, 2006:20). During these 
recruitment operations, children are assessed on their physical condition and size. 
The suitable children are often abducted, accompanied by rape, severe beatings and 
killings of relatives to intimidate them. In case children oppose or thwart these 
abductions the recruiters threaten to kill them, and thus the children are left with no 
choice but to join the rebel group as a new recruit (Singer, 2006:57–61).  
Other examples of forced recruitment are press-ganging and recruitment by 
quota. Press ganging is a form of group abduction and is used for mass recruitment. 
In these cases rebel groups raid schools or sweep streets or marketplaces. Other sites 
that are frequently used for recruitment are refugee and internally displaced people 
camps.  
Dispossessed children in general run a great risk of forced recruitment. As 
Wessells argues, “before war erupts, children from lower socio-economic classes carry 
a heavy burden of poverty and social exclusion” (2006:41). This makes them 
particularly vulnerable to become prey for rebel groups. On the other hand, when 
recruitment by quota is used, any child may become a target of forced recruitment. 
Rebel groups use this method to recruit children from villages. They require a 
particular number of recruits from the village, threatening that if these children are 
not delivered the whole village will be attacked. In these cases parents have no choice; 
they often hand over their children to the rebels to avoid a wave of death and 
destruction inflicted on the village (Wessells, 2006:42).  
Previous research as well as field research indicated that the LRA, RUF, 
LURD, and RENAMO make use of abduction as the main method of child soldier 
recruitment. During one of our interviews, Walter, a former LRA lieutenant, said, “we 
would go to the schools to find new children. And many times when we were looting 
villages, we had to bring new recruits to the bush. When we were on a mission, we 
were all ordered to bring 5 children back to the bush. We had to catch the right ones. 
The small ones were not useful: they were too weak to walk for long. But the 12 year 
olds were good: they were strong enough to work hard and walk far. But we could 
also work their minds so they will be integrated rebels. The bigger boys were 
sometimes also taken but they are stubborn. If they did not listen we called the new 
recruits and let them finish the stubborn ones. They learned to be good rebels.” 
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These strategies of abduction, press ganging and recruitment by quota are 
commonly used among rebel groups and large numbers of children end up in rebel 
groups through forced recruitment. However, we should recall that there are various 
gradations or types of forced recruitment. As Utas (2003, 2011) notes, besides direct 
force, children often fall victim to structural/systemic violence (Galtung, 1969, Zizek, 
2008), as well as military and social structures. In addition, there are several other 
motivations that fuel the decision of children to join rebel groups. The question 
concerning the motivation for children to enter rebel groups is surrounded by a 
variety of narratives. The former description coincides with a narrative focusing 
solely on forced recruitment and abduction, portraying child soldiers as victims of the 
brutality of adults. According to Wessells “this narrative is comforting in its depiction 
of wicked people as the cause of children becoming soldiers” (2006:31). However, 
this view is rather one-dimensional, as it does not consider the possibility of children 
joining armed groups without being forced. 
 
Non-Forced Recruitment   
Contrary to the previous narrative, a second narrative portrays child soldiers as active 
agents with a significantly developed sense of agency. As opposed to the image 
sketched by numerous humanitarian organizations, research has shown that large 
numbers of children choose to join armed groups voluntarily or without force. 
According to Singer “the rough trend line seems to be that roughly two of every three 
child soldiers have some sort of initiative in their own recruitment” (2006:61). For 
instance, numbers of the International Labor Office show that 64% of all children 
participating in armed groups in Central African countries have joined these groups 
under no threat of violence (ILO, 2003). These examples crush the image of children 
as innocent and passive victims: we see child soldiers as active agents, as actors who 
can exercise choice and who have a strong sense of agency. Armed conflict is in these 
cases perceived “as a source of opportunities for children, who willingly join armed 
groups to obtain things” (Wessells, 2006:31). Their motivations for joining armed 
groups vary from obtaining protection, financial gain, a sense of family, power, 
revenge, defense of their ethnic group, education and training, martyrdom, a sense of 
purpose or even out of fear of being abducted. Most of these factors often have been 
denied to them in civilian life.  
Scholars disagree greatly about the motivations of children to join rebel groups 
and particularly about the perception of them being active agents. Obviously, the 
genuine nature of non-forced recruitment can be questioned: prevailing insecurity, 
severe fighting and extreme poverty affect behavior and limit choices. As a 
consequence, children may choose to join an armed group purely as a survival 
strategy. In an attempt to explain the complexity of what motivates children to join 
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and remain with armed groups, this chapter will continue analyzing the variety of 
factors contributing to this decision. 
 
Marginal Backgrounds and Divided, Violent Societies 
Many child soldiers emerge from marginal backgrounds which provide few or no 
opportunities for upward social mobility or progress. At the same time, conflict 
situations damage the state as well as its inhabitants, fuelling discontent and 
unemployment among youth who are dreaming of another life. This marginalization 
of young people in conflict situations creates a “vast pool of recruitment potential.” 
By joining rebel groups, factors such as personal gain, respect, survival, recognition, 
and the possibility to create new meanings of self appear to be within reach of the 
barrel of a gun. Thus, children often voluntarily join rebel groups in order to become 
“someone.” For instance, this may be particularly important for African boys since 
they gain rights when they become a man and can then start a family (Bøås and 
Dunn, 2007:42–51). This way of achieving social recognition is also emphasized by 
Münkler, who claims that children join rebel groups “in the prospect of an otherwise 
unattainable social reputation” (2004:77–78). 
Wessells, Brett and Specht argue that children who are raised in violent, 
divided societies have an abundance of reasons to become fighters for their group 
(2006, 2004). These children have often been victimized and may perceive violence 
as a way to liberate their people or gain revenge. As Wessells claims: “children who 
have lost their parents may decide to join the struggle to avenge their loss, to protect 
their villages, or to seek protection and access to necessities such as food and health 
care. War crushes children's hopes by destroying the schools, markets, health posts, 
and other structures children need in order to have a positive future. As the war 
continues, children may see life inside an armed group as their best option” (2006). 
Thus, children's decision to become warriors can be a rational choice, based on hate 
or necessity, but often on a combination of these.  
Children may choose to participate in the violence in order to get revenge and 
pay back the pain that has been inflicted on them and their families. The loss of 
parents is the greatest loss a child can suffer as their main source of care, protection 
and love disappears. It puts children at great risk by creating heavy emotional 
burdens and significantly increasing vulnerability and poverty. As a means of 
survival, these children may join armed groups (Wessells, 2006:25). The decision to 
participate in armed groups is thus a gradually evolving process, achieved “through a 
slow accretion of smaller decisions and gradually increased engagement with 
members of an armed group” (Wessells, 2006:32). 
Moreover, Wessells argues that children run a particular risk becoming 
soldiers in divided societies for their parents and leaders teach them to continue the 
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struggle. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda some 800,000 Tutsi were killed, 
organized by the Hutu regime. Large numbers of children joined the paramilitary 
groups that were responsible for the killings, as they had been taught to see 
themselves as Hutu but also as opposed to the demonized Tutsi. “Also, communities 
in divided societies teach their children the key wrongs done by the Other, stirring a 
desire for revenge and the fear that motivates pre-emptive action. This poisonous 
mixture of fear and hate heightens perceptions of evil and wrongdoing by the Other 
and strengthens children's own sense of victim-hood, motivating attacks and 
encouraging ongoing cycles of violence” (Wessells, 2006:22). 
In these cases, dehumanization often plays a crucial role in the choice of 
becoming a child soldier. Dehumanization of opponents makes it easier to disregard 
the moral implications of murder (Kressel, 2002). This is for instance achieved by 
media distortion and propaganda. The spread of lies contributes to the 
dehumanization of the opponent and gives meaning and direction for the actions of 
child soldiers. Furthermore, peer pressure may play a significant role in the decision 
for children to join armed groups. Children who have already joined the armed group 
often approach their peers wearing new uniforms and the like. This makes it very 
tempting to join for children in deprived situations (Singer, 2006:67–68).  
In addition, many people are displaced as a result of armed conflict, leading to 
immense refugee flows. According to Wessells: “refugees lack basic materials and a 
cultural identity, and suffer discrimination, alienation, and difficulties earning a 
livelihood and negotiating the complexities of their new social system. Refugee 
camps, with their arduous living conditions, frequently become political hotbeds 
where radicalized youths fuel continued armed conflicts” (2006:25). Not surprisingly, 
large numbers of children are recruited in refugee camps. 
 
Poverty 
Other scholars, like Singer, argue that voluntary participation in armed groups is a 
misleading claim. This view highlights the inability of children to make mature 
decisions and to oversee the consequences of joining armed groups. Children are 
merely driven by forces that are beyond their control when they voluntarily join 
armed groups, for instance by economic factors. Due to hunger and poverty children 
may decide to join any group, particularly as a means to survive (Singer, 2006:62). 
Machel agrees with this, arguing that “rather than exercising free choice, these 
children are responding more often to a variety of pressures—economic, cultural, 
social, and political” (2001:11). Furthermore, Machel argues that poverty is one of the 
main pressures for children to become soldiers. They join rebel groups for protection 
or their parents even “sell” them into the army (Machel, 2001:12). 
Boothby also addresses poverty as one of the main causes of child soldiering. 
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This perspective highlights the need for food, health care, and protection. Children in 
war zones frequently seek money to fulfill these needs and if they live with poor 
families, becoming a child soldier is perceived as a means to fulfill their family 
responsibilities (Boothby et al, 2006:181). Rebel groups provide child soldiers with 
food and protection, thus children suffering from poverty gain as individuals from 
joining rebel groups. Münkler touches upon this motivation, stating that children join 
rebel groups in return for a form of livelihood (2004:77).  
Bøås and Dunn argue that potential child soldiers can be found in every slum 
or forgotten place. These youths see “little if any opportunity to make the 
transformation from their present state of despair and exclusion into something else 
and better. All it takes is one individual with an idea about something else and the 
means to transform his ideas into action—call it resistance, call it revolt, call it 
violence, robbery—and they are game, eager to settle the score of humiliation and 
marginalization” (2007:52). Opportunities for looting when joining a rebel group 
makes is possible for these children to acquire possessions and physically take them 
out of their state of despair. 
 
Lack of Education, Unemployment, and Political Radicalization 
According to Bøås and Dunn, many children who become part of armed groups have 
dropped out of school. In Sierra Leone for an example, children who drop out of 
school are generally from poor families. School fees are too expensive, and when 
children attend school that means a loss of income, as they are not working for the 
family—so children are often taken out of school, to help generate income for the 
family (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:41). It is not rare that these children end up being part 
of rebel groups, as some are even stimulated by their parents to join rebels as a means 
to generate income for their family (Wessells, 2006:43). Dropping out of school limits 
these children’s future opportunities and joining rebel group may thus be an 
opportunity to create meaning in their lives.  
Additionally, Bøås and Dunn describe the fact that there is little left to do in 
conflict stricken societies as one of the causes of child soldiering. This is especially the 
case for young men joining rebel groups. The authors state: “so few alternatives 
seemed viable, and this realization must have led some, obviously not all, to develop a 
mindset of hatred against their society, their communities, their elders, even their 
parents, that was unleashed in anger when a gun came within their reach. The gun 
became their tool, their personal revolution, and by killing they could finally prove 
that even they mattered. These young men are the creation of damaged and broken 
societies, where there is little left to do” (2007:46). 
Boothby addresses the lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and 
failed expectations that are characteristic for war zones as breeding grounds for child 
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soldiering in rebel movements. Hopelessness and futility, as well as the desire to 
change failed political systems makes children eager to join rebel groups. Children 
often make up for half the population in developing countries and this may 
significantly contribute to the force of rebel groups. As noted in the previous chapter, 
in most developing countries teenagers are regarded as adults, attempting to define 
their place in society. With high unemployment figures in war zones (up to 80%) 
children become motivated to join rebel groups, as this can provide them with 
status—as well as skills that may be seem important to them (2006:183–184).  
  
Multiple Causation 
In general, poverty plays a significant role, as poor children are overrepresented in 
armed groups. In addition, revenge for their personal experiences of extreme violence 
and the loss of relatives, political marginalization, unemployment and the lack of 
education tend to be factors contributing to the motivation to join armed groups. The 
status and power that comes with joining rebel groups is a trigger for participating for 
many children in otherwise desperate conflict situations. In some cases, family 
matters like domestic exploitation drive children into the arms of armed groups. 
Further, armed groups offer membership, acceptance and honorable roles (as 
soldiers or leaders) for children in floundering situations, something very seductive 
for children feeling powerless or victimized. The promise of rewards for fighting with 
a rebel group also convinces children it is worth joining (Singer, 2006:62–67). This 
implies that non-forced recruitment is often triggered by interplay of multiple factors 
and situational influences; it seldom reflects one motive. As Wessells argues “the 
causes of soldiering are contextual, vary across individuals, and are embedded in 
wider systems of exploitation and violence” (2006:55). 
As seen throughout this section, all children are different and their decision to 
join rebel groups depends highly on the situation and environment they live in. 
Therefore, we cannot draw general conclusions about the motivations for children to 
get involved with rebel groups. For instance, the RUF in Sierra Leone created a viable 
fighting force by a combination of recruiting youth voluntarily and through force and 
coercion. By tapping into sentiments of social exclusion, youth often voluntarily 
joined the rebels. In cases of forced recruitment, youths had to participate in severe 
violence against local populations and leaders (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:48). Thus, in 
many cases rebel leaders add force to their group through a combination of forced 
and non-forced recruitment of children.  
 
Creating a Child Soldier 
Once children are recruited to become part of a rebel group, they undergo a variety of 
intensive training programs and methods in order to convert into effective soldiers. 
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These programs are designed to create dependency on the rebel group. By achieving 
dependency, rebel leaders aim to prevent attempts to escape from the group (Singer, 
2006:57). One of the essential parts of the transformation into a soldier is 
indoctrination. Indoctrination provides child soldiers with a new perspective of the 
world, which creates and sustains combat motivation. This type of motivation is 
supposed to keep child soldiers in the rebel group in spite of the risks during battles. 
Besides these, rebel leaders use coercive, remunerative, and normative motivators to 
keep child soldiers in the group and make them use violence that would be rejected 
under normal circumstances. Coercive motivators, based on physical punishment, are 
particularly popular among rebel leaders. It rapidly enables the use of children as 
soldiers as high levels of obedience are achieved by using brutality, fear and 
psychological manipulation (Singer, 2006:71). This is also elaborated upon by 
Kressel, who argues that threats, manipulation and persuasion contribute to 
obedience and the creation of brutality (2002).  
The result of the process of indoctrination is that child soldiers quickly become 
dependent on their leaders for protection and needs. Simultaneously, terror and 
propaganda are used in order to stimulate the children to identify themselves with 
the goals of their rebel group and realign their allegiances and worldview. This 
process contributes to the creation of moral disengagement from the violence they 
will use as soldiers. For instance, by dehumanizing the targets of the rebel group, 
children perceive these targets as the enemy who is righteously attacked. This implies 
that any sense of responsibility for violence inflicted upon the “enemy” is diffused 
(Singer, 2006:71–73). The resulting “us versus them” strategy is frequently used in 
collective action of armed groups. As Vetlesen argues, the individual agent, in this 
case the child soldier, perceives himself as acting on behalf of his group. This 
individual agent is a representative of his group and acts for reasons shared with his 
fellow group members. Thus, the agent thinks, feels, and acts in a manner giving 
primacy to his relationship with his fellow group members over his relationship with 
his victims. The connection with the group prevails to such an extent that the 
connection with the victim is effectively cancelled out (Vetlesen, 2005). This provides 
a justification for the continuation of attacks targeted at the enemy. Therefore, 
indoctrination plays a significant role in the violence carried out by child soldiers but 
it also provides them with a new identity. 
One of the most significant factors contributing to the transformation of 
children into soldiers is re-identification, also referred to as the “construction of 
identity.” Re-identification ensures that the child no longer identifies with his past 
but becomes a devoted member of the rebel group. The re-identification alluded to 
above takes place through various methods such as the shaving of a child soldier’s 
head or even branding the skin with the group's name or insignia. Arms, chests or 
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foreheads of child soldier recruits are frequently carved with sharp objects so that the 
resulting scars will identify them as a member of a particular rebel group. Moreover, 
the creation of alternative personas is a significant step in the transformation from a 
child into a soldier and rebel group member. As Singer (2006) argues, the creation of 
alternative personas enables a complete split with the prior self of the child and 
thereby neutralizes the consequences of the violence that rebel groups try to 
indoctrinate. Furthermore, child soldiers are generally renamed and use a special 
war- or jungle name. The use of nicknames dissociates children from the violence 
they carry out and makes it possible for them to function as killing machines without 
remorse (Singer, 2006:73).  This clarifies why names like “Blood Never Dry,” 
“Laughing and Killing,” “The Castrator” or “Bad Pay Bad” are not uncommon among 
child soldiers. 
A common preparation of the mass violence that is to be carried out in the 
future is the forced killing of people. According to Kressel (2002), preconditions for 
mass violence are achieved through three specific mechanisms. The first step to 
convince child soldiers to use violence against the target is authorization. This 
includes approval, explicit orders, and encouragement by an authority figure, in this 
case the rebel leader. The second step that ensures the continuation of violence is 
routinization; when the use of violence against people becomes a routine this makes 
it easier to continue using violence. The third step to mass violence is 
dehumanization, which enables the perception of victims as less worthy and inhuman 
and thus enables child soldiers to disregard the moral implications of the violence 
inflicted (Kressel, 2002). By switching off the emotional burden of inflicting violence 
on others, dehumanization establishes the fundaments for the ruthless and fearless 
image child soldiers are often associated with.  
A complementary tactic to make child soldiers participate in mass violence is 
forcing them to participate in ritualized killings shortly after their recruitment. Child 
soldiers are not left with the choice whether to participate or not; in case they refuse 
they are killed themselves. During these rituals, child soldiers are forced to kill 
children who attempted to escape the rebel group. Moreover, it is not uncommon that 
child soldiers have to kill their relatives or community members, a ritual which 
generally takes place in public places. This implies that the child's home community 
witnesses the killing. This prevents the child from escaping the rebel group as he or 
she cannot just return home anymore; in most cases there is nothing left to return to 
(Singer, 2006:74). Intimacy is an essential aspect of violence in civil war and is 
frequently used by rebel groups to define the new identity of a child soldier. In 
general, people are reluctant to exercise these extreme forms of violence against 
people they know. As Kalyvas claims, it is easier to “kill men who are strangers, to 
obliterate faces which have not smiled on one in recognition, and to burn houses 
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which have never welcomed one as a guest” (2006:331). The intimate character of the 
violence child soldiers are forced to use, naturally goes against their norms and 
causes a rupture with their home communities. The ritualized killing makes children 
therefore cross the ultimate moral boundary and is considered as a defining moment 
in breaking the resistance to the rebel group. Due to their frequent exposure to 
extreme violence children become desensitized to suffering. Rebel groups use this in 
order to harden the child and “make it easier to sever links with the rest of society” 
(Machel, 2001:14). This indicates that child soldiers become reliant on the rebel 
group as the child's home community vehemently disapproves what the child has 
become.  
 
This chapter highlighted various organized strategies, demonstrating how 
children are turned into soldiers by breaking down their defenses and memory. This 
process results in the fact that child soldiers often have only two anchors left: their 
fellow rebel group members and their guns. Due to the achievement of moral and 
psychological disconnections, compliance to orders will therefore generally be almost 
total after the indoctrination process (Singer, 2006:75). The relation between these 
tactics of creating child soldiers is obvious as they both complement and reinforce 
each other. Still, there is more to the creation of a child soldier than the analyzed 
theories in this chapter. Field research has indicated that socialization plays an 
essential role in the creation of a child soldier. Therefore, in the following chapters I 
will use the previously analyzed theories as a starting point and additionally 
investigate how the process of socialization contributes to the creation of a child 
soldier. I will argue that socialization further reinforces the previously mentioned 
methods that accompany the transformation of children into soldiers. By analyzing 
the socialization processes used by the LRA, RUF, LURD, and RENAMO, I will 
address how socialization convinces child soldiers to remain within rebel groups. 
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4 
Following the Holy Spirit 
Child soldier socialization within the Lord’s Resistance Army 
 
 
“When we were in the training camp, Kony came to visit us sometime. When he was 
around he sat down together with the children, chatted and he was making jokes. 
He was always smiling and very friendly with me, he was nice.” 
 
Formerly abducted 15-year-old boy soldier 
 
 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the background of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the conflict in Northern Uganda. In addition, it will elaborate upon tactics 
used by the LRA to create allegiance among its rebels. It will emphasize which factors 
are important in creating allegiance within a rebel group. Moreover, evidence from 
field research will be used to show the use of child soldiers by the LRA, leading to the 
thorough analysis of socialization processes used within the LRA and its far-reaching 
consequences. 
 
Conflict Background 
Since 1987 Northern Uganda has been suffering from a violent conflict involving 
three main parties: the central government, the LRA, and the local population, which 
mainly consists of the Acholi tribe. “Abductions, including the kidnapping of 
children, have been common, and hundreds of people have been compelled to kill 
and maim or be killed and maimed themselves. Victims have had lips, hands and 
fingers cut off. Some have been forced to slaughter their own parents, or drink the 
blood of those they have murdered. Several massacres of civilians have occurred, and 
hundreds of thousands of people are living in displacement camps, where conditions 
are often appalling” (Allen, 2006:1). 
 During the two decades of conflict in Northern Uganda, it has remained 
unclear what the exact roots and causes of the continuing violence are. “Twenty years 
after its birth, the strategy, organization and motives of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
remain shrouded in mystery and supposition. What little we know is drawn almost 
entirely from interviews with former participants, commanders, and civilian victims. 
What emerges is a patchwork of motives, methods, and structure, with different 
accounts sometimes in direct conflict” (Blattman and Annan, 2008:7). One of the 
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reasons for this is that Joseph Kony has refused to speak with representatives from 
the international community until the 2006 peace talks. This was due to his suspicion 
of their motives and fear of being captured (Borzello, 2007). 
Due to a lack of systematic and representative information the LRA and its use 
of child soldiers is poorly understood. To illustrate the complexity of the conflict: 
Bøås and Dunn developed five main theories about the nature of the conflict of which 
none has proven to be true. First of all, some believe Joseph Kony is engaging in an 
irrational campaign of terror and violence without a purpose or ultimate goal and acts 
like a madman. Secondly, it is believed that the conflict resulted from legitimate and 
serious complaints of the Northern Ugandan population against the central 
government of Museveni. A third explanation argues that the conflict is a by-product 
of “the larger geopolitical rivalry between the Sudanese government and Uganda.” If 
this were indeed the case, the LRA would be used by the Sudanese government as a 
rental army to destabilize Uganda. Fourthly, the government of Museveni and its 
army are believed to have no interest in combating the LRA. From this perspective, 
the conflict is exploited for political purposes to disadvantage the Northern Ugandan 
population. Lastly, it is believed that Northern Uganda has become subject to political 
economy of conflict. This view implies that various actors are benefitting 
economically from continuation of the conflict and thus have no interest in finding a 
solution (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:132–146).  
 This complex variety of perspectives on the Northern Ugandan conflict 
indicates that the relationship between the LRA and the people of Northern Uganda 
is not clear-cut, but one of a complex, multidimensional nature. The LRA, which has 
been fighting the Museveni government in Kampala since 1987, is claimed to mainly 
draw its strength from the largest tribe in Northern Uganda: the Acholi. The Acholi 
people in Northern Uganda mistrust the government in Kampala due to a history of 
conflict and exploitation. This feeling of mistrust was enhanced when the Museveni 
government started disadvantaging the Acholi due to the belief that the people of 
Northern Uganda supported the LRA. This belief was initially incorrect yet resulted 
in the government inflicting severe violence and human rights abuses on the 
Northern region and relocating the Acholi into displacement camps. As a result, the 
people of Northern Uganda developed deeply rooted feelings of resentment towards 
the Museveni government. The Acholi claim that the Museveni government 
deliberately relocated them and by doing this allowed the LRA to weaken the Acholi 
in order to undermine political challenge. This resentment caused many Acholi to 
join the LRA as a last resort to fight for their rights. This contributed to the fact that 
the Acholi people eventually did make up most of the LRA's rebels (Redress, 2006:9). 
 However, the people of Northern Uganda, including the Acholi, have been 
subject to numerous atrocities committed by the LRA. The reason is that “Kony 
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claimed that Acholi society had to be purified by violence” (Allen, 2006:40). Some 70 
to 80% of the LRA rebels are child soldiers abducted mainly from the Acholi tribe 
when the LRA operated in Uganda. Bøås and Dunn argue that the LRA has created a 
historical trap through this behavior. Due to the fact that the LRA committed 
numerous atrocities and kidnapped thousands of children, they have lost the support 
of the Northern Ugandan population and seem to continue fighting solely for survival 
(2007:147). This implied that the LRA mainly became abusive of the Acholi and used 
terrorization to acquire sufficient supplies of resources and human capital (Redress, 
2006:9). Today we see similar patterns throughout the region, as the group has 
scattered and spread its violent activities to South Sudan, DR Congo and the Central 
African Republic (Cakaj, Lancaster and Ronan, 2013).  
 
 
Characteristics of the LRA and the Use of Child Soldiers 
In recent years child soldiers have been portrayed as a new source of fighters who 
become increasingly involved in conflicts. This assumption is due particularly to the 
changing nature and proliferation of conflicts, combined with global monitoring, 
reporting and transmission. The public has become more aware of the phenomenon. 
Moreover, the flourishing commercial and illegal trafficking in small arms has 
enabled children to participate in armed conflict as more efficient combatants. Still, 
as Gates and Reich argue, child soldiers “have been with us from time immemorial” 
(2009:3). However, the widespread availability of lightweight weapons that are easily 
maintained and operated, has significantly contributed to the roles of child soldiers 
becoming increasingly violent and destructive (Rosen, 2005:14). Combined with 
issues like poverty, discrimination, and vulnerability, children are soft targets for 
recruitment into armed groups (Redress, 2006:5). Not surprisingly, this “leads to 
vicious cycles of violence and insecurity, prolonging suffering and obstructing post-
conflict reconstruction” (Machel, 2001:119). 
 Singer argues, “children multiply the potential military capacities of groups 
that choose to adopt the child soldier doctrine” (2006:94). As rebel groups often face 
challenges in force generation, the use of child soldiers allows a proliferation of such 
groups. The relatively weak starting point of rebel groups is overcome by using the 
child soldier doctrine. Child soldiers are either forcibly or voluntarily recruited to 
become part of armed groups due to the relatively small investments that groups have 
to make for their recruitment, training, and arming (Redress, 2006:5). This is 
accelerated by the flourishing small arms industry that has allowed children to 
become highly effective fighters. One of the rebel groups who multiplied their fighting 
numbers through this strategy is the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, 
which is led by Joseph Kony. The LRA started out as a group of 200 core members 
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but swiftly transformed into an army of 14,000 soldiers once they implemented the 
use of child soldiers (Singer, 2006:95). This has resulted in the fact that the LRA has 
persisted since they started waging war in the north in 1987 (Behrend, 1998).  
The LRA is often portrayed as a barbaric and insane cult by Ugandan and 
international media. One of the reasons for this is that the LRA, led by self-
proclaimed prophet Joseph Kony, is known to target children in order to increase its 
forces: it has abducted more than 60,000 Northern Ugandan children, with a 
particular preference for young adolescents. Research has shown that a 14-year old 
child is three times as likely to be recruited compared to a 9 or 23 year old (Blattman, 
2007), and that the LRA retains child soldiers because they are “more easily 
indoctrinated and misinformed than adults, and have more difficulty escaping” 
(Beber and Blattman, 2013:6). Due to its practice of kidnapping children, the LRA is 
often portrayed as a barbaric, irrational group. Thousands of children have been 
kidnapped by the LRA to become soldiers, porters or wives for LRA commanders. 
Estimates claim that approximately 70% to 80% of the LRA is made up of child 
soldiers; this explains why the LRA is often characterized as an army of children 
(Bøås and Dunn, 2007:131, and Redress, 2006:8). 
 Most child soldiers fighting for the LRA have become part of the rebel group 
after being abducted from their homes, schools, or villages. Due to the numerous 
abductions of children by the LRA, a phenomenon of “night commuters” has erupted 
in Northern Uganda. These night commuters are thousands of children who leave 
their homes every night to walk to larger towns and sleep in shelters or on the streets 
in order to prevent possible abduction by the LRA (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:131). This 
phenomenon has subsided during recent years, yet according to Bøås and Dunn 
“resolution of the conflict remains highly elusive” (2007:131). Yoweri Museveni, the 
Ugandan president, has promised to end the war and has proclaimed that peace was 
near on numerous occasions. However, the LRA increased its activity each time 
Museveni claimed they were on the road to peace, and instead enhanced its attacks 
on the civilian population. This has resulted in more than half of the Acholi 
population in Northern Uganda living in Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps 
whilst children have been abducted throughout Northern Uganda on a daily basis 
until 2006 (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:132). As elaborated upon in the introduction of this 
thesis, the LRA is at the time of writing scattered throughout the Central African 
region. This resulted in drastically decreasing rates of abduction in Uganda, yet led to 
numerous abductions in South Sudan, DRC, and the Central African Republic 
(International Alert, 2009). 
 Kony still uses large numbers of child soldiers, among other reasons because 
the LRA “need them in their ranks to avoid defeat” and because of the belief “they can 
negotiate an amnesty on this matter in agreeing to a ceasefire” (Gates, 2009:4). While 
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this explains part of the reasons why the LRA tries to hold on to its child soldiers, the 
question arises: why do Acholi children still remain with the LRA after experiencing 
such severe violence and exploitation, instead of escaping to their villages?  
 
Spirituality and Fear 
Part of the answer to this question can be found in the importance of spirituality for 
the Acholi population. Joseph Kony, who was born in the early 1960s, dropped out of 
school during his primary education and was trained as an ajwaka: a spirit medium. 
He became possessed by a variety of spirits and started recruiting followers near Gulu 
in Northern Uganda to establish the LRA in 1987. By 1990 the LRA had become the 
most significant armed unit fighting in Northern Uganda. Field research implied that 
Kony has always received information and instructions from his spirits through 
which he still leads the LRA. He is believed to be possessed by 13 different spirits, 
coming from Uganda, Sudan, Italy, America, China, and Korea. This group of spirits 
is headed by Juma Oris, his Sudanese spirit, and includes one woman who is in 
charge of LRA operations: Silly Silindi (Borzello, 2007:394). Interviews with former 
rebels indicate an incredibly strong belief in Kony’s spirits among LRA rebels; none of 
them denied the existence of the spirits and all acted accordingly to their orders and 
believed Kony could predict the future. This is also highlighted by Borzello who 
explains: “Kony can see the future: some of his prophecies are specific (predicting 
that the UPDF will attack at a certain time), while others are more opaque (that he is 
‘like Moses’ and will ‘never see the promised land’)” (2007:394). The strong 
spirituality of the Acholi resulted in relatively low numbers of defection among LRA 
rebels. As Borzello explains: “Kony appears to have a genuine hold over his followers. 
It is rare to meet former rebels who do not believe that he has real spiritual power” 
(2007:394). The spiritual dimension of the LRA instills fear and respect among its 
members. This either makes the rebels believe that Kony can read their minds and 
will kill them if they think about escaping, or they awe at his remarkable capacities 
(Allen, 2006:38–43).  
 Besides spirituality, fear plays a significant role in achieving compliance 
among LRA rebels. The use of violence creates high levels of fear among rebels, which 
encourages compliance with the LRA. This is clearly shown by Allen: “a key strategy 
of the LRA has been to abduct young people, including children, and to educate them 
to be part of a new society, using forms of abuse that are hard to believe. Many 
recruits become sexual slaves or are deployed as combatants. Some are required to 
perform atrocities against civilians in order to punish them for accepting President 
Museveni’s rule, demonstrate their loyalty and make it difficult for them to return 
home because of the fear of reprisals. At peace talks in 1994, Kony justified LRA 
actions to those present as follows: "If you pick up an arrow against us and we ended 
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up cutting off the hand you used, who is to blame? You report us with your mouth, 
and we cut off your lips. Who is to blame? It is you! The Bible says that if your hand, 
eye, or mouth is at fault, it should be cut off’” (Allen, 2006:42). 
 
Rational Decisions and Terror as a Strategy of Choice 
Even though the LRA generally tends to be depicted as an irrational, barbaric cult 
because of this behavior, this picture is challenged by an emerging literature about 
the LRA. “In the absence of a public face and (until very recently) an active political 
arm, the LRA’s activities, motives, and structure have been defined by external actors, 
from Western academics and journalists to the Ugandan military and 
government…What has often emerged is a picture of the LRA as a primal force—
illogical, barbaric, and cultlike” (Blattman and Annan, 2008:1). Blattman and Annan 
have done extensive research in Uganda which has shown that “the LRA turns out to 
be a much more strategic and conventional military organization than often 
supposed, however terrible its violence” (2008:7). Allen extends this argument, 
stating that LRA leaders have made a more coherent political argument than is 
portrayed and “desire to make a case to the Acholi population as a whole” (2006:44). 
An example of this can be found in the LRA’s statements of demands. These call for: 
“(a) an all-party ‘National Conference’ followed by general elections; (b) creation of a 
Religious Affairs Ministry to ‘see an end to the use of witchcraft and sorcery by 
promotion of the Ten Commandments’; (c) rehabilitation of the economy and 
rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure; (d) national unity (through inter-tribal 
marriages and language instruction); (e) education for all; (f) policies encouraging 
foreign investments; (g) the independence of the judiciary; (h) the formation of an 
ethnically balanced national army; (i) improved diplomatic relations with 
neighboring states; and (j) relocation of Uganda’s administrative capital to Kigumba 
in Masindi district” (Allen, 2006:43). 
The picture drawn by Allen contradicts “assertions that the rebels are all 
deranged and unaccountable for their actions. There are aspects of the LRA which 
draw on local understanding of the spirit world, and resonate with perceptions of ‘the 
bush’ (olum) as a place of unpredictable and amoral phenomena. But rational 
decisions have been made about politics, and terror has been a strategy of choice” 
(Allen, 2006:44). However, due to their use of extreme violence, it has become 
increasingly difficult for the LRA to get support and recruit their forces voluntarily. 
Therefore, they resorted to forced recruitment of children, providing them with the 
possibility to remain a cohesive group. The following section will entail a more 
detailed explanation how the use of child soldiers contributes to allegiance within the 
LRA. 
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Allegiance within the Lord’s Resistance Army 
Chapter three has outlined the range of tactics used by rebel groups in order to create 
child soldiers. In addition, rebel groups employ tactics to make their members loyal 
to the group. Allegiance is essential in order to maintain a cohesive rebel group, as 
defection of its members will significantly undermine its success. As Andvig and 
Gates point out, “the incentive to exit for an individual will increase with the number 
of others exiting” (2007:10). However, “what motivates a person to risk his life in 
armed rebellion? Why continue to expose oneself to life in the bush where one may be 
killed at any minute without home, family, or other comforts? Or, from the 
perspective of the rebel group, how does a rebel group maintain organizational 
cohesion and deter defection? How does a rebel group sustain itself?” (Gates, 
2002:111). These questions are of essential importance in analyzing allegiance within 
rebel groups. 
Gates (2002) examines the organizational structure of rebel groups in order to 
understand patterns of recruitment and allegiance. In this analysis Gates focuses 
particularly on three factors which significantly influence the likelihood of military 
success, defection, and help shape recruitment: geography, ethnicity and ideology. 
“Even for the most blatant loot-seeking groups, ethnicity, ideology, and geographical 
proximity play a direct role in shaping the pattern of compliance and enforcement in 
a rebel army. Likewise, ideologically and ethnically motivated groups do not motivate 
their members exclusively with non-pecuniary awards” (Gates, 2002:113–114).  
According to Gates, “geography is a fundamentally important variable for 
understanding the supervision, oversight, and control of a rebel organization … 
Military tactics and strategies must address geographical issues, shaping the nature 
of engaging the enemy in battle, supplying troops, and the supervision, control, and 
recruitment of the troops” (2002:113). This implies that the geographical distance 
between commanders and soldiers is a determining factor in creating allegiance. 
Looking at the LRA and its recruitment by abduction, geographical distance indeed 
seems an important influence in creating allegiance. Are the newly recruited LRA 
rebels not to be supervised and controlled in close proximity to their commanders, 
one may expect a high chance of defection since they are initially forced to be with the 
LRA. 
Gates’ concept of distance can also be applied to ethnicity. As Gates argues 
“ethnic distance constitutes the sense of group identity that an ethnic or national 
group feels with respect to one another and to other groups. An ethnically 
homogenous rebel group with a clear sense of group identity, therefore, exhibits 
narrow ethnic distances, whereas an ethnically diverse group possesses great ethnic 
distance” (Gates, 2002:113). The majority of the LRA consists of rebels coming from 
the Acholi tribe in Northern Uganda. According to Gates’ explanation this contributes 
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to the creation of a group identity. This is enhanced by the fact that the LRA is 
fighting the Ugandan government forces (UPDF), which represent different tribes. 
Moreover, the people of Northern Uganda have been in conflict with the central 
government for decades. Thus when adopting Gates’ theory on allegiance, recruiting 
people from Northern Uganda is likely to enhance allegiance within the LRA due to 
narrow ethnic distance.   
Thirdly, Gates argues that ideological distance influences allegiance within 
rebel groups. According to Gates, “ideological distance can be represented in terms of 
mapping preferences in an issue space as used in spatial models of elections and 
committees” (2002:113). The distance between ideal points affects allegiance in a 
similar way compared to ethnicity; if rebels share the same ideology, the likelihood of 
allegiance is higher. Looking at the LRA this is a tricky subject. Since the majority of 
LRA recruits are abducted and forced to participate, it may seem unlikely that the 
same ideology is shared. This impression may be even further enhanced by the 
commonly sketched image of the LRA as a brutal organization without clear goals. 
However, if one takes the analyses by Blattman (2008) and Allen (2006) into account 
to which I referred to earlier, the LRA does seem to have an ideology and fights for its 
Acholi people in Northern Uganda. This indicates that there may not be such a large 
ideological distance among LRA rebels as one would expect. The LRA's ideology may 
therefore contribute to allegiance. 
 
Using (Non-) Pecuniary Rewards to Create Allegiance 
In addition to these factors, the provision of benefits also contributes to allegiance 
among members of a rebel group. Gates focuses on the principal agent model, and 
argues that “agents of a military organization (that is soldiers) when recruited on a 
voluntary basis, have to receive sufficient utility by joining that they do not run away 
(the participation constraint). Furthermore the leadership (the principal) must be 
able to find a way to reward the soldiers so that they choose to act in a way that will 
produce the maximum increase of the probability of winning (or sustaining a 
“profitable” conflict) with the lowest financial cost (incentive compatibility 
constraint)” (Andvig and Gates, 2007:7). Moreover, non-pecuniary rewards can be 
used to meet the participatory and compatibility constraints (Gates, 2002). Non-
pecuniary benefits (such as the belief to fight the good fight) “can be created by the 
group and can be used to motivate members instead of material benefits. Leaders 
have an incentive to inculcate a sense of membership and solidarity and thereby 
construct an identity for their organization” (Andvig and Gates, 2007:9).  
Gates acknowledges “the nature of benefits will vary considerably across 
different kinds of rebel groups. Loot-seeking groups will rely on wages and other 
pecuniary rewards distributed from their rent-seeking activities. Ideological groups 
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anchor the other extreme, relying on the non-pecuniary rewards of fighting the ‘good 
fight’. All groups distribute benefits that exhibit a mixture of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary rewards” (Gates, 2002:114). Andvig and Gates state that the LRA, as a 
religious mystical group, uses a mix of functional and solidarity benefits to create 
allegiance among its members (2007:9). In addition, punishment and the use of force 
are often used as means to encourage compliance and control the behavior of rebels 
within the group. “The leader of a rebel group can offer an incentive scheme to a 
subordinate agent through a benefit stream for compliance and punishment for 
defection” (Gates, 2002:116).  
Gates argues, “compliance depends on a minimal allocation of pecuniary 
rewards, but the fact remains that non-pecuniary benefits go far in maintaining 
allegiance to a rebel army” (2002:120). An interesting finding is that non-pecuniary 
benefits seem to be more influential for children than adults. Thereby, Blattman 
(2007) argues that children have a greater tendency towards bonding to a group and 
altruism, which may imply that it takes less effort to create solidarity norms for 
children within the organization. Moreover, children bond more tightly to a group 
(Andvig and Gates, 2007:9–10). This may explain part of the reason why the LRA 
resorted to the recruitment of children as the main source of their fighters; it seems 
the chances for allegiance would be significantly higher among child soldiers 
compared to adult fighters. As Gates points out, “children offer a possibility for rebel 
groups to meet the reservation level of benefits and the compatibility constraint that 
they might not be able to meet with adult recruits” (2002:128). Interestingly, Beber 
and Blattman found that “not only were the LRA more likely to forcibly recruit 
adolescents than adults, but once recruited, younger recruits received more 
punishments and fewer positive inducements” (2013:87). Also, children were “more 
likely to be forced to commit acts that would reduce their real and perceived outside 
options,” such as killing family members (2013:87). Their work showed that younger 
recruits would stay longer before trying to escape, demonstrating that children can be 
coerced to a greater extent compared to adult fighters. Beber and Blattman note that, 
in addition to the above factors, this is partly due to the fact that young recruits were 
easier to influence and convince (2013). However, although their comparative statics 
are an important addition to our knowledge of the LRA, they fail to explore the 
deeper dynamics of this phenomenon.  
When analyzing the LRA as an organization, it emerges that compliance is 
relatively high yet there is hardly any allocation of pecuniary rewards—except for 
commanders, who generally get all the looted goods. Interviews with former LRA 
fighters and commanders have shown that pecuniary rewards are generally not used 
to motivate the rebels. Moreover, the LRA is not particularly driven by ideological or 
ethnic factors. Punishment and force on the other hand, are regularly used to 
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maintain allegiance of the rebels. One should take into account that the spillover 
effect of this use of force creates general fear among LRA rebels. According to Andvig 
and Gates this may lead to either increased obedience or desertion (2007). This 
highlights that the factors indicated by Gates (2002, 2007) do to a certain extent play 
a role in the creation of allegiance; however, interviews undertaken for this thesis 
have shown that these are not the most essential factors. What then actually creates 
allegiance within the LRA? What is the glue that keeps the LRA together? The LRA 
consists mainly of abductees who have been forced to become part of the group and 
stay in the bush. The lack of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards would make 
one assume that non-compliance and defection is high among LRA rebels. Yet this is 
not the case and the LRA still exists after more than two decades of fighting with child 
soldiers abducted years ago in Uganda still being part of the group. One of the 
clearest examples is Dominic Ongwen, who was abducted by the LRA as a teenager, 
became one of the top commanders, was put in charge of the LRA operations in DR 
Congo, and is currently under ICC indictment (Cakaj, 2010). Gates points out that a 
rebel group needs organizational abilities to ensure allegiance of its troops (2002). 
How does the LRA manage to remain such a cohesive body? 
 
Neglecting Socialization 
The factors pointed out by Blattman, Andvig, and Gates indeed play a significant role 
in deterring defection and creating allegiance. However, an important contributing 
factor that is neglected by these scholars is the process of socialization. Interviews 
with former LRA child soldiers and commanders have revealed that socialization 
plays an essential (if not the most significant) role in deterring defection and creating 
allegiance. Blattman indicates that child soldiers often encounter possibilities to run 
away from rebel groups, yet decide to stay (2007, 2008). Furthermore, he points out 
that in order to maintain allegiance among forcefully recruited children, 
indoctrination and socialization play a fundamental role (2007). Even though he 
makes a significant move forward with his research on why and how children end up 
with the LRA, he does not answer the burning question why child soldiers remain 
with the LRA for such long periods of time. Blattman indicates socialization has 
something to do with it, yet fails to explain how the process of socialization leads to 
allegiance. Thus, Blattman notes the importance of socialization yet neglects the 
dynamics and key processes of how this takes place. This approach neglects the 
process leading to allegiance and is the exact trap Checkel emphasized in his research 
and to which I referred earlier (2001:557, see chapter 2 of this thesis, The Process of 
Socialization).  
Simultaneously, Gates and Andvig progress with their theory on allegiance yet 
do not reflect the whole problem either. Their research focuses on non-material 
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incentives, which, to some extent, play a role in the process of creating compliance 
and allegiance within the LRA. According to Andvig and Gates “members of a military 
group are kept attached to the organization through three forms of incentives: force; 
non-pecuniary benefits (often linked to ideology, religion, or ethnicity); and economic 
incentives (2007:10). This theory represents a step forward in understanding the 
mechanisms used by rebel groups, but fails to explain the entire problem. Again, 
research conducted by Andvig and Gates does not feature explanations of how 
socialization contributes to allegiance; they fail to analyze the dynamics and in-depth 
processes. As socialization creates interests, they neglect an essential aspect of the 
problem in their attempts to better understand rebel groups and child soldiers. 
However, although Blattman, Andvig and Gates fail to look at the problem 
dynamically, they all acknowledge that socialization is a significant contributing 
factor in the development of interests and allegiance. The main problem with their 
research is that while it presumes the dynamics, their analysis is one of comparative 
statics. This unfortunately results in a scope too narrow to reflect the broader picture 
and prevents them from in-depth analyses of how socialization contributes to the 
creation of interests and allegiance. This stresses the importance of research with a 
greater emphasis on the dynamics of socialization processes within rebel groups: it 
will give us so a better understanding of how these groups function and manage to 
sustain. 
Wood (2008) addresses some fundamental aspects of socialization and 
emphasizes the lack of research regarding social processes of civil war. Research has 
particularly failed to address how socialization is accomplished within rebel groups. 
In order to fill this gap in the research, the next section of this thesis will clarify how 
socialization is an essential, decisive factor in the creation of allegiance, interests and 
deterring defection within the LRA. Since the LRA recruits the majority of its 
members by force yet manages to efficiently control them, it is particularly interesting 
to analyze to which extend socialization plays a role in this. Socialization may serve as 
the glue that holds the group together. The following section builds primarily on the 
65 in-depth interviews I conducted with former LRA child soldiers and commanders. 
Only their accounts of the socialization processes within the LRA can solve the puzzle 
and give us the answer how socialization facilitated them with the motivation to stay.  
 
 
Fieldwork evidence 
The following figures show parts of the findings from my 65 interviews with former 
LRA child soldiers and commanders in Northern Uganda. Here it should be kept in 
mind that it is difficult to generalize from these results, as it is a relatively small 
sample. Still, the results support general patterns indicated during personal 
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interviews with former child soldiers and commanders. Besides this limitation, many 
LRA rebels remain in the bush. These figures indicate only the average ages of rebels 
who have returned from the bush. Average age and time spent with the LRA would 
probably be much higher if the group remaining in the bush were included in this 
research. These figures thus constitute a lower boundary. 
 
  
Boys 
 
Girls 
Average age of 
recruitment 
 
14.6 years 
 
12.6 years 
Average age of return to 
society 
 
17.5 years 
 
17.6 years 
Average period within 
the LRA 
 
2.9 years 
 
5 years 
Proportion participating 
in DDRR programs 
 
56% 
 
43% 
Total number of child 
soldiers in sample 
 
36 
 
30* 
Table 4.1 Field sample of LRA child soldiers. Total sample size: 66 
* One girl was abducted twice; hence the total number of recruits is 66 instead of 65 
 
Table 4.1 shows the average age of recruitment, the average age of return to 
society, the average number of years spent within the LRA, and the percentage of 
returnees who participated in DDRR programs after their return from the bush. In 
order to see whether there are differences in recruitment patterns of boys and girls, 
these are divided into different categories. The table shows that the average age of 
girls in this sample at time of recruitment was significantly lower than the average 
age of recruitment of boys. This can be explained by the fact that many young girls 
are recruited to become servants to older female rebels. They are particularly targeted 
during recruitment missions to help these women with domestic tasks and 
babysitting. Still, the average age of return to society was comparable for boys and 
girls in this sample. This indicates that girls remain with the LRA for longer periods 
of time. A possible explanation for this is that they are given to male rebels to be their 
wife and are encouraged to have children. Because of this, girls often give birth to 
several children in the bush, which makes it more difficult to leave the LRA. 
Interviews indicated that the LRA is particularly keen on raising these children who 
are born in the bush: they are “real” rebels, they know only “bush life” and will have a 
strong sense of loyalty to the group. Since the girls have to take care of their children, 
it is more difficult to leave the LRA. 
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Figure 4.1 LRA child soldiers: age of recruitment. Sample size: 66 
 
Figure 4.1 indicates that the majority of child soldiers in this sample were 
recruited between the age of 12 and 15. This supports Blattman’s theory and data that 
young adolescents are preferred by the LRA (2007). The horizontal axis shows the 
age of recruitment, the vertical axis shows the number of children recruited at this 
age.   
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Figure 4.2 LRA child soldiers: age of return to society. Sample size: 66  
 
Figure 4.2 indicates that the majority of child soldiers in this sample return to 
society when they are over 18 years of age. The horizontal axis shows the age of return 
to society while the vertical axis shows the number of children who returned at this 
age. The figure indicates that it is very difficult for younger children to leave the LRA, 
which I addressed, in earlier parts of this thesis. One of the reasons for this is that 
young children are extremely loyal, as also found in research conducted by Beber and 
Blattman (2013). Young children are generally more dependent on fellow group 
members and it is relatively easy to disorient them. This shows how difficult it is for 
them to leave the bush on their own; their sole chance to get away from the LRA is 
being rescued by the UPDF. The only boy in under the age of 10 this sample who did 
manage to escape the LRA was in fact rescued after a hard battle with the UPDF.  
Figure 4.2 also indicates that child soldiers are most likely to escape from the 
LRA when they are older than 18. My field research indicates that a possible 
explanation is the fact that child soldiers get more freedom within the LRA once they 
have become integrated rebels and stayed with the LRA for a longer period of time. 
Senior rebels and commanders heavily monitor new recruits for several months up to 
years, yet if they give a continuous impression of being well integrated into the group, 
they are given more freedom. This implies that they are no longer strictly supervised; 
they can for instance fetch water or hunt on their own. Given these conditions, this 
increases their chances to escape and leave the bush. This is in line with research 
conducted by Beber and Blattman, who found that young recruits had the highest 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
Under 10 11 years 13 years 15 years 17 years Over 18 
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
re
tu
rn
in
g 
Age of return to society 
Boys 
Girls 
  
 
91 
allegiance to Kony: 34% of rebels aged 11–13 were loyal to the group, compared to 
22% of rebels at the age of 24–26 (2013:88). 
 
 
Socialization Processes within the Lord’s Resistance Army 
“The LRA’s almost total reliance on forced recruitment distinguishes it from the other 
rebel majority of rebel movements in Africa and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the LRA, 
like any force, has to motivate its recruits not only to participate (i.e. not run away) 
but also to carry out their dangerous duties” (Blattman and Annan, 2008:7).  
 
This section will show how the LRA motivates and controls its members: most 
importantly, it will highlight the role socialization plays in achieving this. This section 
will particularly reflect the first processes of socialization used within the LRA. It will 
shed light on the role of initiation rituals, training, violence, and hazing, and how 
these contribute to socialize and hereby motivate new abductees. Blattman and 
Annan (2008) argue that their interviews with rebel commanders and abductees have 
revealed which methods the LRA employs in order to create motivation for abductees 
to participate and perform. According to their results, the provision of material 
incentives and rewards did not play an important role in creating this motivation. 
There was little to give so instead promises were made that upon victory the rebels 
would receive material rewards and high positions in the army or government. 
Moreover, the main methods of control proved to be violence and the threat of 
punishment. “Real and threatened death and injury were among the primary means 
of dissuading escape and motivating performance.” Moreover, control was achieved 
by ordering “the forcible commission of violence (typically killing or the desecration 
of dead bodies) as a key feature of initiation into the group, one that serves several 
purposes: terrorizing the youth to break down his psychological defenses, raising the 
specter of punishment by his community if he were to return, and desensitizing the 
recruit to violence” (Blattman and Annan, 2008:7). Indeed, these tactics contribute to 
the creation of motivation and control among child soldiers with the LRA. However, 
Blattman and Annan miss out on the essential role socialization plays in the creation 
of allegiance by failing to analyze the deeper dynamics of socialization processes 
within the LRA. 
 
Formal and Informal Socialization 
In her work on the social processes of civil war, Wood states that these processes play 
a significant role in the creation of a cohesive unit. She argues that “the consequences 
of military socialization for combatants are not well documented, but they surely 
include the effects of recruitment and training processes as well as the effects of 
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witnessing and wielding violence. Whether recruits of armed groups are volunteers or 
have been coerced, they have to be socialized in the use of violence for group, not 
private, purposes, if group leaders are to control the violence deployed by their 
combatants, typically through the building of strongly hierarchical organizations. 
Training and socialization to the armed group take place both formally, through the 
immersion experience of “boot camp,” and informally, through initiation rituals and 
hazing. The powerful experiences of endless drilling, dehumanization through abuse 
at the hands of the drill sergeant, and degradation followed by “rebirth” as group 
members through initiation rituals typically melt individual recruits into a cohesive 
unit in which loyalties to one another are felt to be stronger than previous loyalties, 
such as those to family” (2008:546).   
Military socialization as Wood describes it certainly takes place within the 
LRA. Abductees are socialized in the use of violence for group purposes resulting in a 
strong hierarchical organization. This process of formal and informal socialization 
starts from the moment children are abducted by the LRA. Formal socialization is 
achieved by “boot camp”: an intense military training which drills the newly abducted 
children as soldiers. They are generally taught how to dismantle and operate guns, 
how to march, how to patrol areas to detect UPDF forces, how to dodge UPDF 
soldiers, and learn about fighting tactics. This process can take several days up to 
some months, depending on the LRA’s position and the intensity of attacks by the 
UPDF. Generally, training seemed to be most intense when the rebels were located in 
camps throughout South Sudan. There were few confrontations with the UPDF, 
which gave the LRA more time to sufficiently train their new recruits. As a former 
LRA rebel (13F5) explained, “after I was abducted, the rebels took me to Sudan. We 
had to walk for 4 days without food and did not rest. When we came to Sudan we 
were taken to the LRA camp. Then the training started. The rebels taught us how to 
dismantle the gun and how to shoot and march. I also learned how to move through 
the bush without leaving traces for the UPDF. The rebels told me how to use tactics to 
attack the enemy. We were 12 people in the training. We all came from different 
places in Gulu, Pader, and Kitgum districts. The rebels trained us for 2 months so we 
would be good rebels and could be selected to go fight in Uganda. The training was 
difficult but we wanted to be selected to fight for the LRA. I tried to become a good 
rebel and I can shoot the gun very well. I killed many UPDFs when I was selected to 
go back to Uganda.”  
In addition, informal socialization takes place through a “welcome ceremony” 
of initiation rituals and hazing. The initiation ritual of the LRA is used to register its 
new members. As a means of registration, newly abducted children on average 
receive 50 to 150 caning strokes. If they cry the number of strokes is increased, often 
until they lose consciousness. Alternatively, they are beaten with the flat side of a 
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panga, a machete, to be registered as a group member. In addition, a ritual with shea 
nut butter is performed. The butter is smeared on the head, chest, back, and hands of 
the abductees. Another former LRA child soldier (12F5) explained: “the rebels told us 
that the shea butter will protect us from UPDF attacks. The bullets would not be able 
to find us. They also told us that they would always know where we were because of 
the shea butter. If we would escape they would always get us…and then they would 
finish us.”  
After completing the shea butter ceremony, boys are not allowed to wash 
themselves for three days and girls cannot wash themselves for four days. During 
these three or four days, the newly abducted children are guarded and have to eat and 
sleep separately from the rebels which have stayed in the bush for longer periods of 
time. This has an important symbolic value in Acholi culture: when a baby is born it is 
not taken to the outside world until it is three (in case it is a boy) or four days old (in 
case it is a girl). This implies that the shea nut butter ritual leads to the “rebirth” of 
abductees as group members. According to LRA terms the civilian spirit is erased and 
the children become “integrated rebels.” As one boy (14M4) expressed “they chased 
away the civilian spirit by performing the rituals. You become a real integrated rebel 
after that and you are accepted as a member of the group by the commanders. You 
are no longer a civilian, the rebels are your new family.” These formal and informal 
socialization processes within the LRA show the beginning stages of how individual 
recruits are melted into a cohesive unit. 
 
Experiencing Violence 
During and after the registration process LRA abductees generally experience 
extreme forms of violence. This is commonly used within rebel groups as described 
by Wood: “once deployed, combatants experience (to widely varying degrees) 
violence as perpetrators, as witnesses, and often as victims. Combatant memoirs 
consistently report the traumatizing effects of watching the death or injury of fellow 
combatants, as well as the harrowing effects for many of using violence themselves. 
Among the psychological mechanisms possibly at work in these processes of 
socialization to group membership and the wielding of violence are compliance, role 
adoption, internalization of group norms, cognitive dissonance reduction, 
habituation to violence, diffusion of responsibility onto the group, deindividuation, 
and dehumanization of the victimized group” (2008:546). Through these processes, 
children become part of the violent culture of a rebel group. 
The profound effects that a combination of these processes exerts on LRA 
child soldiers are clearly shown by their allegiance to the group and the extreme 
violence they practice. Young abductees are often forced by LRA commanders to 
exert lethal violence, in many cases against family or village members. Besides that, 
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violence and fear are used to control the behavior of new recruits. Suffered and 
observed violence create high levels of fear among abductees. This was strongly 
indicated during field research. As one of my informants (13M6) explained: “one day 
I was going to town with my friends to get sugar, salt and cassava. On the way back I 
was walking in front because my friends were tired of carrying the sugar. I met the 
rebels on the road. They came out of the bush and asked me where I was going. I told 
them I was going home. They asked if I was alone so I told them I was with my three 
friends. They ordered me to wait in the bush with them until my friends came. I could 
not run: they had guns. When my friends came they took them too. Then something 
bad happened. Two of my friends tried to run away. The rebels shot one and captured 
the other one. They told me and my other friend to kill him. They gave us the panga 
(machete) but we could not do it. They got angry and were yelling that they would kill 
us all if we would not do it. They started beating my friend so we had to kill the other 
one, I was fearing them. After we had finished him, the rebels told me to open his 
skull. I had to eat his brain and drink the blood. I could not go home, I was covered in 
blood. The rebels told me I was becoming a real rebel now and we started walking 
into the bush. I never went back home.” This account is just one of many cases in 
which children are forced to exert lethal violence on their relatives and friends. 
However dramatic this may seem, it often results in strong allegiance to the group. In 
Several informants revealed that they were so ashamed of their acts, that it prevented 
them from returning home: instead, they stayed with the rebels and become part of a 
‘new family’. 
Moreover, the rebels tell new recruits they will be killed if they try to escape—
so most of them stay with the group. Children that do try to escape are often caught 
and killed. The experience of an informant (9F11) is just one of many. She tells: “one 
of the girls tried to escape when she was sent to fetch water. The rebels caught her 
and she was given to the other abductees to be killed. There were ten newly abducted 
children. The rebels put the girl in the middle of the group. The new abductees were 
all standing around her and the rebels ordered them all to touch and beat the girl. 
The abductees started beating her until she did not move anymore.” Another child 
(12M4) said: “one of the boys who had tried to escape was caught. They took him 
back to the base and then the other children had to beat him with all the tools we had, 
until he died. His eyes looked so scared and he cried and cried. But we all had to 
laugh and yell at him. The commanders said that if we wouldn’t do so, we were also 
thinking about escaping and we would be killed just like the boy. So we laughed and 
laughed until his screaming stopped and there was no more life in his eyes. That was 
my first one and it was the worst of everything I experienced as a rebel, it felt as if 
part of me also died right there.” 
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Interviews with former LRA child soldiers revealed that the use of violence had 
become normal for them: all constraints disappeared due to the exposure to constant 
violence. This may explain why the LRA has become more and more violent towards 
civilians over the years. In her analysis of military socialization within the RUF in 
Sierra Leone, Wood identifies a similar phenomenon. Wood explains that “the 
frequently observed widening of repertoires of violence over the course of the war 
likely reflects the ongoing effects of these underlying mechanisms, particularly 
dehumanization, diffusion of responsibility, habituation, and deindividuation, all of 
which are likely to undermine constraints on violence” (2008:547). This contrasts 
with Weinstein’s explanation of violence, who claims that external support or an 
abundance of natural resources are key factors to high levels of indiscriminate 
violence being carried out  (2007). In the case of the LRA, neither of these two factors 
were present, yet the level of indiscriminate violence was extraordinary with 
numerous mutilations, extensive plundering and displacement of people taking place 
(Kalyvas, 2006).  
As elaborated upon in chapter 3, violence is a powerful tool to turn children 
into effective soldiers. Violence wielded, suffered, and observed also emerges as an 
integral part of the process of socialization of LRA combatants. As a result of this 
traumatic socialization, many child soldiers started to view the LRA as their family 
and their commanders as father figures. As one of the LRA child soldiers (14M4) put 
it: “when we were living in the bush, there was a lot of violence. The UPDF attacked 
us and we had to fight them back. Some of the children did not listen and were 
punished. They were properly caned and the rebels would say this is what happens 
when you do not listen. But when I was a good rebel and killing many UPDFs, the 
rebels were good to me. I was not caned anymore and I got the rank of sergeant. I had 
my gun in the bush and the rebels protected me from UPDFs. They were my family, 
this was now my life. I wanted to fight, I was not thinking of home anymore.”  
As this account indicates, the LRA displaced and transformed the socialization 
processes of civilian life. As Wood argues: “recruits’ socialization into military life 
reshapes social networks in many ways. Rather than transitioning to adult life 
through traditional cultural rituals of maturation, apprenticeships to particular 
occupations, and participation in migrant labor networks, young recruits are 
socialized to adulthood through their integration into armed groups and the wielding 
of violence. In Uganda, former child soldiers were significantly disadvantaged by 
their loss of schooling and skill development, and a minority was significantly 
traumatized as well. An overarching pattern is the substitution of complex everyday 
ties, shaped by multiple overlapping networks of family, employment, and 
community, by ties with the members of the armed group” (2008:547). In many cases 
ties with the LRA became so strong that it replaced family ties. During interviews 
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former child soldiers often expressed a sense of belonging to the LRA. They had 
friends and a new family in the bush, and could loot whatever they wanted. They had 
gotten guns now which gave them power, while at home they did not have anything. 
They were living and fighting together as a group; they were taking care of each other 
and there seemed no point to return home. This sense of community is also described 
by Brehm and Gates, who argue that the feeling of camaraderie and solidarity results 
in social cohesion, compliance with collective goals and high retention (Brehm and 
Gates, 2008, and Gates, 2011). 
The strong ties among LRA rebels deter defection. One of the first stages in the 
development of these new ties is the restraining of mobility. Children are forced to 
publicly kill in front of their family and neighbors and are then taken away to 
unknown areas. Most children are taken to Sudan and separated from children from 
their home village. This keeps them from running away; the killing has burned the 
bridges with their home community and even if they want to return they do not know 
the way. This is particularly effective with very young children, as seen in figure 4.2. 
As a result they start developing new ties with the rebel group. Also, a buddy system 
is established. Child soldiers monitor each other and are punished in case their buddy 
misbehaves or tries to escape. This prevents defection. This shows how fear is indeed 
a cause for joining as well as staying with the LRA as indicated earlier by Blattman 
and Gates. Brim argues that the use of “group interaction as the context for learning 
and group interchange is the most effective method. This follows from the fact that 
the adult is not a tabula rasa and that the educational problem is one of change, of 
erasing what exists and substituting something new” (Brim, 1968:557). By letting 
these children kill their relatives and burn the bridges with their past, the LRA aims 
to erase their civilian spirit and substitute it with the identity of a rebel. 
 Child soldiers within the LRA developed personal ties to each other, their 
commanders and even to Joseph Kony. This makes the character of the LRA as an 
organization rather personalized and indicates that children became loyal to their 
superiors not only because of their position, but also because of their personality. As 
Andvig and Gates reason: “children’s need for security, to have someone to love and 
respect may be—rather perversely many would feel—transferred to military 
commanders” (2007). This is indeed the case: many former LRA child soldiers 
explain that the LRA has become their new family and their commanders became 
their new fathers. Many even seem to have had a special connection to Kony himself. 
They used to be in training camps in South Sudan and Kony would come to the camp 
every once in a while. He would come to preach to the rebels but afterwards, when all 
children had returned to their barracks, Kony would pay them a visit and have a chat 
with them. They would talk about general things, about life in the camp and Kony 
would make jokes. During personal interviews, many children expressed feelings of 
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affection and appreciation towards him. Kony’s charisma, and that of other 
commanders, seemed to have played a significant role in the development of such 
feelings. Such developments seem extremely contradictory given the fact most of 
these children were abducted and forced to join the LRA. This indicates how powerful 
the process of socialization within the LRA is and highlights the importance of 
researching this phenomenon in order to better understand child soldiers. 
 
Organizational Socialization within the Lord’s Resistance Army 
Socialization is used by the LRA to remain a cohesive body. It is amongst other things 
used to achieve internalization of the norms and values by their new members. 
However, “practices, norms, and preferences are not only internalized by individual 
actors, but, because they are shared by many, also characterize and shape the identity 
of larger social aggregates” (Beyers, [in: Bearce and Bondanella] 2007:707). This 
implies that internalization leads to a cohesive body: it can be seen as the glue that 
keeps a group together. Through interaction on a regular, sustained basis new 
identities and interests are taken on among the members of a group (Bearce and 
Bondanella, 2007). This leads to interest convergence and building bridges within the 
LRA, aiming for an effective organization and high allegiance among its rebels. 
According to Van Maanen socialization processes necessarily involve the 
transmission of information and values. As explained in chapter two of this 
dissertation, organizational socialization consists of six different tactics and refers to 
“the process by which one is taught and learns “the ropes” of a particular 
organizational role. In its most general sense, organizational socialization is then the 
process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to 
assume an organizational role” (1977:3). Moreover, it refers to the way new recruits 
are taught about the group expectations concerning behavior and values, while 
simultaneously learning about what is not acceptable in these regards. As seen while 
laying out the theoretical foundation in chapter two, socializing agents employ a mix 
of different tactics when socializing their new recruits into the organization. The 
following sections will provide an analysis of the different types of organizational 
socialization that are at work within the LRA, based on the framework developed by 
Van Maanen (1977). 
 
Collective Socialization 
The first of six potential tactics is collective socialization. This “refers to the tactic of 
taking a group of recruits who are facing a given boundary passage and putting them 
through a common set of experiences together. A good example of this process is 
basic training or boot camp in military organizations” (Van Maanen, 1977). Moreover, 
Van Maanen argues that “collective socialization programs are usually found in 
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organizations where there are a large number of recruits to be processed into the 
same organizationally defined role; where the content of this role can be fairly clearly 
specified; and, where the organization desires to build a collective sense of identity, 
solidarity, and loyalty within the cohort group being socialized” (Van Maanen, 
1977:41). A clear example of this can be found within the military training of the LRA. 
After groups of children have been abducted the rebels usually order all new 
abductees to gather for military training. They are shown how to dismantle the gun 
and told what all the gun parts are called. After this demonstration the new abductees 
are given guns and have to repeat what they have learned. The ones who fail are 
punished and usually caned until they manage to complete the training properly.  
However, Van Maanen acknowledges that collective socialization may provide 
a potential basis for resistance among new recruits. As the new recruits may face 
common problems overcoming the presented boundary passages, they may look for 
solutions as a group. Thus, the likelihood of rebellion within a collectively socialized 
group is relatively high, which may lead to collective deviation (Van Maanen, 
1977:42). However, any form of resistance or deviation is efficiently tackled by the 
LRA through the use of extreme forms of violence against deviating members. An 
example of this is witnessing or carrying out the killing and beating of misbehaving 
fellow group members, either by integrated rebels or new recruits. This discourages 
other rebels from deviating, as they fear the same punishment. According to LRA 
standards, a rebel misbehaves not only when he or she attempts to escape, but also 
when this person thinks about home. This emerges clearly from the account of a 
former LRA child soldier (10F13): “there was one young boy who was always sitting 
alone. He was not active and very quiet. One day, the rebels ordered me to get him. I 
brought him to the group and they gave me the panga (machete). In front of everyone 
they said: “this one is trying to escape. He is sitting alone and thinking about home. 
We don’t want that, you have to be active! We are your family and you will stay with 
us in the bush! You know what happens to betrayers? We finish them! You first kill 
this boy!” They pushed me to the boy. He looked at me with big eyes. I did not want to 
but I had to do it. If I did not finish him they would kill me too.” 
This example shows that LRA commanders tackle potential deviation by 
spreading fear and carrying out punishments in public. Besides that, collective 
deviation is avoided as child soldiers within the LRA are strictly supervised and are 
not given the opportunity to discuss discomforts among themselves. Their behavior is 
thoroughly analyzed and if rebel commanders are not satisfied with their attitude 
they are heavily punished. In most cases, fellow child soldiers are ordered to carry out 
the punishment. The inclusion in these punishments prevents them from engaging in 
non-compliant behavior. This high level of surveillance significantly limits 
possibilities for collective deviation. 
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Formal Socialization 
In addition to collectively socializing new recruits, the LRA utilizes a formal 
socialization process: the second organizational socialization tactic described by Van 
Maanen. “Formal socialization refers to those processes in which a newcomer is more 
or less segregated from regular organizational members while being put through a set 
of experiences tailored explicitly for the newcomer” (Van Maanen, 1977:43–44). The 
segregation from regular organizational members, in this case “integrated” rebels, is 
an important aspect of the socialization process practiced by the LRA. During their 
initiation period child soldiers stay separated from integrated rebels, sleep in 
different places, eat different food, and are not allowed to approach integrated rebels. 
As explained in the previous section of this chapter, they go through a set of 
experiences that is especially designed for new recruits in order to integrate them 
within the group. These include severe caning of each new recruit as a means of 
registration, the ritual in which new recruits are smeared with shea butter, the task of 
carrying out violence, and a strict training regime. This is done to teach the new 
recruit his or her new role and to feel and think like an LRA member. As Van Maanen 
describes it, formal socialization is typically found in organizations “where it is 
deemed important that a newcomer learns the “correct” attitudes, values, and 
protocol associated with the new role. To put the matter bluntly, the more formal the 
process, the more concern there is likely to be shown for the recruit’s absorption of 
the appropriate demeanor and stance associated with the target role” (1977:45). 
Formal periods of socialization “serve to provide an intensive period in which others 
in the organization can rather closely judge the newcomer’s commitment and 
deference to the critical values of the occupation” (Van Maanen, 1977:46). During this 
period commanders closely monitor and supervise newly abducted children. As 
explained earlier, those who do not adhere to the demands of the commander face 
severe punishment and are likely to be killed. 
 
Random Socialization 
The processes practiced by the LRA can also be identified as random socialization: 
the third tactic of organizational socialization. “Random socialization occurs when 
the sequence of steps leading to the target role is unknown, ambiguous, or continually 
changing…Thus, in random processes, while there may be a number of steps or stages 
leading to the taking of certain organizational roles, there is no necessary order 
specified in terms of the steps that are to be taken” (Van Maanen, 1977:51). Within 
the LRA there is no specific order of steps to be taken in order to achieve a particular 
organizational role. There is a clear hierarchical system within the organization, 
consisting of military ranks that distinguish between the status and roles of rebels. 
Yet it there is no structured path leading to the achievement of a rank or important 
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role.  
For instance, staying with the LRA for many years does not imply one is ever 
granted a military rank. New recruits may receive a rank much earlier than integrated 
rebels, all depending on their behavior and the personality of their commanders. The 
distribution of ranks can therefore vary greatly between LRA battalions. Generally 
speaking, if rebels are actively engaged with LRA activities, they earn the appreciation 
and respect of commanders. In some cases rebels will be given a rank for this reason, 
which will give them the responsibility for their own group of soldiers. Whether ranks 
are distributed in this way seems to depend on which battalion they are part of and 
particularly under which commander they fight. If a rebel manages to achieve 
something significant, a rank might immediately be given to this person, no matter 
how long he or she stayed with the LRA. Examples of achievements which generally 
lead to the provision of a military rank are: killing an important UPDF official, 
shooting UPDF vehicles, looting important supplies like weapons and bullets, and 
abducting a large number of children.   
The image on the next page shows a good example of the distribution of ranks 
within the LRA. The picture shows two of Kony’s bodyguards during the 2006 peace 
talks in Sudan. Interviews indicated that being a bodyguard implies that these two 
boys are both well integrated rebels: Kony does not allow newcomers close to him as 
he is afraid to be killed and needs to be surrounded by people who are capable to 
protect him. Therefore, they need to be well trained and integrated, showing that they 
have become “real” rebels. Even though the boys on the picture are both considered 
to be “real” rebels, they have different ranks. The one in the background does not 
wear a uniform and does not show signs of having a rank, which indicates he is a 
“normal” integrated rebel. The boy in front however, has an important rank within 
the LRA, which indicates an extraordinary accomplishment. Looking at the uniform 
he is wearing, one can see this is a uniform from the Ugandan government forces: the 
UPDF. Wearing this uniform indicates he has most likely killed a UPDF soldier and 
was able to take the uniform of his victim. Moreover, the blue and pink ropes on the 
left side of his body indicate he has achieved a rank: for instance by killing a high 
UPDF official, stealing their arms and radios, or shooting their vehicles. Still, even 
though some rebels obtain higher ranks through such achievements, these actions are 
not rewarded in a standardized way within each battalion and may lead to a higher 
rank only for some. Interviews with former LRA child soldiers revealed that there was 
no specific sequence of steps that could guarantee them a higher rank. These 
insecurities indicate that the LRA uses random socialization. 
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Variable Socialization 
As a fourth tactic of organizational socialization Van Maanen describes variable 
socialization processes which “give a recruit few clues as when to expect a given 
boundary passage” (1977:55). According to Van Maanen “variable socialization 
processes are most likely to produce custodial responses. The logic behind this 
proposition is simply that a variable situation leads to maximum anxiety and this 
anxiety operates as a strong motivator toward conformity…Variable socialization 
processes keep a recruit maximally off balance and at the mercy of socialization 
agents” (1977:58–59). This is indeed the case within the LRA whose entire existence 
may be perceived as a variable situation. As a rebel group they are chased by the 
UPDF and thus are constantly on the run throughout the region. This variable 
situation creates maximum anxiety for LRA recruits: they are taken far away from 
home, are constantly moving and generally do not know where they are. They have 
lost the sense of security they used to have at home and the only thing they have left 
is the LRA. This indeed leads to conformity, as shown by Gates (2011), and Brehm 
and Gates (2008). During interviews with LRA officers and abductees, Beber and 
Blattman found that a variable situation and uncertainty particularly affected young 
abductees; unfamiliar surroundings and their inability to be sufficiently cunning 
made them most fearful of escaping (2013).  
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Many child soldiers indicated during interviews that they had no idea where 
they were during most of their time with the LRA. Long periods of time were spent in 
South Sudan and it was impossible to escape from there, making them subject to 
lengthy socialization processes. Besides that, the UPDF was following them all the 
time. Being with the LRA they had the opportunity to defend themselves. They did 
not know where to turn if they wanted to leave the LRA and were scared of being 
killed by the government forces or civilians. For these reasons, many LRA rebels 
decided to stay with the group. This indicates the effective use of a variable 
socialization tactic by the LRA. 
 
Serial Socialization 
The fifth tactic of organizational socialization elaborated upon by Van Maanen is 
serial socialization. “A serial socialization process is one in which experienced 
members of the organization groom newcomers who are about to assume similar 
kinds of positions in the organization. In effect, these experienced members serve as 
role models for recruits” (Van Maanen, 1977:59). According to serial socialization, 
integrated LRA rebels and commanders would serve as role models for new recruits. 
This is indeed the case as these integrated rebels and commanders groom new 
recruits, as they will have to assume similar positions within the group. An example 
of this is the teaching of new recruits how to operate guns so they can participate in 
fighting like integrated rebels do.  
According to Van Maanen “serial socialization is most likely to be associated 
with inclusionary boundary passages. This association results because to become a 
central member of any organizational segment normally requires that others consider 
one to be affable, trustworthy, and, of course, central as well. This is unlikely to occur 
unless these others perceive the newcomer to be, in most respects, similar to 
themselves. Recruits must at least seem to be taking those with whom they work 
seriously or risk being labeled deviant in the situation and hence not allowed across 
inclusionary boundaries” (1977:62). This is extensively tested among new recruits 
within the LRA. Newcomers have to identify with and act like LRA rebels rather 
quickly. Integrated rebels and commanders test this development by asking new 
recruits questions that are often symbolic.  
A former LRA rebel (11M5) explained how commanders used to talk to newly 
recruited children in order to measure if they could be considered a real LRA 
member: “Commanders would often come talk to us, especially if we sat alone. The 
commanders would say they were thinking about home and ask if we felt the same. 
They did that to test us. If someone said he was thinking about home they would get 
really angry and cane him. If someone said he wanted to go home, we were told to 
finish him because he was not a good rebel.” Another boy (12M2) told about a more 
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symbolic type of questioning: “there was a boy in my group who was quiet. One day 
the commander asked him why he was so quiet. He said he did not know. Then the 
commander asked him if he liked turtles or scorpions better. The boy said he liked 
turtles. The commander got very angry and he yelled at the boy. He said that the 
turtle was like the UPDF: slow, stupid and useless. The scorpion was like Kony: 
mysterious, smart, fast, and poisonous. The commander yelled that the boy was a 
betrayer because he chose for the UPDF and not for Kony. Then he told us to chop 
him in pieces with the panga because we do not want betrayers.” This type of testing 
shows the importance of serial socialization within the LRA and the violent 
consequences of not assimilating with integrated rebels. If new recruits are not seen 
as identifying with the group and its members, severe punishments are carried out to 
set examples for the rest of the group. This encourages other group members to fulfill 
expectations so that they will be considered as trustworthy, well-integrated group 
members and hence avoid being punished.   
 
Divestiture Socialization 
As a final tactic of socialization Van Maanen elaborates upon divestiture socialization 
processes. These “seek to deny and strip away certain personal characteristics of a 
recruit” (1977:64). This type of socialization is “organized explicitly to disconfirm 
many aspects of the recruit’s entering self-image, thus beginning the process of 
rebuilding the individual’s self-image based upon new assumptions. Often these new 
assumptions arise from the recruit’s own discovery, gradual or dramatic, that they 
have an ability to do things they had not thought themselves able to do previously” 
(Van Maanen, 1977:65). This type of socialization is used by the LRA when it seeks to 
erase the civilian spirit from its recruits and turns them into integrated rebels. 
Children enter the LRA with a self-image that is completely rebuilt by the 
socialization process they undergo within the LRA. During the time they spend with 
the rebels, new recruits discover they are able to carry out extreme types of violence, 
kill people, loot villages and so on. 
Furthermore, “in extreme circumstances, recruits are forced to abstain from 
certain types of behavior, must publicly degrade themselves and others, and must 
follow a rigid set of rules and regulations. Furthermore, measures are often taken to 
isolate recruits from former associates who presumably would continue to confirm 
the recruit’s old identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:66). “Divestiture processes are most 
likely to be found (1) at the point of initial entry into an organization or occupation, 
and (2) prior to the crossing of major inclusionary boundaries where a recruit must 
pass some basic test of worthiness for membership in an organizational segment” 
(Van Maanen, 1977:67). This is clearly seen when children are abducted by the LRA. 
From the moment they become part of the group they are not allowed to greet their 
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family anymore and have to pretend they do not know them. They are removed as far 
as possible from their old identity, by burning all bridges with their past. They are 
often forced to kill in front of their village members when they enter the organization. 
Then, to become an integrated rebel, they have to pass the questions of commanders 
and are ordered to perform certain tasks (like killing or looting) as a test of 
worthiness of the group.  
 This highlights that “divestiture processes, in effect, remold the person and, 
therefore, are powerful ways for organizations and occupations to control the values 
of incoming members. It is such processes which lie at the heart of most professional 
training thus helping to explain why professionals appear to be so deeply and 
permanently socialized. For, once a person has successfully completed a difficult 
divestiture process and has constructed  something of a new identity based on the 
role to which the divestiture process was directed, there are strong forces toward the 
maintenance of the new identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:67). This explains why 
organizational socialization is used by the LRA; it leads to high levels of allegiance 
because their recruits take on new identities and become loyal to the group. 
Van Maanen’s theory of these six different processes of socialization shows 
that “these tactical dimensions are associated with one another and that the actual 
impact of organizational socialization upon a recruit is a cumulative one, the result of 
a combination of socialization tactics which perhaps enhance and reinforce or conflict 
and neutralize each other. It is also obvious that awareness of these tactical 
dimensions makes it possible for managers to design socialization processes which 
maximize the probabilities of certain outcomes” (Van Maanen, 1977:68). Looking at 
the tactics used by the LRA one can indeed derive that these reinforce and enhance 
each other, ensuring that new recruits are subject to effective organizational 
socialization, which creates motivation, loyalty, control, resilience and allegiance to 
the LRA. In order to analyze this process more in-depth, the next section of this 
chapter will further elaborate upon socialization processes found within the LRA. 
 
 
LRA Socialization: A Threefold Analytical Challenge 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Checkel stresses the importance of utilizing a 
threefold analytic challenge when focusing on socialization (2005). To pinpoint the 
socialization processes practiced by the LRA this section will use Checkel’s theory, 
aiming to “(1) establish the presence of socialization mechanisms and the conditions 
of their operation; (2) assess whether internalization (Type I or II) actually occurred; 
and (3) ask whether socialized actors behave differently than either they did before 
they were socialized, or than non-socialized actors do” (Checkel, 2005:816).  Applying 
this theory to the LRA will enable the identification of the exact mechanisms of 
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socialization used by the LRA, assess which type of internalization occurs among its 
rebels, and reveal whether socialized LRA rebels demonstrate different behavior. This 
threefold analysis will provide a clear overview of the effects and consequences of 
socialization within the LRA, and it will reveal whether recruits adopt the community 
rules, shifting away from a logic of consequences and toward a logic of 
appropriateness (Checkel, 2005). 
 
Socialization Mechanisms Present within the LRA and the Conditions of Their 
Operation 
Socialization is a highly efficient tool to engage children with the LRA. In comparison 
to adults, children are generally considered to be vulnerable, naïve and susceptible to 
outside influences. Thus, when growing up within the LRA, socialization teaches 
them to become part of the group and creates a sense of belonging. A variety of 
socialization mechanisms are used to achieve this, hence this section will address the 
following question: Which socialization mechanisms were present within the LRA 
and what were the conditions of their operation? According to Grusec and Hastings 
“socialization refers to processes whereby naive individuals are taught the skills, 
behavior patterns, values and motivations needed for competent functioning in the 
culture in which the child is growing up. Paramount among these are the social skills, 
social understandings, and emotional maturity needed for interaction with other 
individuals to fit in with the functioning of social dyads and larger groups. 
Socialization processes include all those whereby culture is transmitted from each 
generation to the next, including training for specific roles in specific occupations” 
(2007:13). 
  This definition will be used in order to show the mechanisms present within 
the LRA and under which conditions they operated. Thus, I will analyze which skills, 
behavior patterns, values, and motivations are taught to child soldiers within the 
LRA. In addition, I will highlight which methods are used to achieve this. 
 
Skills 
As Grusec and Hastings (2007) emphasized, socialization processes transmit culture 
from each generation to the next, for instance by training for specific roles in specific 
occupations. This can be seen in the particular types of training carried out by LRA 
rebels. Abductees are grouped and trained in different fields in order to eventually 
carry out a variety of roles. This is an important part of the socialization process—it is 
repeated with each new group of child recruits in order to transmit the rebel culture 
to the new generation. 
Children who have become involved with the LRA are taught a large variety of 
skills. They generally undergo an intense military training through which they are 
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taught how to operate and dismantle arms, lay land mines, learn how to target the 
enemy and how to march. In case children are selected to become bodyguards for 
commanders, they are taught the skills to protect their superior. Besides that, child 
recruits are taught about military strategies and tactics. Children who are not selected 
to become combatants are taught a variety of different skills. Integrated rebels teach 
them a range of skills needed for escorting, porting of looted goods, cooking, nursing, 
and babysitting. In addition, a selected group of rebels is trained to become medical 
personnel within the LRA. Commanders assess the intelligence of their recruits and 
the ones who seem capable are sent to do medical training at “sickbay” (a place where 
sick and wounded rebels are sent to in order to recover). Commanders discuss the 
assignment of tasks; they decide what kind of role a newly abducted child will 
perform and which skills they are to be taught. This is a common process within rebel 
groups which is also described by Andvig and Gates, who note that “officers of an 
armed force that employs children assess the relative capabilities of children and 
adults both in their recruitment and when allocating tasks” (2007:4). By assessing 
their capabilities and allocating the tasks, commanders seek to ensure that recruits 
are taught the right skills and perform maximally. 
 
Behavioral Patterns 
Teaching new recruits appropriate behavioral patterns is an important aspect of 
socialization within the LRA. New recruits are taught a large set of rules when they 
become part of the group in order to make sure they behave correctly. The 65 
interviews I conducted among former child soldiers and commanders in Northern 
Uganda revealed that the LRA top designs specific rules to control behavior of their 
recruits. Examples of these rules are the following: 
• LRA rebels are prohibited to escape  
• Rebels are prohibited to have any form of contact with civilians 
• Rebels are prohibited to eat food prepared by civilians, this will poison them 
• In case family or village members are recognized these people are to be 
ignored 
• During training in Sudan girls are prohibited to have contact with the Arabs 
• Rebels should at all times cooperate with fellow group members 
• Rebels should at all times protect fellow group members 
• It is prohibited to think about or discuss their earlier homes 
• It is prohibited to discuss ideas to escape with other rebels 
• Solitary behavior is not allowed, one should at all times engage in activities  
• One must engage in group prayers which are held on a weekly basis 
• It is prohibited to drink alcohol 
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• It is prohibited to smoke because this enables the UPDF to detect them  
• In order to prevent tensions amongst rebels, it is prohibited to fall in love with 
fellow group members unless women are given to a male rebel to be his wife 
• It is prohibited to withdraw from fighting the UPDF 
• Recruits must stay in the bush because people from their village and even 
family will reject and kill them if they return 
• Looting and killing is allowed only when this is ordered by Kony or his 
commanders 
• If Kony decides they enter a period in which killing of civilians is not allowed, 
this rule is to be adhered to until Kony declares otherwise 
• When rebels are looting they should avoid red and white things because the 
enemy will detect them 
• When girls menstruate they are to stay separate from the group until “they are 
clean again” 
• New recruits are to stay separate from the group until they are initiated and 
become real rebels 
• When new recruits enter the group they should address all integrated rebels as 
“teacher” 
• It is prohibited to use a bicycle or vehicles, rebels always have to go on foot 
• Rebels are prohibited to use looted goods for themselves, everything is to be 
given to the commander who may divide it amongst them 
• Rebels have to be “strong hearted” and fight to take over the government 
• Rebels who are active and perform well will receive a rank 
• Newly abducted children are to be divided into different groups and cannot 
stay with people abducted from the same village 
• Groups of four newly abducted children are given to an integrated rebel who 
has the responsibility of supervising them 
• When attacking a village, each rebel has to abduct a specific number of people 
• It is prohibited to eat on the battlefield 
• Whatever Kony’s spirits say, all rebels must comply with its orders 
 
Values 
As explained earlier in this chapter, newly abducted children are registered as LRA 
members by caning and several spiritual rituals. Kony is believed to be a disciple from 
God and thus all LRA members are to follow his orders. The orders come from 
several spirits by which Kony is possessed. Most importantly, it is believed by LRA 
rebels that Kony possesses a Holy Spirit that tells the LRA what to do and gives 
directions and orders. Rebels are to obey all orders given and express a sincere belief 
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in Kony’s spirits. Interviews have revealed that the LRA becomes the abductee’s new 
family: it will take care of abductees, and gives them a new outlook on life. Former 
rebels express the importance of avoiding tension within the group. Tension among 
rebels is not allowed and should be solved right away in order not to form a threat to 
group cohesion. The rebels become each other’s brothers and sisters and should treat 
each other like that: they must protect and take care of each other.  
New abductees are at the bottom of the hierarchical system and should always 
show respect to integrated rebels. The integrated rebels will show them how to live in 
the bush. Once newly abducted children become real integrated rebels (by showing 
correct behavior) they are given their own group of new abductees, which they are 
supposed to integrate in the LRA. Respect for each other is a key factor and rebels 
who do not behave according to expectations are to be reported and punished. There 
is a relatively high social control among the rebels, which, in combination with their 
shared values, melt them into a cohesive group. 
 
Motivations 
Looking at the circumstances of their recruitment into the LRA, it may be hard to 
imagine child soldiers become motivated to fight with the rebels. Andvig claims that 
“intrinsic motivation cannot be either bought or forced, it is either present or not” 
(2006:32). This assumption is incorrect. Socialization within the LRA has made child 
soldiers change their norms, values, and even identities to such a large extent that 
their motivations have become intrinsic, even after being forced to become part of the 
LRA. The LRA has created a sophisticated socialization mechanism that creates 
allegiance and fierce loyalty among many of its rebels. For instance, LRA rebels are 
generally motivated to remain part of the group by promises of Kony and their 
commanders. One of the most important motivators is the promise they will get a 
position within the government once the Ugandan government is overthrown by the 
LRA. As these rebels come from very poor backgrounds and miss out on education 
during their stay in the bush, this seems the most viable option for most of them. The 
rebels are promised that if they fight hard, they will get money when they overthrow 
the government and that they will rule the country together in order to realize better 
life standards for the Acholi population in the North. This motivates them in their 
struggle with the UPDF and contributes to a shared feeling of “us vs. them.” 
Another significant factor contributing to motivation is the achievement of 
ranks: an example of non-pecuniary rewards. Getting a rank will give a rebel control 
and power; he or she will be given an own group of soldiers. These soldiers have to 
fight for the rebel and carry out tasks like cooking, washing, and fetching water. This 
gives the rebel a sense of power, which is not likely to be experienced in their old 
village. In addition, male rebels are given wives. They start a new family within the 
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LRA, have children and establish friendships. This contributes to the development of 
strong ties among LRA rebels. Besides that, the rebels have an almost constant access 
to food and other supplies since they loot what is needed in the bush. The fact that 
everything is “free” in the bush proves to be a significant motivating factor for 
remaining with the LRA. Overall, many child soldiers express the feeling that life in 
the bush had significant advantages over life in their villages or IDP camps. At home 
they simply did not have anything, due to the extreme poverty. There were few future 
expectations and opportunities, which made staying with the rebels a good 
alternative. They were not so hungry any longer and believed they would take over 
the government one day. The prospect of such rewards provided them with a much 
brighter future compared to if they had stayed at home. Therefore, many former child 
soldiers expressed high levels of motivation when they were part of the LRA and were 
transformed from scared, abducted children into motivated, loyal fighters.  
 
Means of Teaching 
Several means of teaching are used in order to create the necessary social skills, social 
understandings, and emotional maturity among child soldiers within the LRA. An 
often described example of this is the use of fear. In addition to this, punishment is an 
important means of teaching within the LRA. If child soldiers do not successfully 
acquire the skills they are taught, caning or strokes with a machete heavily punish 
them. Yet most of the time they are killed to set an example of what happens if you 
are not a “good” rebel. The same types of punishment are carried out when rebels 
break the rules or show a lack of motivation. For instance, it is common to kill a 
couple which fell in love in front of their group, as this is inappropriate behavior. 
Also, commanders have rebels killed who do not show active behavior and do not 
eagerly fight the UPDF. This sets examples for other group members who adjust their 
behavior in order to avoid punishment. In addition, rebels are told they will be 
punished anyhow, even if fellow rebels do not discover their misbehavior. They are 
told that the bullet will find them at the battlefield and they will be killed by the 
UPDF. 
Although these are prominent factors, fear and punishment are not the only 
important means of learning. The LRA uses group meetings, assemblies, and spiritual 
beliefs as well. Each battalion of the LRA has its regular group meetings. These often 
take place when they have received a message from Kony on how to proceed with 
their struggle. All the rebels are informed of the new expectations and are supposed 
to act accordingly from that moment on. If they fail to do this, punishment will 
follow. Rebels are called to gather in certain areas for an assembly whenever the LRA 
is either unsuccessful or successful in its achievements. If they have failed in battles 
with the UPDF and have lost many of their combatants, Kony generally calls for an 
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assembly to discuss what has happened. Failing tactics are pointed out as well as 
other areas of improvement. Kony instructs his rebels how to proceed and gives his 
commanders orders to closely supervise their rebels. If the rebels have been very 
successful and won important battles, Kony calls for an assembly to emphasize this. 
According to former child soldiers these meetings motivated the rebels to continue 
the fighting and be “good” rebels, aiming to destroy the enemy. 
Since these children are growing up in the violent culture of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, these means of teaching ensure they are competent in functioning 
as full members of the rebel group. As Grusec and Hastings (2007) argue, social 
skills, social understandings, and emotional maturity are of essential value for the 
interaction with fellow group members in order to fit in with the functioning of the 
entire group. The aim of achieving this can clearly be seen within the LRA by the 
presence and operation of a variety of socialization mechanisms.  
 
The Achievement of Internalization Type I and II 
According to Checkel socialization leads to Type I or II internalization. The first type 
refers to “learning a role—acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in 
accordance with expectations—irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with 
it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or 
community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, means simply that conscious 
instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing” (Checkel, 
2005:804). “On the other hand, following a logic of appropriateness may go beyond 
role playing and imply that agents accept community or organizational norms as “the 
right thing to do.” We call this Type II internalization/socialization, and it implies 
that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of 
which they are part. Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by 
“taken-for-grantedness”” (Checkel, 2005:804). Checkel’s definitions will be used to 
answer the following question: did internalization, Type I or II, actually occur within 
the LRA? 
Interviews have revealed that socialization within the LRA has indeed led to 
internalization, both Type I and II. Still, which type of internalization has occurred 
varies from person to person. It emerges that children who have been abducted at a 
very young age (under 12 years of age) are most likely to reach the stage of Type II 
internalization. This can be explained by the fact they have experienced less 
socialization processes as civilians, making it less complicated to socialize them 
within the LRA. Recruits who were over the age of 18 were the most difficult to 
socialize, and generally reached Type I internalization. According to LRA 
commanders it seemed more difficult to get them to adopt the identity of the LRA, 
not least since they often had wives and families at home. They found it hard to forget 
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about civilian life and erase the civilian spirit. This indicates a significant difference 
between children and adult recruits. These findings are in line with Blattman (2007, 
2008) and Andvig and Gates (2009).  
Gender also seems to play a role in whether Type I or II internalization is 
achieved by LRA socialization. Girls more often expressed feelings of wanting to go 
home, particularly because they were given as wives to male rebels. They had no 
choice of who would become their “husband” which initially made it more difficult for 
them to consider the LRA as their new family. They performed their roles because it 
was expected but generally did not adopt the LRA identity. This seemed to change 
when the girls got pregnant and gave birth to the rebels’ children: bush children. 
Once they had children girls seemed to adapt more easily to the group and started 
considering it as their new home. Male abductees on the other hand, seemed to have 
less problems achieving Type II internalization. Having access to a gun, food, clothes, 
and eventually getting a wife and children in the bush, gave them a strong sense of 
agency and power. Boys generally expressed strong motivation to remain with the 
LRA to fight for its goals. Moreover, they clearly expressed that they felt life in the 
bush was better than life in the camps. They had no future in the camps and were 
suffering from poverty, and felt the LRA offered them a better alternative. This made 
them feel part of the LRA community and they generally perceived themselves as real 
rebels. 
Overall, a clear majority of the total number of interviewees reached Type II 
internalization while they were with the LRA. They expressed feelings that they were 
indeed doing the right thing by fighting with the LRA. They particularly expressed the 
motivation to be fighting for a better future for the Acholi. Still, after these child 
soldiers had returned to society, Type II internalization eventually started to 
diminish. The majority speaks of severe problems when they returned from the bush. 
Many of them were rescued by the UPDF and placed back into society involuntarily. 
This has led to numerous escalations and violent encounters. One of my female 
informants had spent 8 years with the rebels, was rescued by the UPDF when she was 
17 and brought back to her home community. She did not understand the way of life 
in her village and according to which standards people behaved towards each other. 
She (9F8) explains: “after the UPDFs brought me home, I was living with my family. 
It was very difficult. I was not used to them and I did not like it in the village. People 
looked at me and they did not want to talk with me. They were making fun of me. I 
wanted to go back to the bush, back to my friends and fight. One day my father was 
angry with me because I wanted to go back. He did not understand being a rebel is 
good. My mother took me into the hut and we started cooking. She asked me to go 
out and get some cassava from the field. She gave me the panga (machete). When I 
came out of the house my father was sitting there. He made me so angry. I took the 
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panga and cut his head. He fell on the ground and I finished him. People were 
screaming and crying. My mother cried and yelled to me. She said I had to stop. She 
asked me what I was doing. I did not understand why all these people screamed so 
much; this is what we do in the bush. He was not a good man and I am a good rebel.”  
This account explains why their communities looked upon many former child 
soldiers as dangerous criminals, and why they often felt rejected. For this reason 
former child soldiers often moved to different communities. However, when 
becoming part of a new community, they describe feelings of slowly starting to see 
they were not fighting for the right thing with the LRA. This indicates the extremely 
strong effects of socialization within the LRA, particularly when Type II 
internalization is achieved.   
 
Socialized Actors Demonstrating Different Behavior 
Do socialized actors behave differently than they did before they were socialized, or, 
than non-socialized actors do? Looking at the outcomes of socialization processes 
within the LRA, they prove truly effective. Child soldiers who have experienced 
socialization processes within the LRA display behavior very different from that of 
actors who have not been subject to LRA socialization. Andvig and Gates argue, 
“Organizations that have developed sophisticated socialization mechanisms are likely 
to handle collective actions better and therefore rely less on force as long as the 
members stay strongly motivated. That motivation embraces not only direct military 
task solving, but also the motivation to monitor and discipline the other members” 
(2007:16). Andvig and Gates fail to analyze the exact processes through which these 
developments come about, but taking the LRA as an example, this is rightly indicated 
by them. New recruits suffer from a lot of violence when they first enter the LRA. 
However, once they start adapting the identity of the LRA the extent of violence they 
are exposed to significantly starts to decrease. Many child soldiers express that when 
they acted according to the expectations of their commanders, they were not caned 
anymore. They became good rebels, which gave them more freedom. They did not get 
punished as much anymore and they were allowed to walk freely without the strict 
supervision of their commanders. Still, this stage was achieved only after they were 
heavily tested as to whether they indeed had become integrated rebels.  
This indicates that the behavior of child soldiers changed during the period 
they were part of the LRA. During their first weeks with the LRA punishment was 
severe, as they did not yet act as a good rebel. But as soon as they changed their 
behavior and started adopting the LRA identity, they were treated differently and 
considered as part of the group: as new family members. Thus, integrated rebels who 
had experienced thorough socialization processes clearly showed different behavior 
compared to new recruits who had not been socialized yet. This shows the enormous 
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impact socialization has within the LRA and how it significantly contributes to 
allegiance among its rebels.    
One should keep in mind their allegiance was not achieved by pecuniary 
rewards; it is purely a result of non-pecuniary rewards and socialization. As Blattman 
pointed out, pecuniary rewards were basically absent in the LRA and “indoctrination 
into the LRA was a complex process of spiritual training, misinformation, and the 
strategic use of fear and violence” (2007:18). This shows how powerful socialization 
mechanisms can be in changing behavior and even identity; within the LRA these 
mechanisms transformed abducted children into motivated rebels with high 
allegiance to the group. Gates argues that “the more a rebel leader can appeal to the 
provision of non-pecuniary rewards, the better he is able to recruit and maintain the 
allegiance of his rebel soldiers” (2002:127). This is certainly the case with Kony as the 
leader of the LRA. Once his soldiers are going through the socialization process, 
interests and motivations are being created to remain with the group. Their behavior 
shifts from a civilian child to that of a well-trained rebel. 
This shift in behavior and identity also clarifies why it is impossible to purely 
identify child soldiers as victims or as perpetrators. The LRA practices one of the 
most extreme tactics to recruit its rebels, namely abduction, which could make one 
perceive these children as victims. However, when these children change their 
identity within the group and become ruthless killing machines it seems more viable 
to classify them as perpetrators. The LRA case clearly shows that none of these two 
classifications is correct: it is a mix of the two. The only conclusion we can draw from 
this is that socialization serves as a powerful mechanism that changes children into 
soldiers.  
In addition, this development has serious consequences for the reintegration 
of former child soldiers (Vermeij, 2011). Given the fact that children change their 
identity within the LRA due to socialization processes, these children will not be the 
same person if they return from the bush. They have drastically changed from the 
abducted child they once were. This indicates the importance of rightly targeting 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs. These programs need to address the 
personality changes coming about during the period spent within the LRA. My field 
research indicates that this has not taken into account sufficiently, which results in 
limited success or even failure of attempts to reintegrate former child soldiers 
(Vermeij, 2011). As one former LRA child soldier (8F7) explained: “our future is 
already spoiled, we do not have opportunities to develop. The rehabilitation only 
helped us in the beginning; they gave us food and a place to sleep. But now we have 
nothing. They did not integrate us in the village. People do not understand us, we 
missed out on school and our communities are afraid of us. There is no job for us. We 
do not have a future, we can only hope for our children. This is the only reason why 
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we are still alive; we have to try to make the future of our children brighter.” This 
account shows that our limited understanding of the child soldiering phenomenon is 
failing to offer these returnees opportunities to become well integrated in their 
communities again. Further research on socialization processes within rebel groups is 
necessary and needs to be included in the design of such programs. It is to be hoped 
that this will contribute to a more peaceful future for the regions suffering from 
insecurity caused by rebel groups using child soldiers. 
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5 
Too Tough to Die 
Child soldier socialization within the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy 
 
 
“Pa, I'm back! What's the problem? I'm a woman now, I'm home!”  
“Where have you been? Go away, you cannot stay here! You are not my daughter, I 
am no more your father! You are a rebel, you are an animal... Out!” 
 
Final conversation between father and daughter, ex-LURD girl soldier 
 
 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and their use of child soldiers. In order to be able to understand 
why LURD was established, a general understanding of the Liberian war is required. 
A brief conflict background will be provided first. Subsequently, the characteristics of 
LURD as a rebel group and their use of child soldiers are explained. This will lead to 
the use of socialization processes used within LURD, which will be analyzed in detail. 
Evidence from field research will be used to shed light on the lives of child soldiers 
within LURD, and show the major impacts of socialization. 
 
 
Conflict Background 
During the last three decades Liberia has suffered from several periods of violent 
conflict, killing thousands of innocent civilians and transforming numerous children 
into soldiers. The outbursts of violence started in 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel 
Doe assassinated President William Tolbert in a coup. The coup turned the political 
situation in Liberia into a landscape characterized by vengeance and revenge, and 
armed groups would struggle for power in the decades to come. While Doe was in 
power, he favored his fellow Krahn tribesmen, providing them with important 
political and military positions. Besides promoting the Krahn people, Doe did not 
accept alternative political beliefs and kept the Liberian population under strict 
control, with a tight grip on its many tribes. Tensions started to rise and in 1985, 
following rigged elections won by Doe, Sierra Leonean General Quiwonkpa attempted 
to overthrow Doe—unsuccessfully. In the years to follow political tensions kept 
increasing and economic decay reached a peak, eventually resulting in civil war 
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breaking out on Christmas Eve 1989. That night Liberia was invaded from 
neighboring Côte d’Ivoire by a small group of Libyan trained men: the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (Alusala, 2011, Bøås and Dunn, 2007, Gates and Reich, 
2010, Honwana and de Boeck, 2005).  
Prince Johnson initially led the NPFL, but within weeks, problems surfaced. 
Although they had just invaded Liberia together, Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor 
decided to stop fighting side by side, mainly due to operational differences. This 
caused the NPFL to splinter into two factions: Taylor, being a former ally of Doe, took 
leadership of the new NPFL, while Prince Johnson created the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). In the meantime Doe had started to lose control of 
his Krahn tribesmen who engaged in fighting other tribes, and ordered the Liberian 
Army to retaliate against the violence in an attempt to control the situation. Instead, 
chaos erupted: young people started fighting each other for wealth, power and family 
protection, spreading terror all across the country. Taylor and his NPFL forces 
contributed by molesting and the looting the Nimbadians—the very tribe they 
claimed to be fighting for. Johnson’s INPFL forces also took part in the power 
struggle and eventually managed to capture and kill Doe in 1990, resulting in a power 
vacuum and deepening the civil war even further (Alusala, 2011, Honwana and de 
Boeck, 2005).   
As a response to Doe’s killing the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) facilitated an interim government. However, Taylor was determined to 
take control of Liberia and refused to cooperate. He continued the war, which in 1991 
spilt over into neighboring Sierra Leone (Alusala, 2011). As will be thoroughly 
explained in the chapter on Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh invaded eastern Sierra Leone 
with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a mix of Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
rebels, supported by Taylor. Meanwhile in Liberia, several unsuccessful attempts 
were taken to counter Taylor, leaving the war to rage on in both countries. The United 
Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) was established in Freetown to fight 
Taylor. Back in Liberia, “ULIMO split in two along ethnic lines: ULIMO-K became 
largely a Mandingo faction supported by Guinea whilst ULIMO-J enjoyed support 
mainly from the South-East Krahn population” (Utas, 2005:411). It took until 1996 
for peace to return: the signing of the Abuja Peace Accord formed the Liberian 
Council of State which finally comprised all the seven warring factions which had 
been established over the years. In order to monitor the peace process, the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) were deployed. Lack of funding and 
political will hindered their task, which was in turn exploited by the armed groups 
and created circumstances that led to the start of a new civil war in 1999 (Alusala, 
2011, Merrill, 2010). 
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It was at the start of the Second Liberian Civil War that one of the most brutal 
rebel groups in Africa established itself: the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD). Since the conclusion of Liberia’s costly episodic civil war in 
1996, dissidents had been active in the north of the country. The rebels had various 
motivations for taking up arms against the increasingly authoritarian government, 
ranging from ethnic discrimination to the treatment of displaced persons. The 
various insurgent factions were united in February 2000 under the umbrella group 
LURD. The newest addition to Liberia’s wide range of armed groups, LURD consisted 
mainly of Muslim fighters from the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, adding yet 
another dimension to the incredibly complex character of the war (Pugel, [in: Gates 
and Reich,] 2010).  
Backed by the government of Guinea, the LURD started their rebellion in the 
northern part of Liberia in early 2000. As many other armed groups, LURD’s political 
goal was to push Charles Taylor out of power. Taylor had been elected as president of 
Liberia in July 1997, following a campaign during which his armed supporters sang: 
“He killed my Pa, He killed my Ma, I’ll vote for him” (Bøås and Dunn, 2007: 69). 
However, during his presidency Taylor continued spreading fear by terrorizing the 
country. According to Reno, “Liberia under Taylor was a prime example of a system 
of personal rule constructed behind a facade of statehood. This system of authority is 
founded on the ruler’s ability to control his subordinates’ access to markets. Control 
over a state and the prerogatives of sovereignty that global recognition accords gives 
ruler opportunities to manipulate laws and regulations to favor his associates. This 
and the capacity to issue passports and conceal transactions of business partners give 
such rulers the ability to control even clandestine markets” (Reno, [in: Bøås and 
Dunn,] 2007:71). Taylor’s Liberia was an extreme example of such a system, leading 
to tensions and dissatisfaction among the population, and motivating the LURD to 
kick off a violent campaign to overthrow the president and start a struggle for power. 
After years of struggle and controlling the northern part of the country, the 
LURD rebels managed to reach the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in 2003. They 
launched three attacks on the city: operations World War I, World War II and World 
War III. This resulted in masses of innocent civilians being killed, yet this did not 
stop the LURD rebels and Taylor’s government forces from continuing their 
gruesome battles. It took until August 2003, when ECOWAS intervened and peace 
talks put pressure on all the involved parties to stop fighting. Part of the agreement 
was that Taylor resigned as President of Liberia, so he left to live in exile in Nigeria. 
After that, the Accra Peace Agreement was signed by the warring parties: this 
signified the end of the war, starting the disarmament and demobilization of Liberia’s 
numerous fighters, and leading to democratic transformations and peace (Alusala, 
2011).  
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 The formal end to 14 years of civil war was marked when the Liberian parties 
involved signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003. The CPA was 
designed to start the reconstruction of the country; during the war more than 
250,000 people had been killed, towns and infrastructure had been destroyed, 
850,000 refugees had fled the country and about 2,000,000 people had been 
internally displaced (Specht, 2006). As part of the CPA, the National Transitional 
Government was assisted in implementing the peace process by the deployment of a 
15,000-strong UN force: the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The force disarmed 
over 100,000 ex-combatants (Pugel, 2007). Simultaneously, the National 
Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
(NCDDRR) was established which became responsible for the disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants. Looking 
at the thousands of ex-combatants present in Liberia, according to the UN Secretary-
General the success of the DDRR programs would be crucial to create and maintain 
peace and security in the country (Alusala, 2011, Honwana and de Boeck, 2005). 
 
Characteristics of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
and the Use of Child Soldiers 
Although LURD was formally founded and announced during a meeting in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone in 2000, the movement had already existed since 1999 and was based in 
Guinea (Brabazon, 2003). During the early stages, LURD was comprised of a 
coalition of politicians and veteran fighters who were convinced that Taylor had 
manipulated the Abuja Agreement, through which he had avoided full disarmament 
of his forces, and intimidated other factions and the population. Partly due to the 
severe intimidations and claims he would start a new ferocious war if he was not 
elected, Taylor became Liberia’s new president in 1997. Although the elections had 
been designed to make one government and army out of all the warring factions, after 
being installed as president, Taylor started systematically targeting his rivals, 
opponents and civilians who had campaigned against him. Hundreds of ULIMO-J 
fighters were killed during the “Camp Johnson Road” incident in 1998. ULIMO-J, 
one of Liberia’s many armed factions, had been Taylor’s main opponent during the 
first civil war, and the violent incident caused numerous survivors and other ULIMO 
fighters to flee to refugee camps. Fearing assassination, these fighters reunited with 
their old comrades, re-grouped and made plans to remove Taylor. This signified the 
birth of LURD, and anyone who held a grudge against Taylor could join the 
movement. The presence of ULIMO fighters in refugee camps spread across the 
region gave LURD leadership easy access to experienced fighters and commanders, 
and the newest rebel group quickly grew into a capable force (Brabazon, 2003, Reno, 
[in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007). 
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Leadership 
 Sekou Damate Conneh, a Liberian born in 1960 and belonging to the Muslim 
Mandingo tribe, led the LURD rebels. Although he had previously worked at the 
Ministry of Finance in Liberia, during the first conflict Conneh had been primarily 
based in Conakry, Guinea where he worked as a second hand car trader. During his 
stay in Guinea, Conneh established an extensive network of connections and had 
high-level contacts within the Guinean government. When he and other Taylor 
opponents formed LURD, these connections led to Conneh being elected National 
Chairman by the National Executive Council and it was decided that he would lead 
the group’s mission to remove Taylor from power, giving him a political and military 
mandate. According to Brabazon, “Conneh’s appointment was intended to bring 
impartiality, dynamism and international recognition to LURD. His lack of direct 
involvement in the pre-1997 war was thought to augur impartiality, enabling him to 
mediate between the ULIMO factions, while his Mandingo ethnicity would ensure the 
respect of the bulk of LURD personnel” (2003:3). 
 Guinean President Lansana Conté, who backed the rebel movement 
throughout the Second Liberian Civil War, also supported Conneh’s leadership 
position. Although President Conté held some grudges against Taylor for attacks on 
Guinean soil, the decision to back LURD seemed due largely to Ayesha, the wife of 
Sekou Conneh. Ayesha, also referred to as “The Lady” by LURD rebels and a Guinean 
citizen, was President Conté’s principal spiritual advisor and played an important role 
in his life. She had warned him of a coup attempt in 1996, which allowed him to 
prepare and stay in power. It is argued that this influential and direct access led to 
Sekou Conneh’s election as National Chairman (Brabazon, 2003). Furthermore, 
when Ayesha urged Conté to back her husband Conneh and the LURD rebels in their 
attempt to overthrow Taylor, the President decided to support the group. During the 
course of the war, Ayesha mostly remained in Conakry, from where she ensured the 
flow of arms and ammunition from Guinea into Liberia, which enabled LURD to fight 
Taylor’s forces. Her presence greatly benefitted the LURD as the Guinean Army even 
began covert support for the rebels (Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007).  
 
Why Fight? 
While Conneh would remain in Guinea for most of the conflict, he sent his LURD 
forces to invade northeastern Liberia from Guinea in early 2000. The rebels quickly 
captured the town of Voinjama, which would become the rebel headquarters during 
the conflict. At that point, the group consisted of a mere 70 fighters (Pugel, 2010). 
When the LURD started their mission, little was known about what the rebels were 
fighting for and several theories erupted. Not knowing much about the group and its 
whereabouts, the UN initially described the rebels as factionalized. LURD also 
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seemed to fit Christopher Clapham’s definition of warlords, as it looked as if they had 
“poorly defined aims, and could largely be associated with the personal ambitions of 
their leaders” (Clapham, 1998:212). According to Reno, “like other warlords, LURD’s 
leaders sought external patronage on an opportunistic basis. In this it resembled the 
NPFL regime that it fought” (Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007:69). LURD rebels also 
resembled the NPFL in their wish to become rulers of Liberia. At time of the invasion, 
LURD mainly consisted of junior commanders who had fought for a range of armed 
groups during Liberia’s first civil war. They were still holding a grudge against Taylor 
and sought to continue their struggle for power. As the government of neighboring 
Guinea now backed them, these external ties played a role in shaping the behavior 
and organizational structure of the group (Bøås and Dunn, 2007). 
 According to Brabazon, LURD was an “irregular military and political 
organization” with the primary objective to remove President Charles Taylor from 
political office, whether by force or not. LURD had been formed out of feelings of 
frustration and the perception of exclusion from the Abuja Peace Accord. However, 
the group was “not in any sense characterized by political or ideological polemic or 
grandiose intentions” (2003:3). Hoffman adds that the group aimed at “instituting a 
new political regime, and jump-starting the post-war Liberian economy” in addition 
to overthrowing Taylor (2004:219). However, LURD did not seem to be a very well-
established rebel group. Although it is impossible to calculate exact figures, it is 
estimated LURD consisted of approximately 3,000 armed rebels, of which half were 
child soldiers. There were no strong ideological principles besides the wish to 
overthrow Taylor, members had little to no training, the organization and strategic 
planning was weak, and their survival as an armed group completely depended on 
their backers. LURD had no direct control over necessary resources such as weapons 
and ammunition, and therefore had to adapt their behavior according to the interests 
of their supporters. This implied that powerful individuals and their regional 
informal political networks mainly dominated them. Since Taylor was supporting 
several armed groups who were fighting his opponents in neighboring countries, 
these opponents sought to strike back in the same way and supported LURD (Reno, 
[in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007).  
  
Regional Complications and Strategies 
The fact that the conflict was far more complex than just being a power struggle 
between LURD and Taylor’s government was initially ignored. Still, it had a much 
wider interstate political context and was characterized by regional personal-alliance 
politics. Funding of the movement was opaque, obscure and shrouded in secrecy; 
senior political LURD officers claimed that the group was completely financed by 
exiled Liberians in the US, but their identities have never been revealed. LURD did 
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not seem to finance their struggle with illegal diamond sales (Brabazon, 2003). 
According to Reno (2007), Guinea incorporated LURD in their international relations 
and political strategies to pursue their goals, using it as a proxy to pressure Taylor. As 
Hazen argues, Guinean president Lansana Conté had several reasons for supporting 
LURD: his rivalry with Taylor, the economic benefits that were connected to the 
facilitation of the arms trade, as well as his “desire for a buffer zone between Guinea 
and Liberia and from his relationship with the LURD’s leader’s wife Ayesha” 
(2013:119). And Guinea was not the only LURD supporter: the United States 
government as well as the United Kingdom subtly backed the rebels, with its military 
advisers providing LURD leadership with advice from 1999 until early 2002. 
According to Hazen, “the US interest in LURD stemmed from its desire to rid itself of 
the headache of Taylor, although this often took the form of keeping Taylor occupied, 
and therefore contained, rather than seeking his ouster” (2013:120). It was difficult 
for the United States to support Taylor’s removal overtly, as he had several friends 
within the US government. However, with Taylor becoming more defiant and 
ignoring US pressure to quit RUF support, US support for Taylor’s regime diminished 
and the engagement with LURD was increased. The British, on the other hand, 
supported LURD to counter efforts by Taylor to destabilize the region and because of 
his support of the RUF: these were the main threats to the Sierra Leonean peace 
process in which the UK had made extensive financial and political investments 
(Hazen, 2013). 
 Yet, the regional context became even more complex as the war continued 
since “Taylor himself found ways to exploit LURD’s presence for internal and external 
political gain” (Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007:70). As an example, to increase 
regional tensions, Taylor sent some of his own armed units into Guinea to cause 
destruction, yet claimed that these units were not his own but defeated LURD rebels 
causing havoc instead. Besides that, Taylor, who had been backing the RUF rebels in 
Sierra Leone, requested the Sierra Leonean rebels to assist his forces in fighting 
LURD. Even though the UN accusations that Taylor was funding, arming and 
training the RUF rebels had led to commercial and military sanctions imposed on 
Liberia, he managed to fly RUF mercenaries into the country in order to fight LURD. 
In response, the Sierra Leonean Civil Defense Force (CDF) supported the LURD 
rebels (Hoffman, 2011). The CDF were loyal to the Sierra Leone government and as 
revenge for Taylor supporting the RUF’s mission to overthrow the government, Sierra 
Leone decided to support LURD in their mission to throw Taylor out. Brabazon 
(2003) reported that small numbers of RUF forces were found with LURD, as well as 
some of the Sierra Leonean West Side Boys. Moreover, in an attempt to gain 
international support to fight the rebels, Taylor used LURD’s presence to request the 
imposed arms embargo to be lifted. Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General at 
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the time, denied his request. These examples show the regional complications and the 
fact that Taylor proved to be a sophisticated strategist (Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 
2007). 
 
Recruitment and Structure 
During the war, LURD used voluntary and forced recruitment to strengthen its 
forces. The Liberian population had suffered severely from years of conflict, and 
maltreatment by Taylor motivated some civilians to join the rebels. This was 
enhanced as “people were generally poor, disenfranchised, and without any access to 
or hope for upward social mobility” (Bøås and Hatløy, 2008:42). Some people 
believed that joining LURD would eventually improve their desperate situations. 
However, Pugel notes that, compared to the other fighting factions, “LURD soldiers 
were the most prone to violent introductions by favoring village attacks and 
ambushes as a way to meet their potential recruits” (2010:167).  
The rebels did not recruit only on Liberian territory: they also tried to engage 
the Liberian diaspora in neighboring countries. As Brabazon notes,: “Recruiting 
heavily in refugee camps in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, LURD relied extensively upon 
the regional Liberian diaspora to swell their ranks” (2003:7). According to Pugel 
(2007), recruitment increased every year and the LURD forces expanded rapidly. 
Bøås and Hatløy (2008) explained this by stating that the closer LURD came to 
Monrovia, the more people they needed to fight. LURD recruited many people from 
communities and IDPs that were encountered during their advance, while during the 
Monrovia attacks recruitment on the spot was common. No training was provided to 
these recruits as they were expected to start fighting immediately. Whereas the 
Monrovia recruits had the option of fighting or becoming victims to the brutal 
violence that was swallowing the capital, many took up arms and fought alongside the 
LURD rebels. Field research indicated that LURD did train some of its recruits that 
had become part of the movement before it reached Monrovia.  
 According to Pugel, approximately 70 percent of LURD recruits were Muslim 
and 30 percent were Christian. Not all recruited LURD rebels had Liberian 
nationality, however; the group was strengthened by members from Sierra Leone, 
Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire (2007). However, core LURD members seemed to be 
Liberians from the Mandingo and Krahn tribes (Brabazon, 2003, Levitt, 2005). These 
tribes had been the target of a wave of repercussions directed by Taylor, which 
inspired tribe members to take up arms (Specht, 2006). The fact that the group was 
made up of these different tribes and religions did not affect or influence operational 
cohesion (Brabazon, 2003). LURD divided itself according to military structure: it 
consisted of brigades, which were divided into several battalions, which were divided 
into companies. Besides the regular battalions there were Special Forces battalions 
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that stood under direct command of National Chairman Conneh. According to Specht 
(2006), LURD was loosely based on the US military model as the organization 
consisted of a coherent system of titles and ranks. Specht further acknowledges that 
“promotion and the award of rank are based upon longevity of service, age, ability in 
the field, and more especially previous military experience or affiliation” (2006:23). 
She argues that ranks and discipline were respected by most fighters, but not all. 
Pugel notes that discipline among LURD fighters strongly depended upon unit 
commanders (2010).  This is also highlighted by Brabazon: “discipline in the LURD 
army is heavily dependent upon the quality and moral caliber of any given 
commander in charge, and supplemented by those fighters who have had regular 
training in the AFL, including some instruction by American military personnel.” He 
continues, certain troops “showed a remarkable degree of military discipline, 
including regular salutes, the honorific reference to rank, and a willingness to carry 
out life-threatening orders without question” (2003:7). In areas where senior 
commanders were not present, discipline disintegrated “rapidly and almost 
completely. Firing becomes random and indiscriminate, the civilian population is 
harassed, and territory is quickly lost as government troops capitalize on their 
opponents’ disorganization” (Brabazon, 2003:7). 
 
Infighting Taking Its Toll 
As mentioned, in its early days LURD showed few signs of being a well-established 
organization, apart from its military structure. However, during 2001 attacks the 
rebels seemed to become better organized and more disciplined. Administrative 
structures were being established in captured areas and severe human rights 
violations seemed to decrease. Given the sharp contrast with earlier behavior, plus 
the fact that the rebel group’s founding was highly factionalized and all top 
commanders had presidential aspirations, this was likely due to Guinea’s influence 
(Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007). This development was short-lived and LURD 
never achieved the capacity to win the war. Infighting soon started among top 
commanders, separating LURD into smaller groups that started initiatives on their 
own to prevent other LURD groups from reaching Monrovia first. All LURD 
commanders seemed to be struggling to become Liberia’s new president and fought 
for their own interests. Due to their rivalry and disagreements, LURD forces lost their 
common goal and mayhem resulted. Field research revealed that, as the war raged on 
and Taylor’s forces kept posing threats, disagreements within the group led to the 
cleansing of LURD’s own ranks. Commanders were killed by their own men and an 
internal power struggle implied that those rebels who did not obey and/or posed 
threats to power relations were likely to be killed. Brabazon further indicated that 
“conflict between LURD’s political representatives in Conakry and their military 
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command in Liberia was a source of considerable mistrust and instability within the 
organization” (2003:3). 
 During the peace negotiations in Accra, Sekou Conneh was still in power, 
despite the internal difficulties. It was obvious that several commanders wanted to 
take his position, yet Conneh had managed to stay in command by leading his forces 
by radio or phone while he was organizing weapons from Guinea. When Taylor was 
not arrested during the negotiations in Ghana, despite his indictment for war crimes 
by the Sierra Leone Special Court, LURD rebels used his release to justify their cause; 
they were no longer a brutal rebel group trying to overthrow a democratically elected 
government and fighting for their own interests, but freedom fighters struggling to 
release their country from the tight grip of an indicted war criminal. One of my 
informants (16M3) tried to justify the mayhem: “We always fight to protect our 
country and our people. But now we had no choice. Taylor was back and we had to 
bring him down, we had to shed blood on our way to Monrovia.” The situation got out 
of control as the rebels started to live what seemed to be lawless lives.  
 Eventually Taylor left for exile in Nigeria in August 2003 (Specht, 2006). 
LURD rebels had not managed to overthrow him, and could not install themselves in 
power. The parties that backed LURD understood that if they would let the LURD 
commanders become the new leaders of the country, it would not take long for new 
conflict and power struggles to erupt. Some LURD officials did however get positions 
in the new government. In 2004 fighting between LURD factions was reported again; 
competition for allocated customs and ports positions drove the former rebels further 
apart. It was clear that LURD “was settling into the same pattern of exploiting 
resources of the state for members’ benefits. This happened in a very different 
context, however, as the UN prepared to deploy 15.000 peacekeepers. LURD had 
served its usefulness to the government of a neighboring state and to a coalition of 
non-African states that needed to address the problem of state collapse at low cost 
and low risk (Reno, [in: Bøås and Dunn,] 2007:80).”   
 
Civilian Relations 
In general, LURD seemed to “enjoy a high degree of cooperation and a reasonably 
strong degree of support from the civilian population” (Brabazon, 2003:5). Civilians 
were claimed to be well treated as the LURD had established strict rules on the 
behavior of their members. The treatment of civilians however varied over time and 
between regions LURD controlled: as indicated before it heavily depended on the 
commander in charge. Field research indicated that LURD was dependent on the 
Liberian population for the provision of food and shelter. The rebels moved in from 
the northeastern part of the country, but were not self-sustaining. On foot, they 
moved hundreds of kilometers through the dense Liberian forests, which made it very 
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difficult to bring sufficient supplies, and there was no time to grow food. Being 
dependent on Guinea for military supplies, it was hard to continue the struggle, 
especially when transport of goods became almost impossible during the rainy 
seasons. Informants stated that LURD rebels suffered from hunger almost constantly. 
However, while they relied on the Liberian population to feed them, civilians were 
starving too. Hence, Brabazon argues “food shortages account for the greatest 
amount of friction between LURD and the local population in their controlled areas, 
as LURD commanders requisition food for their growing army” (2003:5). Civilians 
had very little to eat due to the conflict: it was too dangerous to travel to markets and 
it was not safe to plant crops either. The population was starving and so were the 
rebels. LURD forces commandeered what little food there was, as soon as they 
occupied an area, increasing civilian food shortages even further. 
 LURD rebels were instructed by their commanders how to approach and treat 
civilians, and were strongly discouraged to harm them. Still, the Liberians had little 
choice whether to participate or not if they received orders from LURD. If civilians 
did not participate to the satisfaction of the rebels, there were violent ramifications: 
they were often beaten or killed (Pugel, 2007). Field research indicated that the rebels 
realized that civilians could be commandeered and coerced only so much: LURD’s 
survival depended on civilian cooperation and support, and they could not afford to 
lose this. Therefore, LURD rebels would be punished in front of civilians in case of 
wrongdoing; this way the commanders sought to display order and rules within the 
group, and convince the population that LURD was fighting for them. Civilians were 
also gathered when LURD prisoners were to be punished. During these occasions, the 
prisoner would generally be stripped naked, after which interrogation and 
humiliation started. Some prisoners were taken into the LURD forces, while others 
were killed. Interviews revealed that it was not uncommon for rebels and civilians to 
eat the prisoners; civilians reportedly assisted in making pepper soup of LURD 
enemies, and would sometimes eat together with the rebels. 
 The rebels predominantly used civilians as forced laborers and porters. That 
LURD frequently ordered civilians to porter incredible amounts of ammunition over 
distances of up to 200km, obviously affected relations between the rebels and the 
Liberians. It was extremely hard work and although civilians were initially promised 
to be paid in salt or rice, some refused to cooperate. The rebels did not accept refusal, 
so they eventually enslaved numerous civilians for porter duties. As the war raged on, 
this threatened to break down civilian relations, and the rebels cut down on the use of 
enforced porters. Sometimes the relations were repaired. When LURD for instance 
lost Bopolu, civilians became subject to the systematic human rights abuses by 
Taylor’s forces again. This seemed to encourage civilians to re-volunteer to support 
LURD by carrying ammunition (Brabazon, 2003). 
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 Child Soldiers 
LURD made extensive use of child soldiers, eventually about half the group was 
estimated to consist of children (Achvarina and Reich, [in: Gates and Reich,] 2010). 
Compared to the other fighting factions, Pugel notes that LURD had the highest 
abduction rate of child soldiers; approximately half of all children affiliated with 
LURD were recruited during attacks or ambushes, most being recruited from the 
Greater Monrovian area (2010). Child recruits were used for a variety of tasks. As 
shown by Pugel (2007), they not only acted as combatants, but were also used as 
camp workers, medical staff, and wives, and they were assigned to administrative 
tasks, spying duties or forced labor. Child recruits were particularly attractive to 
LURD; as there was no money to pay its forces, men and women were reluctant to 
join the movement. Especially at the end of the war, most of child soldiers were 
claimed to have supporting roles and were used as porters, not as actual fighters as 
combat capacity was discouraged from late 2002. Instead, commanders used child 
soldiers to carry ammunition and weapons to the battle site and called them pekin 
(Brabazon, 2003). The exact number of child soldiers within LURD remained 
unclear. Pugel (2010) acknowledges that 34,285 ex-combatants, including 4,228 
children, reported themselves as LURD affiliates at the National Commission for 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), while 
Brabazon (2003) estimates that the group consisted of approximately 3,000 armed 
fighters, plus an unknown number of porters and other assistants. In June 2002 the 
organization itself stated to have 14,000 members in total, which dropped to 5,000 in 
October that same year. It is very difficult to give exact numbers on the involvement 
of children with the rebels. This is jeopardized by three main factors: LURD did not 
seem to officially register the continuous flow of new recruits, they generally denied 
to recruit child soldiers, and innumerable child soldiers died of hunger, disease, and 
combat during the war. However, what is known about LURD is that girl soldiers 
played a rather special role in the group, particularly when compared to other African 
rebel groups. 
 
Girl Soldiers 
Even though war may seem a male playground, it is nothing like it. Girls and women 
played significant and complicated roles within the LURD: supporting the group, 
fighting, seducing young boys to join the group, or even commanding its ranks. 
Although many had been forcibly recruited, they were not solely victims as girls also 
transformed into perpetrators. Taking Mats Utas’ argument into account, it is 
important to highlight the relation between victimhood and agency, in order to create 
a more balanced view of girl soldiers: “A more robust analysis of women’s lives in the 
war zone requires seeing women as something other than mere victims devoid of 
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agency, or alternatively as ‘fully free actors,’ but rather as tactical agents engaged in 
the difficult task of social navigation” (2005:426).  
 LURD’s girl soldiers were indeed a good example that girls cannot solely be 
regarded as victims. Many of their tasks within the group were similar to those of 
men. Although most girls were used for domestic duties, this was certainly not the 
case for all of them. Even though boys more often had a fighting role, when girls were 
assigned with the task, it was carried out with extreme precision. And, girl soldiers 
generally had a positive reputation within the LURD forces as they managed to 
encourage the male rebels (Specht, 2006). Most were respected by their commanders 
as they took their tasks seriously and did not lose sight by alcohol abuse, as their male 
counterparts often did. Although many girl soldiers within LURD seemed to have 
been forcibly recruited, others volunteered. Contributing factors to join LURD were 
poverty, survival, protection, revenge, other economic motives or a wish to achieve 
equality between men and women (Specht, 2006). Utas (2003) states that some girls 
became involved through their boyfriends who were already part of LURD. That 
many girls left their families and hometowns during the war, made it easier for LURD 
to recruit them as these girls often lacked the protection of a community.  
 After their recruitment, the girls were mostly taken to the base where they 
were trained and assigned with roles. Particularly young girls were assigned to do 
housekeeping duties such as sweeping, cooking, fetching water, and washing. Others 
became engaged in the war the rebels were fighting. It seemed as if many girls found 
out quickly that playing an active role contributed to their chances of survival and 
improved their position. And so these girls eagerly joined other child soldiers when 
they were sent out on looting missions. Some girls carried out support tasks within 
LURD; others were armed combatants, or both. As mentioned by McKay and 
Mazurana (2004), their participation resulted in new opportunities regarding 
positions of power and learning new skills. The girls who achieved commanding 
positions generally possessed qualities as courage, strength, persistence, character 
and independence. In many traditional African societies, as Keairns (2002) explains, 
these qualities are usually not valued highly when possessed by women. Instead, 
these societies “promote women’s submission, servility, and willingness to endure 
and accept their subordinate position” (Coulter, Persson and Utas, 2008:14). Girls 
who did show courageous behavior often rose in the ranks and became commanders 
within LURD. Some led groups solely consisting of women, while others commanded 
men and women at the same time. This expanded traditional gender roles as girls 
achieved influential positions in which they experienced power, control, status and a 
sense of freedom. McKay (2007) notes that this created feelings of pride, self-
confidence and a sense of belonging among girl soldiers.  
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For several girl commanders, the war proved a successful endeavor, as they 
managed to start business enterprises with looted goods after the war (Utas, 2003). 
One of these girl commanders became famous when the international media 
discovered her: she was called Colonel Black Diamond and had led her own group 
within LURD (Utas, 2005). LURD had a special characteristic, as it was known to 
have units composed wholly of girls and women: the Women’s Artillery Commandos 
(WAC) (Coulter, Persson and Utas, 2008). At the peak, the WAC consisted of at least 
100 women. They were fighting against rape, which established strong bonds, a sense 
of unity and solidarity among the girls (Specht, 2006). Black Diamond was the 
commander of a WAC. She joined LURD when she was a teenager and had been 
raped by Charles Taylor’s forces. Even though she had several motivations to join the 
rebels, the rape by Taylor’s men was her key reason. Black Diamond: “It made me 
want to fight the man who caused all that, because if you are a good leader you can’t 
behave like that” (BBC News, 2003). She was determined to get her revenge, and 
showed such courage and persistence in achieving this that most male fighters feared 
her. Her fighting skills earned her respect from other combatants and from her 
enemies, they all acknowledged her strength. Like many other girl soldiers, the girl 
who said to favor mortars also became a mother doing the war. Her daughter “Small 
Diamond” was born in the bush after she had been at the warfront until she was eight 
months pregnant (BBC News, 2003). 
 Black Diamond led a group of determined young girls and women. Taylor’s 
forces had sexually violated many of them, and some were recruited from refugee 
camps in neighboring Sierra Leone and Guinea. Some joined out of revenge, others 
wanted respect. As one of my informants (15F2) expressed: “As soon as I picked up 
my gun, the people respected me. I was no longer harassed and was finally in control 
of my own life. No one dared to get near me anymore, I finally had peace.” Still, roles 
like the one Black Diamond had were not common. As noted by Specht (2006) men 
controlled most girl soldiers, demanded sexual favors of them and/or forced them to 
marry. Field research indicated that LURD girl soldiers had been raped frequently, 
and, depending on their position, even very young boys could have four or five wives. 
It was a matter of power and status. Particularly child soldiers, who did not have any 
power or say in the Liberian society, seemed to be extremely proud to demonstrate 
the power they obtained by having wives. Girls on the other hand, also used (forced) 
marriage to improve their position. Some of my informants stated that they purposely 
selected male rebels who had several wives as they considered it a sign that the man 
could provide for all his wives and had a lot of power to protect them. This was also 
indicated by Specht (2006). From a strategic point of view, the girls were interested 
in becoming wives to powerful rebels and tried to get close to these men. This often 
caused jealousy, inducing trouble among the women, and the other wives always gave 
  
 
129 
the youngest or newest addition to a polygamous marriage a hard time.  
 This shows that, even though many girl soldiers were victims as they had been 
forcibly recruited, they employed tactical agency to make the best of their situation. 
As Specht (2006) notes, Liberian women are known to be relatively independent and 
strong. The girls who took part in her study on the experiences of girl combatants in 
Liberia addressed their inequality and “complained about their suppressed role in 
traditional society” (2006:11). Among my informants, similar statements were made 
resulting in the fact that even forcibly recruited girls chose to become fighters as this 
gave them power and some independence. It gave them a certain authority that kept 
men at a distance, and particularly decreased their chances of being sexually abused. 
This shows that girls did not simply accept their situation but used strategic insights 
to improve their lives. As Black Diamond said: “If you are angry, you get brave. You 
can become a master in everything” (BBC News, 2003).  
 
Field Evidence 
The following figures demonstrate the findings of 65 in-depth interviews with former 
LURD child soldiers and commanders. Due to the relatively small sample size, it is 
difficult to draw generalizing conclusions solely based on this field research. 
However, these findings are comparable to the results of research conducted by other 
academics or organizations, and the results support general patterns that my 
informants indicated during interviews. Still, the fact that numerous LURD child 
soldiers died in combat or failed to be registered as such represents a major 
limitation to the research. These children are not represented in the sample, which 
implies that the results reflect only the situation regarding child soldiers who 
survived the war and decided to speak about their experiences. The actual numbers 
may therefore be different, but the circumstances made it impossible to include this 
group of children in the research. 
  
Boys 
 
Girls 
Average age of 
recruitment 
11 11.7 
Average age of return to 
society 
13.1 13.1 
Average period within 
LURD 
2.1 1.9 
Percentage participating 
in DDRR programs 
62.9% 43.3% 
Total number of child 
soldiers in sample 
 
35 
 
30 
Table 5.1 Field sample of LURD child soldiers. Total sample size: 65  
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 Table 5.1 reflects the average age of recruitment, the average age of return to 
society, the average number of years spent with the LURD rebels, and the percentage 
of returnees who participated in DDRR programs after they had left the rebels. In 
order to show the difference in outcomes for boys and girls, the results are divided 
into two categories. We see that on average girls were a few months older at time of 
recruitment. Field research indicated that most girl soldiers in this sample were used 
for sexual purposes, which could explain why average age of recruitment was 11.7 
years; they had started to develop womanly features that were attractive to the LURD 
rebels. The average age of return to society is the same for boy and girl child soldiers, 
indicating that boys and girls spent a similar period of time with LURD forces (2.1 
and 1.9 years). Given the relatively short period LURD was involved in the Liberian 
civil wars (LURD forces fought from early 2000 until mid-2003), this implies that the 
majority of child soldiers in this sample served the rebel group during most of its 
existence. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 LURD child soldiers: age of recruitment. Sample size: 65 
 
 Figure 5.1 indicates that the majority of LURD child soldiers in this sample 
were recruited between 10 and 13 years of age. The horizontal axis shows the age of 
recruitment, the vertical axis shows the number of children recruited at this age. Field 
research indicated that LURD commanders preferred to recruit children of this age as 
they could be used for supportive roles as well as combat. Commanders stated that 
these children were developing physical strength at this age while emotionally still 
being dependent and manipulative, and were hence a useful contribution to the 
group. Since LURD was dependent on civilians for most of its food, it was a risk to 
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force them to fight with them. As described by Brabazon (2003), survival depended 
on civilian cooperation and support, and LURD could not afford to lose this. Civilian 
relations had to be carefully maintained, and interviews with former commanders 
indicated that this encouraged them to recruit children instead of adults. Children 
below 14 years of age were favored as it was easier to make them obey, which is 
reflected in the figure.  
 
 
Figure 5.2  LURD child soldiers: age of return to society. Sample size: 65 
 
 In figure 5.2 the horizontal axis shows the age of return to society while the 
vertical axis shows the number of children who returned at this age. The figure 
indicates that an overwhelming majority (89.2 percent) of child soldiers in this 
sample exited LURD at the age of 16 or younger. This result is not surprising, since 
the war lasted less than three years and 92.3 percent of the LURD child soldiers in 
this sample were 15 or younger when recruited. 
 
  
Socialization Processes within the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy 
This section will analyze how LURD controlled and motivated its recruits, and 
explain how socialization proved to be a significant aspect of this. The section will 
focus on the first stages of socialization, shedding light on the effects of initiation 
rituals, training, extreme violence, and hazing. How these factors socialized and 
motivated new recruits will be illustrated with personal accounts of LURD members, 
which were collected during field research. As Brabazon has noted, “contrary to 
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certain media reports, LURD are not comprised of isolated groups of loosely affiliated 
rebels, but are a coherent and integrated mobile irregular army” (2003:9). Interviews 
with former LURD child soldiers and commanders revealed that socialization 
processes played an essential role in the creation of allegiance among LURD rebels. 
This section will explain how this contributed to the establishment of a cohesive 
group. 
 
Formal and Informal Socialization 
Whereas most African rebel groups are known to rely on forced recruitment of child 
soldiers, LURD was different. Although the group did use some forced recruitment, 
about half of all the children affiliated to LURD joined the movement without being 
coerced by the rebels (Pugel, 2010). The first conflict in Liberia had left thousands of 
children orphaned, and almost every child in the country had witnessed acts of 
extreme violence during early childhood. Many families had been target of Taylor’s 
forces, and these circumstances seemed to motivate some children to join LURD once 
the second war had started. Some were looking for protection, others for revenge, but 
most opted to join the group so they would have a chance to survive the war. As one 
former LURD child soldier (14M2) explained: “I wanted to go to school but I was 
working in the field. Taylor boys killed my father and my mother, and later they came 
for my brother. They all died during the war because of Taylor. I was alone and life 
was hard. Nobody took care of me and I had no money, I could never go to school or 
even get enough food. I decided to join LURD when I was 14 years old in 2001 so I 
could try to survive with the group.” Another informant (10M3) said about his 
experience: “The LURD come to the house at night so I go with them. I was 
abandoned, I have nothing, they are my saviors. They become my father and my 
mother. My parents die so me and my brothers join to survive. My brother was killed 
in combat. The LURD are fighting for peace for the people. Taylor treat us bad, burn 
our houses, treat all the civilians bad so we join to defend our people. Me and my 
brothers and two girls join the group. Taylor boys capture me sometime before to 
carry a heavy load. I hate Taylor for what he did to my parents so I manage to escape 
and want to join LURD. I was 10 or 11 and stay with them until the end of the war.” 
Although these accounts seem to indicate that these boy soldiers already 
possessed motivations to join LURD, socialization within the group remains an 
important aspect of establishing a cohesive organization. Wood argues that “whether 
recruits of armed groups are volunteers or have been coerced, they have to be 
socialized in the use of violence for group, not private, purposes, if group leaders are 
to control the violence deployed by their combatants, typically through the building of 
strongly hierarchical organizations. Training and socialization to the armed group 
take place both formally, through the immersion experience of “boot camp,” and 
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informally, through initiation rituals and hazing. The powerful experiences of endless 
drilling, dehumanization through abuse at the hands of the drill sergeant, and 
degradation followed by “rebirth” as group members through initiation rituals 
typically melt individual recruits into a cohesive unit in which loyalties to one another 
are felt to be stronger than previous loyalties, such as those to family” (2008:546).    
 LURD aimed to initiate the formal socialization of its child recruits into the 
strongly hierarchical organization by providing them with basic training. Training 
was mainly administered in the Voinjama headquarters, while limited programs were 
offered in some smaller towns (Brabazon, 2003). Training mainly consisted of basic 
weapons operation and maintenance, ambush tactics, physical training and drilling. 
These were generally rather short processes, which lasted from some days up to some 
months. One of my informants (12F2) who was recruited from an IDP camps said: 
“One day the LURD rebels came and us children were all taken away from the camp. 
We were about forty boys and girls. The rebels ordered us to come and we marched 
through the jungle until we reached the base. We had carried heavy loads so we were 
tired but after some days training began. We were at least 150 people being trained. 
The rebels trained us how to fight, how to shoot the gun. We learned about tactics 
and how we should escape the enemy. The training was two or three weeks, and then 
we were ready to fight my commander said.” 
 Still, some of my informants had received no training at all, as fighting was so 
heavy when they joined the movement that they were expected to engage in combat 
straight away. Senior rebels quickly demonstrated to these children how to shoot and 
then they were told to join the group to defeat Taylor’s forces. Interviews indicated 
that training within LURD was generally not very thorough: it basically prepared 
LURD child soldiers for the frontline. However, the lack of intense training did not 
seem to hinder the LURD in establishing a cohesive organization. “While LURD do 
not bear any comparison with a trained African army, their apparent respect for (and 
dependency on) the civilian population, combined with a strong esprit de corps and a 
degree of basic military training, certainly elevates them above the level of other 
regional insurgents, specifically the RUF” (Brabazon, 2003:8). 
 Informal socialization was also used within LURD. Although new recruits were 
not registered by name, many would be initiated into the group by spiritual rituals. 
They were blessed with sacred water that protected them from bullets. These rituals 
were repeated before combat in order to ensure that all LURD rebels would be 
protected. My informants stated that these processes made them feel as a group and 
it created a sense of belonging. In addition to these rituals, an essential part of 
socialization within LURD was the “attempts to instill a sense of identity with songs” 
(Brabazon, 2003:8). The rebels sang songs before and during combat which were 
meant to motivate the LURD members to fight for their goals. This contributed to the 
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establishment of a sense of belonging among child recruits, which was further 
encouraged by a common fashion style. LURD rebels used to dress in similar styles or 
even wore the same t-shirts. My informants stated that this helped them to identify 
LURD members and that it made them feel as if they were part of a group. 
 
Experiencing Violence 
LURD child soldiers were constantly exposed to violence while they were part of the 
rebel group. My informants stated that they were threatened and confronted with 
violence on a daily basis. However, most LURD child soldiers had already spent their 
early childhoods experiencing violence. They grew up during the first civil war, which 
affected their lives in many ways. Most children had never had the chance to go to 
school, had witnessed family and community members being beaten, raped, tortured 
or killed, suffered from hunger and were desperate to find ways to survive. 
Experiencing violence had to a certain extent already normalized for children before 
they joined LURD. In a way it seemed as if this normality of violence made them less 
resistant when joining LURD. As Specht notes: “Forced recruitment did not always 
meet great resistance and was even welcomed under certain circumstances. In some 
refugee camps, people were inclined to join armed forces after having been forced to 
flee as a result of violent raids and living under bad conditions in the camps” 
(2006:29). For some children, the extreme violence they experienced in the years 
preceding the second civil war even created motivations to join LURD. Growing up in 
a war environment, they wanted revenge, protection and desperately sought for ways 
to survive the conflict. Several informants stated that because they had witnessed 
Taylor destroying the country and their families, they believed something had to be 
done. Others had been orphaned and no longer enjoyed the protection of their 
families. When LURD came along, they decided to join the group. Within LURD the 
hazardous and violent conditions continued. What did eventually change was that 
many children felt they were no longer just victims and subject to the violence: they 
started to exercise violence instead. This change in behavior was mainly due to their 
socialization within LURD. 
As Wood explains: “Once deployed, combatants experience (to widely varying 
degrees) violence as perpetrators, as witnesses, and often as victims…Among the 
psychological mechanisms possibly at work in these processes of socialization to 
group membership and the wielding of violence are compliance, role adoption, 
internalization of group norms, cognitive dissonance reduction, habituation to 
violence, diffusion of responsibility onto the group, deindividuation, and 
dehumanization of the victimized group” (2008:546). This was indeed happening 
within LURD, as child soldiers were experiencing violence as witnesses, victims and 
perpetrators while they were with the group. This experience started during their 
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recruitment. As an informant (13F2) recalled: “When we first came to the group, we 
had to watch how people were killed. They caught some enemy Taylor boys and then 
it all started. The enemy had to be tortured the commander said, so some children 
who had been there for some time were told to wash (kill) one of the boys. So they 
took his clothes away, beat him, then chopped of his fingers, his hand, ears, nose and 
then his toes. There was blood everywhere and the boy was screaming. I think he was 
only 15. Then in the end one LURD boy stepped forward. He was only small but they 
called him The Castrator. And so he did his job, castrating the enemy boy. The boy 
passed out and then he died, we left him by the road. I did not like it when they did 
this, but the war had already showed me many dead people.” This account shows how 
LURD child soldiers had to witness extreme violence, but also indicates that the 
confrontation with violence and death was not new; experiencing violence had 
somewhat normalized over the course of the conflict. Burning people alive, rape, 
torture and cannibalism had become routines during the wars and many informants 
claimed they had witnessed such acts even before they were recruited by LURD. 
Experiencing such violence continued within the LURD forces and it seemed, 
compared to other conflicts, less difficult for the already traumatized child soldiers to 
adapt to these conditions or even cross the boundary of committing acts of violence. 
Through experiencing violence LURD child soldiers learned to adopt to their 
new roles and they internalized the group norms. This was for instance achieved by 
installing a set of rules that was connected to certain rewards and punishments. If 
child soldiers acted in accordance with the rules, they stood a chance of being 
promoted and military achievements were sometimes celebrated. However, if LURD 
rebels disobeyed the rules, failed to act in compliance with an order or tried to escape, 
violence would be used to punish them. Punishments were carried out in public to 
ensure that child soldiers would witness and/or suffer violence, which would further 
normalize the use of violence. Victims of punishments were often stripped naked in 
front of the group and were caned until they lost consciousness or death followed. 
LURD child soldiers were numbed to violence by witnessing numerous people being 
mutilated, tortured and killed. Furthermore, these experiences instilled a great sense 
of fear among them, as commanders would tell the children that they would also be 
punished or killed if they misbehaved, disobeyed or tried to escape. My informants 
reflected that this fear led to an increased motivation to act in compliance with the 
rules and stay with the group.  
 Some former girl soldiers stated that they were subject to sexual violence if 
they were not married to a male rebel. According to one of my informants (12F2): “As 
for us the girls, we had to be careful around the men. They can just grab you and use 
you. They said you were their woman now and they can do what they like with you. So 
they sex you. Many girls without a bush husband are raped like that. Also, when we 
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moved to a new town they sometimes get the girl in the middle of the village and just 
rape her like that. Four, five, six, nine soldiers, they all use her until they finished.” As 
explained before, girl soldiers who belonged to a WAC were often protected from 
rape. However, girl soldiers with supportive roles in the group tried to marry 
powerful male rebels, as this would be their best option to be protected them from 
rape. My female informants stated that even if they were forcibly married to a male 
rebel and repeatedly raped by this person, eventually it did not count as rape 
anymore. “If it happens many times, it is not rape anymore, it is loving as you are 
now husband and wife” (16F2). This implies that the girls did not look upon 
themselves as victims. Still, they realized women were truly vulnerable to become 
victims and used tactical agency to prevent this. One of my informants (13F3) 
explained this: “I see what they do to the other woman; sometimes when we come to 
a new place they grab the women and force the weapon inside. Sometimes they put a 
big stick inside so the woman scream and scream until she quiet with all the blood 
running. There was one wicked boy; to make example for the people what the rebels 
can do, he put a grenade inside this woman so she will blast. So at that time I find out 
to be one of them. So then I survived, I was active and one of them. It was the only 
way I can be safe, so I make myself one of them.” These examples show how LURD 
made child soldiers experience violence in different ways in order to socialize them to 
group membership. 
 
 
Organizational Socialization within the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy 
As shown in the first part of this section, socialization was used within LURD to 
create and remain a cohesive body. It was intended to lead to the internalization of 
group norms, values and identity among child soldiers. LURD wanted their child 
recruits to internalize the identity that was already shared by the other group 
members, so they would melt them into the organization. Socialization within the 
group meant that children changed from being individual actors, to actors part of a 
larger social aggregate. They adopted new identities and interests that were in line 
with the group. This led to interest convergence, which eventually built bridges within 
LURD. During this process, socialization created allegiance among LURD rebels and 
can hence be perceived as the glue that kept the organization together.  
Van Maanen (1977) argues that socialization processes are necessarily 
composed of the transmission of information and values. Besides the experience of 
violence and formal/informal socialization described in the previous section, 
organizational socialization is an essential part of the process to achieve 
internalization. When combining the six tactics defined by Van Maanen, a process is 
  
 
137 
created during which new recruits learn how to take on a particular role within an 
organization, what kind of behavior is required of them and what the consequences 
are when crossing the borders towards unacceptable behavior. This process with all 
its elements is intended to lead to the establishment of a cohesive organization. The 
following sections apply Van Maanen’s theory to the LURD, as to see how the six 
tactics of organizational socialization contributed to the establishment of a cohesive 
rebel group. 
 
Collective Socialization 
The first tactic of organizational socialization as defined by Van Maanen (1977) is 
collective socialization. An example of this tactic is military training, as new recruits 
are made to go through this experience together before they can become part of the 
group. The aim of this type of socialization is to create a collective sense of identity, 
solidarity and loyalty to the group, as recruits simultaneously learn about the new 
organizational role they are to take on. As illuminated in the previous section, LURD 
indeed used training to put new child recruits through a common set of experiences. 
Child soldiers who were expected to become combatants were trained together and 
prepared for the same organizational role. The content of the role was clearly 
specified, as commanders among other things instructed them how to defeat the 
enemy. Child soldiers generally had to demonstrate they could successfully use the 
skills they had been taught by the commanders. If they failed, they were often 
punished and had to repeat the exercise until it would be completed successfully. One 
of my informants (11M2) explained what his LURD training consisted of: “I was 
trained for two months. The commanders taught my group how to fire, how to use the 
guns, how to fight and how to kill the enemy. Sometimes the commanders were 
shooting at us and then we had to move around. This is how we learned to dodge 
bullets on the frontline. I became a good fighter in the training and was very brave, 
my commander was proud of me and told the other children I did a good job to show 
them what to do.” However, some child combatants were not trained at all, as they 
were recruited during combat and were expected to fight at the frontline 
immediately. Most of these children were quickly instructed how to use the gun on an 
individual basis and did not have the collective experience, limiting collective 
socialization with regards to military training. These children did however experience 
how LURD rebels used to sing songs together before and after attacks. These songs 
were also part of the socialization process, as they sought to install a common sense 
of identity and motivation to fight for LURD. All the rebels had to sing along.  
 Van Maanen (1977) argues that collective socialization may, however, lead to 
collective deviation and resistance among recruits. As the recruits have to overcome 
the same boundary passages, they may face common problems for which they may try 
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to find a solution as a group. This implies that the chance of rebellion within the 
group is quite high and may cause collective deviation. LURD tackled this possibility 
by installing a set of strictly observed rules, supervision and punishing any deviant 
group members. Punishments were carried out in public, and the resulting fear 
among child soldiers discouraged them to deviate. Violent recruitments were also 
used to avoid deviation. According to one informant (11M3): “When we were 
recruiting new kids, we would kill the ones who were scared in front of the others. We 
set an example like that, so the others will join us and stay with us, they don’t want to 
die. If we attacked civilians we told them to laugh when we killed their family. If they 
did not listen and cried, we would kill them. This way all the children knew it was 
better to be part of the group.” Besides that, escapes were prevented by supervision 
and sending new child recruits on missions with rebels who had been with LURD for 
some time. An informant (12M2) told me, “When moving around in the jungle we 
used codes and passwords to find LURD family members. This way we always knew 
who belonged to us. We always moved at least two by two so that nobody would get 
stupid ideas to escape. The new kids had to stay with the big men so they were under 
control and could not make plans together to leave.” These examples show that 
punishments, fear, and supervision discouraged (collective) deviation. The strict 
supervision of new child recruits particularly limited their chances to collectively 
deviate, as any signs of such plans were picked up early and punished heavily. 
 
Formal Socialization 
Formal socialization is the second tactic described by Van Maanen and refers to the 
separation of new recruits from well-integrated group members. The potential 
member has to go through a set of experiences that are designed for new recruits, in 
order to learn about the expected behavior, values and attitudes within the group. 
These are generally intense periods during which other group members critically 
evaluate whether the behavior of the new recruit is in line with the organizational 
expectations, and whether the recruit is committed to the group. As described before, 
child soldiers within LURD were subject to this tactic, as they were expected to 
integrate into the group, learn new roles and correct attitudes, values and protocols in 
order to make them feel and think like members. During this process they were 
closely supervised by the commanders and monitored on their personal development. 
Those who did not make enough progress were punished in front of the group in 
order to encourage children to adopt the group identity. Most children were initially 
separated from senior rebels so they could complete their training and learn how to 
become a LURD member. This shows that formal socialization was also used within 
LURD. However, the degrees of formal socialization varied: children who were 
recruited in battle often experienced such processes to a lesser extent as they were 
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expected to start fighting with the group straight away. A former LURD child soldier 
(9M3) who did go through a period of separation expressed how he felt after he had 
completed the stage: “We do not love, show compassion or be friendly. We are strong, 
hardhearted men now. All the things my parents teach me I was forgetting, because I 
was now learning how to be LURD. First I was confused but now I know what is 
right—we have to be strong. When I know that, I belong to the big men.”  
 
Random Socialization 
Random socialization, implying that the target role is achieved by an ambiguous, 
unknown or changing sequence of steps, is the third tactic of organizational 
socialization identified by Van Maanen. Traces of this tactic were found within LURD 
as well, as my informants stated that they did not know when they would be 
considered as a group member. As one of them (12F3) explained: “When I was 
recruited, the commander took me with him. He said I was going to be his wife and so 
I had to stay with him. He had three other wives and we all stayed together. I was 
thinking to be part of the new family then, but when I just arrived I felt like an 
outsider, they did not like me and I had to do the bad jobs. But after some time I 
knew how to be a wife and they somehow accepted me. Still it was not the same every 
day and I did not understand what was wrong. On bad days they accused me of being 
a stupid child with civilian mind but other days they treated me like their family. 
After some time I became strong and my husband said I would be a good fighter. I 
went to training with some other girls and learned how to fight. After that, the wives 
never bothered me again.” This account shows that the sequence of steps in becoming 
a rebel varied: some children were trained right away, while others received training 
only after they had been with the group for some time.  
 Random socialization was also reflected in the distribution of ranks. Even 
though Specht writes that “promotion and the award of rank are based upon 
longevity of service, age, ability in the field, and more especially previous military 
experience or affiliation” (2006:23), the order of these criteria varied. In some cases 
they were not even applied. Field research indicated that child soldiers could also 
achieve ranks when they accomplished particularly impressive missions, but again, 
there was no specific order in the steps that had to be accomplished to reach this 
target. Fulfilling certain criteria was not a guarantee for promotion either, as it very 
much depended on the personality of the particular commander. Child soldiers 
seemed to have little influence on their career within LURD as the sequence of steps 
to be taken were usually unknown, ambiguous and changing. This indicates the use of 
random socialization within LURD. 
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Variable Socialization 
Variable socialization processes are the fourth tactic of organizational socialization, 
leading to maximum anxiety among recruits which in turn leads to conformity (Van 
Maanen, 1977). Such variable situations are intended to keep new recruits off-
balance, which makes it easier for rebel commanders to socialize them into the 
organization. Interviews with former LURD commanders revealed that the rebels 
indeed created maximum anxiety among the child soldiers; according to informants 
this was done specifically to motivate maximum conformity. They kept child soldiers 
off-balance by making them realize their situation was susceptible to change and 
highly volatile. Generally, the only sense of security that child soldiers had was the 
group, as everything else was highly variable and insecure. Even within the group, 
safety and security were not guaranteed, as children were punished severely for 
misbehavior and Taylor’s forces kept chasing them as the conflict raged on. My 
informants said they lived in constant fear, and did everything they could to be 
accepted as full members. However, acting in compliance with the rules was generally 
not enough to achieve this boundary passage and there was great uncertainty as to 
when they could relax.   
 As described before, many of my female informants tried to secure their 
situation by linking with powerful male rebels. The girls tried to survive as they were 
not able to escape and linking with male rebels was one of their strategies for coping 
with the extreme environment they were part of. Still, this did not necessarily lead to 
a more secure situation and protection. This was explained by several informants, of 
which these accounts are some examples: “I got married because then I would get 
protection. But when my husband was going to combat and I had to stay in the base, I 
would hide myself until he came back. I did this because one of my girlfriends was 
found and raped by the other rebels when her husband was away” (14F1). Sometimes 
girl soldiers used pregnancies to stay close to a powerful commander and ask for 
protection. A female informant (12F3) said about her relation with her bush husband: 
“I carried his child and told him the baby would be real LURD, born in the bush. He 
liked the idea and kept me safe.” Although this worked in some cases, it was not 
always leading to an improved situation. As another informant (13F2) said: “When I 
was eight months pregnant, my commander told me to get rid of the child. He did not 
want to have it, because there was not enough food for the group and I was slow with 
my belly. Then they put me on the ground, and some of the small boys started 
jumping on my stomach. I was in so much pain and then the baby came out. It was 
not alive. Now I still have problems with my stomach and I was never pregnant 
again.” These examples show that linking with male rebels did not always secure the 
situation of girl soldiers. My informants stated that this scared them, but many opted 
to try and link with a male rebel anyway as it was their best option for gaining more 
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protection. The fact that some were successful while others even saw their situation 
deteriorate indicates that variable socialization did play a role within LURD.   
 
Serial Socialization 
The fifth aspect of organizational socialization, serial socialization, is the process 
during which well-integrated group members serve as role models and groom new 
recruits (Van Maanen, 1977). The reason for this is that new recruits can be 
considered as central members to the group only once they have become similar to 
well-integrated rebels, and are hence seen as being trustworthy and taking the group 
seriously. Only then will new recruits be allowed to cross inclusionary boundaries 
that make them central members. Within LURD, experienced members served as role 
models for new child recruits, and they groomed newcomers to assume similar 
positions. Teaching and testing new child recruits with questions regarding LURD’s 
struggle was quite common. Interviews revealed that senior rebels were sometimes 
trying to mislead child recruits as to see if they were adopting the group’s identity and 
assimilated with the other rebels.  
 This implied that child soldiers were tested and observed while they were 
becoming part of the group. Children were taught about the injustices Taylor had 
inflicted on the Liberian population and expected to answer questions about him. As 
explained by one informant (15M1): “My commander was teaching us about Taylor 
boys and how he ruined our country. It was very good education because he also give 
us exams sometimes. When he was asking me who Taylor was I answered: ‘Taylor is 
like a monkey sitting in the top of the tree. He picks all the good fruits and leaves 
nothing for us’, and the commander said I was becoming a good rebel when I 
understand that.” Another informant (13M3) explained the rebels would chant and 
sing songs together to show they were a strong group: “Before combat we would drink 
and smoke together, even the young children shared. We get ready to fight together. 
We dress up together, sing and dance before and after battle. Also when we killed the 
enemy. We were singing: ‘Taylor the woman, Sekou the man! Monkey come down! 
No more monkey!’ And then, when we started we shouted: ‘If you don’t want to die, 
then don’t be born’.” All the children were expected to be part of these ‘celebrations’. 
Those who did not assimilate risked being labeled deviant and could expect to receive 
severe punishment. 
 Eventually some child soldiers were even given the responsibility to groom 
newcomers themselves. This was illustrated by one of my female informants (16F3) 
who had become a WAC commander: “After I went with LURD, they took me to the 
base camp. I was already very strong so they trained me there. Then I went to the 
frontline and after fighting for some time I was good at shooting and hardhearted so 
the commander said I can now have my own group. I got 20 new girls in my group 
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and I took care of them. I was training and educating them so they all become strong 
and together we fight the enemy very well. All the Taylor boys were scared to death 
when me and my girls came around.”  
 
Divestiture Socialization 
Divestiture socialization, the final organizational socialization tactic, is aimed at 
breaking down the personal characteristics of new recruits in order to rebuild his or 
her self-image based upon the values of the group. This development is accelerated 
when new recruits discover they are capable of things they could not imagine before, 
and when they are kept separate from people or factors that could confirm their old 
identity. To further enforce this process, new recruits become subject to rigid rules 
and regulations, are prohibited to show certain behavior and are ordered to degrade 
others and themselves in public (Van Maanen, 1977). Field research suggested that in 
order to achieve allegiance among child recruits and establish a cohesive 
organization, LURD made extensive use of divestiture socialization. The rebels 
sought to strip away personal characteristics of child soldiers by remolding them so 
they would fit in with the organization. As a result, child soldiers did indeed rebuild 
their self-images and acquired new rebel identities. The new identities led to high 
levels of allegiance and loyalty among child recruits once they started perceiving the 
LURD rebels as their new family.  
 An example how the rebels sought to erase the civilian identity of children was 
the inclusion of child soldiers in military practices and ideological discussions. 
Interviews indicated that all the rebels in the base would get together in the 
mornings, stand in line, salute the commanders and sing war songs. An informant 
(13M2) illustrated this with the following account: “Before battle we often talk 
strategic talk. We discuss the arms, codes, the way we want to attack, how we going to 
take the city and take Taylor out. After battle we also discuss to see how the fighting 
was. Or we would just celebrate. These discussions make us feel like a group because 
we all know what we have to do and we feel like fighters. It was like we get a new life, 
we have goals now and are not just children like before. When I was with LURD all 
this things make me feel like a fighter, I don’t feel like civilians because I was now 
fighting for my country and the bullets sound like music to my ears.” That the 
socialization into the group indeed led child soldiers to rebuild their self-image, is 
also indicated by this account: “If anyone was talking about their parents, he was 
punished because LURD was the new family. I missed my family for only three days, 
after that I was becoming a man. I had to fight to survive, thinking of my parents was 
no good. The rebels were my new family and I belonged in the bush to fight with 
them” (10M3).  
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Field research showed that the new identity was enhanced by friendships, 
which appeared to be strong among the rebels, and the fact that they dressed similar. 
Cannibalism also seemed to add to the establishment of new identities and allegiance. 
As an informant (15M2) explained: “We eat the enemy to show we are the real rebels 
and to show Taylor who is the strongest. Also, when we eat the enemy, we take their 
powers. We cut out the heart and liver. It's good, it tastes like real meat. You would 
also eat it if you could. Sometimes we cook it, or make soup with black pepper and 
vegetables. Or we just eat it raw. The General's heart is good! We will capture the 
enemy and kill them, and take the skull with us as a trophy. This way we get many 
special powers and become big men. It show us all the power we can get when we are 
with LURD. To me, I never feel so strong before.” Another informant (9M2) seemed 
to have become obsessed with the thought that eating human beings would 
strengthen him while he was with LURD: “We sometimes kill a child before the fight, 
drain the blood and drink it to become strong. We also taking drugs and alcohol for 
this. Sometimes we dismember the pregnant women, sliced out the baby and use the 
body parts to mark our area and make soup. That also make us strong. And I will eat 
you raw, if you are my enemy, I will eat you and take all your power.” 
 To encourage a new self-image and identity, child recruits were provided with 
a new name once they became part of LURD. As indicated by an informant (8M3): 
“We get new rebel names in the base to become real members to LURD. The small 
small children are Young Rebel or Young Killer. My name was General Skinny. They 
give me the name because I was so small when I joined the group. Our civilian name 
was never used. I love that bush name. The name was used to make people fear us. 
My name was somehow friendly so the civilians would not fear me, I was there to 
protect them.” That names were sometimes chosen to characterize a particular rebel’s 
behavior is suggested by the following account: “We all get new names. Sometimes we 
can pick, sometimes the older rebel give us one that fits how we act” (11F2). 
Interviews revealed the following names were used within LURD: Master Bullet, 
Jungle Killer, Bush Dog, Nasty King, Blood Dragon, Never See Light, Death Dealer, 
No Death No Rest, General Never Die, Killer Baby, Rocket Killer, Master Castrator, 
Savannah, Bruce Lee, General Butt Naked, Jackie Chan, Terminator, and Rocky. 
 These examples highlight that “divestiture processes, in effect, remold the 
person and, therefore, are powerful ways for organizations and occupations to control 
the values of incoming members. It is such processes which lie at the heart of most 
professional training thus helping to explain why professionals appear to be so deeply 
and permanently socialized. For, once a person has successfully completed a difficult 
divestiture process and has constructed something of a new identity based on the role 
to which the divestiture process was directed, there are strong forces toward the 
maintenance of the new identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:67). Divestiture socialization 
  
 
144 
played an essential role within LURD. What should be kept in mind is that the impact 
of the six tactics of organizational socialization is cumulative, and the processes are 
likely to have enhanced and reinforced each other, as indicated by Van Maanen 
(1977). Some tactics had stronger effects than others; interviews indicated that 
divestiture socialization had the strongest effects, particularly due to renaming and 
the encouragement of behavior in line with these gruesome war names. Collective 
socialization did not always reach its potentially strong effect on LURD child soldiers 
as many children were taken into the group during the heights of fighting, not 
allowing for any significant military group training or other common experiences. 
However, interviews indicated that each of the described tactics played a particular 
role in the dynamics of organizational socialization within LURD. The combination of 
these tactics ensured that child soldiers melted into the organization as they provided 
the possibilities to create the new identities, loyalty and allegiance which glued the 
LURD members together.  
 
LURD Socialization: A Threefold Analytical Challenge 
As mentioned, Checkel (2005) stresses the importance of utilizing a threefold analytic 
challenge when focusing on socialization. This theory will be used in order to 
breakdown and analyze the socialization processes practiced by LURD. It will “(1) 
establish the presence of socialization mechanisms and the conditions of their 
operation; (2) assess whether internalization (Type I or II) actually occurred; and (3) 
ask whether socialized actors behave differently than either they did before they were 
socialized, or than non-socialized actors do” (Checkel, 2005:816).  This will allow a 
thorough identification of the socialization mechanisms used by LURD, assess which 
type of internalization occurred among its rebels, and highlight whether socialized 
LURD child soldiers demonstrate different behavior than they did before they were 
socialized. The establishment of this threefold analysis aims to provide a clear 
overview of the effects and consequences of socialization within LURD. It should 
reveal whether a shift occurs, away from a logic of consequences and toward a logic of 
appropriateness. 
 
Socialization Mechanisms Present within LURD and the Conditions of Their 
Operation 
As indicated in the previous sections, socialization has proven an efficient tool for 
engaging child soldiers within LURD. Children are generally considered to be 
vulnerable, naïve and susceptible to outside influences, particularly in comparison to 
adults. This makes them attractive to rebel groups, as was also the case for LURD. 
While spending time as members of LURD, socialization taught child soldiers to 
become part of the group and to certain extent created a sense of belonging. As a 
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range of socialization mechanisms were used to achieve this, this section asks: Which 
socialization mechanisms were present within LURD, and what were the conditions 
of their operation? To answer this question, this section will provide an analysis while 
applying Grusec and Hastings’ (2007) definition of socialization. According to their 
research “socialization refers to processes whereby naive individuals are taught the 
skills, behavior patterns, values and motivations needed for competent functioning in 
the culture in which the child is growing up. Paramount among these are the social 
skills, social understandings, and emotional maturity needed for interaction with 
other individuals to fit in with the functioning of social dyads and larger groups. 
Socialization processes include all those whereby culture is transmitted from each 
generation to the next, including training for specific roles in specific occupations” 
(2007:13). Combined with Checkel’s (2005) theory, this definition will be used in 
order to answer which mechanisms were present within LURD and under which 
conditions they operated. The skills, behavioral patterns, values and motivations that 
were taught to child soldiers within LURD will be analyzed. In addition, the methods 
used to achieve this will be highlighted. 
 
Skills 
As Grusec and Hastings (2007) emphasized, socialization processes transmit culture 
from each generation to the next, for instance by training for specific roles in specific 
occupations. Although most LURD child soldiers received some basic training that 
taught them how to shoot, the rebel forces were generally not trained very well 
regarding other, additional skills. Numerous children were involved in combat; 
Pugel’s research revealed that almost 70% of the LURD child soldiers interviewed had 
been involved in combat; the remaining children were engaged with supportive and 
administrative roles at the base (Pugel, [in: Gates and Reich,] 2010). Among my 
informants that percentage was lower: 63 percent had been involved in combat, 
whereas the others had been spies, recruiters, cleaners, cooks, bodyguards, forced 
laborers, bush wives, or medics. During the conflict, my informants stated to have 
been suffering from hunger all the time, as there was no food provision. When they 
had attacked Taylor’s forces they would try to steal their food, but this had often been 
poisoned and caused many child soldiers to get very sick or die. The medical staff was 
supposed to look after the sick and wounded, yet most had not been given any 
training. As indicated by Brabazon (2003), multiple gunshot wounds were treated 
with Paracetamol. The older rebels had many small soldiers who accompanied them 
and carried out tasks. These young children delivered goods, did washing, prepared 
food and so on. Girl soldiers also became involved in the recruitment of new children. 
An informant (12F2) recalled: “My commander said I had a good eye for new 
children, so recruitment became my mission. I took the children away from villages, 
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or sometimes even from the enemy. I looked at the child and if it was ok, I decided to 
take it back and train them for us. But sometimes, if they looked too much like 
enemy, we killed them right there.”  
 Most child soldiers had very little skills training. Field research indicated that 
there was little time and opportunity for training, as the rebels either seemed chased 
by Taylor’s forces or lacked training material. The majority of my informants was 
trained for just some weeks or had been sent to the frontline straight away. Still they 
operated weapons such as AK47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), large-caliber 
machine guns and even anti-aircraft guns. The weapons were handled with 
nonchalance, leading to innumerable accidents. For instance, AK47 safety catches 
were hardly ever set to safe, but usually to fully automatic. As a result, the children’s 
weapon handling was extremely dangerous and careless. Not surprisingly, most 
rebels were initially not very good at shooting and combat tactics. These skills were 
mostly learned during actual combat. Interviews revealed that many (fatal) accidents 
occurred, as the group largely seemed to consist of rather chaotic and unskilled child 
soldiers. Even LURD Special Forces did not seem to have enjoyed thorough training; 
they were simply assigned with special tasks and were in no way highly skilled 
fighters, despite what their title would suggest. The same went for rebel leaders who 
kept claiming they would get Taylor, but their lack of strategic insight and training 
jeopardized their attempts to take over Monrovia time after time. Ceasefires were 
merely used as tactical ploys to regain strength, weapons, and territory. As soon as 
the new weapons arrived, a briefing would be given and the rebels would advance 
again. The fact that the organization as a whole was rather unskilled meant that 
numerous children died during the course of the war, during combat but also due to 
accidents when the rebels were not fighting. 
 Due to the lack of training, the LURD did not function as a well-organized 
military group. Child soldiers were known for wasting the scarce ammunition as they 
were often running around shooting without gaining any territory. Due to the 
unprofessional combat behavior of the group and insufficient planning, LURD was 
nearly defeated on numerous occasions and had to retreat to regain strength several 
times. Their challenges were increased by the fact that they always had to wait for 
new supplies from Guinea, on which they were dependent. Still, interviews revealed 
that child soldiers always took the orders of their commanders and drilling officers 
seriously, as they would face severe punishment otherwise. LURD commanders 
seemed to have installed a high degree of discipline among the children. Most child 
soldiers saluted their seniors and followed their orders without question, which was 
an important skill they were taught in order to keep the group together.  
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Behavioral patters 
Teaching new recruits appropriate behavior is a significant aspect of every rebel 
group aiming to establish a cohesive organization. According to Specht, in order to 
achieve this “LURD strongly emphasized discipline and order, including through a 
rigorous system of corporal punishment and the very real threat of execution for 
mutiny” (2006:24). Field research indicated that the LURD attempted to achieve a 
cohesive organization by teaching their recruits a set of rules which they had to obey 
at all times. These rules were frequently repeated and commanders made sure they 
were considered with a high degree of importance. Some examples of the LURD rules 
indicated during interviews are: 
• It was prohibited to loot civilian property 
• It was prohibited to harass civilians 
• It was prohibited to rape civilians 
• It was prohibited to rape girls affiliated to LURD 
• Passwords had to be used when moving through areas 
• Rebels were not allowed to move on their own, they at least had to be two by 
two 
• Commanders were to be respected and saluted 
• Orders from commanders must be followed 
• Ranks were to be respected 
• Prisoners had to be interrogated 
• ‘Good’ prisoners had to be integrated into the LURD forces, whereas 
‘unreliable’ prisoners should be killed 
• Quarreling among LURD forces was prohibited 
 There was quite a strict social control to guarantee that the rebels would 
behave according to the rules. If someone disobeyed, the commander would be 
informed and the person would be punished. Female commander seemed to be 
particularly strict, as also argued by Specht: “Female commanders at LURD were 
known as stricter disciplinarians than their male counterparts. One of the 
explanations for this discipline is found in relationships between commander-girls. 
The comment of a Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) staff member provides further 
insight to this: ‘Just like a mother, she would immediately punish a child or reward it 
when it is doing something wrong or right’. This analysis sees the enforcement of 
quasi-maternal discipline by commanders as both an act of restraint and protection 
from the consequences of misbehavior, suggesting both a strong sense of 
responsibility on the part of the commander as well as a clear power over the actions 
of the ‘child’” (2006:24). Discipline was an important value, yet varied widely among 
LURD forces as it very much depended on the commander in charge. In order to 
preserve the fragile relationships with civilians, commanders would constantly 
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remind child soldiers that the Liberian people were not their enemy yet had to be 
protected, and that they were solely after Taylor and his forces. Although most rebels 
were living by the rules, this changed at the end of the war when all control seemed to 
be lost and lawlessness took the upper hand. 
 
Values 
Whereas Liberia once had a tradition of secret societies to maintain local traditions 
and customs, this was severely disrupted during the war. Normally these societies 
would teach children about respect, discipline and responsibilities for life. Due to the 
conflict, “the current generation of youth, including the girl combatants, is the first 
not to have been collectively initiated into secret societies” (Specht, 2006:42). 
Whereas secret societies are considered an essential socialization process within the 
Liberian society, the lack thereof has effects on the relationships between children 
and the older generations, but also implied that LURD socialization could go to great 
lengths. Like many other African rebel groups, LURD promoted a strong belief in 
spirituality and witchcraft. Briefings were held before each battle and fighters would 
wash themselves with blessed water as a means of protection. According to one 
informant (10M2): “Before battle the special man would come. He prepared us for 
battle on a spiritual level and washed our body with sacred water and herbs. We 
would dance around the fire and he would give us blood tattoos and talisman for 
protection of the bullets. Then, the commanders would try to shoot us with their 
weapons but nothing happened. The special man made us invincible, the bullets 
could not harm us. So when we went to battle we just had to keep going if the enemy 
was shooting at us. We just shoot back and never ever pull out. If you try to retreat 
without order, you be killed, otherwise no bullet can harm you.” In addition, many 
children would make white marks on their faces to provide them with protection. 
And, as the LURD rebels practiced different religions, verses from the Bible as well as 
the Qur’an were chanted.  
 Cannibalism by LURD rebels was not unheard of and was part of the spiritual 
beliefs as well. Interviews suggested that child soldiers believed that if an enemy 
fighter was captured, eating his heart and/or liver would give them the opponent’s 
power. That the rebels also sought to spread fear with this practice was noted by one 
informant (13M3): “In the combat I was scaring many people to yell at them. ‘If you 
fight against me, I'll come and get you. I'll eat you raw and drink your blood’. Taking 
out the heart will make my protection more stronger, help me to kill and give me his 
powers. I’m a wicked boy, I’m a real rebel! We are the lions of the jungle!” 
 In addition to spiritual values, fashion seemed an important aspect of 
identifying with LURD. Although some rebels wore military outfits such as uniforms 
from the Guinean or Liberian armed forces or other camouflage, most child soldiers 
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distinguished themselves as LURD by wearing t-shirts, jeans and flip-flops. Ripped 
jeans with thick belts were very popular amongst them, and some LURD groups all 
wore the same t-shirts. The t-shirts stated to which battalion they belonged or which 
operation they were involved in. Many favored red clothing; the WAC girls would 
wear numerous red accessories and some of the boys also wore red t-shirts 
emblazoned with the motto “Too Tough To Die.” Cross dressing was also common 
and many boys were seen to wear dresses and/or wigs. It seemed an important part 
of LURD culture to wear bizarre outfits, as many children were seen wearing 
combinations of sunglasses, wigs, masks, hats, shower caps, shell necklaces and 
goggles, while they were dragging teddy bears and other stuffed animals along. In 
addition, most child soldiers wore bandanas around their heads, and were bedecked 
by a collection of numerous bangles, necklaces, beads, bracelets, amulets and 
ammunition. The ‘jewelry’ often had spiritual value and was used for protection. 
Interviews indicated that child soldiers commonly believed bullets could not hit them 
as long as they were wearing their talisman. According to one informant (12F3): “I am 
invisible because of my protection and my necklace. The bullets cannot harm me 
because they just pass me. They change into water when they are fired and never 
come to me.” 
 
Motivations 
In order to motivate child soldiers, Pugel reports that LURD commanders promised 
them jobs, money, food and an improved situation in Liberia. In addition, ideological 
goals and family protection were emphasized (2010). The general motivations to join 
and remain with LURD indicated by my informants varied between family or 
individual protection, revenge, support of LURD’s goals, food, money, boredom, 
poverty, hunger, fear, economic prospects, education, peer pressure, and grievances, 
while many female informants were motivated by a strive to become equal to men or 
because of relationships they had with male combatants. Many joined the group 
because they were abducted, and scaring provided them with the initial motivation to 
remain with the rebels. Others joined because their friends or family already had, and 
they were asked to follow them. Some believed in LURD’s goals, while others were 
motivated to join, as it would prevent exploitation by Taylor’s forces. As an informant 
(17F2) said: “ The people of Liberia must be free, and the LURD forces were fighting 
for their freedom and peace. Charles Taylor is a liar and a criminal, and we had to 
bring him to justice, we will bring him down! We had an agreement that when he 
goes, we will lay our weapons down. No Taylor, no war.” Some others joined to 
improve Liberia’s future or because the circumstances were better within the group as 
compared to civilian life. Poverty and exploitation were hence important motivating 
factors, as well as victimization. The following account shows how this compelled an 
  
 
150 
informant (16F1) to join the LURD forces: “Me, I decided to join LURD. I was treated 
really bad and I was so poor, I could hardly survive. I was angry at the system and I 
wanted to do something about it.” Another one (12M1) said: “I joined to fight the 
government forces. They were bad, hurt my family and killed my friends. They forced 
me to do hard work for them but I could never rest. They beat me all the time and 
never treated me nicely. So when LURD came I wanted to be with them, and fight the 
government. Taylor boys had done too much destruction for Liberia.” 
 Some of the youngest informants joined because they had been staying in 
displacement camps without their families and LURD rebels recruited them while 
they were on their own. LURD child soldiers “indicated a catastrophic loss of the 
family structure” (In: Gates and Reich, 2010:181). LURD provided them with some 
sense of security as they had lost their families. There were hundreds of child soldiers 
under the age of ten. Informants remembered their guns dragged on the floor and 
some seemed even smaller than their weapons. Some families motivated their 
children to join the rebels, as indicated by one of my female informants (14F1): 
“When the rebels came, we were all scared. Some people were beaten and the 
property was destroyed. My parents said I had to go to the big man and love him, for 
protection. They were scared the rebels would force me, so I went to the commander 
myself. Because I was now staying with him, my family was protected when the rebels 
are around. The commander liked me, he said I was pretty and called me Bum Bum. 
But then we moved to the battle front and he tell me to come. We never come back to 
my town. I don’t know where my family is now, I have never seen them again.” 
 Promises also played a significant role. Senior commanders told child soldiers 
they would get jobs and positions in the government once they had overthrown 
Taylor, and that the international community would pay them. Almost all of my 
informants claimed they believed to get a big pay day once Charles Taylor was pushed 
out of office. They stated that many child soldiers fought for benefits promised to 
them after the war. These promises often included money, but some were promised 
to see their parents again. However, the promise to reunite with family seemed rare, 
as most children were told to forget about their parents. Some informants stated that 
the victory celebrations held by LURD were a motivation to stay, as the rebels would 
sing, dance and drink together. Power was a significant motivator as well. Many 
informants spoke about the power they experienced when holding a weapon as boy or 
girl soldiers. A male informant (11M1) stated: “I was just small-small then, so the 
people in the village ignored me and not respect me. But then I had the gun, and they 
feared me, I can control them and I get many things I can never even dream of. The 
power let me stay with LURD, so I could enjoy the war. If I leave I have nothing.” 
Besides power, promotions were a motivating factor to remain with the rebels: 
“When I was promoted I was very happy and felt good. I was an adult man then. I had 
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more control and disciplined the boys under me. I was happy to protect my country 
and fight for my people. All the LURD people were happy to fight” (13M1).  
 Girls often joined to protect themselves and linked with male commanders to 
avenge sexual violence. According to one female informant (11F3), “For me it was 
good to have my husband, he took care of me and my family. He was a good man, and 
provide my family with protection and sometimes food. Whenever he go looting, he 
bring me something back. When your husband die, it is better to find a new one right 
there. If not, they will all try to use you. It was better to stay with one, so he give you 
little more protection.” As Specht (2006) indicated, economic motives also played a 
role for girl soldiers. Being part of the rebels gave the girls access to make up, clothes 
and shoes, which they otherwise could not have obtained. This was also reflected in 
interviews: “I preferred staying with the rebels; at least I had access to things and 
food when they went out looting. If I stay by myself I would die, so my life was better 
with them, even if it was hard” (13F1). As explained earlier, fighting against rape was 
another major motivator for girl soldiers and many joined LURD to avenge as well as 
prevent rape by other forces.   
 Field research indicated that child soldiers often had a nervous energy among 
them, which was settled or accelerated by the use of drugs, depending on going to 
combat or not. LURD rebels used a lot of drugs as marijuana was generally smoked 
on a daily basis while cocaine and amphetamines were taken regularly when the 
group was going to combat. Child soldiers joined in this practice and frequently drank 
alcohol in addition. Informants stated drug use motivated them as it helped them 
forget about the war for a while or made them happy to fight. Hence, commanders 
encouraged children to take drugs before fighting. Several informants told me about 
drug use. For instance: “Sometimes children began crying during combat because 
they were so scared. That’s why it was better to keep them high on drugs. The 
commanders would shout at them: what’s wrong with you? You see many people die! 
If the enemy fire you, you fight back or you be killed! Now fire! So instead next time 
we go to the battlefield, the commanders cut a little on the side of our head and put 
cocaine. It prepared children for battle and make sure we win because nobody was 
fearing anymore. Through drugs you can do anything” (14M2).  
 
Means of teaching 
Although skills training provided by LURD varied from rather basic to non-existent, a 
range of other means of teaching was used to transform child recruits into soldiers. 
Fear and punishment were predominant as using extreme violence taught the 
children to become part of the group. Punishments ranged from double shifts at the 
front line up to death, and would be carried out in public. During interviews, 
informants showed how and why punishments took place: “We could not kill or 
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violate civilians because we needed their support. If you did harm them there was 
trouble. All commanders ordered to respect life and property of civilians. If you see 
them suffering, you must help them. We were fighting to save their life and 
properties. So if you disobeyed the strong law, they kill you or punish you. First they 
tie you, and then everybody was watching, even the civilians. It was an example for 
the civilians that LURD punished the rebels who did not obey. The civilians were 
happy to see the LURD was fighting for them and punished the bad rebels” (14M2). 
Another one (13F3) stated: “If you were looting, you were severely beaten. If you were 
raping, they kill you. They tie you and beat you until you die. Sometimes they lock you 
inside a building somewhere. Then after that you have to go fight in the frontline as 
punishment. It was an example for the others because it tell them do not ever do 
this.” Setting examples by public punishment seemed an important aspect of 
controlling the behavior of LURD child soldiers. As a female informant (9F3) 
explained, “When I became the wife, I did not know he had other wives. He already 
had four. That was difficult because I was new and young, the other women humiliate 
me and make me do hard work. I suffered a lot. Then one day he discover the other 
women jealousy of me. He was very angry and he take one on her hair, outside. He 
beat and beat and then shot her. Then he say: if you women ever make more trouble, 
I kill you. From that moment we never fight again.” 
 Besides punishment, spiritual ceremonies were also used as a means of 
teaching. Child soldiers were taught that spirit mediums provided them with 
supernatural powers and once they had performed rituals, senior rebels would 
pretend to shoot at the children with real bullets to prove they were invincible and 
could not be harmed by bullets. Rewards also played a role in teaching what was right 
or wrong: “When we did a good job, we get rewards from the commander sometimes 
if the situation was safe. We party and drink alcohol from Guinea and smoke. The 
music was so fine. And sometimes you get a promotion or some small small things for 
rewards to teach all the children that it was a fine job. I sometimes get a small 
allowance but I was fighting to live” (10F3). And, as indicated during several 
interviews, even movies were used as a means of teaching: “We used American films 
as examples to get used to fighting and see how to do it. Rambo was the best, I also 
chose that as my name. I wanted to be as strong as he was” (15M2).   
 
The Achievement of Internalization Type I and II 
According to Checkel, socialization leads to Type I or II internalization. The first type 
refers to “learning a role—acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in 
accordance with expectations—irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with 
it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or 
community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, means simply that conscious 
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instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing” (Checkel, 
2005:804). “On the other hand, following a logic of appropriateness may go beyond 
role playing and imply that agents accept community or organizational norms as “the 
right thing to do.” We call this Type II internalization/socialization, and it implies 
that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of 
which they are part. Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by 
“taken-for-grantedness”” (Checkel, 2005:804). These definitions will be used to 
address the following question: did internalization, Type I or II, actually occur within 
LURD? 
 Field research among former LURD child soldiers suggested that both Type I 
and II internalization were achieved by in-group socialization. Especially the 
continuous experience of extreme violence seemed to produce a change in attitude 
and made child soldiers play the expected roles (Type I) or adopt the identity (Type 
II) of the movement. Given the character of the movement, this may come across as 
an unexpected result. Brabazon also acknowledges this: “Despite dressing partly in 
military uniforms and partly like rap singers, LURD shows higher than expected 
degrees of morale, discipline and training. Despite being unpaid and suffering 
perhaps 1.000 fatalities over the last three years, they display generally high morale, 
if occasionally boosted by copious amounts of marijuana. The singular cause of 
ousting Taylor from power is easy to grasp, and highly appealing to former ULIMO 
fighters who felt they were denied the benefits of the 1997 peace agreement. If 
nothing else, fighting with LURD offers prestige, excitement, food, and the possibility 
of employment in the event of a LURD victory” (2003:7). 
 Although LURD recruited numerous children by force, internalization was still 
achieved among them. For most of my informants, it did not take long to get used to 
life within LURD as they had grown up in a conflict ridden country and had, to some 
extent, already become used to witness extreme violence during their early 
childhoods. Some LURD child soldiers had been orphaned during the first war, which 
allowed the factional identity of the group to shape them. However, Type I 
internalization was most common among my informants. During interviews, the 
former child soldiers stated they knew what behavior was accepted within the group 
and acted accordingly: they performed a role but did not adopt the identity of a 
LURD rebel. The following account is from an informant who reached Type I 
internalization: “I was small and so scared when the fighting started, my body 
sometimes almost collapsed when I was shooting. The people were butchered and we 
had to protect ourselves, no one else would look after us so we just had to fight 
everything to survive. But it never made me happy, I was happy only when it finished 
and I could go home again” (9M1).  
 Female informants reported that many girl soldiers calculated their moves and 
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manipulated their environments without actually adopting the rebel identity. Without 
reaching Type II internalization, they developed ways to broaden their perspectives. 
“We had war for so many years, we were quick to learn how to operate with LURD. 
Especially the smart girls were performing well in the group, they were loving the 
powerful men and that gave them status and respect. Many admired them, so if the 
man wanted to keep her, he must take care of her by bringing her many beautiful 
things. The girls became wealthy like that, because their manipulations of stupid male 
rebels helped them survive. They were very successful without becoming true rebels: 
they just played the game. As soon as the war was over, they were gone, looking for a 
new project” (16F2).  
 Still, some of my informants reached Type II internalization. An informant 
explained he identified himself as a rebel, and realized what had happened only years 
after the war ended. He (13M3) stated: “When we were fighting we were doing the 
right thing, we had no idea we did wrong things. I was a radio operator; I did not have 
a weapon. We were drilling and singing songs to prepare to move to the front and 
fight. We had a strong identity, because the songs also created tight bonds between 
us. We were a tight group, a strong connected fighting force that many people 
identified with and believed in.” Another informant (8F2) explained why she 
identified as a rebel; “I was too small, I start fighting when I was 8. I don’t know my 
name, I don’t have no family, the rebels are my family. I am motherless, I am 
fatherless, so I don’t care, I am LURD. My weapon is my mother and my father, we 
are freedom fighters.” 
 Whereas the effects of Type I internalization quickly subdued once child 
soldiers had left LURD, Type II internalization lingered for quite some time after the 
war finished, as shown by this account: “It was very hard to come back home, and 
also to see the enemies we had been fighting against all those years. Now the war was 
over, but we still had our own beliefs. It took a long time to know we were all the 
same human beings. Only after some years did I know that the enemy was just like 
me: used by the big men to get money and power. Only when I knew that I did not 
want to be a rebel anymore, I did not feel like LURD anymore. I wanted a new life 
and a new family” (14M2). 
 The field research indicated the following general patterns: the younger the 
recruit, the more likely he or she seemed to be to reach Type II internalization. This 
may be explained by the fact that particularly young children are considered to be 
most easily manipulated. Moreover, these children proved to be most actively seeking 
for a sense of family protection, and hence adopted the rebels as their new families 
more easily. Whereas most girl recruits achieved Type I internalization, boy soldiers 
seemed more likely to achieve Type II internalization. Earlier parts of this chapter 
have made clear the active and independent attitude of Liberian girls. They often 
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used tactical agency to maneuver through the war, which may have protected them 
from reaching internalization Type II. Furthermore, the longer recruits remained 
with LURD, the more likely it became to achieve Type II internalization. This result 
seems quite straightforward as recruits simply become more susceptible to 
indoctrination the longer they are exposed to its forces. To conclude, child soldiers 
who had reached Type II internalization most often reported that they felt LURD 
socialization thwarted their reintegration into society after they had left the rebels. 
The fact that they had adopted a new rebel identity and cut ties with their 
communities implied they had to start all over when they returned to civilian life. 
They had not only to re-adapt their behavior, but also to shed their rebel identity in 
order to be able to rejoin civilian society This process was much easier for child 
soldiers who just had achieved internalization Type I, as they had merely assumed a 
role, not a new identity. 
 
Socialized Actors Demonstrating Different Behavior 
Do socialized actors behave differently than they did before they were socialized, or, 
than non-socialized actors do? Looking back at the analyses provided in this chapter, 
LURD child soldiers definitely did. They were socialized from the day of their 
recruitment and it seemed as if this fractured their social norms, while the societal 
hierarchy was severely disrupted. Young children could become commanders who 
enjoyed a sense of power, control and respect, and while they achieved these 
positions older people were frequently disrespected. Besides that, socialized child 
soldiers learned to behave according to LURD rules and expectations, and these were 
very different from the societal rules and expectations non-socialized actors complied 
to. Hence, socialized child soldiers demonstrated different behavior.  
 Many LURD child soldiers learned that violence could be used in ways that 
would increase their control and influence. Interviews revealed that even forcibly 
recruited children realized that they could use violence to find their own ways in the 
war, implying that violence transformed victims into agents by changing their 
behavior. Within LURD, girl soldiers may be the most obvious example that 
socialized agents changed their behavior. Although boys also did this, girls in 
particular seemed to use violence to take control over their own lives, as they no 
longer accepted to be victimized and sexually assaulted. Whereas most girls had led 
rather subordinate lives before they became part of LURD, joining the rebels changed 
all their perspectives and behavior. Many tried to turn the war into a successful 
endeavor and achieved power through the barrel of their guns. This shows how 
powerful the socialization mechanisms within LURD were. A former boy soldier 
(14M2) explained that the changed behavior of girls scared him during the war: 
“Before the war, I had never seen violence by girls. But now, the girls were so much 
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wicked. They are even more hardhearted than men, you don’t want to meet them in 
combat. As your enemy, they will leave nothing, you will be finished in few minutes. 
They were different from the boys when we were fighting and I think it was magic. 
When we were attacking the enemy the girls had no fear, they went ahead just like 
that. They were very good fighters. Sometimes the boys were more scared than them. 
Yes, we were also fearing them ourselves because their wickedness was so much 
different from before.” However, boy soldiers were frequently involved in extremely 
violent behavior as well: “We sharpen the bayonet on top of the AK47 and cut the 
enemy’s stomach to get out the good stuff. The children were eager to eat the enemy, 
they were wicked. Ha, sometimes I saw them cutting of the penis and testicles of 
enemy soldiers and yelling: ‘You are my pussy!’ Most of those children were far gone 
and did not think straight anymore, the war had taken total control of them” (16M3). 
These two accounts clearly show that socialized actors demonstrated behavior 
different from that of non-socialized actors. Whereas most had predominantly been 
the subjects of violence before they joined LURD, socialization within the group 
taught them to become used to employing violence themselves. 
 The fact that socialized LURD child soldiers demonstrated such different 
behavior, led to severe challenges during their attempts to return to society. As LURD 
had particularly fought a lawless war towards the end of the conflict, the Liberian 
population was generally not very keen to reintegrate former child soldiers into their 
communities. Many child soldiers had been involved in innumerable atrocities, which 
caused fear and anger among the population. This led to the stigmatization and 
exclusion of former LURD child soldiers. Although this was overcome in certain 
cases, especially girl soldiers who returned from the bush with children fathered by 
male rebels, seemed to be condemned to a future of hardship. According to one 
informant (16F1), “I was with the rebels because I had no other choice. Now the 
community judge me for it, I had a baby in the bush, it is a rebel child. I was raped, 
but now the society is excluding me because of the child. Rape is now kind of 
accepted because so many women were raped, but rebel babies, that is the end of 
your life.” Other children proved to be severely traumatized by their involvement with 
LURD. One of my informants had been socialized so deeply by the continuous 
exposure to extreme violence within LURD, that seven years after the war ended still 
all he could think of was violence. I quote: “The youths of our country are destroyed, 
our women are raped, our country was looted. Now I want to keep fighting, I am 
LURD and I want to kill Taylor people. First they give me drugs and tell me lies, and 
then they teach me how to fight. Then the war is finished but I want to continue now, 
I want revenge even if the war is over. If I kill them, I feel better. It is better when 
they are dead.” This account is just one of many examples that indicate socialization 
within LURD had far-reaching and severe consequences. It significantly changed the 
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behavior of child recruits and managed to transform them into soldiers. As this 
example shows, some child soldiers took on the identity of a LURD rebel through 
socialization, and never lost this sense of belonging after the war ended. This 
indicates that, in order to assist child soldiers in their return to civilian life, DDRR 
programs should address the socialization processes during the war and aim to 
reverse their disturbing effects.   
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6 
An Idle Mind Is the Devil’s Workshop 
Child soldier socialization within the Revolutionary United Front 
 
 
“Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home 
Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more 
When fighting in the battlefield I'm fighting forever 
Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land 
 
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone  
RUF is fighting to save our people  
RUF is fighting to save our country”  
   
RUF Anthem: Footpaths to Democracy, 1995 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the socialization of child soldiers within 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. First, in order to create a 
deeper understanding of the circumstances RUF child soldiers were broadcasted to, a 
study of the Sierra Leonean conflict is provided. This section will touch upon the 
extremely turbulent years of war, yet will not provide a complete analysis of the 
conflict—this is mainly due to the complexities and numerous facets of the conflict, in 
combination with space limitations of this thesis. Still, a summary of the most 
important stages of the conflict should create the sufficient background knowledge 
needed to apprehend the thorough analysis of the RUF as a rebel group and its child 
soldiers. The RUF and their use of child soldiers will be discussed in detail, followed 
by a comprehensive analysis of the socialization processes used within the rebel 
group. This analysis will mainly be based on extensive field research conducted in 
Sierra Leone and include the voices of former RUF child soldiers. 
 
Conflict Background 
Sierra Leone suffered from a violent civil war between 1991 and 2002. Years of high 
unemployment, gradual erosion of civil society and chronic economic stagnation had 
led to mounting frustration and disappointment among the population, especially 
among Sierra Leone’s youth. With their desperate situation mainly being the result of 
governmental mismanagement, it became the foundation for a decade long civil war 
and created a recipe for rebellion: the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Coulter, 
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2009, Denov, 2010). The RUF found its roots in a student movement and outlined its 
ideology in a manifesto that proclaimed the group was fighting for the population. As 
the population seemed to become the target of the RUF revolution, its legitimacy and 
justification soon became disputed. According to Abdullah, “the language of 
revolution was not only ambiguous, it was also misunderstood by those who claim to 
speak that language on behalf of the people who ironically became their prime target” 
(Abdullah, [in: Honwana and de Boeck,] 2005:186).  
Although the war involved numerous armed groups, the main parties were the 
government army and the RUF rebels (Rosen, 2005). The RUF rebels were seeking to 
overthrow President Momoh’s All People’s Congress (APC) regime and install 
democracy. For this reason they invaded Sierra Leone’s eastern districts Kailahun 
and Pujehun from war-torn Liberia in March 1991. Reports claim the RUF started its 
rebellion with only 100 fighters, but rapidly grew into a large organization by 
recruiting thousands of youths and children. The expansion of their forces helped to 
make it possible for the RUF to control a fifth of Sierra Leone within a few months, 
based in the eastern and southern parts of the country. The government of President 
Momoh, which had until then not taken the RUF seriously, seemed unable to control 
the rebels (Denov, 2010).  
The security situation in Sierra Leone aggravated even further due to the fact 
that President Momoh failed to pay his soldiers at the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), 
resulting in a crippled morale and numerous defections (Denov, 2010). The 
uncontrolled situation regarding the RUF led to even stronger dissatisfactions among 
defected SLA soldiers and in 1992, a year after the war had started, a group of these 
young military officers overtook the government through a successful military coup 
led by 26-year old Captain Valentine Strasser. His men took over the capital 
Freetown, blaming the APC government for not doing enough to control the RUF. 
They established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and would stay in 
power until 1996 under command of President Strasser (Peters, 2006).  
After Strasser’s coup, the RUF called for a ceasefire. As the APC government 
had fallen, the RUF proposed to start peace negotiations and establish a new 
government. However, the NPRC neglected the proposal and instead killed several 
RUF key figures. This enraged the rebels and triggered the eruption of a full blown 
war. By the end of 1993, the heavy fighting had taken its toll on the RUF, and the 
rebels retreated into the Gola forests at the Liberian border (Coulter, 2009, Denov, 
2010). Still, Strasser was determined to wipe out the entire RUF, and the NPRC 
started a campaign to double its forces. During the campaign thousands of youths 
were recruited in Freetown to fight the RUF rebels, but it would not bring an end to 
the conflict. After a few months the NPRC was no longer able to control the new 
recruits: approximately 40% misbehaved, defected the NPRC or even cooperated with 
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the RUF rebels in attacking civilians (Peters, 2006). 
Strasser’s NPRC was not able to stop the RUF surge towards Freetown on its 
own. The uncontrollable situation gave the RUF rebels a chance to pillage scores of 
villages and towns, and thousands of children were kidnapped throughout the 
country to strengthen the rebel forces. President Strasser then decided to take a new 
approach to stop the RUF, and hired a group of mercenaries from South African 
based Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1995. EO, who were supposed to be paid 31 
million US dollar annually in diamonds concessions and cash for their involvement, 
managed to force the rebels from the hills surrounding Freetown and pushed the 
RUF back to their headquarters around the diamond mines of Kono in eastern Sierra 
Leone. After the attacks carried out by EO it seemed as though the RUF would not be 
able to function as a rebel group anymore and thus, following national and 
international pressure, the NPRC scheduled democratic elections in 1996. The 
government finally seemed to be placed back into the hands of the Sierra Leonean 
people (Peters, 2006).  
Then, against expectations, the RUF resurfaced: ordering the population not to 
vote during the elections, increasing atrocities and re-starting the terrorization of 
towns and civilians. Violence gripped the country again as the theme and slogan of 
the scheduled elections—‘The future is in your hands’—was used by the RUF to begin 
a new, bloody campaign of their own. The rebels started amputating the hands and 
limbs of thousands of people, warning them not to support the NPRC. To maximize 
fear among the Sierra Leoneans even babies were amputated during this so-called 
Operation Stop Elections (Denov, 2010). The violence continued until the RUF, 
mainly motivated by their wish to be part of the electoral process as a candidate, 
eventually agreed to a ceasefire in early 1996. The rebels called for peace before 
elections and—temporarily—laid down their weapons. In February 1996, even though 
a peace process had not yet been established, elections were held due to national and 
international pressure. Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) was elected as President and established a multi-ethnic, multi-party 
government (Peters, 2006). 
After being elected, President Kabbah continued peace negotiations with the 
RUF. Involving RUF members in the government seemed an opportunity to end the 
war and finally bring peace to Sierra Leone again (Denov, 2010). However, Kabbah 
was also persuaded to authorize an operation to ‘neutralize’ the RUF headquarters 
and key figures by EO. In cooperation with the Kamajor, an armed civil militia group 
also known as the Civil Defense Force (CDF), EO attacked several RUF camps in the 
months to follow (Peters, 2006). These attacks brought RUF leader Foday Sankoh to 
call for a ceasefire again, which eventually led to the signing of the Abidjan peace 
accord in November 1996. The peace accord included “a cessation of hostilities, 
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conversion of the RUF into a political party, a general amnesty, DDR for the 
combatants, downsizing of the army and withdrawal of EO” (Peters, 2006:178). In 
addition, the government was called to address the marginalization of the country’s 
rural population, and hence target the socio-economic dimensions of the war (Denov, 
2010).  
However, it did not take long for chaos to break out again: in December 1996 
the ceasefire was broken by all parties and in attempts to take control of Sierra 
Leone’s diamonds and resources, clashes between the armed groups increased. On 
the RUF side, top commanders had been particularly hesitant to honor the peace 
accord, probably out of fear of retaliation and due to the economic benefits to be 
gained from the war. Rebel leader Sankoh reportedly intended to sustain the conflict 
but when he was arrested in Nigeria for smuggling ammunition, a power struggle was 
ignited within the RUF (Denov, 2010). Civilians seemed to be the main victims of the 
in-group struggle as it once again led to intensified attacks throughout the country. 
Meanwhile, the Kabbah government had increasingly started to support the CDF and 
provided the militia with weapons. The President’s favoritism of the CDF, in 
combination with rumors the SLA would be downsized, caused SLA soldiers to 
increasingly resent the Kabbah administration, which was subsequently overthrown 
by a military coup (Denov, 2010). Kabbah was removed; the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) became the new junta government and invited the 
RUF to form an alliance. Sankoh accepted the invitation and AFRC leader Johnny 
Paul Koroma made an official announcement that the RUF had become part of the 
new government. Koroma claimed he had brought peace by the “only way possible: 
aligning with the enemy: the RUF” and asked the population for support of his 
decision (Gberie, 2005:102). Instead, 400,000 people fled Sierra Leone, hoping to 
find protection in Liberia, Guinea or the Gambia (Gberie, 2005).  
The international community condemned the AFRC/RUF junta outright and 
sent ECOMOG forces to help restore President Kabbah’s government (Denov, 2010). 
The offensive, launched by ECOMOG with support of CDF units, managed to force 
the AFRC and RUF alliance out of Freetown and both groups retreated to the eastern 
and northern parts of the country (Coulter, 2009, Peters, 2006). Subsequently, 
Kabbah was reinstalled as President of Sierra Leone and upon his return 60 junta 
members and collaborators were charged with treason by the government, RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh amongst them (Denov, 2010). Twenty-four of these junta 
members were executed for taking part in the coup and Sankoh remained among the 
ones sentenced to death, re-igniting a new explosion of violence by the RUF rebels. 
Another reign of violence was unleashed on innocent civilians on the countryside in 
two campaigns: Operation No Living Thing and Operation Pay Yourself (Honwana 
and de Boeck, 2005).  
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The RUF rebels were determined to take Freetown and attacked Sierra Leone’s 
capital again on January 6, 1999. That week violence reached another peak: the RUF 
and AFRC saw more than 6,000 people killed in one week, hundreds of abductions 
and numerous atrocities. The RUF had planned to kill everyone they came across and 
“made little distinction between civilians and military targets, stating that they 
believed that civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support 
for the existing government” (Denov, 2010:74). Hence, the explosive situation got out 
of control again, which made concerned West African leaders insist on new 
negotiations to reach a settlement. Meanwhile, ECOMOG forces continued their 
support of the Sierra Leonean government and eventually managed to push the RUF 
out of Freetown for the second time (Coulter, 2009).  
In the wake of this defeat and with national and international pressure rising, 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh agreed to new peace negotiations with President Kabbah 
and on July 7th, 1999 the Lomé peace accord was signed. The agreement included the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), a commitment to 
the end of all hostilities, a power sharing deal with the RUF, DDR of all combatants, 
and blanket amnesty (except for international crimes against humanity). UN 
peacekeepers and military observers would replace the ECOMOG force, yet in 
practice had limited access to areas controlled by the RUF, and the implementation of 
DDR programs was delayed (Denov, 2010, Peters, 2006).  
Initially, the Lomé peace accord did not manage to stop the war. During the 
following two years unsuccessful outbursts of RUF violence continued. Even though 
their strength began to fade, the RUF was not ready to give up just yet (Denov, 2010). 
In 2000 the rebels captured 500 UN peacekeepers within days. In response, the 
9,250 strong United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeeping force 
was increased to 17,500 troops and given a more robust mandate. Simultaneously, 
Liberian President Charles Taylor used his power on the RUF to achieve the release of 
hostages held by the rebels (Peters, 2006). This slightly improved the situation and 
peace negotiations continued in Abuja, Nigeria. By the end of the year the Abuja 
peace accords were finally signed by all parties, leading to the demobilization of 
42,551 fighters during 2001 and bringing an end to the war. In 2002 the Joint 
Declaration of the End of War was signed, and Sierra Leone officially emerged from 
the civil war that left an estimated two million people displaced, 10,000 amputated, 
70,000 killed and destroyed the country’s infrastructure (Coulter, 2009, Denov, 
2010, Peters, 2006). According to Ibrahim Abdullah, “the end result was a grotesque 
caricature of revolution, one that left thousands of Sierra Leoneans dead, thousands 
of others maimed for life, and a country ravaged and stripped in the name of an 
elusive but least understood ideal (Abdullah, [in: Honwana and de Boeck,] 
2005:186). 
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Characteristics of the Revolutionary United Front and the Use of Child 
Soldiers 
 
Why Fight? 
Even though the RUF is often pictured as a brutal, self-enriching group of drug-
abusing maniacs, the rebel group emerged proclaiming a coherent political argument 
and developed itself into a cohesive military organization. What initially started out 
as a student/political youth movement soon developed into a brutal rebel group 
(Rosen, 2005). As a response to the corrupt government, the RUF invaded the 
eastern part of Sierra Leone by crossing the border from neighboring Liberia on 23 
March 1991, having been trained in Libya and receiving material support from 
Liberian president Charles Taylor (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Supported by 
Taylor and under command of Foday Sankoh, the RUF found its roots in the 
aspirations of alienated youth and claimed to be fighting for political goals: they 
aimed to overthrow the government so a multiparty democracy could be established 
and economic exploitation would come to an end (Denov, 2010). In their manifesto 
Footpaths to Democracy the RUF presented its political agenda. It read:  
“We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation 
of crooked politicians and military adventurists... It is our right and duty to change 
the present political system in the name of national salvation and liberation... This 
task is the historical responsibility of every patriot... We must be prepared to struggle 
until the decadent, backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of 
history. We call for a national democratic revolution—involving the total mobilization 
of all progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the existing system is our 
lack of organization. What we need then is organized challenge and resistance. The 
strategy and tactics of this resistance will be determined by the reaction of the enemy 
forces—force will be met with force, reasoning with reasoning and dialogue with 
dialogue” (Footpaths to Democracy, 1995). 
The emergence of the RUF can also be explained looking at the position of 
youth in Sierra Leone. According to Abdullah (2005), one of the driving forces behind 
the rebellion was a perennial lack of means to acquire skills and job opportunities. 
Numerous young men were unemployed due to the non-availability of small loans to 
start up businesses, the absence of vocational education opportunities and the fact 
that few jobs were available. Still, most of these young men were literate and did 
possess special skills. Most had enjoyed some formal education and were politically 
conscious. Not being able to use their skills and knowledge, and seeing their country 
slip away, caused a frustration that contributed to the establishment of the RUF 
(Abdullah, in: Honwana and de Boeck, 2005). However, once they got access to 
weapons the rebels seemed to forget that the offensive was launched to stop 
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corruption in the government. Community leaders were decapitated, villagers were 
enslaved to work in the mines, and children were forced to rape their mothers: the 
RUF became famous for their countless human rights abuses. 
 
Leadership 
Led by former army photographer Foday Sankoh and senior members like Rashid 
Mansaray and Abu Kanu, the RUF consisted of a mere 100 fighters at time of the 
invasion (Bøås and Dunn, 2007, Coulter, 2009). Sankoh, embittered by his 
imprisonment for alleged involvement in a coup d’état in 1971, was determined to 
strike back at the APC and mobilized disgruntled Sierra Leoneans for his cause. 
However, without the extensive support of Charles Taylor, the RUF would not have 
managed to fight their war of terror. Sankoh and Taylor had met each other during 
military training in Ghana and Libya during 1987–1988 and decided to form a 
mutually profitable alliance. Taylor, who was in charge of the NPFL rebels in 
neighboring Liberia, was seeking to extend his control to Sierra Leone and therefore 
provided his ally Sankoh with extensive support for the RUF military operation 
(Rosen, 2005). Moreover, Taylor wanted revenge as Sierra Leone had allowed 
ECOMOG forces to use its territory as an air base for their mission in Liberia. This 
greatly frustrated Taylor, especially since it were the ECOMOG forces that kept him 
from capturing Liberia’s capital and bombed his NPFL rebels (Denov, 2010). Hence, 
in addition to financial support and the provision of arms, Taylor organized that RUF 
members were trained in Liberia (Coulter, 2009). “Over time, the partnership 
evolved and Taylor eventually played the role of banker, trainer and mentor to the 
RUF by providing them with outlets for diamond exports in return for weapons and 
military training” (Denov, 2010:62). In return, Sankoh and the RUF supported the 
Liberian NPFL rebels, and when Taylor became President of Liberia, RUF forces were 
sent into the country to fight off the LURD rebels who were trying to overthrow the 
Taylor regime. 
 
Recruitment and Tactics 
At the early stages of the Sierra Leonean conflict the RUF consisted merely of 
borrowed but experienced Liberian commandos from Taylor’s Special Forces, 
mercenaries from Burkina Faso and some young Sierra Leoneans (Denov, 2010). 
When this small group of fighters invaded Sierra Leone and announced its goal of 
liberating the population from the corrupt government, the government did not 
consider the RUF as a serious threat. However, this would soon change. In order to 
achieve their goals, the RUF started to increase their number of forces. Sankoh began 
a large recruitment campaign, mainly targeting youth who dropped out of school 
and/or lived and worked in towns or mining areas unaccompanied by their families. 
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Indeed, the RUF smartly tapped into the sentiments of social exclusion by promising 
a better future for Sierra Leone’s marginalized youth. Besides using this strategy to 
attract voluntary recruits, the RUF also enlarged its force by coercion through 
“systematic, but indiscriminate use of abduction” (Humphreys and Weinstein, 
2008:438). Furthermore, the rebels often forced youths to commit atrocities against 
the population and local leaders and then took them away to the rebel base camps 
where a new life started. This proved to be a rather successful strategy, as the RUF 
established a viable force and controlled one fifth of the country within months of 
invading Sierra Leone (Bøås and Dunn, 2007).  
“Reportedly, initial RUF recruits were a mixture of disaffected Sierra Leonean 
youths and intellectuals and Sierra Leoneans arrested by Taylor in Liberia” 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008:438). Most RUF youth recruits were unemployed, 
uneducated, and unemployable (Denov, 2010). Their lives before the war were often 
characterized by desperate misery yet after they had joined the rebels, some youth 
seemed to get struck by megalomania. According to Abdullah, “lacking any clear-cut 
ideas about the political goals of an armed uprising, and mesmerized by the 
individuals who set themselves up as guardians of the revolution-to-be, some of these 
youths were convinced that they had arrived at a level of political maturity that would 
usher in the much talked about revolution. Those who were involved in these 
conversations about revolution/violent change were impatient with the protracted 
process of political education and ideological transformation, which normally comes 
with a revolutionary project. They were convinced that all that was needed was guns: 
guns, not even military training or political education…The conversations about 
revolution and violent change among rebellious youths, produced youths obsessed 
with the necessity of violence in changing the system, not conscious revolutionaries” 
(Abdullah, [in: Honwana and de Boeck,] 2005:184).   
This indicated that the recruitment campaign had particularly strengthened 
the RUF by enlisting youth with an “obsession with violence as the midwife of 
change” (Abdullah, [in: Honwana and de Boeck,] 2005:184). Still, this did not seem 
to transform the RUF into a cohesive rebel group that would cause lasting trouble in 
Sierra Leone. Responding to the rebel invasion, President Momoh hit back with 
forces loyal to the APC, which were turn reinforced with Liberian combatants who 
were anti-Taylor. The RUF seemed to be close to defeat in 1993, when the rebels 
retreated into the Gola forest on the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia and 
only few fighters seemed to have remained. However, nothing could have been 
further from the truth as the rebels established inaccessible training camps and 
silently prepared to continue the war. Shortly after their retreat the RUF pulled itself 
together and came out of the forest with a renewed determination and strategies, 
launching a large surprise attack during which they recruited numerous people, 
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looted everything they wanted, and destroyed or killed most of what they did not 
need. After the attack they retreated into the forests again until it was time for a new 
attack. This period was called Phase Two of their war against the government and the 
guerrilla style attacks of indiscriminate violence became the signature style of the 
RUF (Coulter, 2009). It was during Phase Two that, whereas the Liberian forces had 
been blamed for the extreme violence at the beginning of the RUF invasion, it became 
obvious that Sierra Leonean rebels participated just as much. This realization 
resulted in a lack of popular support, which was again compensated by an increasing 
reliance on acts of incomparable brutality and violent rhetoric (Abdullah, in: 
Honwana and de Boeck, 2005). 
Even though the rebels had little support and were chased by government 
forces, the forests provided them with protection and hiding places, enabling the RUF 
to stay beyond the reach of the Sierra Leonean army and ECOMOG peacekeeping 
forces. As RUF leader Foday Sankoh wrote: “Frankly, we were beaten and on the run, 
but…we dispersed into smaller units. We destroyed all our vehicles and heavy 
weapons. We now relied on light weapons, and our feet and brains and knowledge of 
the countryside. We moved deeper into the comforting bosom of our mother earth—
the forest. The forest welcomed us and gave us succor” (Footpaths to Democracy, 
1995). This move allowed the RUF to regroup and retrain fighters, permitted its 
leaders to rethink their strategy and modus operandi, and saved the movement from 
an early defeat (Bøås and Dunn, 2007).  
 
A Baptism of Fire 
According to Bøås the RUF was fighting for a new Sierra Leone through a baptism of 
fire. To illustrate this statement: Operation No Living Thing, Operation Burn House, 
Operation Cut Off, and Operation Pay Yourself were just a few names of RUF 
missions, clearly implying violent goals. In most cases, the extreme violence used by 
the RUF does not make sense from a military point of view. Looking at it from 
Weinstein’s perspective (2006), the extremity and high level of violence can be 
explained by the availability of natural resources: diamonds in this case. However, 
Bøås argues that the RUF’s reasons “must be sought at another level. Most likely the 
war was just as much about symbolic acts as about ordinary warfare…the war was not 
simply a war of arms but also an attempt to reconstruct the societal structures of 
Sierra Leone through violent but basically discursive means” (Bøås and Dunn, 
2007:49). This may well have been the case, as a typical characteristic of Sierra Leone 
is its patrimonial political system. Sierra Leonean society is led by economically and 
politically powerful ‘big men’. Children, youth and adults are dependent on these men 
and often provide services in exchange for support by the ‘big men’ (Coulter, 2009). 
For instance, young men would offer their physical strength for economic benefits. 
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Many youth were discontent with this situation as employment and resources had 
been monopolized by big men, and their frustrations with the system became a main 
reason to join the RUF. Their increasingly violent behavior as the war raged on, 
particularly after the RUF’s near defeat, could be explained as follows: “as these 
people understood their own actions, they were fighting for a new Sierra Leone, 
putting their lives at risk for a revolution that would save Sierra Leone from the years 
of corruption and mismanagement that had followed after independence. Now they 
had to seek refuge in the forest, as their project was generally not well received in 
rural communities. This may very well have increased the frustration and hatred that 
these young men already had toward rural life and traditional structures of authority” 
(Bøås and Dunn, 2007:48). 
 
Diamonds Are Forever 
Although the war did not start as a competition over natural resources, diamonds did 
commence to play an important role in the conflict as the war raged on: the stones 
helped the RUF to sustain the movement. Although the RUF initially did not start 
fighting for diamonds, it became one of their main objectives to control the Sierra 
Leonean diamond fields since the selling of diamonds implied a steady supply of 
weapons (Rosen, 2005). RUF rebels took control of the mines, performing the 
various roles that used to belong to traders, chiefs, soldiers, politicians and civil 
servants in order to obtain all the extracted diamonds. Some civilians were chased 
away from the area; others were killed or used as diamond diggers (Bøås and Dunn, 
2007). The illegally extracted diamonds were used to obtain weapons and 
ammunition through international networks of illicit arms trading. Charles Taylor 
was an eager ‘customer’, offering extensive support to the rebels in exchange for the 
so-called blood diamonds. “While there is no doubt that international networks of 
clandestine dealers in diamonds and weapons assisted the RUF, it took the RUF until 
1998 to get such activities organized—a fact that fatally undermines the argument 
that diamond mining and control was the sole objective of RUF and its fighters” 
(Bøås and Dunn, 2007:47). 
 
Extreme Violence and Civilian Relations 
The negative image of the RUF is mainly due to the extremely violent behavior 
towards innocent civilians, particularly during the latter part of the war. Even though 
new recruits were still educated about the RUF’s ideology during Phase Two of the 
war, murder, mutilations, amputating people's limbs, raping women and generally 
disrespecting the lives and property of civilians seemed to become the modus 
operandi. As Denov puts it: “the RUF’s so-called ‘democratic revolution’ was 
ultimately fought not through the political realm, but instead through the pillage of 
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rural institutions and industrial assets, the mass looting of village property and, 
perhaps most disturbingly, brutal violence against the very civilians it was claiming to 
liberate” (2010:63). The group became well known for their ‘short-sleeve’ or ‘long-
sleeve’ amputation options: cutting of hands and arms of civilians at the wrist or just 
above the elbow (Coulter, 2009).  
The use of rape became more widespread over the years as well. In her study of 
sexual violence during the Sierra Leonean civil war Dara Kay Cohen found that the 
RUF’s increased use of rape functioned not only as a tool of military strategy, but also 
as a method of socialization within the group: it was “useful both as a bonding tool 
and also as a method for proving one’s bravery as a warrior” (Cohen, 2007:21). Cohen 
argues that there are high costs to rape: sexually transmitted diseases such as 
gonorrhea and syphilis were rampant during the war and left many RUF fighters 
ineffective as the diseases were left untreated in the jungle and quickly worsened. In 
addition, because rape requires physical contact, it could lead to “emotional hardship 
on the perpetrator that other types of more removed or abstract forms of violence 
arguably do not” (Cohen, 2007:5). All the same, these emotional and physical costs 
were outweighed by the social benefits within the RUF, and rape proved a highly 
successful tool to facilitate bonding between its members. How rape was part of the 
socialization process is shown by the way it was carried out in Sierra Leone: 75% of 
reported incidents were gang rapes and hence public acts. In Cohen’s interviews with 
ex-combatants they reported “a strong social pressure to commit rape” and they 
described “a subculture in which those who had raped many women obtained a sort 
of legendary status among their peers, and those who refused to participate were 
ruthlessly mocked” (Cohen, 2007:6).  
The RUF particularly used rape as a “tool to terrorize the inhabitants of 
strategically important areas” (Cohen, 2007:7). To illustrate this: 60% of all rapes 
committed during the war were committed in 1998 and 1999—years during which the 
RUF attacked the Sierra Leonean capital Freetown (Asher, 2004). Cohen also found 
that rape in villages usually took place as part of a hit and run style attack, while rape 
in larger cities “was more of an organized event, during which time public spectacles 
of gang rape took place, along with organized attacks of other types of 
violence…Interviews with ex-combatants confirmed this general pattern: the former 
fighters reported that major battles were among the only times they were actually 
ordered to commit rape; otherwise, rape was treated as a ‘private issue,’ outside the 
purview of direct war strategy” (Cohen, 2007:7).  
Although the movement had started quite differently, these examples illustrate 
that the violent behavior became more extreme over time. The RUF transformed into 
a brutal force, controlling the diamond mines to finance their struggle. However, 
control of the diamond mines was not sufficient to sustain the movement; the rebels 
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were also dependent on the cooperation and support of civilians. Although large parts 
of Sierra Leone’s population felt grievances against the government and thus initially 
showed (some) support for the RUF, this significantly decreased over time. Whereas 
the RUF had proclaimed to be fighting for education, human rights, and against 
patrimonial structures and corruption, reality proved quite different: there was an 
enormous rift between RUF propaganda and rebel behavior. This resulted in a lack of 
local support, which made the rebels increasingly turn on the rural population and 
target their predatory behavior on civilians. “The terror used against civilians and 
soldiers was both symbolic and pragmatic: it delivered a message that the central 
government was incapable of protecting the civilian population, and it pushed the 
population into submission or flight by showing that the rebels could kill with 
impunity” (Rosen, 2005:86).  
 Still, field research indicated that the rebels were dependent on civilians, as 
they did not have access to resources: they moved through the jungle and their 
continuous relocations made it very difficult to grow food. Hence, the RUF depended 
on civilians for the supply of goods. Civilians needed to cooperate and provide the 
rebels with food and basic necessities, otherwise the movement could not sustain 
itself. Given that the rebels were armed, civilians were forced to support them: if they 
refused they would be punished harshly. Punishment could imply that several 
villagers would be tortured and killed as to set an example for the rest of the 
population. Or, the village would be completely looted and then burnt down. If the 
villagers did cooperate, the rebels promised to protect them in return.  
 The RUF often announced their arrival as well as the goods they required in 
written statements. This created fear among the civilians, as the requirements were 
usually absurd but had to be met in order to prevent a new killing spree. One of my 
informants showed me letters that had been written to a village chief in eastern Sierra 
Leone, signed by an RUF commander. The letters read that large amounts of food, 
alcohol, oil and gas were required at a specific date. The notification would give the 
villagers some time to deliver, yet if they failed to provide on time, the rebels 
rigorously punished them. “If the people did not cooperate, we would kill them. 
Sometimes we would shoot them, or we would lock them inside a house and set it on 
fire.” A civilian survivor told me: “it was bad when the RUF came. Sometimes they 
announced it, but it was the worst when they had the crazy look; when they were high 
on drugs. Those times, they would just kill everything they came across and chop 
hands everywhere.”  
 
Child Soldiers 
Field research indicated that child soldiers were no exception regarding the brutality 
of the RUF: they were gouging out the eyes of civilians, filling the sockets with 
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melting plastic from burning carrier bags. They wiped out entire villages, killing 
everyone, slitting the throats of their elders and leaving women with sticks in their 
vaginas. As touched upon earlier, Bøås believes these practices “represent direct 
connections between the old social systems of the dysfunctional state and the new 
social orders practiced by the armed insurgents. If acceptable modes of social (to say 
nothing of political and economic) behavior are cast so openly and violently into 
question in the wake of dysfunctional states, is it so striking that some of the young, 
marginalized, and vulnerable elements of society eventually gravitate to extremes? In 
very real ways, these young men are only putting into practice what they have learned 
from their elders” (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:51).  
 That this behavior led to a negative image of the RUF was not a surprise. 
Rosen: “A murderous army cloaked in revolutionary ideology, the RUF was drenched 
in the blood of the people for whom it claimed to be fighting. It was also an army of 
children and youth. Indeed, with the exception of its leader, Sankoh, virtually the 
entire army, including its command and control structures, was under thirty” 
(2005:83). The use of child soldiers became a key element of the RUF: Peters and 
Richards (1998) estimate that approximately half of the RUF was between eight and 
fourteen years old, while Boothby et al. (2006) and Mazurana et al. (2002) argue that 
up to 80 percent of the RUF forces consisted of child soldiers between seven and 
fourteen years old. Several thousand children got caught up inside armed forces: 
according to UNICEF 6,000 child soldiers took part in the Sierra Leonean civil war, 
UNAMSIL estimated 10,000 children were conscripted, and McKay and Mazurana 
speak of 48,000 child soldiers (Denov, 2010). McKay and Mazurana (2004) estimate 
that the RUF had 22,500 child soldiers, of which 30 percent were girls. The exact 
number of child soldiers the RUF managed to recruit remains unclear: the chaos of 
war made it impossible to keep track of such numbers. Furthermore, numerous child 
soldiers have died during the war, others escaped or were never identified as soldiers. 
This makes it impossible to make a conclusive statement about the exact number of 
children involved. Hence, the figures provided are only estimates.   
 The role child soldiers played became symbolic for the brutal character of the 
war: the type of warfare in Sierra Leone was described as the main example of the 
“new barbarism” which was signifying modern conflict (Rosen, 2005). Whereas the 
rebels mainly relied on voluntary recruited youth and adults at the beginning of the 
conflict, once the war was underway they started conscripting thousands of young 
boys and girls by force. “As the rate of attrition among adult RUF combatants 
increased, with factors such as the prolongation of the war, the horrible conditions of 
service, the lack of salary (whereby many soldiers augmented their pay through 
looting or mining), the high death toll and the overall senselessness and brutality of 
the war, the RUF needed to devise another recruiting strategy” (Denov, 2010:63). 
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Hence, the RUF started recruiting children. Although some of these children joined 
the rebels willingly (Peters, 2004), most were press ganged to join the movement and 
had little ideas what they were fighting for (Honwana and de Boeck, 2005). The 
rebels kidnapped children in the villages they looted, took them to the bush, provided 
military training and desensitized them to killing and death. For instance, the rebels 
would often kill a child's family or friends in front of their eyes, telling them the same 
faith would await them if they did not join the rebels as child soldiers or tried to run 
away. Enslaving these children led to a “social death”: they were torn out of their 
communities, which destroyed family ties. “In Sierra Leone, the kidnapping of 
children and youth, the permanent tattooing of child soldiers with the mark of the 
RUF, the reports of gruesome rites in which children were forced to publicly murder 
family and community members to ensure their alienation from them show the 
trademark violence of a slave regime” (Rosen, 2005:59).  
 Field research indicated that child soldiers took on a variety of roles within the 
RUF; there was no exclusiveness. Not all RUF child soldiers were taken to the 
frontline and used as combatants: many were used as porters, cooks, spies, 
babysitters and sex slaves. Child soldiers also had various positions and 
responsibilities within the RUF’s hierarchy, ranging from domestic and supportive 
roles, to positions as combatants or commanders.  The type of role they would take on 
depended on a variety of factors such as physical capabilities, age, skills and the 
demand for fighters. 
 
Girl Soldiers 
Even though Rosen (2005) argues that the majority of girl soldiers had subordinate 
positions, the girls played an essential role within the RUF. Out of all child soldiers, 
approximately 40 percent were girls (Save the Children, 2005) and it is believed that 
the RUF had between 10,000 and 20,000 girls and women associated with them 
(Coulter, 2009). These girls performed a variety of roles within the movement: some 
were used as combatants, but most were given domestic duties, were used as sex 
slaves and/or became bush wives. The majority of girl soldiers are likely to have 
experienced sexual abuse. Girls are usually portrayed as sex slaves when part of a 
rebel group, yet not all girls were abducted and used as sex slaves by the RUF. Field 
research indicated that some chose to join the RUF, as they believed it would bring 
material gain, protection and power. These girls were particularly active inside the 
movement and were known for their “wicked” behavior. Male rebels were often 
scared of them due to their violent attitudes and for that reason did not harass them. 
These girls played significant roles during battles and had powerful positions within 
the RUF, often being responsible for dozens of (girl) child soldiers. Rosen (2005) 
calls these girls mammy queens and describes how former girl soldiers still salute 
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them in reintegration centers. However, most girls who chose to join the RUF conceal 
this fact out of fear for community rejection and see it as their best interest to claim 
they have been abducted instead. As Brett and Specht explain, girls “may consider it 
to be in their own interest (retrospectively) to let it be assumed that they, like the 
majority, were abducted” (2004:85). 
 According to McKay and Mazurana (2004), girl soldiers represented 16 
percent of the total RUF forces. The majority of these girls have been raped during 
the conflict. If they refused sex, they were most often killed and otherwise mutilated. 
Gang rapes were no exception and Wessells states “the rapes of abductees in Sierra 
Leone occurred on too vast a scale to write them off as the crimes of a handful of 
psychopaths. They were part of accepted practice, a de facto policy, within the RUF” 
(2006:89). That the majority of RUF girl soldiers experienced sexual violence was 
also reflected in my field research: 80.6 percent of my informants said to have been 
raped at least once. Most of these girls had been continually sexually abused and gang 
raped during their stay with the rebels. This number corresponds with estimates 
given in an Amnesty International report (2000), stating that between 70 and 90 
percent of abducted girls were raped. Rape simply became part of daily life for most 
girl soldiers. 
 Girls, who managed to become a bush wife to one of the high ranking 
commanders, were considered lucky. These girls often escaped being sexually abused 
by multiple rebels as they belonged to the commander and could stay in the base 
during combat most of the time. In addition, they were sometimes given “staff” to 
work for them. Senior wives in particular had considerable power within the group. 
As Coulter (2009) explains, these women were in control of distributing weapons and 
ammunition before an attack, were in a position to get everything they wanted, could 
punish and reward, and often had commanding responsibilities within the group. 
Moreover, when the commanders had gone to combat, their wives “kept in 
communication with the commander and would select and send troops, spies, and 
support when needed. These girls and young women decided on a daily basis who in 
the compound would fight” (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:14).  
 Girls who did not become bush wives were used as slaves by the rebels, would 
be raped frequently, had a lack of food and suffered from general hardship. This did 
cause jealousy among the girls in lower ranks and struggles to become wives to 
powerful commanders frequently erupted between them. Many of my female 
informants said they were treated well by their commander or bush husband, yet they 
were afraid of the other women. The situation between co-wives was very hostile and 
should not be underestimated: field research indicated there was a fierce competition 
over powerful men, and women would sometimes kill for it. Moreover, if girls and 
women had trouble amongst themselves, it happened that the commanders took 
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them out and killed one of them to solve the problem. It was a dangerous game girls 
had to play. 
  
  
Field Evidence 
This section presents the results of field research in Sierra Leone during which I 
interviewed 65 former RUF child soldiers and their commanders. Some of my 
informants stayed with the RUF for a few months before escaping, while most stayed 
for several years or even during the entire course of the war. They had had different 
roles and responsibilities within the movement. The following charts will show at 
what age they were recruited by the RUF, and at what age they returned to society. It 
also shows the percentage of child soldiers who joined DDRR programs. As I focused 
on a generally small sample size, these figures are not conclusive and further research 
is necessary to establish generalizations about child soldiers within the RUF. 
Although I have sought to portray a representative image of the life of child soldiers 
within the RUF, one should keep in mind these numbers are estimates: it is 
impossible to calculate definite figures in the chaos of war. Still, these findings are 
generally in line with other research and reports written about child soldiers in Sierra 
Leone, and support the general patterns indicated during field research. 
 
  
Boys 
 
Girls 
Average age of 
recruitment 
12.6 11.9 
Average age of return to 
society 
18.1 17.1 
Average period spent 
within RUF 
5.5 5.2 
Percentage participating 
in DDRR programs 
55.9% 38.7% 
Total number of child 
soldiers in sample 
 
34 
 
31 
Table 6.1 Field sample RUF child soldiers. Total sample size: 65 
 
 Table 6.1 shows the result of field research conducted in Sierra Leone. It shows 
the average age of recruitment, the average age of return to society, the average 
number of years spent within the RUF, and the percentage of returnees who 
participated in DDRR programs after they had left the rebel group. In order to see 
whether there are differences in recruitment patterns of boys and girls, these are 
divided into separate categories. The table shows that the average age of recruitment 
was comparable for boy and girl soldiers at 12.6 and 11.9 years old. On average girls 
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returned one year earlier: at 17.1 years of age, while for boys this was 18.1 years of age. 
The table also shows that girls had significantly lower participation levels in DDRR 
program. This is a well-known given, as a clear majority of DDRR registrants were 
male former rebels. According to Coulter (2009), most RUF girl soldiers have never 
been through DDRR programs. They have not been registered as former child 
soldiers and did not receive any benefits from the programs. Coulter’s research may 
indicate that the 38.7 percent DDRR participation among girl soldiers in this sample 
is rather high and not necessarily a representative result; actual figures may be 
significantly lower.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 RUF child soldiers: age of recruitment 
 
 Figure 6.1 indicates that the majority of RUF child soldiers in this sample were 
recruited between 10 and 14 years of age. The horizontal axis shows the age of 
recruitment, the vertical axis shows the number of children recruited at this age. Field 
research indicated that commanders recruited these children deliberately; they often 
selected child recruits by physical appearance and age. If children looked healthy and 
strong they were taken to the base for training. As it was important they could fight 
and obey orders, former RUF commanders stated that they particularly targeted 
children between 10 years and 15 years of age. 
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Figure 6.2 RUF child soldiers: age of return to society 
 
 Figure 6.2 shows that most the child soldiers in this sample were 17 years of 
age or older when they left the RUF. The horizontal axis shows the age of return to 
society, while the vertical axis shows the number of children who returned at this age. 
That RUF child soldiers had often reached adulthood when they left the group is 
partly due to the fact that the war lasted almost a decade. This implied that numerous 
children grew up within the RUF; many felt they had become RUF, and subsequently 
decided to stay with the rebels. Others had achieved ranks and did not want to 
sacrifice their privileges for a return to civilian life. My field research indicated that 
the older child soldiers got and the longer they remained with the RUF, the less likely 
they were to exit the group. Hence, most of these children stayed with the RUF until 
the Sierra Leonean conflict ended. 
 
 
Socialization Processes within the Revolutionary United Front 
The Sierra Leonean conflict cannot be described as an ethnic one: neither ethnicity 
nor religion played a role in the war. Its roots were far more complex, resulting in 
young fighting old, countryside fighting towns, and the interior feeling that Freetown 
was exploiting them. The most common reasons to fight were economic aspects 
(Kandeh, 2002, Reno, 2000), youth dissatisfaction (Abdullah and Muana, 1998, 
Richards 1996), cultural and historical conditionalities (Denov, 2010), the urban–
elite bias and the unrest of marginalized farmers (Peters, 2006). As mentioned 
earlier, the RUF originated as a student movement. Its core consisted of relatively 
privileged students who increased their forces by recruiting children and youth from 
Sierra Leone’s poorest areas (Rosen, 2005). Many child soldiers were recruited by 
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force, yet it was not uncommon that they joined the RUF willingly. Reasons were 
marginalization, boredom, economic reasons or revenge. Many youth were discontent 
with the fact that local rulers or big men had monopolized employment and 
resources. Protection was a main factor: many children felt it was better to be armed 
and fight, compared to be unarmed and subject to violence. Others experienced a 
sense of freedom once they had joined the RUF: societal rules no longer had to be 
taken into account and they finally experienced a sense of power and agency. 
However, one should keep in mind that the motivation to fight was often the result of 
myriad factors and different for each child, a sole common denominator cannot be 
pointed at.  
 Once children had been recruited, the RUF was left with the difficult task to 
make these children loyal to the group, even though many of them had been coerced 
to join the movement. As Denov rightly explains: “Newly abducted children were 
clearly terrified, full of despair and profoundly disoriented. Moreover, they were 
highly uncommitted to the RUF as a whole. For the overall ‘success’ of the movement, 
the RUF leaders needed to ensure that children gradually internalized and adopted 
the values, norms and practices of the militarized world that was forced upon them” 
(2010:98). In order to shed light on this challenge, this section will show how 
socialization enabled the RUF to motivate and control child soldiers, and made them 
part of the group. It will address the different stages of socialization processes used 
within the RUF. Field research indicated that, although rewards played a minor role, 
initiation, violence and fear were main methods of control exercised to motivate 
newly recruited RUF child soldiers. Therefore, the first part of this section will mainly 
focus on the roles initiation rituals, training and extreme violence played in the 
creation of allegiance among new recruits, and provide a thorough analysis of how 
these contributed to motivation among RUF child soldiers. Hereafter, to establish a 
broad understanding, a detailed analysis of organizational socialization within the 
RUF will be provided. 
 
Formal and Informal Socialization 
When analyzing the existence and characteristics of the RUF, it becomes apparent 
that the rebels effectively transformed children into soldiers. How did the RUF, which 
relied largely on forced recruitment, accomplish this? Richards: “If we want to 
understand the behavior of RUF abductees we shall have to look at the way their 
social worlds were pulled apart by social exclusion and capture, and put together 
again through initiation and subsequent control” (2005:125). This section aims to do 
this. Field research indicated that the RUF indeed first pulled the worlds of their child 
recruits apart by ensuring alienation and loss. Then, the confused child would be 
integrated into the group and provided with an illusion of control through weapons. 
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This section will provide a detailed analysis of the myriad aspects of this process by 
focusing on socialization. As Wood argues: “Whether recruits of armed groups are 
volunteers or have been coerced, they have to be socialized in the use of violence for 
group, not private, purposes, if group leaders are to control the violence deployed by 
their combatants, typically through the building of strongly hierarchical 
organizations. Training and socialization to the armed group take place both 
formally, through the immersion experience of “boot camp,” and informally, through 
initiation rituals and hazing. The powerful experiences of endless drilling, 
dehumanization through abuse at the hands of the drill sergeant, and degradation 
followed by “rebirth” as group members through initiation rituals typically melt 
individual recruits into a cohesive unit in which loyalties to one another are felt to be 
stronger than previous loyalties, such as those to family” (2008:546).  
 The RUF certainly used this kind of military socialization to make child 
soldiers part of the group and hereby managed to establish a cohesive organization. 
Both formal and informal socialization played important roles in the transformations 
children underwent while they were part of the rebel group. These processes started 
immediately after a child had been recruited. Formal socialization was achieved 
through several types of training, as pointed out by Denov: “To facilitate children’s 
pathways into violence and armed conflict, the RUF leadership began children’s 
initiation into the dictates of the RUF using physical, technical and ideological 
training” (Denov, 2010:98).  
 That training was a truly important characteristic of the RUF was indicated by 
field research. All of my informants stated they had received training when they 
joined the RUF. All had had ideological training, and the majority had been given 
military training. However, their accounts suggested that the extent of training child 
soldiers received varied. Some children only had crash courses in handling AK–47s. 
This was often the case when the RUF was involved in heavy fighting. Other children 
were provided with thorough and lengthy training routines that could last up to 
several weeks or months. The RUF seemed to train both boy and girl soldiers. As 
indicated by an informant (11F8): “All the girls who stayed over a year were trained. 
We all knew how to fire, and many of us were even better fighters than the boys.”  
 Most of my informants stated they initially found it difficult to participate in 
military training, they were scared of holding a weapon and were not used to the 
violence they witnessed. Some of them said, that in order to erase their fear, their 
commander or the ‘doctor’ would inject them with drugs. This would help them to 
complete the training program, as they were no longer fully aware of their actions. 
Their accounts revealed that new recruits used drugs and alcohol often; it was said 
that their intoxication would make them better fighters and the commanders used 
this fact strategically. It made the initiation of children into the world of the rebels 
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easier, as indicated by one of my informants (10M4): “When they took us, we were all 
scared. And then we had to learn to fight. The training was not good for many 
children, we were fearing the weapons. But then the commander injected us with 
some medicine and it was better. It freed our mind, we felt strong and ready to fight.” 
 In addition to military training, the rebels taught child soldiers about the 
ideological cause the RUF was fighting for. The children were told about the RUF’s 
goals of stopping the marginalization of the population and establishing democracy. 
One of my informants (14M7) recalled: “When we were captured they took us to the 
base where we got ideological education and training. We listened to Papi Sankoh’s 
speeches about the government. The government had maltreated us for too many 
years, marginalized Salone’s youth, and caused poverty with their corruption and 
oppression of the population. Papi Sankoh was right that men, women and children 
had to stand up and fight for our future and the equal distribution of Sierra Leone’s 
resources.” Besides Sankoh’s speeches, my informants state they were given lectures 
by the commanders, had ideological discussions and were singing songs about the 
RUF cause during morning parades. Several informants indicated that this kind of 
training motivated them to fight, often because they came from extremely poor 
families. Even forcibly recruited children were affected by the ideological training. As 
one informant (13M6) explained: “I was abducted but when I learned all these things, 
I wanted to fight. I felt I had an important role, to save my country.”  
 In addition to training, informal socialization was an essential aspect of 
becoming RUF. Secret societies are a significant part of Sierra Leonean culture. 
Initiation practices are an important aspect of these societies by marking the end of 
childhood and the beginning of adulthood. According to Mende tradition, one of the 
main ethnic groups in Sierra Leone that was well represented within the RUF, boys 
are initiated at puberty to the male secret association Poro. Their initiation would 
signify their transition into manhood and warrior status, as it allowed for “rebirth 
into a world of adult responsibility” (Richards, 1996:81). Even though the boys would 
still be in their (early) teenage years, the Mende looked at them “as young adults with 
the rights and duties of adulthood” (Rosen, 2005:64). Details of such initiation rites 
are not to be revealed to outsiders, hence the name “secret societies.” However, 
research has indicated that during the Poro initiation process, boys would learn about 
the expectations of manhood, their relationship to the community and the moral 
conduct of war. Sande, a similar secret society, was concerned with the initiation of 
girls and teaches them about marriage, medicine, child rearing and midwifery 
(Denov, 2010).  
 “The rigors of initiation are said to symbolically break the family tie, create 
bonds among peers, as well as the life-long respect for the expertise of elders, and 
commitments beyond the web of kinship” (Denov, 2010:58). This indicates that these 
  
 
179 
societies are of fundamental importance in Sierra Leonean culture, as they signify the 
start of a child’s transformation into an adult. Since the RUF had to transform their 
child recruits into soldiers, it may not come as a surprise that such initiation 
traditions were also used within the RUF. Rosen explains: “RUF recruits were often 
sworn to secrecy and took oaths of loyalty, the violation of which was said to result in 
the magical death of the violator.” And “a report of the European Commission claims 
that the RUF’s use of the Poro was a way of manipulating the cultural ‘infrastructure’ 
of rural life in Sierra Leone. Arguing that the Poro is the “main idiom of transition 
from childhood to adulthood in forest society” the report interprets the use of the 
Poro by the RUF as a way of abusing traditional sacred rite to convert children to a 
radically new way of life” (2005:72).  
 Field research indicated that the RUF’s use of initiation rites was indeed an 
efficient means to encourage the transformation of children into soldiers. It severed 
the ties to their families and communities, symbolized the start of a new life as a 
rebel, and prepared them for becoming full members to the rebel group. An 
informant (12M7): “as for the children, the ceremonies were very important because 
after that we were part of the group now. Some children tried to resist but we had no 
choice, we were now RUF, and the bush was home. There was no point going back to 
the village.” This illustrates the importance of both formal and informal socialization 
within the RUF as to create a cohesive group by engaging child soldiers. 
 
Experiencing Violence 
Like many other African rebel groups, the RUF became famous for its brutality. The 
group is well known for its absurd violence, committed by ‘wicked’ child soldiers and 
‘evil’ women. The question rises how children became actively involved with this 
group. Child soldiers continuously seemed to suffer from the violent circumstances 
surrounding the RUF, yet innumerable children stayed with the group for several 
years. Although it may sound awry, this section will explain how it was the actual 
experience of extreme violence that encouraged children to become part of the RUF. 
The use of violence was a significant part of the socialization mechanisms used by the 
Sierra Leonean rebel. The RUF was not unique from this perspective, as Wood 
explains it is common for rebel groups to use violence in order to engage their 
recruits: “Once deployed, combatants experience (to widely varying degrees) violence 
as perpetrators, as witnesses, and often as victims…Among the psychological 
mechanisms possibly at work in these processes of socialization to group membership 
and the wielding of violence are compliance, role adoption, internalization of group 
norms, cognitive dissonance reduction, habituation to violence, diffusion of 
responsibility onto the group, deindividuation, and dehumanization of the victimized 
group” (2008:546).  
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Field research indicated that, amongst child soldiers within the RUF, the 
experience of violence created allegiance and loyalty. Over time, it led to changed 
behavior and developed new identities. The exposure to extreme violence already 
started during the recruitment of RUF child soldiers. As one of my informants (11M5) 
stated: “I was working in the field one day with my parents. The RUF came and 
wanted to take me away. My parents begged them to let me go, but the rebels killed 
them instead. Then they gave me the option: kill or come. So I went.” When 
recruiting children, it was not unheard that the RUF forced them to kill family or 
village members in the presence of the entire village, rupturing their bonds with 
society. Moreover, boys and men were sometimes forced to rape their mothers and 
daughters. Refusing was no option if these boys wanted to survive, as the rebels 
threatened to kill them if they would not rape. As another informant (10F4) recalled: 
“When the rebels came to town, they grabbed me and other children. They told us to 
kill some people. My uncle and neighbor were with the people, so I did not want to 
hurt them. But the rebels said the other children would kill me too if I didn’t 
cooperate, so I did it and survived.” In some cases, children were given drugs during 
their recruitment in order to numb their feelings and make them more cooperative. 
This is illustrated by the account of another informant (8M8): “First they killed my 
parents. I had to watch and dance, I could not cry because then the rebels would kill 
me too. They gave me drugs and then I don’t know what happened. When I woke up 
all my family was dead. The rebels told me I was a good soldier now, because I had 
washed them all.” RUF rebels often refer to ‘Washing’ when they speak about killing. 
 Using violence against their own community members was purposely ordered 
by commanders, as this would sever the child’s family ties and discourage potential 
attempts to escape and return home. Once newly recruited child soldiers were taken 
away from their homes and brought to the RUF base, the violence would continue. 
My informants stated they witnessed and suffered extreme forms of violence on a 
daily basis, and they were often ordered to carry out violent acts. Most said that they 
eventually became used to it, as the violence would never stop. And so they started 
engaging in violence too, often motivated by fear. As one former girl soldier (14F8) 
explains: “I was frightened and so I did what I was told. After some time I did not see 
the people anymore, I just chopped when they told me.” That RUF child soldiers 
became used to violence is also suggested by the following accounts: “After some time 
I became used to the fighting and sounds of war. Now to me, firing the gun sounds 
like music” (10M7), and, “When we captured the enemy we tortured them and then 
killed them. Sometimes we chopped them into parts and leave them on the road. It 
would show the people we were around and controlling the area, it was our territory” 
(12M9). 
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That many child soldiers, even those who had been forcibly recruited, over 
time became actively involved in extreme violence became apparent during 
interviews. One well-known example of RUF atrocities is their practice of attacking 
pregnant women and eviscerating the fetuses they were carrying (Coulter, 2009). 
This practice was confirmed by my informants: they stated that the rebels would 
often argue over the sex of the baby and then cut the woman open so they could take 
out the fetus and find out whether it was a boy or a girl. One informant (14M6) 
explained: “Whenever we came across pregnant women we would capture them and 
become curious about the sex of the baby. We would cut her stomach and pull the 
baby out. The ones who guessed right would celebrate.” Another one (13F5) said: “I 
have seen the women split open to check on their baby’s sex. We would make bets if 
she was carrying a boy or girl. There were so many, sometimes I won, sometimes I 
didn’t.” 
 Sexual violence was also very common among the RUF. One of my informants 
(12F6) told me about her experience: “when the rebels attacked I tried to run but they 
captured me. They hacked off my mother’s arm and killed my father. I couldn’t cry 
because they said they would kill me. They looked like wild beasts and they were 
shouting. They killed many people that day, also babies. They just took them from 
their mothers, tossed them high into the air. And then you would hear the sound 
when the baby hit the ground, it was finished. After a while they started beating me 
too and then took their turns. They undressed me and virginated (de-flowered) me, 
one by one they used me. When they were finished I was told to get up and they took 
me to the base. I was in so much pain but I had to walk, they kept saying they would 
kill me. When we came to the base I was given to a commander, I was now his wife. 
From that day, I was raped almost every day.” During interviews, the term 
“virginating” was commonly referred to by girls to explain they lost their virginity. 
 According to several informants, the social pressure to use sexual violence was 
so high that young boys often tried to imitate older rebels by raping women. These 
boys could be as young as 9 years old. Male rebels would generally discuss their skills 
and proudly announce how many women they had raped during attacks. These 
findings are also noted by Cohen (2007), who emphasizes that rape was a public 
event and that any rebels who refused to participate were ridiculed. However, rape 
was not committed solely by male RUF rebels: some girl soldiers played an active role 
in raping other women. As one of my female informants (11F9) explained: 
“Sometimes we would assist when other women were raped, I held them down so 
they could not fight back when the boys took turn. I have seen RUF girls put the AK47 
in the woman’s vagina and other times the girls forced some boy recruits to rape their 
sisters.” These findings are confirmed by Mansaray’s research (2000), stating that 
female fighters committed or assisted during approximately 12 percent of rape cases. 
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Asher (2004) even found that in almost one third of reported rape cases female 
fighters were implicated as perpetrators. 
 These examples show the extreme extents to which the RUF utilized violence. 
Initially child soldiers would mostly suffer from these practices, but field research 
indicated that over time some of these children became perpetrators themselves. My 
informants also said that the described practices of formal and informal socialization 
led to the creation of allegiance to the RUF. They changed their behavior in order to 
be considered a member of the group. Part of the reasons behind their often violent 
behavior is summarized by Coulter: “Fear was definitely a motivator of violence, 
especially violence perpetrated by those rebels who themselves had been abducted by 
violent means. Many abducted men and women had witnessed the brutal 
assassination of their own families, and some had been forced to participate in them. 
Life with the rebels after such events consisted of few, but nonetheless complex, 
options: adapt, die, or try to escape” (2009:123). Most child soldiers adapted to 
survive; thus, one can conclude that violence wielded, suffered and observed was an 
integral part of child soldier socialization within the RUF; it effectively contributed to 
the transformation of children into soldiers and the creation of allegiance. 
 This argument is bolstered by Cohen’s work on sexual violence (2007). She 
argues that socialization and sexual violence within military units are inextricably 
linked, stating that “rape as a means of socializing new membership is best 
understood as an interactive process in which members in an armed faction establish 
their position in the group. Rape bonds together people in social groups, and plays an 
especially important role in groups with low cohesion, in which the members know 
very little information about each other.” This certainly was the case within the RUF, 
where combatants “typically knew nobody in their factions” (Humphreys and 
Weinstein, 2004) and approximately 85% of RUF rebels was recruited to the group 
by strangers (Cohen, 2007). This indicates that rape has been an essential aspect of 
the socialization process within the group. 
 Cohen explains that most RUF rebels initially started using rape as a means 
that would ease their entry into a group that was characterized by an “immense 
pressure to participate in sexual violence—creating a self-reinforcing circle of sexual 
violence” (2007:18). However, the social pressure to keep engaging in sexual violence 
was high, particularly encouraging those at the bottom level of the group to organize 
rape in order for them to be recognized as real rebels. “Rape, with its attendant 
dangers to the individual’s health, was an especially useful signaling device, because 
it encompassed both a form of torture and a grave personal risk. Ex-combatants 
reported that those who participated in rape in Sierra Leone were seen to be more 
courageous, valiant and brave than their peers … Those who committed rape were 
respected by their peers as “big men”—essentially, strong and virile warriors with 
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tough attitudes” (Cohen, 2007:8). This shows that sexual violence was not just a tool 
of military strategy: it was an essential aspect of socialization within the RUF. It 
contributed to the organization of the group structure and because it was “the 
costliest form of civilian torture perpetrated by the combatants, it was arguably the 
best signaling device available to group members” (Cohen, 2007:9). 
 
 
Organizational Socialization within the Revolutionary United Front 
Whereas the previous section elaborated upon formal and informal socialization, this 
section will deepen the analysis by focusing on organizational socialization. 
Organizational socialization consists of six different tactics and refers to “the process 
by which one is taught and learns “the ropes” of a particular organizational role. In its 
most general sense, organizational socialization is then the process by which an 
individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an 
organizational role” (Van Maanen, 1977:3). Moreover, “organizational socialization 
refers to the fashion in which an individual is taught and learns what behaviors and 
perspectives are customary and desirable within the work setting as well as what ones 
are not” (Van Maanen, 1977:4). Working from this definition, the following sections 
will illuminate the presence of the six organizational socialization tactics within the 
RUF, to create a broader understanding of the group’s use of child soldiers. 
 
Collective Socialization 
Putting new recruits through experiences as a group before they can become accepted 
members, collective socialization generally takes place when the organization aims to 
achieve a collective identity, loyalty to the group and solidarity. Examples of this 
socialization tactic are military boot camp or training (Van Maanen, 1977). When 
analyzing the RUF as an organization, it becomes apparent that the training provided 
to their new child recruits was an attempt of collective socialization. As thoroughly 
explained in the previous section on formal socialization, the RUF made extensive use 
of military and ideological training. Child recruits were always trained in groups and 
they went through the same experiences on the way to becoming a rebel. During these 
training periods, child soldiers were given new names. An informant (14M5) stated: 
“All the children were getting new names to make us feel good and confident. 
Sometimes it was because of the personality, hot temper or something that happened. 
But everybody got the jungle name so we were becoming real members of the RUF.” 
This account shows how the collective renaming of child recruits contributed to the 
transformation of children into soldiers. 
In addition to training, the RUF organized meetings that had to be attended by 
all the rebels. These meetings can also be perceived as collective socialization as they 
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aimed to create a collective sense of identity, solidarity and loyalty. As indicated by 
one of my informants (15F4): “We spent most of the time with our family group, but 
in the morning we grouped together with all the people on the base. We would all join 
the morning parade and pray together. The commanders would give us tasks for the 
day at that point and they preached about the movement. This way we found out 
about our plans and they encouraged us to be a group. Everybody was there and had 
to listen carefully.” 
 As Van Maanen (1977) indicates, collective socialization brings along certain 
risks. As participants go through the experience together, this may create a potential 
foundation for collective deviation and resistance among recruits. As participants 
may face similar problems during training, they may look for solutions as a group. 
Hence the chance of collective rebellion may originate. The RUF tackled this 
possibility by strongly discouraging their recruits to deviate. The rebels spread fear by 
threatening recruits with execution and by carrying out punishments in public. This 
significantly limited the chances of escaping the movement, as explained by one of 
my informants (8F8): “If you did not manage to escape straight away, the rebels 
would keep you with them for years. Your only option to escape would be death or 
when they left you behind during combat. If you tried to run or misbehaved, they 
would kill you and show everybody. There was no other way but follow the orders.” If 
an RUF rebel did deviate, the morning parade was often used to carry out 
punishments so that all RUF members in the base would witness what happened to 
disobedient rebels. Depending on their violations they were beaten or killed in front 
of the entire group, which discouraged the other rebels to resist against their leaders.  
 
Formal Socialization 
During formal socialization, new recruits are generally segregated from the other 
group members while going through a set of experiences that is designed to ensure 
they learn the correct behavior and values associated with life as a rebel. During this 
intensive period, new recruits’ commitment and respect of key values to the rebel 
group are closely monitored (Van Maanen, 1977). Examples of formal socialization 
can be traced back in the dynamics of the RUF. Interviews suggested that this type of 
socialization was particularly used to teach children their new role and make them 
feel and think like members, while they were closely supervised by commanders who 
kept track of their developments.   
 How newly recruited children were segregated from other RUF rebels became 
apparent during interviews. One of my informants (13M3) said: “When the rebels 
attacked my village, they took many children. I was taken with my friends and when 
we came to the base, we were locked up in separate places. They kept boys and girls in 
different areas, and we stayed separately from the other rebels when we were getting 
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our education. Some rebels were assigned to guard us so we would not escape. Those 
people were very angry. The commander said we had to stay in that place until we 
were ready to become real members.” A female informant (14F3) stated: “I was taken 
with many other children. When we came close to the base, we were divided in 
groups. Then I was kept in one space with 22 new girls. We were all young, maybe 
around 12 or 14. When we just arrived the rebels came to check on us. They first 
picked the pretty girls and used them one by one, just in the room. Some said you will 
be my bush wife. We could not refuse when they wanted to sex us, they would kill us. 
We stayed in that place until we had the understanding of the ideology. The men said 
we were ready to be wives and then we were moved inside the base.” 
 
Random Socialization 
Interviews with former RUF commanders and child soldiers indicated that the third 
tactic of organizational socialization also took place within the group. This tactic, 
referred to as random socialization, “occurs when the sequence of steps leading to the 
target role is unknown, ambiguous, or continually changing” (Van Maanen, 1977:51). 
This dynamic can be found within the RUF as the rebels generally did not determine 
a necessary order or specific sequence of actions that had to be accomplished to reach 
a particular target. For instance, obtaining a rank within the RUF had mainly to do 
with a child’s performance and his or her relation with the commander. Child A and B 
could have similar performances, but whether they would be promoted often 
depended on the relationship with their superiors as well as the commander’s 
character. Still, there was never a guaranteed promotion; the process was rather 
vague and ambiguous. Ranks were not organized according to age or the period of 
serving, they were mostly given to rebels who proved they could fight and 
demonstrated violent behavior. According to my informants, ‘wickedness’ was an 
important quality for rebels who wanted to achieve a rank and brutality was hence 
encouraged. This implied that young boy and girl soldiers could become commanders 
within the RUF, whereas this would have been unheard of in traditional society. 
 However arbitrary their promotional system may have been, the RUF had a 
strong hierarchy in place. According to Rosen this was a rather fluid hierarchy: 
“Those who volunteered to join had higher status than abductees, who often became 
virtual slaves. Men and boys had much more power than women and girls, although 
women and girls attached to higher-ranking officers could sometimes wield 
considerable power and influence. Most women and girls were in subordinate or 
slave-like roles” (2005:83). Although Rosen indicates the general divisions within the 
RUF hierarchy, random socialization through arbitrary promotions implied that there 
were many exceptions made to these patterns.  
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Variable Socialization 
 As a fourth tactic of organizational socialization, variable socialization played a 
prominent role within the RUF. Variable socialization processes create maximum 
anxiety among new recruits, as it keeps them in the dark regarding the passing of 
boundary passages. The anxiety resulting from not knowing what to expect motivates 
new recruits to obey and drives them towards conformity, making them susceptible 
to the demands of their leaders (Van Maanen, 1977). Based on interviews with former 
RUF members, the rebels indeed seemed to ensure maximum anxiety among its child 
recruits by exposing them to an extremely volatile environment. Constant violence 
kept the children alert and aware of their behavior. My informants stated that they 
had to calculate every move they made as the rebel’s normalized use of violence made 
them realize situations could turn explosive within a split second. This resulted in a 
deep fear to be executed and the impression that they could not afford to relax.  
 Moreover, the existence of the group itself can be seen as rather variable, as 
the rebels were almost continuously on the run from enemy forces and had to 
establish new bases frequently. Child recruits were moved away from their home 
areas; the unfamiliarity of the new territory made the rebel group their only sense of 
security, discouraging them from escape. Interviews revealed that this situation 
added to the constant fear experienced by all of my informants. One of them (15M8) 
explained the volatile situation: “For me, fighting was not the worst. Even to survive 
in the base was complicated, I was alert for my life all the time. I had to satisfy the 
wishes of my commander, avoid contact about the past and even more things. I knew 
that because those were the rules. But still, even if I did everything my commander 
ordered me, he could still become hot tempered and punish me for no real reason. I 
was scared the big rebels would kill me, I was scared all the time. I never knew when I 
was ok and when I could feel safe, or when they would get angry and violent. Honest, 
I realize I was living in fear all the time and could never rest. My heart kept beating so 
fast and loud. It never stopped until the war ended.” Still, there was no other option 
but to remain with the group. Successful escapes were very seldom and the unknown 
areas led to profound confusion among child soldiers. Even though the situation 
within the RUF was volatile, most of my informants claimed there was no alternative; 
they had to obey the commanders in order to stand a chance to survive.  
 
Serial Socialization 
The fifth tactic of organizational socialization is defined as serial socialization. During 
this process, well-integrated members groom new recruits who will take on similar 
roles within the group, functioning as their role models (Van Maanen, 1977). Using 
this definition when analyzing the dynamics within the RUF, it seemed that serial 
socialization indeed took place. Interviews suggested that senior RUF rebels would 
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serve as role models to new recruits: child soldiers learned how to be a rebel from 
their superiors as they provided them with training and monitored their 
developments. The children typically remained under close supervision until the 
senior rebels decided they had adopted the group’s behavior and identity, and hence 
acted accordingly. This is in line with Van Maanen’s further specified description of 
the process: “Serial socialization is most likely to be associated with inclusionary 
boundary passages. This association results because to become a central member of 
any organizational segment normally requires that others consider one to be affable, 
trustworthy, and, of course, central as well. This is unlikely to occur unless these 
others perceive the newcomer to be, in most respects, similar to themselves. Recruits 
must at least seem to be taking those with whom they work seriously or risk being 
labeled deviant in the situation and hence not allowed across inclusionary 
boundaries” (1977:62). 
 Within the RUF serial socialization was taken rather seriously. As Coulter 
notes: “Every act and spoken word was measured in a dangerous balance between life 
and death” (2009:120). This was also experienced by most of my informants. I quote 
one (16F7): “The commanders tested us, we could never know their minds, they 
would ask us questions and if you gave the wrong answer, it was finished for you. The 
commanders did not trust the new ones, they first had to prove themselves.” That this 
was indeed the case is illustrated by the account of a former commander (16M10): 
“When you are recruited we do not know your mindset, so you could not go to the 
frontline straight away. We were testing them, we kept them somewhere without 
arms and ammunitions. When they tried to escape we would catch them and set the 
example.” Another informant (12M8) told about his testing experience: “So one day 
they decided to test me. They took me to my village and killed some of my people. I 
knew I could not make a sound and had to watch and celebrate. If I didn’t, I would 
have joined my family and be chopped. But I completed the assignment and then they 
accepted me as a real rebel and I got my rank.” 
 Still, even though child soldiers successfully passed their ‘tests’, a certain 
degree of mistrust was always present among the RUF forces. According to one 
informant (14F6): “Sometimes we stayed behind in the base when they went out to 
fight or loot. But the commander never left us alone: he always told some men to stay 
behind and watch us. This was both for protection but also because we could not run 
away.” The rebels continuously had to prove themselves, even commanders had to 
invest to ensure that the RUF top was convinced of their loyalty and impressed by 
their performance. One of my informants (13M5) addressed which implications this 
had for the hierarchy within the RUF: “The hierarchy worked like this: our group was 
led by my commander, and he had to report to his commander and he had to report 
to Maskita or Superman (senior commanders). This way they could control all the 
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rebels, they had divided the responsibilities. If one of them was not successful in 
controlling, he was wiped out and replaced.” These accounts suggest that serial 
socialization played a significant part in the creation of allegiance among child 
soldiers within the RUF. 
 
Divestiture Socialization 
The sixth tactic of organizational socialization may be most extreme, as it aims to 
destruct the self-image of new recruits by stripping them of various personal 
characteristics, and rebuilds it based upon a new set of assumptions. This is often the 
result of the new recruit realizing he or she is capable of doing things they would not 
have deemed possible (Van Maanen, 1977). Within the RUF, this type of socialization 
is for instance used during the initiation rituals performed on child soldiers. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, the initiation ceremonies sever family ties and 
prepare children for a new life as a rebel. Field research indicated that the importance 
of such ceremonies in Sierra Leone implied that the ceremonies within the RUF had 
consequences on the self-image of a child; he or she was likely to no longer consider 
him or herself as a child after the ceremony and the other rebels encouraged this. 
From that moment on the new self-image of child soldiers started to develop. The 
socialization processes within the group confronted the children with the fact that 
they were able to do things they would have never imagined. Killing, extreme violence 
and looting are obvious examples of this.   
 In addition to triggering the building of a new self-image, divestiture 
socialization also implies that “recruits are forced to abstain from certain types of 
behavior, must publicly degrade themselves and others, and must follow a rigid set of 
rules and regulations. Furthermore, measures are often taken to isolate recruits from 
former associates who presumably would continue to confirm the recruit’s old 
identity…Divestiture processes are most likely to be found (1) at the point of initial 
entry into an organization or occupation, and (2) prior to the crossing of major 
inclusionary boundaries where a recruit must pass some basic test of worthiness for 
membership in an organizational segment” (Van Maanen, 1977:66–67). Looking at 
the perpetrating acts child soldiers were forced to commit on their family and village 
members during their recruitment or later tests, the RUF did make use of this type of 
socialization. These acts were not only degrading, but also isolating, as they burned 
the bridges to the communities. In addition, once part of the RUF, child soldiers were 
forced to show different behavior and were confronted with a rigid set of rules, as will 
be further analyzed in the next section of this chapter.  
 Divestiture processes have the power to remold new recruits, and it is 
therefore an efficient socialization tactic for the group to control the person’s values. 
It is also one of the most important processes that contribute to the survival of the 
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group as such: “for, once a person has successfully completed a difficult divestiture 
process and has constructed something of a new identity based on the role to which 
the divestiture process was directed, there are strong forces toward the maintenance 
of the new identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:67). This explains why the RUF used 
divestiture socialization; it made child soldiers take on new identities and feel 
allegiance to the group. To illustrate this, Bøås explains how young men underwent a 
personal transformation once they had picked up a gun: “Importantly, the gun 
represents not simply another form of survival but also the possibility of creating new 
meanings of self. As noted at the outset, war does more than disrupt existing social 
systems; it also creates new social orders. In this process, the fighters become active 
agents in the transformation of their social systems and their selves. They are no 
longer merely passive agents of a brutal system, but through the gun they gain agency 
in their daily lives. As they gain agency, others pay the price as victims of the violence 
used to establish this agency” (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:46).  
 This exemplifies how children transform into soldiers within rebel groups, 
adopting new identities. What also contributed to their re-identification was the use 
of new names. This made it easier for child soldiers to become a devoted member of 
the group as it further disabled the identification with their past. Within the RUF 
most child soldiers were given a nome de guerre, whereas some picked one. Some 
examples were provided by my informants: Commander Blood, Superman, General 
Cut Hands, No Laughing, Pay Yourself, Killer Baby, Chop Chop, Die Naked, 
Commander Bloodshed, Captain Slit Throat, Pepper, Nasty Killer, Mandela, Burn 
Baby, No Mercy, Nothing Spoilt, Slice Through You, Junior Sankoh Trouble, 
Consider and Super Washer. Most of these names leave little to the imagination as to 
which identities and roles these children had taken on. 
The six different processes of socialization explained in this section are linked 
to one another and the impacts on new recruits are a cumulative result of this mix, 
mostly reinforcing one another (Van Maanen, 1977). Looking at the RUF, it seems as 
if each tactic of organizational socialization was deliberately used to effectively 
control the rebels. The tactics enhanced and reinforced each other in this case, 
leading to the creation of allegiance, obedience and loyalty among child soldiers and 
allowing the RUF to become a cohesive rebel group.  
 
 
RUF Socialization: A Threefold Analytical Challenge 
This section will provide a detailed analysis of the socialization processes used by the 
RUF. In order to achieve this, Checkel’s (2005) theory on the threefold analytical 
challenge regarding socialization will be applied to the Sierra Leonean rebel group. 
Hence, this section will “(1) establish the presence of socialization mechanisms and 
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the conditions of their operation; (2) assess whether internalization (Type I or II) 
actually occurred; and (3) ask whether socialized actors behave differently than either 
they did before they were socialized, or than non-socialized actors do” (Checkel, 
2005:816). The threefold analysis aims to provide a clear overview of the effects and 
consequences of socialization within the RUF. It will reveal whether a shift occurs 
away from a logic of consequences and toward a logic of appropriateness. 
 
 Socialization Mechanisms Present within the LRA and the Conditions of Their 
Operation 
Which socialization mechanisms were present and what were the conditions of their 
operation within the RUF? This question will be addressed in this section. Previous 
sections have shown that socialization was a highly efficient tool to engage child 
soldiers with the RUF. The rebel group used the fact that children are generally 
considered to be vulnerable, naïve and susceptible to outside influences to establish a 
cohesive organization. While numerous child soldiers grew up within the RUF, 
socialization taught them to become part of the group and even created a sense of 
belonging amongst them. A variety of socialization mechanisms were used to achieve 
this, hence this section is designed to shed light upon these. This will be done 
according to Grusec and Hastings definition of socialization: “socialization refers to 
processes whereby naive individuals are taught the skills, behavior patterns, values 
and motivations needed for competent functioning in the culture in which the child is 
growing up. Paramount among these are the social skills, social understandings, and 
emotional maturity needed for interaction with other individuals to fit in with the 
functioning of social dyads and larger groups. Socialization processes include all 
those whereby culture is transmitted from each generation to the next, including 
training for specific roles in specific occupations” (2007:13). Combined with 
Checkel’s (2005) theory, this definition will be applied to the RUF in order to identify 
which mechanisms were present within the rebel group and under which conditions 
they operated. Skills, behavior patterns, values and motivations that were taught to 
child soldiers within the RUF will be analyzed and the methods used to achieve this 
will be revealed. 
 
Skills 
As emphasized by Grusec and Hastings (2007), socialization processes transmit 
culture from each generation to the next. An important aspect of this transmittance is 
the provision of training for specific roles in specific occupations. The RUF handled 
this by providing ideological training to all its recruits as this would transfer their 
values and contribute to the establishment of a common identity. Moreover, recruits 
were grouped and trained for a variety of tasks. Some children were selected to learn 
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combat skills during intensive military training. Here they learned skills related to 
military strategy, tactics and guerrilla warfare. However, not all children were taken 
along during battles. Some were used to control the diamond mines and their 
commanders taught them skills related to supervision and security. Other children 
had responsibilities on the base and were expected to possess a range of supportive 
skills; they were used for cooking, fetching water and firewood, washing, cleaning and 
guarding. Their training was often informal as they learned skills from working with 
or for senior rebels. That child soldiers generally learned a variety of skills while they 
were part of the RUF was indicated by the following account: “When the rebels 
attacked my village they took me with them. I was brought to the base camp where 
they trained me to operate the gun so I could go to the battlefield. When I was not 
fighting I had to do domestic tasks and the women showed me. When we attacked 
villages I had to chop hands many times. My commander first showed me how to do 
it, and then me and other children were told to pick the people, and give them short 
sleeve or long sleeve. Most of us were doing many different things” (11M4). 
 In order to sustain the movement, the RUF recruited numerous girls. Girls 
were often selected for their productive labor and had usually been taught useful 
skills by their families already. They carried out everyday life tasks if there were no 
villagers to exploit and were valued highly for their contribution to the movement. 
Their skills often proved essential for the survival of the rebels. These were not their 
only skills. As this informant (11F10) explains, girls were often used for spying too: “I 
was a spy. When we needed new things and wanted to attack, I was sent to the town 
first. There I would look around, see how it works and talk to people. I was just a little 
girl, so nobody suspected me. When I was getting older, I still went to town and 
talked to the soldiers. Sometimes I loved them, I let them use me, so I would get more 
information from them. Then when my job was finished, I moved back to the base 
and told my commander everything I knew. He used to be proud of me, and with my 
information he started the attack.” 
 The youngest children often became part of the Small Boys Units (SBU) or 
Small Girls Units (SGU). These children were trained in combat skills and sent ahead 
at the frontline, or used as bodyguards. The SBU/SGU were feared and had a terrible 
reputation, they were often regarded as exceptionally cruel. Most of these children 
were severely traumatized as many of them had seen their families being killed. Their 
commanders tapped into this by providing them with skills and drugs, which 
unleashed a seemingly irreversible anger and urge to kill while all their fears had 
been erased. An informant (8F10) said: “The rebels drugged me and I started killing. 
I killed many. I don't know how many people I killed, I was shooting and shooting 
and shooting until nobody moved. I was singing. My mother is dead, my father is 
dead, I have no one, now I will kill you.” 
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Behavioral patterns 
Another significant aspect of socialization within the RUF, was teaching new recruits 
appropriate behavioral patterns. As indicated by Weinstein (2007), in order to 
sustain the group, it needs to be ensured that rebel group members follow orders and 
that internal discipline is maintained. Disciplined behavior by group members is 
enabled by structures of internal control, and new recruits are generally taught an 
extensive set of rules. This was also the case for child soldiers within the RUF. That 
these laws were to be taken seriously is indicated by the account of this informant 
(14M5): “We knew we had to obey the laws, even when we drank or took drugs they 
had printed it into our minds.” The following list of RUF rules are examples that were 
provided during interviews:  
• It was forbidden to kill without permission 
• It was forbidden to fight or quarrel with fellow rebels 
• If a rebel killed anyone on the base, this would be punished by death 
• Children should not be beaten 
• Rebels were not supposed to socialize and friendships were discouraged 
• Bush wives were not allowed to have sex with other men 
• Bush wives had to accept co-wives and a polygamous marriage 
• If a rebel fell in love with someone else’s wife or husband, this person would be 
punished by death 
• Everybody had to speak Krio in order to prevent secret talking in local 
languages 
• It was forbidden to kill and loot from civilians when a cooperation had been 
established between the rebels and the villagers 
• It was forbidden to discuss the past and talk about life as a civilian 
• Rebels had to discuss the RUF, goals, tactics and strategies 
• Passwords had to be used when rebels moved through areas 
• People who could not answer the password are enemies and should be 
interrogated and killed  
• Stealing from commanders or other rebels was strictly forbidden  
• When civilians were captured, they must be interrogated 
• Any looted goods had to be reported and provided to the commander 
• Any stolen money had had to be provided to the commanders 
• All the RUF members had to take part in ideological training 
• If rebels had sex they were expected to wash themselves so they would not 
become ‘ill’ 
• Rebels were not allowed to shoot at random, only on command 
• Rebels had to surrender whatever possessions they had and everything had to 
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be shared with the RUF 
• Missions had to be completed under any circumstances 
• Weapons should never be left behind 
• Any vehicle should be taken to the base, except military vehicles; those must 
be destroyed. 
 
Values 
The RUF installed specific values among their members. The group changed many 
important aspects of traditional Sierra Leonean society: war names were used, the 
hierarchy of age was reversed, women and children suddenly became powerful while 
elderly men were disrespected, civilian identities were concealed in order to achieve 
power, backgrounds were denied, and local languages were forbidden. RUF rebels 
lived in constant fear as violence could flare up any moment, projected on anyone. 
Although everyday life in the base camp consisted of the preparation of food, taking 
care of children and other domestic duties, the fear of death was present at all times. 
It only took being in the wrong place at the wrong time, saying the wrong thing or 
looking at someone in the wrong way to be killed. Whether deliberately or not, the 
culture of fear was used to keep the rebels together. Child soldiers seemed to do 
everything they could to adapt to the values of the RUF in order to survive. As a result 
they were always on guard, did not show their feelings or intent and eventually 
adopted the identity of an RUF rebel.  
 As described before, spiritual values were of great significance. Initiation 
rituals had far-reaching effects on child soldiers and besides that they would often 
wear necklaces and charms filled with herbs in order to protect themselves from 
bullets during combat. Spiritual rituals were often used in the transformation of 
members and as a preparation for combat, as described by this informant (12M9): 
“To make you a member they killed animals, get special leaves from the bush. They 
put the blood of the animal on the leaf and rub it on and around our neck. It was 
protection against our enemies. So when you see them, you are protected.” Interviews 
revealed that the RUF strongly believed in the powers of traditional African medicine 
and witchcraft (juju) played an important role in the movement. In addition to 
respecting those values, respect for superiors in the RUF hierarchy was of key 
importance to survive. New child recruits were at the bottom of the hierarchy and had 
to prove themselves in order to climb the ranks. 
 
Motivations 
Former RUF child soldiers expressed a variety of motivations to remain with the 
movement. It emerged that many forcibly recruited children even developed 
motivations to stay with the group. The motivations of my informants were often a 
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combination of two or more factors. These ranged from promotions, celebrations, 
friendships, women, dependency due to family separation, promises, survival, 
control, prestige, anger, fear, poverty and access to resources. Some of my informants 
willingly joined the rebels to fight for their country. Their motivations for joining 
were solely political and they did not feel like victims of the rebels. As one girl said 
(17F8): “I chose to pick up my weapon and fight for our freedom. It was not because I 
was raped or abducted, it was because I want to liberate my country. I wanted to fight 
for the women, we also have rights, at least we should get them.” Being from marginal 
backgrounds, many RUF child recruits had had no perspectives in their home 
communities and dreamt of different lives. However, there were few possibilities for 
progress as many areas were suffering from negligence by the government. For some, 
this became a motivation to join the RUF, as they believed they would escape poverty 
and achieve a better future. 
 Other children stayed with the RUF out of revenge. As one of my informants 
(9M3) said: “When I was abducted, I was with my mother and siblings. My mother 
and sisters were raped by too many boys on the way to the camp. When they cried 
and begged them to stop, they chopped them. After that I was very quiet, they 
continued raping my mother. Later on I found out that my brother also got killed. 
That changed everything. First I was just scared, but now I also wanted revenge. I lost 
everyone. I became very active and my mission was to kill as many people as possible, 
just because my siblings died for nothing. I became fearless then and could do 
anything.” This account shows that this boy was taking revenge for the killing of his 
siblings, yet did not target his violence at the initial perpetrators. The boy decided to 
redirect his anger, fear and pain on civilians, adding to the gruesome cycle of 
violence.  
 Another motivating factor to fight for the RUF were promises made by the 
rebels. The commanders frequently promised child soldiers to avenge against the Big 
Men who had marginalized them (Rosen, 2005). Some of my informants indeed 
indicated this as a motivation to stay with the group. This is an example (12M7): “I 
was motivated to stay with the group because of the ideology. We don’t know about 
politics, we were just juniors. They emphasized the politics so we took it as very 
important information and decided to take part in the movement. And the training 
also gave us courage, to participate. And also the weapon, it gave us courage to stay 
and power. The commander promised us that after the war we would be educated, 
the property of our parents would be restored, we could return to our homes. There 
were a lot of promises; it was so fertile that I wanted to continue with the movement. 
It gave us courage to carry out the movement. Although at the end of the day we did 
not make it.”  
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Others recalled no motivation at all, as they had been drugged during most of 
the conflict. Sometimes drugs became a motivating factor in itself, as child soldiers 
developed addictions while they were with the RUF, and the only way to access drugs 
was to stay with the group. Drugs turned many RUF child soldiers into tenacious 
fighters. My informants stated they were given marijuana, cocaine, crack, brown 
brown (heroine or a mix of cocaine and gunpowder) and amphetamines, often on a 
daily basis. The drugs, which were often taken with alcohol, “can induce recklessness 
and suspend normal inhibitions by impairing judgment and other cognitive 
functions” (Wessells, 2006). This partly explains the behavior of child soldiers within 
the RUF. My informants stated they became ‘wicked’ once they had taken drugs and 
they could do anything without showing hesitations. They became extremely violent, 
even against family, friends and elderly people. One of them (11M5) said: “You won’t 
feel anything until the drugs is finished working. The only thing you feel is like 
superman. The drugs made me feel brave, I could do anything. I did not recognize the 
people I was fighting anymore so I could even kill my own family and friends. Then 
later maybe you realize what happened, but to forget we just took more drugs. 
Marijuana was most common. It was everywhere, available for free and we took it 
every day.” Another one (8M8) stated: “The rebels injected us with drugs and gave us 
alcohol. Or the commander would cut my body and put drugs inside. Then they sent 
us, the small small pikin (children), to the frontline because we have no fear. We 
would just move, fire and kill everyone. Because of the drugs we were fearless, even 
when the enemy shot at us. We would not retreat, we could not die.” 
 Another motivating factor was the availability of weapons: it gave child 
soldiers a new outlook on life. Whereas they used to be rather powerless due to their 
marginal backgrounds and the fact they were at the bottom of their society’s 
hierarchy, having guns opened entirely new perspectives for them. Power, respect, 
personal gain and recognition were suddenly within reach. My informants stated that 
their guns created new realities that they could have never imagined. As explained by 
one informant (12M9): “This is my gun, it is my mother and my father. It gave me 
everything: power, women, respect and money.” Most of my informants expressed 
rather high levels of motivation for remaining with the RUF. They had become 
allegiant to the group, indicating that their socialization was very effective. 
 
Means of teaching 
In order to achieve emotional maturity, as well as social skills and understanding 
among their child recruits, the RUF used several means of teaching. Fear was 
obviously an important aspect, as indicated by Denov: “The RUF was extremely adept 
at using propaganda and misinformation to instill widespread fear and panic, as well 
as project an image of control and supremacy” (Denov, 2010:63). They used this to 
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terrify the population, but also to control their own recruits. In addition to fear, 
punishment played an essential role in the lives of child soldiers within the RUF; it 
was continuously used to teach them what they could or could not do. The RUF used 
a variety of punishments. The most common examples were beatings and killing but 
imprisonment was also used, as explained by an informant (14F5): “They took 
immediate action when the commander knew you disobeyed the law. We had one 
place: the jorjor (prison), it is made for people who did not obey the law. They made a 
deep hole in the ground, they will beat you and then place you in there for some time 
and close it. It was so inconvenient for human beings, it was dark, too much 
respiration, no flowing of air, no freedom of movement, no food and sometimes 
rebels urinate on you. Everything was inconvenient, it was a bad punishment.”  
 Some of my informants spoke about ‘branding’ as punishment. One said 
(13F4): “after the RUF took us, we were trained in using the gun. After some time we 
were taken to combat. Some children were too scared to fight: they were not strong 
hearted yet. Then after fighting we moved back to the base and these children were 
labeled RUF. The commanders would cut their skin with razors or knives and write 
RUF. After, they put some substance inside so it becomes a scar and it will say RUF 
for the rest of their lives. That way, they could never leave the group, because 
everybody knew they were a rebel. They did it with many children—they cut RUF on 
their skin to punish them and to make them rebels.” Further interviews revealed that 
branding indeed prevented child soldiers from escaping, as their scars would reveal 
they “belonged” to the RUF. Any child who was believed to be planning an escape was 
called upon by the base commander who would subsequently brand the child using 
razor blades, knives or other sharp objects. The children were taught that anybody 
who would find them would kill them instantly because their scars read RUF. Even 
after the war, this had prevented some of my informants from returning to their 
home communities. They expressed fear of retribution, since the community could 
see they had been with the rebels. 
 RUF child soldiers were taught to act in compliance with the laws under any 
given circumstance. In addition, they were ordered not to show fear, pain or other 
“weak” emotions. This is shown by Coulter, who argues that “in the socialization of 
young women they are taught to endure pain, keep it hidden inside, and not to reveal 
any emotions, as is obvious, for example, in female initiation ceremonies and in 
childbirth” (2009:99). Boys were taught the same, as the rebels wanted to mature 
their child recruits. Field research indicated that lectures given by commanders were 
used to teach child soldiers what was expected of them regarding social skills and 
understandings. To reinforce this, public punishments as well as recognition were 
important means to teach the children. Children who accomplished extraordinary 
results were praised in public, in order to encourage other children to show similar 
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behavior. Simultaneously, punishments took place in public to discourage certain 
behavior. As one informant explains (12F7): “I was in command of 16 boys. I was 15 
years old but they knew I was in charge. If one of them disobeyed I would punish 
straight away. Sometimes I beat them until they passed out, sometimes I would burn 
them or blind their eyes. If they did bad things I would order the boys to kill. All the 
boys had to watch or participate, so they knew what to expect when they broke the 
law. I had to be tough, once they feared me they would listen to me.” 
 To achieve full control, child soldiers were taught they would be punished for 
their deeds, even if they had not been caught in the act. According to one of my 
informants (16F7): “If you disobey, the bullet will touch you, you will go. Even if your 
commander don’t know, the bullet will come and kill you. At that time we trust this, 
we see examples.” The combination of these means of teaching ensured that child 
soldiers behaved and functioned as was expected of all the RUF members.  
 
The Achievement of Internalization Type I and II 
Internalization is an essential facet in the creation of a cohesive rebel group. 
Socialization processes leads to Type I or II internalization, as indicated by Checkel 
(2005). The first type refers to “learning a role—acquiring the knowledge that enables 
them to act in accordance with expectations—irrespective of whether they like the 
role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a 
given setting or community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, means simply 
that conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing” 
(2005:804). “On the other hand, following a logic of appropriateness may go beyond 
role playing and imply that agents accept community or organizational norms as “the 
right thing to do.” We call this Type II internalization/socialization, and it implies 
that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of 
which they are part. Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by 
“taken-for-grantedness”” (Checkel, 2005:804). In this section, Checkel’s definitions 
will be applied to the RUF in order to answer the following question: did 
internalization, Type I or II, actually occur within the RUF? 
Most of my informants spent years under the harsh and brutal conditions 
within the RUF. Interviews revealed that the extensive socialization processes they 
were part of, indeed resulted in internalization. The results varied: some of my 
informants reached internalization Type I, while others reported Type II. My field 
research suggested the following general patterns: children recruited under 13 years 
of age seemed most likely to develop internalization Type II. The majority of this age 
group reported that the RUF’s interests became their own and changed their 
identities over time. This result can be explained by the fact that young children are 
considered particularly susceptible to indoctrination and they were looking for a 
  
 
198 
sense of security within the RUF. Even though they suffered from severe abuse, most 
of these children became loyal to their commanders. As one boy (11M6) noted: “I felt 
he protected me, so I wanted to give him something in return. He was the only one 
who cared about me, and who helped me to survive. My commander was my new 
father, I forgot my family, the RUF was now my family who took care of me. I 
belonged with them. My new name was Pepe, because I was so hot, I was so much 
wicked. My temper was bad.” 
Also, the longer child soldiers stayed with the RUF, the more likely they 
seemed to become to adopt the RUF’s interests and identity. My informants stated 
that the longer they were subject to RUF indoctrination, the harder it became to 
remember village life and the norms and values of a civilian. As a result, they 
generally reached a confused state of mind in which their values were replaced and 
their behavior changed. Many of these former child soldiers reported that they 
believed they were RUF. On the other hand, children who had been recruited from 14 
years of age, more often indicated they were performing a role within the RUF, and 
questioned whether it was right what they were doing while part of the rebel group. 
This suggested they had only reached internalization Type I. Most of these 
informants reported strong memories of home and a wish to return to their families. 
However, it did happen that these children reached internalization Type II as well, as 
indicated by this account: “When we were captured I did not believe in fighting the 
government. The RUF told me about all the things that were wrong and they were 
right, they woke me up. They educated me and then I got convinced they were 
fighting for the right things. I believed what they said and they motivated me to join. 
So I started fighting, I became one of them” (13F6). This exemplifies how political 
education led RUF child soldiers to reposition themselves and created commitment 
to the cause as well as the group. Those children who had initially chosen to join the 
RUF generally reached internalization Type II, no matter how old they were at time of 
recruitment. These children were motivated by the RUF’s ideology, and achieved 
internalization Type II more quickly and easily than did forcibly recruited children.  
More boys than girls achieved internalization Type II. My female informants 
stated they were reluctant to become part of the RUF, as male rebels had often 
mistreated them. They indicated sexual violence as a major factor in decreasing their 
motivation to take initiative and showing active behavior. It negatively affected their 
image of the RUF, which caused them to do as they were told, but prevented most of 
them from adopting the rebel identity. Few of these girls eventually adopted the 
interests and identity of the group. This was different for those girls who claimed to 
have chosen to join the RUF; they were rather quick to adopt the group’s identity. 
These girls often managed to reach commanding ranks, which may explain why 
powerful girls were generally perceived to be more loyal and trustworthy by the 
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rebels. These results are generally in line with Coulter’s research, stating that “To 
most girls and women, life in “the bush” was a far cry from life at home, but gradually 
some of the women became socialized into this existence, leaving both their language 
and their sense of belonging to their natal homes” (2009:110). What should be noted 
is that the girls who had achieved a commanding status, managed to keep men away 
from them and were no longer subject to sexual violence. This may have contributed 
to their adoption of the RUF identity. However, it also seems as if girls who had 
achieved high ranks within the RUF, suffered in particular during their return to 
society. They viewed themselves as rebel leaders, and were proud of their “strong-
heartedness” and new identities. Looking at their reintegration, there was a very large 
difference as compared to girls who did not achieve such strong internalization. 
Overall, the majority of my informants reached Type II internalization, which 
seemed largely due to the extensive periods they spent within the RUF. Some even 
reported disappointment they were no longer part of the RUF. Despite all the 
violence, they considered their lives had been better in the bush. Returning to society 
had confronted them with numerous challenges and most were suffering from 
poverty again, just as they had before their recruitment by the RUF. Interviews 
revealed that one of the most difficult things for them was to let go of their rebel 
identities and behavior. For most of my informants this process had taken up to 
several years, demonstrating the extreme consequences RUF socialization processes 
had had on them. 
 
Socialized Actors Demonstrating Different Behavior 
Do socialized RUF actors behave differently than they did before they were socialized, 
or, than non-socialized actors do? This chapter demonstrated that RUF child soldiers 
definitively started behaving differently as they were being socialized. Keeping their 
past as children living normal life in mostly rural areas in mind, this chapter has 
shown how the socialization processes transformed them from children into soldiers, 
and how strict RUF rules determined their behavior. According to my informants, 
everyday life in the base camp was similar to life in the village. Even though they were 
living with a rebel group, my informants recall that they still had to perform tasks 
associated with normal daily life while they were in the bush. The organization of the 
camp, the hierarchies within the movement, the division of responsibilities and labor, 
as well as social structures were in a way comparable to civilian life. The major 
difference to life with the rebels was the use of violence. It was common to see people 
get punished, tortured or killed and all my informants had personally experienced 
violence. And, where life in the village saw the elders and big men in charge, within 
the RUF it was possible for young children to achieve ranks and power. This was 
unthinkable in civilian society and disrupted traditional structures.  
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 The following account provides an example of such a disruption: “When I was 
a little boy, I used to work in the mines. We had no money at home, so I could not 
attend school. The miners used to abuse me, I was the youngest and they maltreated 
me. If I found a diamond I had to give it to my boss and he give me a few dollars. But, 
when I became a commander with the RUF, one day I returned to the mines. This 
time it was different; I was in control and the power was mine. I felt so proud; I had 
become a big man, a real victory that I never imagined when I was young. Now all the 
other men had to obey my orders, that made me very happy” (12M10). This ab-
normalization of life was accelerated by the enormous drug abuse within the RUF. 
Coulter: “it has been suggested that the tight security measures and the wrecking of 
the social world were aspects of the RUF master plan for creating a “bizarre new 
reality” (Richards 2005:135), and many stories reveal that some girls and women 
slowly became socialized into this new, “bizarre” way of life (2009:121–122). 
 That the behavior of socialized child soldiers changed as compared to non-
socialized actors, can also be seen in their reactions to violence. Socialized RUF 
children had been taught not to show remorse, shame, or pain when they experienced 
violence as witnesses, victims, or perpetrators. The socialization had taught them to 
celebrate violence instead; they were told to sing, dance, and shout to demonstrate 
their happiness. This is an example given by one of my informants (12M8): 
“Whenever we attacked a village, we were clapping and shouting, sometimes singing. 
We were happy to make a successful attack. We surrounded the people in the village, 
scared them and chopped hands. Then we would put car tires around some people 
and set them on fire. They would burn and scare the other people. They had to be 
quiet; if they cried I killed them. It was my job and I was happy to tell my commander 
I was successful and had taken properties back to the base.” That this is completely 
different behavior from non-socialized actors does not need further explanation.   
 Although girls are portrayed as victims of the war, some certainly took an 
active role within the RUF, as also seen in Cohen’s work (2007). Many war accounts 
state that girls were used as sex slaves and had to fulfill domestic duties, yet this 
chapter aimed to show there was also another side to their lives as a rebel which has 
not been widely researched nor discussed: their role as perpetrators. In order to 
create a broader understanding of the complex phenomenon, it is important to go 
beyond viewing women as passive victims. Women do have agency and their acts and 
decisions need to be critically analyzed. Even though the majority of girls may have 
been forced to join the RUF, we cannot generalize that this was the case for all girls. 
Some girl soldiers took initiative to join the rebels and became active members, 
others developed such behavior over time as they started identifying themselves with 
the RUF through socialization processes. This cannot be neglected, as it would lead to 
invalid and incomplete conclusions. It must be understood that both boys and girls 
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were victims some of the time, but not all the time. And the same goes the other way 
around; many of the RUF’s child soldiers were perpetrators some of the time, yet not 
all of the time. This implies that, also in the case of the RUF, most child soldiers were 
victims and perpetrators. This once again illustrates the complexity of the problem 
and shows the difficulties that come with drawing conclusions about the subject. 
These have to be well balanced statements, taking a broad range of factors into 
account. I hope this chapter has illuminated the significance of including the power of 
socialization to transform children into soldiers as one of those factors. 
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7 
Matsangas: Puppets or Patriots? 
Child soldier socialization within the Mozambican National 
Resistance 
 
 
The war in Mozambique has been depicted as one orchestrated by external forces. 
This chapter seeks to provide a more balanced view, although its main purpose is not 
to explain the Mozambican conflict. This chapter is essentially meant to illuminate 
the socialization processes and the complexities of transforming children into 
soldiers within the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). In order to 
understand these processes it is important to have an understanding of the 
Mozambican situation and the characteristics of its conflict, so a brief conflict 
analysis will be provided. Hereafter, an in-depth analysis of RENAMO and its use of 
child soldiers will be developed, followed by highlighting the socialization processes 
used within the group. The latter analysis will build predominantly on field research 
conducted among former child soldiers in Mozambique. 
 
 
Conflict Background 
Mozambique has suffered from armed conflict lasting almost 30 years. In 1964 the 
first anti-colonial conflict broke out when the Mozambique Liberation Front 
(FRELIMO) launched an insurgency against their Portuguese rulers. FRELIMO’s goal 
was to liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese who had colonized the country in 
1505. As Portugal resisted the struggle for liberation, armed conflict erupted. 
Simultaneously, the neighboring Rhodesian government was facing an insurgency by 
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). During their struggles, both ZANU 
and FRELIMO had ideological, organizational and personal links and the groups 
became increasingly organized and well-equipped. To tackle the subsequent threats 
posed to the governments, Mozambique and Rhodesia aimed to establish a 
cooperation that could tackle the insurgents (Young, 1990).  
However, most cooperation tactics were obstructed and after a decade long 
war the Portuguese gave in: Mozambique declared itself independent in 1975 and 
FRELIMO stepped up to govern the country. These developments were closely 
followed by the neighboring white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Both countries were alarmed by Mozambique’s independence, fearing they would be 
defeated in the struggles with their own indigenous populations. Sharing its eastern 
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800KM border with Mozambique, Rhodesia was particularly alarmed and its Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO) organized an anti-FRELIMO group in 1976: the 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). RENAMO consisted partly of 
disgruntled ex-FRELIMO fighters who had fled from Mozambique and was armed, 
trained and organized by the Rhodesian secret police. When Mozambique in turn 
welcomed and supported ZANU in 1977, this signified the go ahead for RENAMO to 
invade Mozambique and start its brutal operations (Boothby et al, 2006). The fact 
that Mozambique had closed its border to Rhodesia, inflicting considerable economic 
damage on the Rhodesians, encouraged Mozambique’s neighbor to offer increased 
support to RENAMO and focus on the development of an effective strategy (Young, 
1990).  
A senior CIO official said about the support for RENAMO: “To start off with it 
was sabotage, to disrupt the population and disrupt the economy which really comes 
under sabotage, to come back with decent recruits at that stage and hit any FRELIMO 
bases they came across” (Young, 1990:495). In addition to sabotage and intelligence 
gathering, RENAMO was used by Rhodesia to cover for clandestine operations. The 
rebel group was continuously supported by Rhodesia during the first years of the civil 
war, which allowed them to push further into Mozambique and establish permanent 
bases (Young, 1990). Base camps were set up inside the country and in 1979 
RENAMO was fully operating from Mozambique (Morgan, 1990). The Rhodesian 
support provided the rebels with arms until this changed drastically in 1980. The 
country’s white minority regime lost its power to ZANU and Rhodesia became known 
as Zimbabwe. ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, had been elected as the new government 
and as they had established friendly relationships with FRELIMO, support for 
RENAMO ended right there (Morgan, 1990).  
At that stage, the rebel forces became rather demoralized, feelings that were 
amplified by the fact that FRELIMO managed to re-capture several areas and 
RENAMO bases (Young, 1990). However, South Africa stepped in and “took over as 
the mentor and major force behind RENAMO,” offering the rebels support and 
training on its territory (Morgan, 1990). According to Young, “the importance of 
these developments was not then clearly perceived by the Mozambican government 
and in retrospect it is apparent that the Mozambicans had no idea that the South 
Africans were prepared to unleash such a serious assault on them and, furthermore, 
FRELIMO’s judgment was distorted in the wake of ZANU’s victory by a sort of 
Bastille mentality that anything was possible, a mentality not uncharacteristic of 
Marxist regimes at certain periods in their development” (1990:496).  
 While the independence process in Zimbabwe took off, a monitoring force was 
sent from the United Kingdom to supervise the developments. The force reported 
that RENAMO members and supplies were removed from the country by the South 
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African Defense Force (Metz, 1986). They were taken to South Africa, which “then 
provided RENAMO with improved training and logistical support, as well as advice 
about changes in strategy—specifically an increased focus on economic 
destabilization, notably by disrupting the country’s transport network, so vital to the 
region” (Morgan, 1990:606). South African support enabled RENAMO to re-train, 
gain strength and reinvade Mozambique to undermine its government and 
infrastructure. Whereas Rhodesia had mainly used RENAMO as a clandestine 
movement, South Africa aimed to give the rebels a public profile and presented them 
as a “genuine political movement” (Young, 1990:496). Still, although the South 
Africans tried to conceal their own interests, RENAMO was also used for covert 
operations, just as the Rhodesians had done (Young, 1990).  
 During their support of the rebels, South Africa encouraged RENAMO to 
extend its operations and take control of the Inhambane and Gaza provinces. Large 
numbers of RENAMO rebels were airlifted into Mozambique, allowing the group to 
expand its activities to ten of the twelve provinces in Mozambique (Metz, 1986). That 
South Africa took its role serious became clear when the Gorongosa Documents were 
retrieved from RENAMO headquarters: including detailed information about supply 
drops and training schedules (Manning, 1998). During the conflict it kept providing 
the rebels with arms, ammunition and medicine, which were delivered by land, air 
and sea (Minter, 1989). With South African material support, RENAMO attacked and 
destroyed towns and installations, and foreign aid workers were kidnapped (Young, 
1990). Field research indicated that these destructive orders often came from South 
Africa as the country had interests in destroying Mozambique’s infrastructure and 
economy. And even though RENAMO’s top commanders would initially reject some 
of these orders, they were forced to carry them out by the South African government. 
Hence, the war raged on, and RENAMO destroyed numerous schools, shops, health 
clinics and factories over the years to come (Boothby et al, 2006).   
 However, South Africa was not the only country supporting RENAMO. The 
rebels received significant financial and material support from various external 
sources. These ranged from organizations in West Germany, Portugal, and the United 
States, Malawi and unknown sources, which sent their support through the Comoros 
(Morgan, 1990). Field research indicated that most former child soldiers had no 
knowledge of these ties. Although various organizations provided RENAMO with 
support, Young states that the group “has been condemned as a terrorist organization 
by senior officials of the United States and other Western governments.” He 
continues: “it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this more or less consistent outside 
condemnation is an effect of its all too obvious links with the South African armed 
forces and certain disgruntled colonialist circles in Portugal and South Africa” 
(Young, 1990:503).  
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Although the war may have been perceived as mainly being caused and 
supported by external factors while RENAMO functioned as a puppet of external 
interests, internal factors played a determining role in the proliferation of the scale 
and severity of the conflict (Morgan, 1990, Roesch, 1992). The harsh conditions 
within Mozambique, which were mainly due to inadequacy of the FRELIMO 
government, and the internal dynamics of the conflict kept the war going and 
encouraged support for the rebels who claimed to be fighting for a new government. 
According to Morgan (1990), these internal dynamics were a combination of 
economical, religious, and regional factors combined with a general weakness of the 
state. From an economical perspective, decades of mismanagement and exploitation 
under the Portuguese rulers had left FRELIMO with a poor economy when it came to 
power in 1975. Mozambican farmers had been forced to grow cash crops, which they 
could only sell for poor returns during the colonization, leading to widespread 
impoverishment and rural dislocation. In addition, forced and migrant labor in the 
central and southern areas of Mozambique had been encouraged and led to the 
neglect of rural areas, while the Portuguese had paid little attention to the 
development of infrastructure and the education of the population (Morgan, 1990).  
The post-independence situation was not much better: FRELIMO adopted 
strategies that added to Mozambique’s misery and increased the economic decline. 
Mismanagement regarding the agricultural sector was an important aspect of this. 
Although the agricultural sector supported 80 percent of the Mozambican 
population, the sector was neglected and the government embarked on a policy of 
collectivization of agriculture. As a result, family owned farms were disregarded and 
large state farms were established instead. Even though the family owned farms still 
provided the bulk of agricultural produce and state farms usually ran at loss, state 
farms received approximately 90 percent of FRELIMO’s expenditure on agriculture. 
The peasants obviously suffered from these policies, and so did the situation 
regarding Mozambique’s balance of payments. This created a widespread resentment 
of the government, which was enhanced even further when FRELIMO’s ill-designed 
agricultural policies led to a severe food crisis. As a result, the rural population was 
alienated from the government, adding fuel to RENAMO’s struggle (Morgan, 1990).    
It was not only the agricultural policies established by FRELIMO that bred 
resentment against the post-independence government: the popular resurgence of 
traditional beliefs, practices and religion contributed to tensions as well. FRELIMO 
opposed the re-emergence of traditions and religion as it wanted to modernize 
Mozambique, leading to the development of another disagreement with the 
population. Young: “Mozambique was and is a largely rural society with complicated 
local village politics often bound up with local beliefs, all of which FRELIMO wrote 
off as backward” (1990:508). Morgan further explains: “FRELIMO’s opposition to all 
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types of religion, to polygyny and to chiefs, stems partly from its commitment to the 
‘modernization’ of what it saw as a backward and ‘uncultured’ peasantry, and partly 
from its desire to rid Mozambique of customs, beliefs, and especially institutions 
closely associated with the colonial regime” (1990:613). The population however felt 
it was of essential importance to re-connect with the traditional roots of their society. 
This disagreement added to the rural population’s resentment felt towards the 
government and RENAMO smartly tapped into this: it used the resurgence of interest 
in traditional practices and beliefs as well as religion to rally support (Morgan, 1990, 
Young, 1990). Field research indeed indicated that the rebels paid respect to 
traditional customs and religion: spirit mediums and traditional healers played an 
important role within the movement and religious buildings were often left intact 
during RENAMO’s violent attacks. 
Regional and ethnic tensions were additional factors that played roles during 
the conflict. The northern, central and southern regions of Mozambique are very 
different on economical, geographical and cultural levels. Within FRELIMO’s 
hierarchy, the southern Mozambicans acted as superiors. This led not only to internal 
struggles, but also to statements made by RENAMO claiming that FRELIMO’s 
policies were ethnically biased and that the organization was not truly representative 
of Mozambican society (Morgan, 1990). Moreover, the weakness of the Mozambican 
state in combination with the political alienation of its inhabitants, probably 
contributed to increased support and growth of RENAMO. The weak state structure 
implied that FRELIMO was unable to cope with crises, particularly in rural 
Mozambique. These inherited weaknesses of the state required reforms, yet 
FRELIMO leaders lacked the capacities to realize these (Morgan, 1990). Meanwhile, 
the participation in the government by the Mozambican population was significantly 
limited by policies implemented by FRELIMO. As a result, FRELIMO’s poorly 
designed policies initiated increased support for RENAMO in some areas and 
increased the revolt. Thereby, political power became concentrated in the capital 
Maputo where the central authorities were based. This led rural youth in particular 
feel excluded and alienated, and they subsequently became an important part of 
RENAMO (Morgan, 1990).  
These examples illustrate how FRELIMO’s policies led to growing 
dissatisfactions among the Mozambican population, which in turn initiated the 
political and socio-economic breakdown of the country. However, this did not lead 
directly to support for RENAMO throughout the country, as the brutality of the rebel 
operations and violence against civilians limited popular support in certain areas. 
Nevertheless, the Mozambican population could identify with the FRELIMO 
government less and less, and RENAMO did not give up their violent struggle. The 
government army found itself unable to defeat the rebels. Particularly due to a low 
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morale among its soldiers and a weak strategy to approach the rebels, FRELIMO 
proved incapable to deal with the threats posed by RENAMO and it seemed 
impossible to control the war (Morgan, 1990).  
FRELIMO’s incapacity to end RENAMO’s struggle partly stemmed from the 
first conflict, which had led to Mozambican independence in 1975. FRELIMO had 
fought the Portuguese in a low-intensity war as a guerrilla movement, yet had to be 
transformed into a conventional army once the war for independence was over. A 
hierarchy of ranks and strategy had to be determined, as FRELIMO forces were 
incapable to deal with the challenges posed by the different type of war that was 
fought by RENAMO. It needed counter-insurgency techniques to conquer the rebels 
and hence young officers were promoted over conservative older soldiers. Still, the 
low morale among the soldiers, particularly due to a lack of basic supplies and a low 
concentration of troops on the ground, limited FRELIMO’s chances against 
RENAMO. This was amplified by a shortage of the budget and the fact that the army 
had a difficult relationship with the Mozambican population. As FRELIMO soldiers 
were accused of brutalities and abuses too, the population was alienated even further 
from the government (Morgan, 1990). 
After almost a decade of fighting, the Nkomati Accord was finally signed by 
Mozambique and South Africa in 1984, aiming to stop the violence. During these and 
later negotiations, “RENAMO issued a series of political demands, calling for the 
dissolution of the Mozambican government, the establishment of a power-sharing 
arrangement between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and the creation of a free-market 
economy” (Manning, 1998:162). However, the Nkomati Accord would not hold. 
Mozambique failed to expel African National Congress (ANC) members who had 
been challenging the South African Apartheid regime while South Africa continued 
their support for RENAMO, allowing the war to continue. As a result FRELIMO 
sought support from other external players. Zimbabwe deployed approximately 
10,000 troops to protect vital installations, Britain trained FRELIMO troops, and 
Malawi and Tanzania sent units to support the army. In addition, multinationals 
organized their own militias in an attempt to protect their interests in Mozambique 
(Morgan, 1990). Violence nevertheless continued. Only when the Cold War ended in 
1990 and apartheid disintegrated did external support for RENAMO dry up and 
opportunities for peace within the country were created. Peace negotiations between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO started again in 1990, and fighting eventually ended with 
the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords in October 1992. By then, the war had 
displaced 5 million civilians and 900,000 people had died (Boothby et al, 2006).  
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Characteristics of the Mozambican National Resistance and the Use of 
Child Soldiers 
 According to Manning, “RENAMO is best known to most of the world for its 
grotesque campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians, for its status as an army 
of captives and for its apparent lack of a political program” (1998:161). The 
movement was veiled in secrecy during the war, leading to a rather ill understanding 
of the shadowy group and the impression it was a puppet of external forces. 
“RENAMO, however, is more than just a creature of outside interests and a tool of 
destabilization” (Hall, 1990:59). The following sections will therefore aim to 
disentangle the often concealed nuances surrounding the Mozambican rebels.   
 
Why fight? 
Although the existence of RENAMO has been shrouded in mystery and speculation 
during and after the conflict, the origins of the rebel group have been well 
documented (Hall, 1990, Minter, 1989). Being found by the Rhodesian Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO) in 1976, RENAMO was initially established as a 
political, anti-communist organization with a military wing. With the creation of 
RENAMO, Rhodesia sought to target the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
as well as political and economic targets in Mozambique, particularly in the central 
area (Morgan, 1990). ZANU had been challenging the Rhodesian regime during the 
years before, and had been exiled from the country. The organization became mainly 
based in Mozambique as the FRELIMO government had welcomed the group. The 
Rhodesians supported the creation and growth of RENAMO, enabling them to 
become a cohesive rebel group (Boothby et al., 2006).  
 RENAMO mainly derived its logistical support from outside the country and 
developed a hierarchical and well-organized structure (Minter, 1989). Although it 
may have seemed that the existence of RENAMO mainly resulted from external 
funding, internal factors played an essential role in the creation and expansion of the 
group. Many of the initial RENAMO members had belonged to the anti-insurgency 
units of the International and State Defense Police (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa 
do Estado, PIDE) while Mozambique was still a Portuguese colony. When 
Mozambique became independent and FRELIMO took over the colonial regime, 
PIDE members fled to neighboring Rhodesia to escape retributions as they had 
established a reputation of torture, brutality and executions (Hall, 1990, Morgan 
1990). One of the former PIDE members, Orlando Christina, became RENAMO’s 
secretary general. To increase the RENAMO forces, Christina blackmailed PIDE 
members who had remained in Mozambique; he threatened to hand confidential files 
about their past employment to the FRELIMO government if they would not join the 
newly established RENAMO ranks (Metz, 1986, Morgan, 1990). In addition to PIDE 
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members, RENAMO increased its forces with FRELIMO dissidents during its early 
days. Numerous recruits came from the many splinter groups that had broken away 
from FRELIMO in the years leading towards independence (Metz, 1986). However, 
the majority of the initial RENAMO recruits were dissidents who no longer agreed 
with FRELIMO post-independence and were disgruntled with the conditions in 
Mozambique. Many of these recruits had been sent to re-education camps by the 
FRELIMO government, and subsequently fled across the Rhodesian border (Fauvet, 
1984, Hall, 1990).  
 RENAMO’s objectives remained vague during their struggle in Mozambique. 
The movement has been “widely described as crudely anti-communist and anti-
FRELIMO, with no political program as such” (Hall, 1990:47). According to Young, 
“RENAMO has not been pro anything, it has been anti-FRELIMO” (1990:508). 
Nevertheless, in 1981 the rebels came forward with a manifesto and program that 
elaborated upon its goals. The manifesto claimed that “apart from being opposed to 
communist systems of government and in favor of free market economic policies, 
RENAMO committed itself to an extensive social program” (Morgan, 1990:607). In 
addition, the manifesto called for a government of national unity, democratic 
elections and a mixed economy (Young, 1990). Still, this would be the only 
substantial political statement RENAMO made until a different program was 
announced in 1988, adding to the vagueness of the organization. The new program 
emphasized political and economic liberty and stressed liberating Mozambique from 
“Soviet colonialism, expansionism and imperialism” (Young, 1990:502). Besides 
these programs, witness accounts indicate specific grievances motivating RENAMO 
rebels. These were: “resentment at FRELIMO’s suppression of traditional chiefly 
authority and repressive attitude towards religion and religious practitioners, and 
rejection of FRELIMO’s economic and agrarian policies, which are perceived as 
having brought ruination. Above all, compulsory villagization, where this has 
occurred, appears to have caused outrage” (Hall, 1990:47). 
 Few statements have been made about RENAMO’s objectives by its leadership. 
However, in an interview with Manning, Raul Domingos, one of RENAMO’s military 
chief of staff, said the following about RENAMO’s reasons for fighting and the lack of 
political statements: “People joined RENAMO without worrying about the details ... 
But people had no clear idea about an alternative [to FRELIMO]. Many thought, 
eliminate FRELIMO and we can do what we want. But this was not RENAMO's 
program. But [also] it was not the time then to elaborate a program for the RENAMO 
masses. There was a certain class of people who wanted to see a written program, by-
laws, etc. Some people think that way. But there was another layer of people who just 
wanted to know simply what the war was about. You could say, 'it is against 
communal villages, or against cooperativization, or re-education camps, or passes' ... 
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The more intellectual approach would not do any good for most people. This 
explanation was for another class of people. This wasn't all necessary or even a good 
idea for most people. The war was about mobilizing people to get rid of aspects of the 
regime they found offensive. We used the language of the population, appealing to 
specific aspects that they felt. To speak to the population about democracy, liberty, 
human rights, things very.... [abstract]... they don't understand. Now, if you talk 
about the pass law, yes sir, this I know, it is very inconvenient. To visit my cousin who 
is just over there I have to go speak to the president of the Dynamizing Group to write 
a pass for me to go there. To get rid of this, this was enough of a motive for someone 
to go to war. Because he knows that otherwise, if he criticizes this he will go to a re-
education camp. So what is the alternative? He joins RENAMO to get rid of this…” 
(Manning, 1998:178).  
 Domingos’ account has been one of very few statements, resulting in the fact 
that RENAMO’s broader political ideology always remained vague. As its leaders did 
not seem capable to express a coherent vision and were often inconsistent, Hall 
argues, “In the absence of any distinct political ideology, a motivating system of 
beliefs and values should probably be sought at the grassroots level of the military 
organization.” She continues: “Elsewhere in Africa, inherently political peasant 
grievances have been channeled within a religious idiom. Traditional forms of belief 
particularly lend themselves to this form of protest, because of the usually strong 
association between the spiritual realm and the land; it seems especially common in 
Africa where political activity has been suppressed” (1990:47). This argument is 
further explained by Roesch, who states, “the core of the motivating ideology on 
RENAMO bases is expressed in a religious idiom that is rooted in traditional African 
ancestor worship. The constant political propaganda refrain of the RENAMO military 
commanders is that the war they are waging is a ‘war of the spirits’—a crusade—in 
which FRELIMO is painted as a traitorous organization that is forcing people to 
abandon their ancestors and accept foreign (‘communist’) ideas, whereas RENAMO is 
allied with the ancestral spirits in a war to return Mozambique to its traditions and 
ancestral ways” (1992:472). This view is also elaborated upon by Wilson (1992) and 
seemed to be an important aspect of RENAMO. To underline the importance of 
religion and spirituality, churches and mosques were usually spared during RENAMO 
attacks and the rebels used to carry bibles. Further, spirit mediums or spiritual 
healers were associated to most bases and played an important role for the rebels. 
The rebels believed they were given supernatural powers by the spirit mediums, 
which amongst other things made them bullet-proof during combat (Hall, 1990). 
 The spiritual argument has not been widely elaborated upon in the literature 
considering RENAMO, which may have contributed to the limited understanding of 
the organization. Young (1990) argues that the apprehension of RENAMO was 
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predominantly jeopardized by polarized viewpoints: left wing writings claimed the 
rebels to be “just puppets,” and right wing groups portrayed RENAMO’s mass killings 
and violence as a “struggle for freedom.” This image bothered the rebel leaders and 
Manning argues that, during the last years of the war, “RENAMO was busily 
attempting to clean up its international image and to provide hard evidence that it 
did in fact have a political program and matching political ambitions” (1998:176), 
driven by their wish to become political party represented in the government.  
 
Leadership 
André Matsangaissa initially led RENAMO. Matsangaissa, who had been responsible 
for the distribution of supplies and provisions within FRELIMO, had been dismissed 
from FRELIMO after he had stolen a Mercedes-Benz car. He was sent to one of 
FRELIMO’s re-education camps but managed to escape and fled to Rhodesia where 
he joined RENAMO (Fauvet, 1984). The Rhodesians pushed him forward as the 
rebel’s leader and supported him in achieving the position. RENAMO members 
became known as Matsangas, called after their leader (Minter, 1989). Although 
Matsangaissa was considered a brave fighter with leadership qualities, he would not 
remain in command of RENAMO for a long time. He was killed in Gorongosa in 1979, 
leading to a major crisis within the movement. A violent power struggle saw him 
eventually replaced by his deputy Afonso Dhlakama (Metz, 1986, Young, 1990). 
According to Morgan (1990), these events led to a period signified by the lowest 
morale and strength of RENAMO. Even “Dhlakama himself expressed the view that 
the organization had reached a very low point of disorder and demoralization” 
(Young, 1990:496). RENAMO was under the tight grip of CIO at that time, had little 
independence and consisted of only a few hundred fighters. The situation improved 
when South Africa took over as RENAMO’s main supporter and offered the rebels 
new training and shelter (Morgan, 1990). 
 Afonso Dhlakama, president and commander-in-chief, managed to establish 
and control a conventional military hierarchy within RENAMO based on good 
command, communications and control. Press interviews with the RENAMO leader 
were very rare, but “in 1983 he spoke in general terms of introducing ‘elections, real 
democracy and a mixed economy’, and vouched that after his forces had won the war 
and guaranteed peace, they would allow the civilians and intellectuals to govern. He 
described himself as a nationalist, whose only real responsibility was to rid his people 
of ‘communist oppression’, and complained that FRELIMO was worse than the 
Portuguese before them: ‘The colonialists exploited us, but at least they didn’t try to 
wipe out old traditions because they are so-called ‘reactionary’’” (Hall, 1990:44).  
 According to Young, RENAMO became well organized under Dhlakama’s 
command and was not just “a band of criminals or anti-social elements” (1990:499). 
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Also, Dhlakama claimed that the rebels “controlled the countryside whilst FRELIMO 
‘hid in the cities’” (Hall, 1990:44). Dhlakama based RENAMO’s national 
headquarters in Gorongosa, and command structures were divided according to the 
country’s regions, which were divided into provinces. The provinces were under the 
control of a provincial RENAMO commander, who was in charge of the rebels in the 
particular area. Whereas the movement had few ethnic imbalances, members from 
any ethnic group could become commanders, the RENAMO leadership was made up 
mostly of Shona speakers from the central region of the country (Hall, 1990, Minter, 
1989, Morgan, 1990). Its leaders mostly came from relatively modest backgrounds, 
but “many in this group were ambitious individuals frustrated with their lot” 
(Manning, 1998:176). Field research further indicated that the rebel groups were 
divided into several smaller groups headed by commanders which communicated 
with the headquarters from the field on a daily basis, upon which Dhlakama decided 
which strategies to follow. This was enabled by the fact that each company was 
equipped with radio communications (Young, 1990). These efficient communications 
by radio proved to be a critical aspect of “RENAMO’s capacity to organize its attacks 
over the wide expanse of rural Mozambique” (Minter, 1989:12).  
 
Recruitment and Tactics 
Most of the initial RENAMO members appeared to be volunteers. The population’s 
resentment of the FRELIMO government that could not provide their needs and 
condemned their traditions and beliefs resulted in RENAMO support in certain parts 
of the country. However, over time volunteering decreased and innumerable 
RENAMO recruits were forced to join the movement. Coercion became the 
overwhelmingly dominant method of recruitment (Minter, 1989), probably due to the 
brutality against civilians and the subsequent decreasing support (Young, 1990). 
Forced recruitment was usually done through abduction or kidnapping (Morgan, 
1990). Moorcraft (1987) reports that while many recruits were press-ganged into the 
movement, others decided to join because of hunger, poverty and/or boredom. 
However, RENAMO never completely relied on forced recruitment. Schafer states 
“coercion was supplemented by non-violent persuasive techniques, including political 
education” (2001:223). Whereas some recruits were taken as individuals, others were 
forced to join RENAMO in large groups. These group recruitments often took place 
during attacks on small towns or villages, schools or plantations (Minter, 1989). Field 
research indicated that it was not uncommon that groups of people were taken to the 
bases, yet whoever complained, expressed a wish to return home or could not keep 
up, was killed.  
 Whereas RENAMO started as a small organization with only a few hundred 
members, the group rapidly expanded during South Africa’s support. While estimates 
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claim that the group consisted of approximately 5,000 rebels in 1981, this number 
increased to 8,000 to 10,000 rebels in 1982 (Hall, 1990, Young, 1990) and further 
expanded to 20,000 members by 1989 (Minter, 1989). It was the expansion period 
which started in 1982 that led to a significant strengthening of the rebel forces and 
enabled RENAMO to operate throughout the entire country, becoming a serious 
threat to the FRELIMO regime (Hall, 1990, Young, 1990). With the signing of the 
Nkomati Accord in 1984, RENAMO headquarters were moved from South Africa to 
Gorongosa in Mozambique. There, the rebels started a massive and aggressive 
campaign to expand the movement even further and innumerable recruits were 
enlisted to the group between 1985 and 1986 (Manning, 1998). That this campaign 
was rather successful can be derived from Morgan’s claim: “except in the largest 
cities, the rebels cause an enormous amount of damage and virtually hold the 
government to ransom” (1990:608) 
 The tactics used by RENAMO have changed over time and varied by region. 
According to Wilson this reflected the “changing demands of external sponsors and 
the requirement for different strategies in the various military, political and socio-
economic contexts in which it operates” (Wilson, 1992:529). Read in documents 
captured at the rebel headquarters in 1985, RENAMO’s tactics mostly seem to have 
focused on destruction during the conflict. The documents included three major 
goals: “1. Destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones, 2. Destroy the 
communications routes to prevent exports and imports to and from abroad, and the 
movement of domestic produce, 3. Prevent the activities of foreigners because they 
are the most dangerous in the recovery of the economy” (Hall, 1990:58). South Africa 
is likely to have played an important role in the design of these goals. Young (1990) 
adds another goal by stating that RENAMO aimed to “steal people from the state by 
getting their chiefs to move them away from government controlled areas into 
RENAMO controlled areas” (1990:504). In addition, the rebels tried to tap support 
from Mozambicans whom had been particularly marginalized by the FRELIMO 
government: the rural populations. In these societies, RENAMO was received with 
initial enthusiasm, especially among the young. As the peasantry in particular had 
been marginalized by the government’s policies, RENAMO exploited the situation to 
win popular support (Roesch, 1992). According to Hall (1990), RENAMO used 
different kinds of military tactics to achieve their objectives: sometimes they did 
guerrilla style hit and run attacks, whereas on other occasions towns were taken over 
by an entire battalion for a substantial period of time. 
 
Civilian Relations 
RENAMO relied heavily on the rural Mozambican population for the provision of 
food, services, information, as well as recruits, porterage and intelligence (Gersony, 
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1988, Young, 1990). Rebel commanders would make demands through village chiefs 
who had to fulfill their food and labor requests and/or indicate areas where 
RENAMO could set up base (Young, 1990). In these bases a strict division between 
the civilian population and the rebels’ military structures would be ensured (Hall, 
1990). Civilians were not allowed closer than 100 or 200 meters from the military 
base and were mostly used for obtaining and transporting food and goods (Minter, 
1989). However, once base was set up, civilians automatically became part of 
RENAMO and had to support the movement. As bases were moved frequently, the 
most important task of civilians was to porter for the rebels (Roesch, 1992).  
 RENAMO called on “people to abandon communal villages and to return to 
their ancestral lands and traditional way of life” (Roesch, 1992:476). Whereas 
FRELIMO was trying to suppress this traditional way of life and cultural norms, 
RENAMO promised rural communities the “recuperation of an insulted identity” 
(Geffray, 1991:54). In some areas this led to widespread popular support for the 
rebels, as civilians were frustrated by the disrupting consequences villagization had 
had for the peasants (Schafer, 2001) and believed the rebels would redress the 
imbalance and government marginalization of rural areas (Manning, 1998). Geffray 
(1991) argues this belief changed around 1988 when it became apparent RENAMO 
could not address the marginalization. And so, communities that had initially 
volunteered to move to RENAMO areas became less and less convinced about the 
group’s motives. This was also the case for Mozambican youth, who had until then 
been “a prime source of support for the movement.” During this period, local 
populations started to realize that “they had been supporting a parasite army that was 
never going to improve things” (Manning, 1998:173).  
 As RENAMO’s existence was dependent on the population, violent tactics were 
designed to deal with the lack of support in certain areas. However, Schafer (2001) 
stresses that there were significant differences in how RENAMO approached 
civilians; although mostly characterized as a rebel group projecting arbitrary and 
brutal violence on civilians, RENAMO predominantly attacked and destroyed towns 
and communal villages held by FRELIMO. Schafer states that the group’s behavior 
was not particularly bizarre or irrational although often depicted as such. To illustrate 
this, Gersony developed three models to describe the ways in which RENAMO treated 
the population of different areas. “(1) The ‘tax areas’ are characterized by a widely 
distributed population from which RENAMO, on a regular basis, forcibly extracts 
food, clothing, and services, especially labor for porterage duties. In what are known 
as (2) the ‘control areas’, which normally exist in close proximity to a large but secret 
base, the local inhabitants are permanently engaged in helping the rebels, often 
under extremely brutal conditions. They have to work in the fields to provide the 
RENAMO base with its food requirements, and are also heavily engaged in porterage 
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duties, often over long distances during which they receive very harsh treatment. 
Finally, in (3) the ‘destruction areas’, RENAMO does not distinguish between civilian 
and military targets, and its tactics are characterized by violent, wholesale, and 
thorough-going devastation” (In: Morgan, 1990:608).   
 Field research indicated that to mark these territories, RENAMO rebels would 
place sticks with the decapitated heads of their enemies on top. Young (1990) states 
that heads on poles were also found within RENAMO camps. These were often the 
heads of civilians who had been suspected of spying for FRELIMO. Combined with 
mutilating adults and children, castrations and crucifixion, civilians were killed as a 
means to control the Mozambican population. Still, the extend of RENAMO violence 
varied throughout the country: most major massacres seemed to take place in the 
southern region, indicating that regional commanders had considerable autonomy 
(Hall, 1990). The brutality of RENAMO seemed pointless. If, however, we look more 
closely at the movement, the destruction of certain targets becomes slightly more 
explicable. For instance, RENAMO destroyed entire villages; these were often 
Communal Villages established by FRELIMO. Health centers and schools were 
destroyed in order to weaken and destroy FRELIMO’s position in the area as well as 
to undermine its popularity. However, certain acts had no rational explanation. 
“Given RENAMO’s other strange features—the extreme violence, the forced 
recruitment, the fascination with religion, the habit of destruction—suspicions must 
arise that the organization has been tapping the ‘darker side’ of traditional beliefs, in 
the absence of alternative overarching ideologies, and in doing so has become locked 
into a negative culture of evil. Put another way, destruction may no longer be merely 
a tactic, but may have become an end in itself, explicable more in psychological, than 
in political, social or military terms” (Hall, 1990:60). Even though the Mozambican 
population was living in constant fear, RENAMO’s violent behavior did not keep the 
group from expanding into a large, cohesive rebel group.  
 As the war raged on, RENAMO’s strength developed against a background of 
decreasing external support, which was mainly due to the rebels’ brutality and 
violence used against the local population. Morgan explains why RENAMO was still 
able to flourish in these circumstances: “the destruction of social structures and the 
process of impoverishment which the rural inhabitants have experienced for decades, 
and which have been worsened by FRELIMO policies, have led to a scenario where a 
ruthless organization, operating in the way RENAMO does, is able to flourish. In a 
situation where day-to-day survival is so uncertain, the option of obtaining a living by 
violent means must seem persuasive, while the ability to resist is inevitably 
weakened. Hence, not surprisingly, in many districts the inhabitants have either fled 
from RENAMO, or give in almost without struggle” (1990:612). And so, some local 
chiefs, magicians and traditional healers cooperated with RENAMO and provided 
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support for the movement (Minter, 1989). However, RENAMO was also known for 
killing uncooperative village officials and powerful community members, especially 
during attacks on FRELIMO territory (Young, 1990). Powerful citizens were often 
killed first, after which a wave of uncontrollable violence would be unleashed on the 
rest of the community. The extent of this violence is shown by Young: “Military logic 
may provide a rationale for violence in the sense that RENAMO must secure its basic 
needs (essentially food and porterage) from local populations as it has no rear bases 
to which it can retreat or on which it can rely for supplies. Yet the evidence suggests 
that the degree of violence goes beyond any purely rational military explanation. 
Attacks on schools and health posts have often involved not their simple destruction 
in a military sense but a joy in destruction for its own sake. During attacks on clinics 
there has been the dismantling and elaborate destruction of equipment” (Young, 
1990:506). This indicates that RENAMO’s use of violence was characterized by the 
methodical, meticulous destruction of everything they came across, as was also the 
case for the RUF in Sierra Leone (see the Baptism of Fire section in chapter 6). 
However this brutality predominantly colors RENAMO’s image, we should note that 
there were significant regional differences “in terms of levels of RENAMO violence 
against the civilian population, levels of popular support for RENAMO, the existence 
of formal RENAMO administrative structures, the ethic and historical geography of 
RENAMO controlled areas, and the enthusiasm of the civilian population at being 
‘liberated’ from RENAMO control by government forces” (Roesch, 1992:464). This 
implies that, although violence was generally speaking no longer a tactic but had 
become an end in itself, in some cases rebels were seen to support the civilian 
population. For instance, in times of severe hunger the rebels would occasionally 
hunt for meat and provide the civilian base with food as well (Schafer, 2001).  
 
Child Soldiers 
According to surveys conducted by UNICEF during the war, the conflict has had 
ravaging impacts on children. “One-third of Mozambique’s children died before they 
reached the age of five from starvation, malnutrition, and preventable illnesses 
related to the continuing conflict” (Boothby et al, 2006:156). The surviving children 
had mind boggling stories to tell. In 1989 Boothby’s team interviewed 504 
Mozambican children about their experiences during the war: 77 percent of them had 
witnessed murder, 88 percent witnessed physical abuse/torture, 51 percent had been 
physically abused/tortured, 63 percent had witnessed rape/sexual abuse, 64 percent 
had been abducted, 75 percent were then forced to serve as porters and 28 percent 
were trained for combat. These staggering results show how much children were 
affected by the extreme violence of the war.  
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 In addition, the war saw an exorbitant number of children being recruited as 
child soldiers by RENAMO. Since the extreme violence carried out by the rebels led to 
decreasing voluntary recruitment and support of the population, RENAMO started 
targeting children in their recruitment campaigns. The rebels predominantly relied 
on forced recruitment to increase their forces and children became an easy target. 
According to Minter, in certain areas “there was a systematic preference for getting 
children because it was easier to keep them from running away than to control adults. 
Children as young as 10 were used, and more than half of the armed soldiers were 
children (roughly 15 or under)” (1989:5). The recruitment of children was also 
encouraged by the fact that many young men fled into the bush once they knew 
RENAMO was coming to the areas they resided (Minter, 1989).  
 Schafer (2001) provides an account of how child soldiers were recruited. She 
states: “RENAMO soldiers were sent on recruitment missions, with orders to round 
up a specified number of men and women of a certain age (usually between thirteen 
and seventeen). They picked up people at their homes or in the fields, usually in the 
daytime but occasionally after dark. They told recruits and their families that they 
were being taken to do a ‘job’ and that they would return home afterwards. The use of 
the term ‘job’ was an important tactic, as it imparted a sense of normality to the 
recruit and to the family. Since most of the young men were underemployed and 
eager for work at the time, it could even be used as an incentive to make them go 
more willingly” (2001:224). 
 In addition to ‘offering jobs’, promises such as scholarships in foreign 
countries were made, luring hundreds of secondary school students into RENAMO 
between 1989 and 1991. “Many of these students left behind government scholarships 
and hard-won places in secondary schools, with only a few semesters or even just a 
few exams left” (Manning, 1998:175). The students were initially recruited to allow 
the creation of a loyal RENAMO division, which could fulfill the duties that would 
come along if RENAMO would be elected into the government. However, things took 
a different direction. “None of them were sent on scholarships abroad, and many 
interrupted their studies in their final stages only to find themselves in a remote 
RENAMO outpost with no possibility of resuming their academic careers” (Manning, 
1998:183). The majority of these children were trained and sent to various RENAMO 
bases where they were used as soldiers or administrative personnel instead.  
 Some rural youth voluntarily joined RENAMO “in an attempt to escape the 
unemployment and poverty that is its lot. Rather than face the uncertainties of illegal 
emigration to South Africa and with little interest in working the land, given the 
difficulties of hoe-based surplus production, a small number of young men opt for an 
easier life of marginality, first as petty thieves and ultimately as collaborators and 
actual ‘bandits’ in the ranks of RENAMO. For though life in RENAMO ranks is hard 
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and dangerous, it is also exciting, and offers access to luxury items and women on a 
scale hitherto impossible for rural youth” (Roesch, 1992:477). These youth were often 
referred to as bandits and were “extremely valuable to RENAMO from a military 
point of view. They are able to guide and direct RENAMO attacks on their home 
areas, pointing out village defenses, FRELIMO members, and the homes of migrant 
laborers working in South Africa, which invariably contain more food, consumer 
goods, and money than those of other rural dwellers. For these young men, 
membership in RENAMO is often also a way of settling old scores with neighbors and 
local authorities within their home areas—with people who may have punished or 
humiliated them at an earlier date for petty thievery or other marginal activities” 
(Roesch, 1992:478). Young (1990) adds to this argument by stating that child soldiers 
played a significant role in the conflict what seemed “a profound crisis in youth.”   
 
Girl Soldiers 
Although the literature on RENAMO generally pays little attention to girl soldiers 
specifically, field research indicated they played significant roles within the 
movement. Most of these girls were forcibly recruited, yet some volunteered to join 
the rebels as a means to survive in the harsh circumstances they faced (Honwana, 
2007). The majority of girl soldiers were assigned with tasks as recruiters, 
intelligence officers, spies, trainers for new recruits, weapon experts, wives, porters, 
medics, first aid technicians and slave/domestic laborers within RENAMO (McKay 
and Mazurana, 2003, Wessells, 2006), while few were used in combat (Honwana, 
2007). According to Minter (1989), although reports varied per region, some girls 
were trained for combat but most remained in the base. Honwana (2007) states that 
many girl soldiers were provided with military training, yet most of these girls served 
as camp guards and joined in looting missions. Some of my female informants 
claimed to have been involved in combat on a regular basis, stating that physically 
strong girls were used for combat, while others took up roles as nurses, sex slaves, 
cooks or porters. While few of my female informants even became commanders and 
were in charge of particular units during their stay with the rebels, most girls had not 
much say in decisions regarding their own lives once recruited by RENAMO. They 
would be initiated into the group and subsequently ritually allocated to the rebels. 
Male base commanders, who could have several wives, had the right to choose 
between the captured girls first and after they had made their choice, the remaining 
girls would sometimes be distributed to other soldiers or become part of the civilian 
base. As Roesch states: “Only RENAMO commanders are allowed to bring women 
into the garrison area to serve as cooks and sexual partners. Lower ranking officers 
and rank and file combatants, on the other hand, attach themselves to particular 
women amongst the civilian population for sexual purposes, even though in theory 
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they are not supposed to maintain relations with civilian women” (Roesch, 1992:471). 
According to Thompson (1998), this was particularly the case in southern 
Mozambique, as girls did represent large parts of RENAMO bases in the northern 
region of the country. 
 According to Wilson (1992), girl soldiers were mainly used as objects. 
Honwana states, “the dominance of soldiers over captive girls was established and 
demonstrated right from the start” (2007:84). Girls were often strategically used as 
‘rewards’ that motivated male rebels to stay with RENAMO once they had been 
recruited. For instance, in captured RENAMO documents from 1981, it is suggested 
“that in order to discourage the soldiers from leaving there should be a women’s 
detachment in the RENAMO training camp in South Africa in order to ‘entertain 
them’” (Minter, 1989:5). Next to being used as entertainment, girls were often given 
to commanders as wives and usually stayed with these men for long periods of time. 
Even though these were forced marriages, girl soldiers did, to some extent, benefit 
from pairing up with a powerful soldier. Honwana explains: “Well-fed and well-
dressed women were those ‘adopted’ by or ‘married’ to powerful soldiers, who 
benefited from the spoils that were looted from towns, villages and factories. These 
women themselves became powerful and subjugated other women in the camps. They 
required services from them, such as cleaning; searching for water, firewood and 
food; cooking; and childcare. The wives of powerful commanders held special 
positions in the camps as leaders of women’s affairs, nurses, counselors, teachers and 
political advisors” (2007:87). If girl soldiers did not become a wife, they often served 
as concubines throughout their stay with the rebels. This indicates that RENAMO 
consisted of hierarchical structures and internal organization, in which “women 
played a variety of roles and invented institutions to mirror normal life” (Honwana, 
2007:87). 
 Wilson summarizes the group’s use of girls as follows: “Rape and the use of 
slave-wives is rather seen by RENAMO soldiers as their right of access to women, and 
a key ‘perk’ of the job, not a direct tactic of war.” He continues: “RENAMO 
commanders repeatedly stress their special rights to women and girls, along with the 
status and prowess that this confers upon them as men of power relative to the 
RENAMO rank and file” (1992:536). If girls refused to have sex they would face 
severe punishment, ranging from being beaten, tortured or even killed. However, just 
as the use of violence, the behavior towards girls also varied throughout the country: 
Thompson (1998) states that rape was more common in southern Mozambique 
compared to its northern region. Schafer writes of the varying behavior towards 
women: “it appears that both FRELIMO and RENAMO combatants regarded women 
in the enemy area as fair game for capture and sexual abuse, whereas women in their 
own areas were to be treated with caution and approached according to normal social 
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rules” (Schafer, 2001:233). The extent to which girls within RENAMO territory were 
approached “according to normal social rules” remains questionable, however, as the 
majority of my informants reported repeated sexual abuse during their stay with the 
rebels. 
 
Fieldwork Evidence 
During field research in Mozambique, I interviewed 65 former RENAMO child 
soldiers and commanders. The majority of my informants stayed with the rebels for 
several years. Some of them indicated they were with RENAMO during the entire 
conflict. All of my informants had carried out a variety of roles while they were part of 
the group, ranging from porterage to combat. Most had several types of 
responsibilities at a time, which often changed as they got older. The following figures 
indicate at what age my informants were recruited and how old they were when they 
left RENAMO. The figures show which percentage of my informants took part in 
DDRR programs and indicate the differences between boy and girl soldiers. Since the 
research concerns a relatively small sample size, results should be interpreted as 
indicative instead of conclusive and final. Although supporting general patterns 
indicated during field research, these results are estimates due to the sample size and 
should therefore not be used as the foundations for generalizations regarding the 
subject.  
  
Boys 
 
Girls 
Average age of 
recruitment 
10.2 9.4 
Average age of return to 
society 
17.8 16.5 
Average period within 
RENAMO 
7.6 7.1 
Percentage participating 
in DDRR programs 
48.6% 39.3% 
Total number of child 
soldiers in sample 
 
37 
 
28 
Table 7.1 Field sample of RENAMO child soldiers. Total sample size: 65 
 
 Table 7.1 shows the results of field research conducted among child soldiers in 
Mozambique. It indicates the average age of recruitment for boy and girl soldiers, 
their average age of return to society, the average number of years they spent within 
RENAMO, and the percentage of returnees that participated in DDRR programs after 
leaving the rebel group. In order to indicate differences between boy and girl soldiers, 
these have been divided into separate categories. The table indicates that boys 
included in this sample were slightly older when they were recruited as compared to 
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girls: on average boys were 10.2 years old, whereas girls were only 9.4 years of age. A 
possible explanation for this difference is the fact that RENAMO mostly recruited 
boys for the purpose of fighting, while most girls were given domestic duties that 
could be performed from a very young age. Within the movement young children 
seemed responsible for domestic duties while boys from the age of nine were 
generally considered ready to be trained for combat. This could possibly explain why 
the rebels targeted girls younger than boys.  
 As indicated by the table, boy soldiers were also slightly older when they 
returned to society: on average they were 17.78 years old, whereas girls in this sample 
were 16.5 years old. Boys remained with RENAMO longer than girls did and more 
often participated in DDRR programs. This finding is in line with the existing 
literature on DDRR in Mozambique, signaling that girls were often neglected in such 
programs and hence quietly blended in with society (see for instance, McKay and 
Mazurana, 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 RENAMO child soldiers: age of recruitment 
 
 Figure 7.1 shows a wide variety in the age of recruitment. The horizontal axis 
shows the age of abduction, the vertical axis shows the number of children abducted 
at this age. A possible explanation for the variation is that RENAMO recruited 
children to fulfill different roles, and there did not seem to be a specific target age as 
the LRA for instance had. Boys over the age of 9 were generally provided with 
military training and became combatants, while younger children were frequently 
used for domestic duties and/or placed in the civilian base attached to the military 
base in order to support the rebels. Children of these ages were all considered useful 
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and hence stood a chance to be recruited and taken to the base. Figure 7.1 does show 
a decrease in the recruitment of children of 15 years or older. According to RENAMO 
commanders this was because these children were becoming “stubborn” and it was 
difficult to catch them, possibly because they hid in the bush once they knew the 
rebels were coming, as described earlier in this chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 RENAMO child soldiers: age of return to society 
 
 Figure 7.2 shows a wide variety in the age of return to society by RENAMO 
child soldiers. The horizontal axis shows the child soldiers’ age at their return to 
society while the vertical axis shows the number of children who returned at this age. 
The figure indicates it was difficult for young children to escape; while 87.7 percent of 
RENAMO child soldiers in this sample were recruited at 13 years of age or younger, 
only 20 percent of child soldiers were 13 years of age or younger when they escaped. 
Interviews indicated several reasons: young recruits seemed particularly disoriented 
after they had been recruited, they had few ideas how they could leave the group, they 
quickly became dependent, and most started accepting RENAMO as their new family. 
The majority of child soldiers in this sample (55.4 percent) left the group when they 
were 17 years or older, which indicates that their chances of leaving RENAMO 
increased as they got older. Still, most child soldiers were between 17 and 22 years of 
age when they left RENAMO; the numbers drop again at 23 years of age. Interviews 
revealed that the group of 23 years of age or older had earned respect and ranks 
within RENAMO due to their years of serving. This provided them with certain 
benefits, which they said withheld them from exiting the group. 
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Socialization Processes within the Mozambican National Resistance  
This section will focus on the powerful mechanisms RENAMO used to motivate and 
control its members, and reveal how socialization contributed to the establishment of 
a cohesive rebel group. Although the circumstances in Mozambique made it seem 
unlikely for RENAMO to develop into a rebel group consisting of loyal members, 
reality proved to be different. As pointed out by Hall: “Lacking all the features we 
have come to associate with successful insurgencies in Africa, such as a charismatic 
leadership or easily identifiable ideology, it has failed to develop a political identity 
commensurate with its military strength. It has no clearly defined regional base, 
relies on widespread forced recruitment, and behaves with notorious brutality 
towards the civilian population. Yet it operates throughout the length and breadth of 
Mozambique, and holds the state in virtual paralysis. Since it lacks rear bases and 
therefore depends upon local provisioning, it must be able to obtain compliance over 
large areas of rural Mozambique. That also implies effective organization” (1990:39). 
Hall further questions, “how an organization with so little appeal that it must rely on 
widespread forced recruitment can achieve such a measure of ‘success’ against the 
Mozambican state” (Hall, 1990:39). RENAMO’s achievements are indeed remarkable 
given the Mozambican circumstances. In order to approach an explanation of 
RENAMO’s perseverance, I argue that socialization played an essential role in the 
achievements and “success” of the rebel group. Hence, this section will examine how 
RENAMO created obedience and motivation among its members, and show how 
socialization contributed to the establishment of an effective organization. The 
section focuses on the early stages of socialization processes within the group, 
showing how initiation, training and violence provided the foundations that kept 
RENAMO together. We will see that the actual provision of material rewards did not 
play a significant role in the creation of motivation among the rebels. Due to their 
dependence on the civilian population RENAMO had little to offer to their members. 
Instead, promises and ranks were used to motivate child soldiers. In addition, the 
experience, observation and use of extreme violence proved to be one of the main 
methods used to control and socialize child recruits within RENAMO, eventually 
leading to allegiance.  
 
Formal and Informal Socialization 
As stated before, little is known the about socialization processes executed within 
rebel groups. This is also the case for RENAMO. Still, field research indicated that the 
processes played a significant role in the creation of a cohesive unit while facing the 
discouraging circumstances of Mozambique’s conflict. Wood (2008) highlights the 
importance of socialization in her work and argues that each recruit, whether 
volunteering or coerced, has to be socialized within a rebel group. For instance, in 
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order to control the violence deployed by the rebel group, recruits need to be 
socialized in using violence for group purposes by their commanders. This is typically 
achieved through the establishment of a strong hierarchical organization. Wood 
further argues, “Training and socialization to the armed group take place both 
formally, through the immersion experience of “boot camp,” and informally, through 
initiation rituals and hazing. The powerful experiences of endless drilling, 
dehumanization through abuse at the hands of the drill sergeant, and degradation 
followed by “rebirth” as group members through initiation rituals typically melt 
individual recruits into a cohesive unit in which loyalties to one another are felt to be 
stronger than previous loyalties, such as those to family” (Wood, 2008:546).  
 This type of military socialization has also been exerted by RENAMO; its 
leaders managed to establish a strong hierarchical organization by socializing each of 
their recruits in the use of violence for the group’s purpose. Formal and informal 
socialization started immediately when child soldiers were recruited, whether 
voluntarily or through coercion. Formal socialization was achieved by thorough 
military training, which became an important aspect of RENAMO. Once new rebels 
had been recruited, they were divided into groups. Those selected for combat were 
provided with two to three months of training in specifically designed bases, 
separated from RENAMO’s operational bases. The basic training consisted of weapon 
handling while additional training was provided in first aid, anti-aircraft, intelligence, 
paratrooper skills and communication (Minter, 1989). In the Rhodesian days of the 
movement, a permanent training camp had been established where the rebels 
underwent serious military training. During South African support, the rebels were 
trained on its territory (Young, 1990).  
 Child recruits from the age of 9 were provided with training in these camps. 
Younger children were generally sent to the civilian bases after their recruitment and 
were often provided with training once they got older. According to one informant 
(10F12), “The rebels attacked our town and started to collect everything. All the food 
and clothes and animals were taken to the middle of the village. Some people were 
killed and the houses were burned down. Then some villagers were forced to march to 
the RENAMO base. I think we were 100 people taken away: men, women and 
children. After marching for three days many people had died but we reached the 
base. They were taken to different areas but I was sent to training with the older 
children straight away. I remember the younger ones were sent to the civilian base, so 
they could support them with housekeeping.” Another one (9M8) states: “When I was 
abducted, the rebels held me at gunpoint and told me to come with them. I was tied 
to some other people and we marched to the training base. I was on my own during 
training, I did not know any of the people. We all came from different places but we 
were many, I think 50 children. We stayed for three months. I learned how to use the 
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gun and how to fight the enemy. First it was scary and very difficult, but then I got 
used to the sounds of shooting. At the end of the training my commander gave me my 
own gun and I was so proud.”  
 Once RENAMO child soldiers reached the final stages of their training, the 
rebels organized a ceremony that was similar to the traditional rites of passage used 
by Mozambican society (Boothby, Crawford and Halperin, 2006). This was an 
important part of the informal socialization of new recruits, as the ceremony 
registered and prepared the children as full members of RENAMO. Although 
Wessells (2006) fails to acknowledge the equal importance for girls, he explains the 
importance of such ceremonies: “Psychologically, this tactic forges strong allegiance 
to the armed group, equating his role and identity as a man with belonging to the 
armed group.” The sense of belonging and allegiance among recruits were an 
essential achievement, which allowed RENAMO to become a cohesive group. With 
these ceremonies, RENAMO aimed to erase the civilian identity and replaced it with a 
rebel identity, making RENAMO the child’s new family. These developments were 
then further encouraged by political and ideological education. This is explained by 
one informant (14M8): “After being trained we were given the politics. They 
(RENAMO) were fighting to liberate our country and we were elected to join them. 
They explained FRELIMO would destroy our society as the spirits would not be 
honored and the chiefs would be removed. We need the spirits and our chiefs, so we 
fight for them.” The use of political education is also mentioned by Schafer: 
“Although the majority were forcibly recruited and subject to coercive pressures, 
many guerrillas attested to effective political education once within the movement. 
RENAMO slogans did find echoes with these rural recruits, as they expressed 
sympathy with the desire to ‘live as we pleased’ rather than being forced to move to 
FRELIMO’s communal villages—a cause for which they were ready ‘to accept death, 
because I wanted the country to be free’” (Schafer, 2001:226). These methods 
indicate the importance of formal and informal socialization, as they manage to 
involve new recruits and thereby encourage the establishment of the foundation for a 
cohesive unit. 
 
Experiencing Violence 
RENAMO was known for its violent character. Not only did the Mozambican 
population fall subject to their extreme violence, child soldiers were kept under 
control by violent means as well. According to McKay and Mazurana (2003), 
“physical and sexual violence, including murder, amputations, rape, forced 
cannibalism, and torture, was widespread.” Field research indicated that during and 
after RENAMO’s recruitment process, child soldiers experienced all of these extreme 
types of violence. This is not uncommon for rebel groups, as Wood explains violence 
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is a common tool in the socialization of their members: “once deployed, combatants 
experience (to widely varying degrees) violence as perpetrators, as witnesses, and 
often as victims … Among the psychological mechanisms possibly at work in these 
processes of socialization to group membership and the wielding of violence are 
compliance, role adoption, internalization of group norms, cognitive dissonance 
reduction, habituation to violence, diffusion of responsibility onto the group, 
deindividuation, and dehumanization of the victimized group” (Wood, 2008:546). 
Although it may sound crude, extreme violence creates allegiance and field research 
indicated that it made RENAMO child soldiers become part of the group’s violent 
culture.  
The far-reaching effects of experiencing violence as victims, witnesses, or 
perpetrators, were powerfully shown by the development of allegiance and loyalty to 
the group, as well as by extreme violence carried out by child soldiers themselves. 
Field research indicated that even those children who had been recruited by force 
showed a change in behavior that seemed to become natural over time. The violent 
part of the socialization process was started immediately during the recruitment of 
child soldiers. RENAMO commanders forced children to witness or exert (lethal) 
violence against family and/or community members, instilling a paralyzing fear 
amongst them. According to RENAMO commanders this was done because the fear 
and violence would control the children and make them obedient to the group. One of 
my informants (8M6) told about his recruitment: “At the end of the year we had 
school holidays and I was on my way home with three of my friends. That day we 
were captured and recruited by RENAMO. It was a group of 30 or 35 soldiers, many 
of them carrying food looted from the civilians. When they found us, they asked 
where we are coming from. We answered that we came from school and we are on the 
way home. Then they said you have to follow us, you have to come, we are RENAMO. 
They beat us, and said if you don’t come, we will kill you on the spot. We knew that 
RENAMO was forcibly recruiting people and hurting them so we went with them. We 
walked and they said we should leave our belongings in the bush. When I put down 
my books, they gave me things to carry, food and other stuff. My one friend was not 
strong and he fell in the bush. The soldiers shouted at him and then chopped him 
with the machete. They looked at me; if you don’t walk and be quiet now, we will do 
the same to you. And so I walked with them without crying.” Although this is the 
personal experience of one of my informants, many informants recalled similar 
memories, which often led to strong allegiance to RENAMO. 
Whereas RENAMO is often characterized as a captive army, the question rises 
how its leaders could create a cohesive group and deter their recruits from escaping. 
One of the most important factors was the systematic use of intimidation, violence 
and terror. This is also indicated by Young, who states “the organization uses a 
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variety of methods to deter escape. Recruits are transferred away from their home 
area often after having been forced to kill someone in that area” (1990:500). 
Relocating child soldiers and forcing them to kill someone from their home area 
restrained their mobility and burned bridges with their communities. This prevented 
them from escaping, which was further discouraged by extreme violence and constant 
threats. Once the newly recruited children had reached the base, they were told they 
would be killed if they tried to escape and that the rebels would go after their families 
too. The resulting fears discouraged recruits from escaping, as did the relocation to 
unknown territory (Minter, 1989). All my informants had witnessed the 
consequences when people tried to escape. One of them said: “Some people tried to 
run away. Then we had a general meeting with all the people. The commanders would 
say: ‘See, these people tried to run away. They are on FRELIMO side and traitors. We 
want to show you how we educate them’. Then they took the children and asked 
them: ‘Who is the man? Show you are the man and can kill these people’. This 
happened many times, the children killed many people like that. Sometimes it were 
complete families getting executed because they lived around the military base and 
tried to run together.” 
 As already indicated by this account, RENAMO rebels preferred to carry out 
punishment in public; it was a common strategy. As Wilson states, the first thing 
RENAMO did in newly captured control zones was “to warn the community of the 
dangers of disobeying them or trying to escape, and gruesome examples are quickly 
made of those who have resisted.” He continues: “People of all ages and sexes can be 
subject to violence, and frequently the blood relatives of those singled out are also 
subsequently abused. Particularly common is the forcing of mothers to kill or maim 
(and even eat) their own infants” (1992:534–535). In addition, to maximize fear 
among the victims as well as the witnesses to their violence, RENAMO mostly used 
machetes, axes and knives with which they would kill slowly, engaged in bizarre 
mutilations and tortured by delaying death. Then, the rebels seemed to pay careful 
attention to the visual impact of their violence, and therefore displayed bodies. This 
was used not only to discourage child soldiers from escaping, but also to discourage 
the people living in the civilian RENAMO bases from leaving. Hall argues that a 
majority of interviewees “who had resided in a control zone had personally witnessed 
severe punishment or death inflicted on captives apprehended while trying to escape, 
and reported that when individuals made successful escapes, any dependents left 
behind might be executed in retribution. In general, these punishments were 
conducted publicly, as a deterrent. The effect of this violence may have been to induce 
passivity—and a sense of fear, anxiety and helplessness—in the populations 
concerned” (Hall, 1990:53).  
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 The threat of execution was used by RENAMO from the perspective of 
FRELIMO as well. In order to maintain control of his own rebels, Dhlakama gave 
regular speeches in which he claimed that “the government’s amnesty program was a 
lie, and that if they turned themselves in they would first be interviewed on the radio 
and then shot” (Minter, 1989:6). RENAMO recruits were hence presented with a 
catch 22, which is reflected by Minter’s explanation of the options that RENAMO 
rebels faced: “if he tries to escape and fails, he may well be executed, and, as far as he 
knows, if he succeeds in escaping he might be killed by the government” (1989:6). 
This was also acknowledged by my informants: “If you escape the government will 
kill you. We just had to stay and be one of them. We used the violence to keep the new 
children with us too; they were too scared to leave. Sometimes, we would set 
ambushes next to the road. Once we took a bus and set in on fire. We left all the 
people to burn alive and made the children dance around it” (12M12). 
 This account belongs to a boy who was forcibly recruited at the age of 12. He 
explained how he was initially forced to commit violence but later on started to 
engage actively without being ordered. Many of my informants had had similar 
experiences, which shows that over time the use of violence became normal for 
RENAMO child soldiers. The constraints disappeared, mainly due to their exposure 
to continuous violence, which in turn may explain why RENAMO became 
increasingly violent as the war raged on. As Wood (2008) also mentions in her 
research, the habituation of violence, dehumanization of victims, and diffusion of 
responsibility seemed to undermine constraints on violence for these children.  
 Similar to the case of LRA child soldiers, violence wielded, suffered and 
observed proved to be an integral part of the socialization of child soldiers within 
RENAMO. Many of my informants, particularly those who had been used as 
combatants, started perceiving their commanders as father figures. This development 
was encouraged by cultural values: Mozambique’s patriarchal society significantly 
enhanced RENAMO’s chances of creating a cohesive rebel group consisting of 
obedient child soldiers. As Wessells argues: “Highly patriarchal societies prize 
obedience to the father, bestow on him considerable power and authority, and treat 
his word as unquestionable. Living in a dangerous environment, vulnerable children 
may tend to follow the patriarchal norm, seeing obedience to a powerful, 
domineering adult as offering protection. Armed groups exploit this cultural tendency 
by promoting themselves as a surrogate family and invoking father imagery” 
(2006:65). This was certainly the case for RENAMO, which not only portrayed itself 
as the father of the nation—its commanders also portrayed themselves as the fathers 
of the rebels (Schafer, 2004). As indicated by field research, this had far-reaching 
consequences for child soldiers in RENAMO. The ties to RENAMO developed to such 
strength that family ties were replaced and a new sense of belonging was created. As 
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one of my informants (11M5) stated: “When I was taken I was just a small boy. I was 
in an area far away from my family and I did not know anybody. My commander took 
me in the group, teaching me how to be a big man. I listened to all his advice and took 
his orders without questioning so I grew up as a good fighter. I feel my commander 
was my new father, he was very proud of me and took care of me. It made me feel 
happy to show what I had learned from him, to make him proud. I belonged to 
RENAMO, my new family.” 
 Even though child soldiers developed a deep sense of respect towards their 
commanders, their guns simultaneously provided these children with a sense of 
social promotion. Owning a gun reversed power relations, as the children became 
masters over elderly people. Still, RENAMO leadership seems to have instructed 
these children to respect their elders. “Dhlakama taught us that ‘since I took you to be 
soldiers, it wasn’t for you to go and threaten people’. If you meet up with an elder, you 
must show respect, kneel down for them with your weapon, greet them properly. You 
must not rob, and not go begging. The people must just feel (sympathy) for you and 
give you whatever they can give” (Schafer, 2001:232). Not all child soldiers acted 
according to these instruction though, as field research indicated that elderly people 
and chiefs were killed and mutilated by child soldiers. This shows that children 
became used to witnessing and using violence, and shed their old identities. Instead 
of longing back to their families, most of my informants started developing ties to 
each other and their commanders. Although this may seem a distorted development, 
it proves to be quite logical, as explained by Andvig and Gates (2007): “Children’s 
need for security, to have someone to love and respect may be—rather perversely 
many would feel—transferred to military commanders.” The majority of my 
informants expressed these feelings. Furthermore, they expressed feelings of loyalty, 
appreciation and belonging to the group. Looking at the fact that most of them were 
forcibly recruited, this indicates how powerful the processes of socialization have 
been within RENAMO and how extreme violence was a significant aspect of these. 
 
 
Organizational Socialization within the Mozambican National Resistance 
The previous section presented the first stages of socialization used by RENAMO in 
order to establish and remain a cohesive group. Violence, formal and informal 
socialization emerged as important factors in the creation of allegiance among child 
soldiers. This section further analyzes the dynamics of socialization present within 
the rebel group. It will particularly elaborate upon the norms, practices and 
preferences internalized by the group and hence on the inclusion of child soldiers 
within the group’s identity. The section will highlight how RENAMO sought to 
become an effective organization based on interest convergence and building bridges 
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within the group, leading to high levels of allegiance amongst its recruits.  
As elaborated upon in earlier chapters, socialization processes involve the 
transmission of information and values (Van Maanen, 1977). The six tactics of 
organizational socialization that teach new recruits skills and knowledge needed to 
take on an organizational role are analyzed in the following sections. Shedding light 
upon these six tactics in which new recruits are taught about desirable behavior and 
values, the next part of this chapter aims to provide a more detailed understanding of 
the socialization processes present within RENAMO. 
 
Collective Socialization 
To start with, collective socialization takes a group of new child recruits through a 
variety of common experiences such as military boot camp or training, in order for 
them to become loyal to the group, develop solidarity and start adopting a collective 
identity (Van Maanen, 1977). Applying this definition to RENAMO indicates that the 
military training of the rebel group was an example of collective socialization. After 
recruitment, physically capable children were sent to do military training. Although 
Minter (1989) states that training was mostly provided to male recruits between 12 
and 30–40 years old, field research resulted in different numbers. According to my 
informants children were mostly trained from the age of 9. One of them (13M3) 
explains: “Child soldiers were given training from 8 or 9, 10 years of age. The rebels 
trained a big group and gave them weapons and on the first training they focused on 
how to shoot. The rebels were not so technical as the regular military, we did not 
always have to march and salute. In training we learned the most important things: 
how to protect yourself, how to fight in cities or jungle, and different styles of combat 
discipline were taught. Most children were sent to the training camps for some 
months and then came to the base as trained men. But sometimes there was little 
time for training, because RENAMO were moving guerillas. We had a base, but 
tomorrow we could have to run for FRELIMO. We wanted to get as many people as 
possible to fight guerilla warfare so at the least they always made sure to quickly 
teach groups of children how to fight. We were always taught how to carry weapons in 
training. Sometimes we had three, because there were so many. Even all the children 
carried weapons.” 
Still, collective socialization is not without risks. As Van Maanen (1977) 
indicates it may provide a potential foundation for resistance among recruits and 
collective deviation. This is particularly due to the fact that recruits may experience 
similar problems while overcoming the boundary passages they are presented with, 
and in response search for solutions as a group. As a result, the likelihood of rebellion 
within a collectively socialized group is relatively high. As described in the section on 
extreme violence, RENAMO efficiently tackled this possibility by using violence 
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against deviating members and punishing them in public. This created fear amongst 
child recruits to be executed. According to Minter (1989), the fear of execution 
discouraged recruits to escape, as did the relocation to unknown territory, which was 
another strategy used by RENAMO. As explained by Young: “There is a hierarchical 
military organization which appears to have an effective command and control 
system. Camps are protected by manned control posts. Command structures are clear 
and normal military practices such as saluting officers are in use. New recruits, 
whether coerced or not, are sent for military training, under disciplined conditions, in 
areas some considerable distance from where they were first introduced into the 
organization” (1990:500). Relocating their recruits caused disorientation and 
dependency to the group, which discouraged escaping. Moreover, new recruits were, 
in addition to military training, provided with what was called a political education 
and training. This education was mainly used to prevent recruits from escaping and 
encourage them to fight for RENAMO instead. Commanders supervised the new 
recruits and monitored their developments to pick up any signs of deviation 
tendencies. These children were then immediately punished in public, and often 
killed. By setting these examples, RENAMO severely discouraged any potential 
rebellion in the collectively socialized groups.  
 
Formal Socialization 
In addition to collective socialization, RENAMO invested in formal socialization as 
well. This second tactic refers to new recruits being segregated from the other group 
members, while going through experiences that are particularly designed for 
potential new members (Van Maanen, 1977). This was an important aspect of 
RENAMO, as new recruits were kept in separate places compared to rebels who had 
been with the group for some time. As one of my informants (14F8) indicated: “We 
moved the entire night until we came to the base camp. We did not see the 
commander, they left us a little outside the base because they had a big area which 
they controlled. There were many children around that area, maybe about 150. They 
had many people in the base camp and civilians surrounding them. The civilians 
belonged to RENAMO but were just living a normal life, going to the fields and so on. 
We (the children) were kept in separate areas where we had training and education. 
Then when we had learned about the movement and knew how to fight, we were 
allowed to move to the base and stay with the other rebels.” This is supported by 
Minter (1989), who states that new recruits were kept away from RENAMO’s 
operational base, as they were placed in separate training bases during the 
completion of their military training. 
 Field research indicated that the segregation from regular members during a 
specific newcomer experience was very common for RENAMO. During the 
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segregation, child soldiers went through a set of experiences that had been especially 
designed for the new recruits. The experiences were intended to encourage their 
integration, teach them new roles, make them feel and think like RENAMO members, 
and to learn the correct attitude, value and protocols. During this period the newly 
recruited child soldiers were supervised and monitored on their personal 
development and commitment to the rebels. More senior rebels were allocated with 
the tasks of policing, surveying the area and reporting disobedience. This established 
an effective surveillance and spy network (Hall, 1990). Interviews indicated that rites 
de passage were crucial and served as part of the induction into RENAMO’s rebel 
ranks. Violence was an essential aspect of this and new recruits were reportedly held 
under gunpoint until they committed their first perpetrating act. They were 
threatened to be killed if they refused or tried to escape. As a means to become used 
to violence, blood and death, new recruits were often ordered to kill cows. When this 
process was completed, new recruits were allowed to move to the base. Still a 
hierarchical separation remained in place: commanders often lived in large houses in 
the center of the base, while regular soldiers lived in grass huts in the surrounding 
areas (Wilson, 1992). This was also the case for the civilian base, as noted by Roesch: 
“On all RENAMO bases, a rigid physical and hierarchical separation of the 
combatants from the civilian population is evident. Each group has its designated 
area where it lives and sleeps” (1992:471).  
 
Random Socialization 
RENAMO also used random socialization practices, the tactic which encompasses the 
ambiguous, unknown or changing order of actions that are required to achieve a 
certain organizational role or target (Van Maanen, 1977). Random socialization took 
place within RENAMO as there was no particular sequence of steps to be taken in 
order to achieve specific roles within the group. The group consisted of a clear 
hierarchy, yet there was no determined road to take to reach the top. For instance, 
field research indicated that some child soldiers achieved a rank while in comparison 
with others they had not been with RENAMO for the longest period of time; the 
achievement of ranks rather depended on a particularly active performance and on 
the personality of the child’s commander. However, even an active attitude did not 
guarantee child soldiers would be promoted. The distribution of ranks within 
RENAMO battalions varied significantly, indicating that commanders had a decisive 
role in the promotion of rebels and no comprehensive, organization-wide guidelines 
were followed.  
 Still, Manning claims that “it did not take much to rise to the prominence 
within the political-administrative structure of the movement, provided one had 
more than primary school education, a modicum of political savvy, and managed to 
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endure the initial hardships of life in the bush” (1998:175–176). This statement is 
supported by one of my informants (15M5): “Shortly after I joined RENAMO, I was 
promoted. I stayed in the base most of the time. What saved me was that I was going 
to grade 6. I could write and read, and that saved me. They needed literate people and 
asked ‘Who can write?’ I said I could. Three other children said they could write but 
they picked me. They said ‘you stay and register all people here. Control them, give us 
their names and age’. This saved me from going to combat many times. The other 
children were sent to go to combat or to loot food and other things outside the base, 
almost every day. Sometimes they stayed away for a whole week and then come back. 
I was lucky I did not have to join them. I never knew why they picked me over the 
other children who could write.” Given that these educated children were arbitrarily 
selected for organizational roles, indicates that RENAMO used random socialization 
techniques.   
 
Variable Socialization 
RENAMO also used the fourth tactic of organizational socialization: variable 
socialization processes. According to Van Maanen, these “give a recruit few clues as 
when to expect a given boundary passage” (1977:55). This type of socialization is most 
likely to lead to conformity, as new recruits are kept on the peak of anxiety and off 
balance. This makes it relatively easy for rebel commanders to socialize the new 
recruits, as they have nothing else to hold on to in their search for security. RENAMO 
frequently made use of this as it kept its child soldiers off balance almost all the time 
by creating variable situations. Field research revealed that child soldiers realized 
there was no security within the group; situations were sensitive to sudden change, 
implying it could always take a wrong turn and they could be killed at any given time. 
My informants indicated that the only sense of security they had was belonging to the 
group, the rest was highly variable and insecure. This resulted in a constant fear. 
 One of the reasons for the constant fear was that RENAMO systematically 
transferred its recruits away from familiar areas. “While a few may be kept in their 
area of origin to serve as local guides, almost all described marches of at least two 
days from the point of capture to the training base. Most reported being transferred 
to other bases immediately after training, or sometimes before. With very few 
exceptions, they were posted as soldiers in districts other than their home districts, 
and some to other provinces.” Moreover, military units were described as “very mixed 
in origin, and said they were not with people who they had known at home or who 
had been trained with them” (Minter, 1989:6). My informants stated RENAMO 
created these variable situations in order to make it very difficult for recruits to 
escape. Most of my informants had indeed been taken to unfamiliar areas and 
separated from their families. As one of them (8F5) said: “I was taken away to an area 
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I had never been before. It was far from home and I knew no one there. I was very 
scared because I was all alone and nobody told me what was going to happen. I saw 
the people getting killed and the commander told me to obey to his orders, otherwise 
it would also happen to me. I wanted to cry because I did not know what to do, but 
there was nobody there to help me. The commander shouted I better stop crying, and 
that I was lucky he warned me. I just had to move with the group and be one of them 
to live.” During interviews, RENAMO commanders revealed that the creation of 
anxiety was a deliberate strategy as it would make new recruits dependent on the 
group, and the unfamiliar surroundings would prevent them from escaping. Manning 
further indicates that the relocations “helped prevent people from building up a 
power base in their home region from which they might challenge RENAMO 
authority” (1998:166). 
 Looking at Wilson’s argument, RENAMO had a clear interest to invest in 
variable socialization, also from the perspective of using violence. As Wilson argues, 
“to have the desired effect, ritualized violence should not be predictable or legitimated. 
It must remain beyond the realm of comprehension and hence the belief that it can be 
managed. It challenges the capacity of the ‘social order’ to encapsulate it, and 
ultimately provides a foundation for RENAMO to reconstruct an alternative set of 
power relations and norms” (1992:533). Variable socialization hence seemed 
particularly useful in providing the “glue” that kept the rebels together. 
 
Serial Socialization 
According to the definition of serial socialization (Van Maanen, 1977), senior 
RENAMO rebels would have served as role models for their new recruits, grooming 
them so they could assume similar roles within the group. As with the other rebel 
groups analyzed in this thesis, this was also the case for RENAMO. Senior RENAMO 
rebels taught child soldiers about fighting tactics and trained them in military skills. 
This prepared the children to eventually assume similar roles to those of their senior 
rebels. 
 Yet, there is more to this fifth tactic of organizational socialization. “Serial 
socialization is most likely to be associated with inclusionary boundary passages. This 
association results because to become a central member of any organizational 
segment normally requires that others consider one to be affable, trustworthy, and, of 
course, central as well. This is unlikely to occur unless these others perceive the 
newcomer to be, in most respects, similar to themselves. Recruits must at least seem 
to be taking those with whom they work seriously or risk being labeled deviant in the 
situation and hence not allowed across inclusionary boundaries” (Van Maanen, 
1977:62). In the case of RENAMO, child soldiers were ordered to start serving the 
goals of the rebels immediately after their recruitment. From that moment onwards, 
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their obedience and capacities were tested continuously. If they showed any 
disobedience, weakness, or were suspected of defiance, they were executed in front of 
the other rebels. In other words, they had to identify with and act as rebels while 
assimilating with the group in order to survive. If they managed to do so, this often 
led to improved living conditions, as noted by one of my informants (13F8): “We were 
all treated the same in the beginning, but later, when they found out who really 
supported RENAMO, these people were given better positions. If you were motivated, 
you could become very important and your life would be easier, you would even get 
your own servants and did not have to be at the frontline anymore.” The 
consequences of not assimilating were also well known, as indicated by another 
informant (10M3): “Some children never changed, they were always thinking about 
home and cried about their parents. The commanders got really tired of this. They 
said ‘if you don’t want to be a rebel, we cannot use you. We will finish you off and 
cook soup of your body’. This happened sometimes. Other children had to kill the 
complaining child and chop it into pieces. Then they would eat the soup to show they 
had become real RENAMO members to the commanders.” These accounts were just 
two of many indicating that serial socialization played an important role in the 
creation of allegiance among RENAMO child soldiers.  
 
Divestiture Socialization 
The final tactic of organizational socialization as elaborated by Van Maanen (2007) is 
divestiture socialization. These processes are rather rigorous as they deny the 
personal characteristics of the new recruit, aiming to build a new self-image that is in 
line with the identity and culture of the group. The construction of a new identity is 
generally based upon new assumptions that are derived from the recruit’s recognition 
that he or she is able to carry out certain acts that earlier seemed impossible (Van 
Maanen, 2007). As for child soldiers within RENAMO, divestiture socialization 
played a significant role. As an informant (11M7) explains: “The commanders tried to 
make children feel it was the best way to build a man by showing active behavior and 
following them. Being a man was very important. There were children who thought 
that kind of life was good. They said I want to be a lion of the forest, it was a 
philosophy they liked to follow, there was nothing else. So they were fighting active 
and then took initiative for attacks and killing. When we were children inside 
RENAMO, we could not compare our lives to life in the village anymore. We did not 
know what was good or bad. Normally, the old people in the community would 
educate us about life and how to live. Now we did not have those people around 
anymore, the only thing we saw and experienced was RENAMO. This led many 
children to believe it was right during the conflict and they did many things we had 
always learned were wrong.” 
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 Van Maanen notes that in extreme cases, new recruits must obey a strict set of 
rules, refrain from certain behavior and publicly degrade themselves and other 
people, while being isolated from their former friends and relatives who could 
support attempts to stick to the recruit’s old identity (Van Maanen, 1977). This was 
the case for RENAMO child soldiers as well, as they were forced to break family ties 
and/or even ordered to kill or violate family members. In addition, child soldiers 
were often moved to areas where they did not know anybody; they were isolated from 
their communities. This significantly contributed to the establishment of new 
identities. An informant (8F2) explains: “I was taken with six children from my 
school. When we reached the base, we were all separated and I myself since then was 
alone.” Another informant (11F6) states: “I was taken from my village with eight other 
children. One of the boys had to do something very bad. The rebels told him to use his 
mother. Then, when he was finished, he had to chop her fingers and the rebels 
smashed the baby. This boy was dead inside after that day. The rebels said he would 
be a good fighter and was now part of the RENAMO family, because his old family no 
longer existed.”  
 Furthermore, field research supported Van Maanen’s assumption that 
divestiture socialization processes are mostly seen when recruits first enter the group, 
or just before they reach important inclusionary boundaries for which a test of 
worthiness may have to be passed (1977). At the point of entry into RENAMO, child 
recruits were often ordered to violate their family and/or community members and 
they were relocated to unfamiliar areas as the rebels wanted to burn all their bridges 
with the past. Then, before child soldiers could become part of the military base, they 
had to finish their training, undertake the initiation ceremony, and prove they had 
assimilated with the group. 
 This highlights that “divestiture processes, in effect, remold the person and, 
therefore, are powerful ways for organizations and occupations to control the values 
of incoming members. It is such processes which lie at the heart of most professional 
training thus helping to explain why professionals appear to be so deeply and 
permanently socialized. For, once a person has successfully completed a difficult 
divestiture process and has constructed  something of a new identity based on the 
role to which the divestiture process was directed, there are strong forces toward the 
maintenance of the new identity” (Van Maanen, 1977:67). This clarifies why 
RENAMO used organizational socialization; it encouraged child soldiers to adopt new 
identities and become loyal to the group. Hence, it led to high levels of allegiance. 
These were further increased by the fact that most child soldiers adopted new names 
while they were part of RENAMO, often associating themselves with dangerous 
animals such as lions and crocodiles.  
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The findings elaborated upon in this section are supported by Boothby’s 
research, describing “how RENAMO socialized children into violence. Adults relied 
on physical abuse and humiliation as the main tools of indoctrination. In the first 
phase of indoctrination, RENAMO members attempted to harden the children 
emotionally by punishing anyone who offered help or displayed feelings for others, 
thus conditioning them not to conspire to question the group’s authority. Children 
were then encouraged to become abusers themselves. A progressive series of tasks— 
taking the gun apart and putting it back together, shooting rifles next to their ears to 
get them used to the sounds, killing cows—culminated in requests to kill unarmed 
human beings. Children were expected to assist adult soldiers without question or 
emotion. Those that resisted were often killed. Those that did well became junior 
“chiefs” or garnered other rewards such as extra food or more comfortable housing. 
Upon reaching the final stages of training, normally after their first murder, 
RENAMO marked the occasion with ceremonies that resembled traditional rites of 
passage. This process of mimicking traditional ceremonies appeared to be aimed at 
usurping children’s ties to their families, communities, and traditional ideas of right 
and wrong” (Boothby et al., 2006:157). 
Van Maanen’s theory of these six different processes of socialization claims 
that the tactics are interlinked and that their impact is a result of their mix, making 
the effects on new recruits cumulative. In addition, they might enhance or neutralize 
each other, depending on how they are used by the socializing agent. (1977). 
Analyzing the tactics used by RENAMO, one can indeed derive that these enhanced 
and reinforced each other. This ensured that new child recruits were subject to 
effective organizational socialization, which created allegiance, control, obedience, 
loyalty, motivation and resilience to RENAMO. The next section will provide a more 
detailed analysis of socialization processes within RENAMO and their effects. 
 
 
RENAMO Socialization: A Threefold Analytical Challenge 
As done in the previous case study chapters as well, Checkel’s (2005) theory on the 
threefold analytic challenge will be used in this section to further reveal socialization 
processes used within RENAMO. The exact mechanisms used by RENAMO will be 
identified and an analysis of the different types of internalization among RENAMO 
child soldiers will be provided. This will eventually reveal whether socialized 
RENAMO child soldiers demonstrated different behavior. This threefold analysis will 
provide a clear overview of the effects and consequences of socialization within 
RENAMO. It will reveal whether a shift occurs away from a logic of consequences and 
toward a logic of appropriateness. 
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Socialization Mechanisms Present within RENAMO and the Conditions of Their 
Operation 
Field research and extensive literature reviews revealed that socialization has been a 
truly efficient tool to engage child soldiers with RENAMO. As explained before, in 
comparison to adults, children are generally considered vulnerable, naïve and 
susceptible to outside influences. This enabled RENAMO to teach children to become 
part of the group and create a sense of belonging while they were growing up with the 
rebels. Socialization was a key aspect of this process and, as already introduced in the 
previous section, a variety of socialization mechanisms were used to achieve this. To 
indicate these, this section will address the following question: which socialization 
mechanisms were present within RENAMO and what were the conditions of their 
operation? 
 As done in previous chapters, Grusec and Hasting’s (2007) definition will be 
used in order to answer which socialization mechanisms were present within 
RENAMO and under which conditions they operated. Their definition of socialization 
“refers to processes whereby naive individuals are taught the skills, behavior patterns, 
values and motivations needed for competent functioning in the culture in which the 
child is growing up. Paramount among these are the social skills, social 
understandings, and emotional maturity needed for interaction with other 
individuals to fit in with the functioning of social dyads and larger groups. 
Socialization processes include all those whereby culture is transmitted from each 
generation to the next, including training for specific roles in specific occupations” 
(2007:13). Using a combination of this definition and Checkel’s (2005) theory as a 
starting point, I will analyze which skills, behavior patterns, values and motivations 
were taught to child soldiers within RENAMO. Additionally, I highlight the methods 
used to achieve this. 
 
Skills 
Socialization processes are designed to transmit culture from each generation to the 
next. This is often achieved by training for particular roles in specific occupations 
(Grusec and Hastings, 2007). Within RENAMO, training was certainly important. 
Whether recruited by force or not, RENAMO child soldiers who were physically 
considered capable to fight received military training. This was generally from the age 
of nine. They were relocated to specific training bases where they were taught a wide 
range of combat skills. They learned how to use arms and ammunition, lay land 
mines, operate according to specific strategies and tactics, and how particular targets 
should be approached. According to Roesch RENAMO child soldiers were most often 
used to attacks civilian targets. He states: “after undergoing basic military training—
which involves a high degree of physical and psychological deprivation—older 
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children are integrated into separate military units under the command of adult 
combatants. These child units are used primarily in attacks against civilian targets 
and in resupply missions for the bases, and only rarely in direct combat with 
Mozambican government forces” (Roesch, 1992:472). In addition to roles as 
combatants, RENAMO child soldiers were often used for looting food and clothing, 
cooking, cleaning, registration, porterage, herding cattle, guarding the civilian 
population to prevent escapes, spying and patrolling. Senior rebels and people in the 
civilian base taught them skills related to their responsibility. Training for these 
skills, was less strict and intense compared to the military skills taught in separate 
training bases. Still, these children remained under strict supervision as their 
performance and skills were continuously observed by their seniors. A select group of 
child soldiers was used for medical aid purposes and was taught skills to perform as 
nurses who would care for RENAMO’s wounded. However, in the division of tasks, 
commanders and other senior rebels made sure child soldiers were allocated with 
responsibilities that were in line with their capabilities. Hence, they aimed for 
maximum performance of the group.  
 
Behavioral Patterns 
Newly recruited child soldiers immediately became subject to RENAMO’s strict rules 
that determined behavioral patterns within the group. They were taught a specific set 
of rules to ensure they would behave correctly, which, according to Weinstein (2007), 
is necessary for maintaining internal discipline and hence essential for the survival of 
a rebel group. Structures of internal control enable the realization of disciplined 
behavior. The top commanders and leadership designed general rules for their 
recruits, that had to be obeyed. For instance, all child soldiers had to obey their 
superiors, fulfill their responsibilities and stay with the group. None of the RENAMO 
rebels were allowed to mingle with civilians. They were held in isolated bases, as their 
commanders feared that tactics would be revealed to the enemy. This, in combination 
with other strict laws regarding the interaction with the population, allowed 
RENAMO commanders to keep a tight grip on their rebels and simultaneously 
envelop the group in a powerful mystique (Wilson, 1992). 
Still, field research indicated that each base had additional rules in place. This 
suggests that the base commanders had a certain freedom in leading their group and 
had a personal influence on the behavior of their recruits. This could partly explain 
why the reputation and behavior of the rebels varied across the regions of 
Mozambique. Here are some examples of rules indicated by my informants: 
• RENAMO members were forbidden to leave the movement 
• Discussions about and attempts to escape were forbidden 
• Rebels should continue fighting until all RENAMO’s goals were achieved  
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• The rebels should ensure that FRELIMO stopped humiliating the population 
and fight until all the people of Mozambique were equal 
• Girls were not allowed in the military base during their menstruation 
• Combatants could not have sex before or during battles 
• Rebels always had to bring something back to the base from an operation or 
mission 
• Each rebel knew what his or her tasks were and had to fulfill these  
• Any form of defecting was prohibited and RENAMO spirits would kill the 
defector 
• Every rebel on the base was responsible for fighting 
• It was forbidden to betray the movement 
• It was forbidden to pass information from the base to other people 
• All orders from the commanders and RENAMO leadership had to be followed 
• The rebels had to show confidence in everything they did 
• Rebels had to loot what they could, nothing should be wasted 
• Rebels had to fulfill their missions: only then they could return 
• Rebels should never give their guns to others, as the guns were RENAMO 
property 
• When rebels reached a community, they had to tell them what they wanted 
and get it from them; otherwise their stomachs would get problems 
• Rebels were prohibited from sleeping with girls 
• Male rebels were not allowed to have relationships with women, unless the 
commander had explicitly appointed or approved a woman 
• The spirits always had to be respected 
• If rebels did not fully respect spirit mediums, a spell would be cast on them.   
 
Values 
As indicated by the last two rules and earlier sections of this chapter, spiritual values 
were of great significance within RENAMO. This already started with the 
establishment of RENAMO bases. When an area was selected, RENAMO visited the 
traditional land chiefs “in order to consult with, and seek the support of, the chief’s 
ancestral spirits, who are deemed the legitimate ‘owners’ of the land” (Roesch, 
1992:472). Only then a base could be established. On the all the bases, honoring 
spirits remained an important aspect of the RENAMO culture and was part of the 
daily lives of the rebels. On an individual basis, RENAMO rebels often carried out 
ceremonies and spiritual offerings for their household spirits and asked them to 
provide protection (Schafer, 2001). The importance of honoring spirits is further 
stressed by Roesch: “no major decisions, and especially no military decisions, are ever 
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undertaken without a prior consultation with the spirits” (1992:472). Thus, the spirits 
and ancestors of Matsangaissa, RENAMO’s first leader, were often consulted by the 
rebels for guidance and assistance (Roesch, 1992). Field research further indicated 
that if RENAMO members did not respect these spirits, it was commonly believed 
that these rebels would die. Almost all of my informants acknowledged these beliefs, 
and indicated that they adopted these values. 
 Simultaneously, traditional spirit mediums played a significant role within 
RENAMO. Field research indicated that each base had spirit mediums associated 
with it. The mediums were treated well and respected by the RENAMO rebels, who 
would visit them when ill and consult them before every battle. These findings are 
supported by Wilson (1992). The mediums were “magically protecting RENAMO 
bases, making them invisible to FRELIMO soldiers, ‘vaccinating’ RENAMO 
combatants to make them bullet-proof, identifying witches amongst the civilian 
population and captives contemplating flight. All residents on RENAMO bases are 
obliged to participate on a regular basis in such religious ceremonies—ceremonies in 
which the ancestral spirits ideologically legitimate RENAMO’s war against 
FRELIMO” (Roesch, 1992:472). These ceremonies were believed to have significant 
effects on child soldiers as well, as the spiritual mediums would ensure that (new) 
recruits would be looked after by protective spirits. Their protection would be 
enhanced by magical charms: rebels would be protected against bullets, believe they 
could transform them into water, become invisible or even fly. It was also believed 
that recruits fought better if they were protected by spiritual mediums. In order to 
complete their protection rebels often drank goat blood before going to battle. Also, 
spirit mediums required the organs of babies to make protective medicine (Roesch, 
1992).   
 The strong spiritual beliefs indicate that spirit mediums became important 
parts of the lives of RENAMO rebels. Roesch supports this: “RENAMO forces treat 
this whole traditional religious discourse as an integral part of the struggle and as the 
central element of the movement’s mobilization ideology” (1992:474). It was 
commonly believed among my informants, that those who did not pay respect to 
spirit mediums and those who were disobedient, would be put under a spell and die. 
Respect was also a key feature within the general hierarchy of the rebel group. 
Dhlakama was leading a strongly hierarchical organization, in which all the rebels 
had to pay respect to their superiors. Disobedience and disrespect were punished 
immediately and strongly discouraged. Child soldiers were monitored if they behaved 
according to these values, and most of my informants recalled adopting the values as 
they melted into the group.  
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Motivations 
A combination of positive as well as negative incentives was used to create a cohesive 
core and allegiance among RENAMO’s child soldiers. Most rebels “understood the 
reasons for the war, but some had different ideas about the objectives: ‘Some thought 
RENAMO was just going to kill FRELIMO. But the Commissars taught that that 
wasn’t the way—the goal was to eliminate the existing system, to make FRELIMO 
accept its errors and abandon its ways’” (Manning, 1998:177). Although most of my 
informants had been recruited by force and captured during attacks, some indicated 
they believed in the purpose RENAMO was fighting for and therefore joined the 
movement. Others were promised scholarships, jobs, education and money, which 
motivated them to join the rebels. Besides that, RENAMO was often seen as an 
opportunity to escape the despair and frustration of rural daily life. Geffray also 
argues this: “In truth the recruits simultaneously escape the retrograde constraints of 
domestic life and the contempt and lack of trust of local lineage notables and party 
and administrative officials. All the authorities that had blocked their destiny, who 
deprived them of a future and reduced to nothing their hopes of satisfying their social 
aspirations, suddenly disappeared from the horizon immediately after the first few 
days of capture” (1991:76). This account is supported by Hanlon (1984), who states 
that press-ganged recruits were induced to stay within the group due to the 
excitement the experienced as a rebel. Their life had improved in comparison to the 
poor and dull life in the Mozambican countryside. Schafer provides a similar 
statement: “former guerrilla accounts included a combination of resignation, lack of 
alternatives, the possibility of gaining access to survival goods, and an element of 
political conviction which was not insignificant. They emphasized feelings of 
deprivation from being away from their families and normal life, although at the 
same time they expressed some excitement at the new life” (2001:236). 
 Moreover, Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995) argue that the majority of 
RENAMO recruits were people with lower education levels and living standards than 
average. This is explained by the fact that these people were often too poor to flee 
their communities, which made them more vulnerable and hence more likely to 
become subject to RENAMO attacks. The researchers also found that RENAMO’s 
most loyal recruits in terms of years spent with the group, were people who had the 
least education and those who had been worst off economically before the conflict 
(1995:90). This supports the indications that were confronted during field research: 
namely that RENAMO commanders predominantly, yet not alone, encouraged the 
recruitment of children, youth and the poor. Children seemed particularly interesting 
targets, as it was almost certain they had little education, which would make them 
more likely to become loyal to the group. 
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 Although the researchers mainly highlight motivations to join the rebels, 
motivations to stay with the rebels were equally important. During RENAMO’s early 
years, these had often been the salaries paid by the Rhodesians (Schafer, 2001), and 
South Africans (Minter, 1989). However, this changed when support dried up and 
RENAMO had little to offer their recruits. Manning indicates several motivating 
factors that contributed to the decision to stay with RENAMO during later periods. 
These were amongst others: “fear and the risks of deserting (this included not only 
the fear that they would be killed or punished for running away from RENAMO, but 
that if they returned they would be viewed suspiciously by FRELIMO); the appeal of a 
lifestyle free of conventional constraints, or perhaps more importantly, the freedom 
to take on a new identity and wipe clean the slate of the past; genuine dissatisfaction 
with the FRELIMO government, or conflicts with particular local officials; and 
finally…the opportunity for socioeconomic advancement” (1998:174). 
 These motivations were all suggested during interviews with my informants, 
who stated that they contributed to the development of ties to and within the rebel 
group. Many informants were convinced that if RENAMO would win the war, they 
would be provided with jobs, education and money. Promises were hence a 
significant motivating factor for child soldiers. Others stated they were motivated to 
remain with the rebels because they had no other opportunities, because they had 
obtained a rank, or because the commanders threatened to execute them if they tried 
to leave. Another one (9M12) said: “The situation in the group was better compared 
to life as a civilian. I always thought the rebels had no food and clothes, but when I 
joined they offered me food, clothes and shelter. I had many things during the war 
that I could never get at home. I also got a rank, so I was sure I wanted to stay. My life 
was easier and better in the bush.” Interviews often indicated that child soldiers 
remained with RENAMO due to the fact that their guns gave them power and control, 
and their access to free, looted goods. They often came from impoverished families 
and had no prospects for better futures. This transformed many RENAMO child 
recruits into determined soldiers. However, it should be noted that during interviews 
with my informants it became apparent that the provision of goods and power 
depended on the position of the rebel in question. Higher ranking child soldiers 
would receive much more compared to low-ranking children; they would receive 
supplies only sporadically. The motivations of child soldiers for remaining with 
RENAMO thereby varied. 
    
Means of Teaching 
According to Grusec and Hastings’ (2007) definition, social skills, social 
understandings and emotional maturity among child soldiers would be of essential 
value for the interaction with fellow group members and necessary to fit in with the 
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functioning of RENAMO. Different means of teaching were used within RENAMO to 
achieve this. Fear was an important aspect to encourage internal discipline. As 
explained by one of my informants (12F4): “When the enemy started shooting at us I 
was very scared. I remember I was trembling and I wanted to cry. But then the 
commander shouted at me that I had to shoot or he would kill me. And so I did start 
shooting, and I was proud of myself. I was no longer afraid.” Although the 
commander of this girl soldier only threatened with execution in this case, actual 
punishment represented a significant means of teaching as well. Whenever child 
soldiers would disobey, showed a lack of motivation or showed other undesirable 
behavior, RENAMO commanders would be quick to punish them. The types of 
punishment varied: “one of the most important controls is the threat of execution or 
other severe punishment” (Minter, 1989:5). Although (the threat of) execution 
seemed most common within RENAMO, various other types of punishment were 
mentioned by my informants. Predominant were imprisonment, torture, beatings 
and starvation. When rebels were sent to prison, this often implied they were kept in 
a hole in the ground or a hut. Interviews revealed they were usually deprived of food 
in these circumstances and some of them remained tied up for 100 days in a row.  
 Field research indicated that punishments were carried out in public, as to set 
an example for other rebels not to misbehave. Victims of punishment were often 
mutilated with machetes, axes or the bayonet of a rebel’s gun. The witnesses to the 
punishment were often explicitly told that the same faith would await them if they 
disobeyed RENAMO rules. Young support this: “Internal discipline is harsh and 
brutal and punishment is exemplary, knives or axes being preferred to firearms” 
(1990:500). One of my informants (16M2) said about the punishments: “The 
punishment was too bad. If you were lucky you would only be deprived of food. But if 
you were unlucky…this was better avoided. They would beat you, kill you. Human 
rights don’t matter in this situation, it was full on war and rules do not apply, only 
those of the rebels. Everybody knew the rules. If you break them, you be punished. 
Always in public, same with the rewards, to set examples for other people with good 
or bad ideas and teach us.” 
 As indicated by this boy soldier, rewards, although rather limited, also played a 
role within RENAMO. Commanders taught their child recruits that they would be 
rewarded if they showed “big men” behavior. This was particularly done to encourage 
active engagement with the group and provided children with incentives to stay with 
the group. For instance, if child soldiers managed to loot a substantial amount of 
goods, caught high ranking enemies or won important battles, celebrations were 
often organized. The rebels would dance, sing, eat and drink together during these 
occasions. Another type of reward was obtaining a rank. In most battalions, ranks 
were solely provided to skilled child soldiers who kept demonstrating their 
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engagement with RENAMO, had a pro-active attitude and took their responsibilities 
as given by their superiors. In fact, the rebels had not much to offer their child 
soldiers. “In the absence of any rewards in the leadership’s gift—other than the 
guerillas’ access to a gun, loot, and a relatively well-organized system of first aid—
violence is probably the most effective and cheapest means to obtain obedience 
within the ranks, and outside it” (Hall, 1990:54). Hence, to add to their means of 
teaching, Dhlakama organized for his rebels to be briefed about the struggle. Field 
research indicated that the rebel leader would hold occasional speeches or spoke on 
the radio, teaching the rebels about RENAMO’s purpose and the Mozambican 
situation. These were obligatory, political meetings and all child soldiers were 
ordered to listen how Dhlakama tried to motivate them by saying they were fighting 
for capitalism and free lives in the bush. Using a combination of the means of 
teaching described here, RENAMO aimed to ensure that their child soldiers became 
competent in functioning as full members of the group. The broader analysis 
provided in this section indicates that in addition to teaching, a wide variety of 
socialization mechanisms were present and operated by the rebels. 
 
The Achievement of Internalization Type I and II 
 As addressed earlier, Checkel (2005) states that socialization leads to Type I or 
II internalization. The first type refers to “learning a role—acquiring the knowledge 
that enables them to act in accordance with expectations—irrespective of whether 
they like the role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially 
accepted in a given setting or community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, 
means simply that conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious 
role playing” (2005:804). “On the other hand, following a logic of appropriateness 
may go beyond role playing and imply that agents accept community or 
organizational norms as “the right thing to do.” We call this Type II 
internalization/socialization, and it implies that agents adopt the interests, or even 
possibly the identity, of the community of which they are part. Conscious 
instrumental calculation has now been replaced by “taken-for-grantedness”” 
(Checkel, 2005:804). This section will use these definitions in order to address the 
following question: did internalization, Type I or II, actually occur within RENAMO? 
 In-depth interviews with my 65 informants revealed that internalization Type I 
and II were both achieved by child soldiers within RENAMO. Whether Type I or II 
was achieved, seemed to depend on several factors. One of these was age: as with the 
LRA, most children abducted at a particularly young age (under 12 years old) were 
most likely to achieve Type II internalization while they were part of RENAMO. 
Whereas this could partly be explained by their lack of socialization experiences as a 
civilian and the fact that they grew up learning to believe RENAMO was doing the 
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right thing, Geffray argued about these young recruits: “they become aware that they 
are not captives like the others, that they are not submitted to the authority of captors 
who intend to reduce them to a servile condition, but, on the contrary, to men whose 
intention is to make of them (the youths) their peers and equals. They become 
conscious of the possibility of being integrated into an independent social milieu, 
completely new and very special—an army in battle” (1991:76). This explanation 
seems a valid point, as several of my informants expressed similar experiences. 
Several male and female informants stated they realized that if they cooperated with 
their commanders, their situations would improve and they would receive benefits 
instead of punishment. While most continued their cooperation for several years, this 
eventually made them adopt the identity of a RENAMO member: it was the new 
family they belonged to. Honwana (2007) explains this as tactical agency. She argues 
that, in order to cope with the immediate circumstances of the war, child soldiers 
exercised tactical agency. This was clearly seen during field research. As one 
informant (9F6) said: “I had to carry on with my life and needed protection. So I 
decided to become a rebel, because then they would take care of me.”  
 For some of my informants it seemed not difficult to achieve Type II 
internalization, as they had volunteered to join RENAMO. As one of my informants 
(14M7) said: “When the rebels attacked my town, I joined them. I wanted to join 
RENAMO because I agreed with their politics. Our country had to change and joining 
them was the way forward. My parents agreed so I went fighting for my people. I 
never wanted to escape. FRELIMO has mistreated us, and I wanted revenge. I want to 
change the system and with RENAMO we were working for a better country.” Still, 
Type I internalization was common too, as noted by another informant (11F5): “I 
decided to fight active, because then we would win and I could go back home. The 
base never felt like home. I did my duties so the commander would not beat me, but I 
missed my mother.”  
 As was also the case within the LRA, gender did seem to play a significant role 
in whether internalization Type I or II was achieved. Field research revealed that this 
was mainly due to the additional violence girls faced while they were part of 
RENAMO. Whereas all child soldiers were frequently confronted with extreme 
violence, girls were also raped often. This could be an explanation why, among my 
informants, girl soldiers typically reached internalization Type I. They often 
complained about the sexual violence they endured, which made them want to leave 
the movement. This was especially the case for girls who were repeatedly (gang) 
raped by different men and forced into loose sexual relationships. The experience of 
my female informants who had married a commander within RENAMO was very 
different. These girls reported significant benefits and improvements, and became 
part of the movement more easily. One of them (10F13) said: “When I was 12, I 
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married a commander in the bush. We had two children together and developed a 
good relationship. I was very lucky because I was no longer used by other men when I 
was with him, he took care of me and we started a family. I forgot about life in the 
village, because now I had my own family. I stayed for 13 years and RENAMO was my 
own life.” The difference in these accounts indicates that (gang) rape is very likely to 
have played a determining role regarding the internalization of girl soldiers. 
 The benefits child soldiers experienced when they became part of RENAMO 
often accelerated internalization. As one of my informants (13M9) stated: “After I 
became a real part of RENAMO and behaved like a big man, I had many privileges I 
never knew. I had status, they called me commander, I had servants, I could have a 
wife, and my weapon gave me all the power I needed. I had become the superior to 
my community elders who had always dominated me. I feel I belonged to the group, I 
never wanted to leave anymore.” Another one (11M3) said: “My life with RENAMO 
was good, I had no problems and I was treated well. I was very poor before the war, 
but now I had food. I was proud when I was fighting, especially when I accomplished 
my missions, then we would sometimes celebrate.” 
 Even forced recruits reported the existence and/or development of a high 
morale while they were part of RENAMO. Roesch also explains this phenomenon: “A 
certain percentage of those kidnapped by RENAMO eventually come to accept this 
harsh and precarious existence and give up the idea of escape. Faced with the 
prospects of returning to the poverty, insecurity, and anomie of their former war-torn 
lives, the relative stability and subsistence security of a semi-nomadic, military life of 
pillage, of the sort offered by RENAMO, becomes preferable for many people” 
(1992:471). This argument is supported by Geffray: “the life of adventure and the 
exaltation of war was by far preferable to the insipidness of domestic life, and many 
must have considered the years they spent living in a bush camp, in the company of a 
submissive wife and their comrades-in-arms, to be the best hours of their lives” 
(1991:77). Although some of my informants spoke of comparable experiences, 
Geffray’s statement seems rather biased: it fails to include the negative experiences 
that child soldiers had, thereby giving a rather unbalanced view of RENAMO rebels.  
 Most of my informants achieved Type II internalization. That this was quite 
common is noted by Manning (1998), who describes how many RENAMO members 
who had initially been forced to join the movement, decided to stay affiliated when 
RENAMO transformed into a political party after the war. Although the majority of 
my informants were coerced into the movement, most of them expressed that they 
believed to be rightfully fighting against FRELIMO and were motivated to fight for 
the future of their country. As will be further elaborated upon in the next section, 
their internalization diminished only slowly once they returned to society, which led 
to significant challenges.  
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Socialized Actors Demonstrating Different Behavior 
 Do socialized actors behave differently than they did before they were 
socialized, or, than non-socialized actors do? Analyzing the outcomes of socialization 
processes within RENAMO, these proved highly effective. Child soldiers who had 
been socialized within RENAMO indeed demonstrated different behavior as 
compared to actors who had not been socialized by the rebels. Most of them 
portrayed violent behavior, even after they had left the rebel group, most likely due to 
the extreme violence they had become used to within RENAMO. As described in the 
previous section, child soldiers adapted their behavior while they were part of 
RENAMO. Behaving like a ‘big man’ and hence adopting the identity of a rebel 
enabled them to avoid punishment and become more likely to receive benefits. In 
melting into RENAMO, informants explained that this felt as if they became family 
members of the rebels. Most of them said that the longer they stayed with the group, 
the more loyal they became towards RENAMO. Analyses of their accounts and the 
lack of material rewards indicate that the thorough socialization processes within 
RENAMO had significant effects on child soldiers, even on those who had been 
forcibly recruited. The group efficiently transformed children into soldiers. 
 One can imagine that these developments had serious consequences when 
child soldiers left RENAMO. Showing great similarities to the outcomes of my own 
field research, Boothby’s study (2006) on RENAMO boy soldiers found that some 
boys kept acting as RENAMO commanders once they had left the group, ordering 
other children to do things and steal goods for them. Taking whatever they wanted 
had become normal to them, and they did not consider whether this would be right or 
wrong. They fought over many things yet over time their behavior started to 
normalize and they became more supportive and cooperative towards each other. 
With time, leadership dynamics changed and the former boy soldiers became a more 
cohesive group. Their aggressive behavior subsided and made place for social 
behavior. The amount of time the boys had spent with RENAMO had a significant 
influence on their adjustments. “In general, boys who spent six months or less with 
RENAMO (72 percent) appeared to emerge with their basic trust in human beings 
and social values more or less intact. Although all of these boys had been exposed to 
severe trauma, and some also had participated in abuse and violence, members of 
this group described themselves as victims rather than members of RENAMO” 
(Boothby et al., 2006:163). 
  Similar results were found during field research. My informants stated they 
had remained aggressive and violent for some time after the war had ended. How 
long this behavior lasted mainly depended on how long the child had been part of 
RENAMO. The research indicated that the longer child soldiers had been with the 
rebels, the more difficult it seemed for them to adjust to civilian life and show 
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according behavior. Children who had spent relatively short periods within RENAMO 
and reached internalization Type I, were relatively quick to leave their rebel behavior 
behind and re-adapt to the norms and values of their society. This was different for 
Type II internalization child soldiers who had started identifying themselves as 
members of RENAMO and assimilated their self-images to those of their 
commanders. As Boothby’s research (2006) also indicated, the children who had 
spent more time with RENAMO had gone through some serious changes. He writes 
about their rehabilitation: “They continued to exhibit disobedient and uncooperative 
behaviors during the first three months at the center. Despite their ability to 
articulate the belief that violence was wrong, these boys continued to use aggression 
as a principal means of exerting control and social influence.” One child stated that 
RENAMO used people “like animals to achieve its objectives. He stated that he 
thought this was wrong. The next afternoon, however, this same boy was observed 
beating up a smaller child because this child refused to steal food for him” (Boothby 
et al., 2006:164). My informants told similar accounts. During interviews they 
repeatedly stated that they slowly started realizing that violent behavior was not 
right. Still, they also stated that they continued their violent behavior, despite this 
realization. Only over time did their behavior become normalized.   
  As Boothby claims “there appears to be a child soldiering duration-of-time 
threshold that is correlated with individual well-being and social functioning 
outcomes” (Boothby et al., 2006:165). My own field research in Mozambique led to 
the same conclusion. The longer children stayed with RENAMO and were subject to 
the rebel socialization processes, the more and longer they suffered from behavioral 
problems and reintegration challenges. Also, the younger a child was at time of 
recruitment and the higher the rank a child soldier achieved, the more difficulties he 
or she faced when trying to leave the war behind. Almost all former child soldiers 
stated they had had aggressive, violent and disruptive behavior for certain periods of 
time. Many of them became addicted to alcohol and/or drugs and threatened the 
people around them. If they managed to find a job, which was often an incredible 
challenge due to their lack of education, it was often very difficult for them to stay 
employed, due to their violent behavior. These factors indicate that the behavior of 
socialized RENAMO child soldiers significantly differed from non-socialized actors. 
 In addition, many former child soldiers who were with RENAMO for several 
years found it frustrating that they lost their status after the war. Instead of being 
respected, they often felt stigmatized and isolated by their communities. Some of my 
informants said they still felt like members of RENAMO instead of civilians, and they 
often stayed together with other former rebels. All of my informants indicated that 
they have had thoughts and memories about traumatic experiences since they left 
RENAMO. As also found by Boothby (2006), some claimed the war was still going on 
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in their minds, preventing them from leading a normal life even though the war 
ended twenty years ago. As a result, most had demonstrated withdrawn and 
unpredictable behavior, and were suffering from violent mood swings. That the 
internalization which resulted from RENAMO’s socialization processes had far 
reaching consequences becomes clear when addressing the long-term effects: forty 
percent of my informants said they were still suffering from nightmares related to the 
war almost twenty years after the conflict had ended. This signals that the 
socialization within rebel groups needs to be thoroughly addressed when attempting 
to reintegrate former child soldiers into their communities. To enable an outlook on 
positive future prospects for former child soldiers, its effects need to be reversed. 
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Part III 
 
 
From In-Group Socialization  
To Reintegration 
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8 
Socialization within African Rebel Groups:  
A Comparison    
Effects, similarities and differences 
 
 
 The previous chapters have shown the characteristics and use of child soldiers 
by the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO. Each of these four African rebel groups is 
different and unique, yet there are many similarities regarding the socialization 
processes within the groups. Although little was known about socialization within 
rebel groups, the case study chapters revealed that these processes play a significant 
role in the creation of allegiance and prove to be an efficient tool for engaging 
children with these rebel organizations. The children were transformed into rebels 
after a sequence of socialization processes through which they learned to identify 
with the group. This chapter will compare the four rebel groups by highlighting the 
similarities and differences of their socialization mechanisms. Moreover, it will 
compare the effects that socialization processes have had within these rebel groups 
and analyze to what extent internalization type I or II was achieved. Ultimately, the 
chapter aims to provide an indication whether factors such as age, gender, 
motivations and the period spent within the rebel group have significant effects on 
the outcomes of socialization processes. 
 
Transforming Children into Soldiers 
The case study analyses show that socialization processes were essential mechanisms 
at work within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO. Socialization taught children 
recruited by these rebel groups how to become part of the group and created a sense 
of belonging. As many of these children grew up within the rebel groups, they 
eventually adopted the identity of the group. The case-study chapters have shown 
that various socialization mechanisms were used to achieve this. In each group, 
experiencing violence, as well as formal, informal and organizational socialization 
played distinctive roles in the transformation of children into soldiers. These 
processes often complemented, reinforced and enhanced each other, and their 
combination seemed to provide the glue that enabled the establishment of cohesive 
rebel groups. The following sections will illuminate and compare the socialization 
mechanisms present within the four rebel organizations. Here I will work on the basis 
of the definition offered by Grusec and Hastings: “socialization refers to processes 
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whereby naive individuals are taught the skills, behavior patterns, values and 
motivations needed for competent functioning in the culture in which the child is 
growing up. Paramount among these are the social skills, social understandings, and 
emotional maturity needed for interaction with other individuals to fit in with the 
functioning of social dyads and larger groups. Socialization processes include all 
those whereby culture is transmitted from each generation to the next, including 
training for specific roles in specific occupations” (2007:13). The skills, behavioral 
patterns, values, motivations and means of teaching within each of the rebel groups 
will be compared, providing an overview of the socialization effects on their child 
recruits. 
 To present some of the findings indicated during field research on the LRA, 
LURD, RUF, and RENAMO, the following tables reflect the outcomes of the 
interviews conducted with 261 former child soldiers and commanders related to these 
groups. Table 8.1 gives their average ages of recruitment and return to society, 
average periods spent within the rebel groups, and the percentages of DDRR 
participation. The distinctive outcomes for boy and girl soldiers are reflected in table 
8.2 and 8.3.  
 
Table 8.1 Overview field evidence. Total sample size: 261 
 
 
 Boys 
Sample 
Girls 
Sample 
Average 
recruit-
ment age  
Average 
time 
with 
rebels 
Average 
return 
age 
Average 
DDRR 
participation 
 
LRA – 
Uganda 
 
36 
 
30 
 
13.7 years 
 
4 years 
 
17.5 
years 
 
49.5% 
 
LURD – 
Liberia 
 
35 
 
30 
 
11.4 years 
 
2 years 
 
13.1 
years 
 
53.1% 
 
RUF – 
Sierra 
Leone 
 
34 
 
31 
 
12.3 years 
 
5.4 years 
 
17.6 
years 
 
47.3% 
 
RENAMO  
Mozam-
bique 
 
37 
 
28 
 
9.8 years 
 
7.4 years 
 
17.2 
years 
 
44% 
 
Total / 
Average 
 
142 
 
119 
 
11.8 
years 
 
4.7 
years 
 
16.4 
years 
 
48.5% 
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 Average 
recruitment 
age 
Average time 
with rebels 
Average 
return age 
Average 
DDRR 
participation 
 
LRA 
 
12.6 years 
 
5 years 
 
17.6 years 
 
43% 
 
LURD 
 
11.7 years 
 
1.9 years 
 
13.1 years 
 
43.3% 
 
RUF 
 
11.9 years 
 
5.2 years 
 
17.1 years 
 
38.7% 
 
RENAMO 
 
9.4 years 
 
7.1 years 
 
16.5 years 
 
39.3%  
 
Average 
 
11.4 years 
 
4.8 years 
 
16.1 years 
 
41.1% 
Table 8.2 LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO girl soldiers. Sample size: 119 
 
 Average 
recruitment 
age 
Average time 
with rebels 
Average 
return age 
Average 
DDRR 
participation 
 
LRA 
 
14.6 years 
 
2.9 years 
 
17.5 years 
 
56% 
 
LURD 
 
11 years 
 
2.1 years 
 
13.1 years 
 
62.9% 
 
RUF 
 
12.6 years 
 
5.5 years 
 
18.1 years 
 
55.9% 
 
RENAMO 
 
10.2 years 
 
7.6 years 
 
17.8 years 
 
48.6%  
 
Average 
 
12.1 years 
 
4.5 years 
 
16.6 years 
 
55.9% 
Table 8.3 LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO boy soldiers. Sample size: 142 
 
 Before we move on to a detailed analysis of the socialization processes, the 
following table shows certain differences and similarities regarding the 
characteristics of the rebel groups. The figures provided in this comparative overview 
are estimates based on a combination of field research and literature reviews, and 
provide an indication of the situation within the rebel groups. These are not to be 
interpreted as final and conclusive, as the actual percentages may have varied in 
reality. As explained before, it is unfortunately impossible to guarantee full accuracy 
of these numbers as the chaos of war has severely limited detailed recordings of child 
soldier involvement in each conflict. The fact that many child soldiers did not 
participate in DDRR programs yet quietly returned to society to lead anonymous 
lives, further jeopardized this. As a result, the exact number of child soldiers that 
have been involved with these rebel groups remains unknown. Still, with these 
numbers I aim to reflect the most realistic image possible at this stage, as they are 
based on thorough literature reviews and hundreds of eye witness accounts. 
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 LRA – 
Uganda 
LURD – 
Liberia 
RUF – 
Sierra Leone 
RENAMO – 
Mozambique 
Time period 1986—ongoing 1999—2003 1991—2002 1976—1992 
Structure Military Military Military Military 
Ideology Political/Spiritual Political Political Political/Spiritual 
Leader Joseph Kony Sekou Conneh Foday Sankoh Afonso Dhlakama 
Civilian support  Initially high, 
significantly 
decreased over 
time to no support 
Varied widely, 
little towards end 
of the war 
Initially high, 
significantly 
decreased over 
time 
Initially moderate, 
decreased over 
time. Regional 
differences  
Child soldier use Very high, 
deliberate 
High,  
deliberate 
Very high, 
deliberate 
High, deliberate 
Youngest recruit 7 years 4 years 7 years 5 years 
Recruitment 
methods 
Predominantly 
forced, some 
voluntary  
Voluntary, partly 
forced 
Voluntary and 
forced 
Voluntary and 
forced 
Incentives 
 
Predominantly 
fear 
Varied widely Varied widely Varied widely 
Civilian violence 
 Sexual 
 Punishment 
 Torture 
 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Started moderate, 
increased to 
severe towards the 
end of the war 
 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Varied from 
moderate to 
severe, depending 
on region 
In group violence 
 Sexual 
 Punishment 
 Torture 
 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
 
Limited 
Severe 
Severe 
 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Brutality Severe Extreme Extreme Severe 
Child soldier / 
adult ratio 
Estimates range 
from 22 to 80 
percent children 
Estimates range 
from 53 to 70 
percent children 
Estimates range 
from 50 to 80 
percent children  
Estimates range 
from 27 to 40 
percent children 
Boy / girl soldier 
ratio 
Estimated 
between 60/40 and 
70/30 percent 
Estimated 
between 60/40 and 
70/30 percent 
Estimated between 
60/40 and 70/30 
percent 
Estimated between 
65/35 and 80/20 
percent 
Drug/alcohol use Low Very high High High 
Discipline Very high 
throughout the 
conflict 
Initially high, 
significantly 
decreased towards 
end of the conflict 
High throughout 
the conflict 
High throughout 
the conflict 
Exit Death, rescue or 
desertion 
Death, end of war Death, end of war 
desertion 
Death, end of war, 
desertion 
Table 8.4 A Comparison of African rebel groups and child soldier use 
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Formal and Informal Socialization 
As shown in the case-study chapters, formal and informal socialization were 
significant aspects of each of the rebel groups, aiming to bring about the re-birth of 
children as soldiers. These types of socialization started immediately after the 
recruitment of child soldiers. Military and ideological training was a main aspect of 
formal socialization. Although the extent and intensity varied, military training of 
child soldiers was used within all the groups. LURD did make exceptions to this 
towards the end of its struggle, as children were recruited on the spot and were 
expected to start fighting straight away without being trained. There was simply no 
time or opportunity to invest in training. Within all the groups, military training 
seemed rather basic. Children were generally taught how to handle certain weapons 
and how to shoot, and sometimes learned about military tactics and strategies.  
 Additional training was provided to RENAMO, RUF, and LRA child soldiers 
who were assigned with particular responsibilities, such as medical staff. This implies 
that, compared to the other groups, training within LURD was most basic. A logical 
explanation for this may be the relative short life span of the group and the high 
intensity of fighting during their existence, not allowing much time for (additional) 
training of their recruits. Ideological and political training was less common than 
military training but still seemed to be provided by the LRA and RENAMO on a quite 
regular base. RUF informants even stated that all of the recruits were provided with 
ideological training. During these trainings the rebel leader or senior commanders 
would usually preach about the reasons to fight and objectives to reach. All the rebel 
groups that provided ideological training stressed the marginalization of the 
population during such meetings. Spiritual beliefs would also often be highlighted 
during these occasions  
 Informal socialization played a role within each of the rebel groups as well. 
Initiation rituals and ceremonies are examples of these. Within all four rebel 
organizations, initiation rituals were conducted to confirm new recruits as members 
of the group. These rituals were often similar to traditional rites of passage and were 
designed to instill a sense of belonging to the group among new recruits. Interviews 
revealed that within each of these groups, the rituals allowed for the ‘re-birth’ of 
children and transformation into soldiers. They severed the family ties of the child 
and symbolized the start of a new life with a new family: the rebel group. Besides that, 
war and victory songs were used to instill a common sense of identity among the 
rebels. Child soldiers were obliged to participate and it seemed as if the pressure of 
the group eventually contributed to making them feel part of the rebels. Overall, 
formal and informal socialization were important means to involve new recruits with 
the rebel groups as they established the foundations that enabled all four 
organizations studied here to become cohesive units.  
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Experiencing Violence 
Experiencing extreme violence is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the lives of 
child soldiers. Besides that, it is the most obvious similarity between LRA, LURD, 
RUF, and RENAMO child soldiers. The profound effects that these experiences 
exerted on children within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO is sharply illustrated 
by their allegiance to these groups. Field research revealed that children within the 
different groups had comparable experiences and numerous parallels were indicated. 
All of my informants stated to have witnessed and suffered violence, and most of 
them had executed violence during their stay with the LRA, LURD, RUF or 
RENAMO. Most of the children who had been forcibly recruited were continuously 
exposed to violence, starting during their recruitment. Within each of the rebel 
groups, violence was used to burn the bridges with the child’s family and past. 
However, RENAMO made some exceptions to this, sometimes keeping entire families 
together in the base. By contrast, the LRA, RUF, and LURD expected all of their 
recruits to break family ties. Life as these children once knew it was supposed to be 
left behind, and the rebels sought to erase their memories and civilian identities. 
Violence and the threat of execution were important tactics for achieving this.  
 Those children who chose to join the groups were generally exposed to 
violence once they reached the military base. They were trained to use violence and 
witnessed violence during the frequent public punishments and combat. Children 
who tried to escape the rebels were killed in front of the other child recruits, or the 
child recruits were ordered to kill the escapee themselves to prove they did belong to 
the group. Contrary to what might be expected, such violence resulted in allegiance 
among the child soldiers within each of these rebel groups, whether they had been 
recruited by force or not. The constant exposure to violence made all constraints 
disappear and children changed their behavioral patterns towards the demands of the 
group they belonged to. In order to encourage compliance to the group, experiencing 
violence continued during the entire stay with the rebels. Field research indicated 
that these processes were similar in each of the groups: within the LRA, LURD, RUF, 
and RENAMO experiencing violence was an integral part of socialization and it 
resulted in strong hierarchical organizations. In addition, violence against civilians 
was an important aspect of the behavior of each of these rebel groups: the longer the 
wars raged on, the more brutal the violence exercised by the rebel groups seemed to 
become. Just like the RUF, LRA and LURD, “RENAMO destructiveness has 
progressed beyond any reasonable strategic goal and reduced the rural areas to 
economic devastation and social breakdown” (Hall, 1990:59). This may imply that 
socialization normalized violence to such an extent, that there were no limits to its 
use anymore. 
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Organizational Socialization 
Organizational socialization played a role within each of the rebel groups as well. The 
case studies revealed that each rebel group used the six tactics of organizational 
socialization as defined by Van Maanen (1977). Firstly, child soldiers within the LRA, 
LURD, RUF, and RENAMO became subject to collective socialization, as they were 
trained in groups. Each of the rebel groups discouraged collective deviation by 
installing a large set of rules and a tight supervision system. If any signs of deviation 
were discovered, the rebels would publicly punish the suspected child in order to set 
an example for the other children not to misbehave or try to escape. In each case, this 
was highly effective as relatively few children escaped and allegiance to the group was 
established instead due to this socialization process of which fear was an important 
aspect.  
 Formal socialization took place through the segregation of new child recruits 
from rebels who were already considered to be full members of the groups. 
Segregation seemed to be particularly strict within the LRA and RENAMO as child 
recruits were often sent to special training camps that were separated from the 
military base. Within the RUF, and LURD new recruits were also separated from 
senior recruits as they stayed in different areas, yet they often remained within the 
same base. In all cases, the segregation was used to teach new recruits about the 
correct attitudes and values that were related to their new role as a rebel. During 
segregation all children were supervised and their developments were closely 
monitored so commanders could judge when they were ready to become full 
members. In each group children were generally allowed to join the senior rebels only 
once they had proved themselves. Although these were the general patterns indicated 
during field research, there were exceptions to these rules. Looking at LURD for 
instance, some children were recruited just before or during combat and there were 
no opportunities to train or segregate them. These children were often instructed to 
join the struggle straight away and hence skipped the collective and formal 
socialization that the majority of child soldiers underwent. 
 Random socialization took place within each of the groups as well. This was 
usually reflected in the division of ranks. Particularly within the LRA, RUF, and 
RENAMO, the sequence of steps leading to obtaining a rank was ambiguous and 
subject to change. Some rebels could stay with the groups for years without ever 
being promoted, while relatively new recruits could obtain a rank. Promotions often 
depended on the character of the child’s commander, were influenced by the various 
situations the rebel group found itself in. There were no given criteria that needed to 
be passed before a rank could be achieved. This indicates that the promotional 
systems within the groups were rather fluid. This was also the case within LURD, yet 
LURD rebels were often also promoted based on the length of service, age or previous 
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experience. This was generally not the case within the other rebel groups, indicating 
that their random socialization of child soldiers was even stronger.  
 Variable socialization seemed to be used in rather similar ways within each of 
the rebel groups. Maximum anxiety was created among child soldiers in order to keep 
them off balance and encourage allegiance to the group. Given the chaos of war, the 
only sense of security these children had was the rebel group, and within that the 
protection of their commanders. Most children were taken far away from home and 
had to march two or three days through dense jungle to reach the rebel base camp. 
These areas were unfamiliar to them, which led to disorientation and confusion. 
There was generally no chance to escape and thus these children considered 
becoming a member of the group as their only option for survival. However, within 
the groups, circumstances were susceptible to change and highly volatile as well. The 
child soldiers had to be alert constantly and consciously act according to the laws 
installed by the rebels. If not, they risked severe punishment or execution, and thus 
variable socialization encouraged them to become allegiant to the group. Former 
child soldiers of each of the groups reported these feelings and situations during 
interviews, indicating that variable socialization was used within the LRA, LURD, 
RUF, and RENAMO.  
The effects of variable socialization can also be understood through an analysis 
of the Stockholm syndrome. As explained by Wessells: “Obedience may also reflect a 
psychological process called Stockholm syndrome, wherein captives identify with 
their captors. The process is named for a 1973 bank robbery in which four hostages 
who had initially been fearful of their captors developed a strong association with 
their robbers, even fearing rescuers who had come to help them. This process occurs 
in situations in which the captives experience a strong fear of death and have no way 
of escaping. That their captors, who could kill them, spare their lives, creates a strong 
sense of gratitude in the captives. Isolated from the outside world, they come to see 
their captors as good people or even as saviors, forging bonds of identification with 
them. A similar process may affect child soldiers, who recognize that the armed group 
could kill them at any moment but who see particular commanders as having saved 
them. The resulting gratitude can create a strong sense of loyalty and obedience to 
the commander” (2006:66).  
Interviews with LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO child soldiers indicated that 
this was a common phenomenon within the groups. I quote a former boy soldier that 
was abducted in Liberia: “When he first take me away, I fear him every time I breath. 
He take me in the night, away from my village to the bush. He say I was now his boy 
and we go fight. When he look at me with the fire eyes I fear he will take the machete 
and finish me. But after some time I know how to be good because he protect me. He 
save me, show me how to be a good man and be strong. My Pa, I want to stay by his 
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side every day. One day they came look for us to take us to the village but I don’t go 
back, my Pa teach me how to be a man, and me, I want to be strong like them.” This 
quote shows striking similarities with the Stockholm syndrome. During the interview 
the boy spoke about his commander (Pa) with affection, showing how he became 
loyal and considered his commander as his father. When an attempt was made to 
rescue the boy, he decided to stay with his commander instead.  
Stockholm syndrome was quite a common phenomenon among my 
interviewees, as also seen in this quote by a former LRA child soldier who was 
forcibly abducted from his home: “When we were in the training camp, Kony came to 
visit us sometime. When he was around he sat down together with the children, 
chatted and he was making jokes. He was always smiling and very friendly with me, 
he was nice. I liked him.” Although the boy said he knew Kony abducted thousands of 
children just like him, he started associating with his leader and the group. Not being 
in contact with his friends or family anymore, Kony became a “nice guy” who gave 
him a new family that he felt he belonged to. This shows how socialization is closely 
linked to the powerful Stockholm syndrome, which, as indicated by interviews with 
former child soldiers and commanders, is at work within rebel groups. 
 The fifth tactic of organizational socialization, serial socialization, was present 
within each of the analyzed rebel groups as well. In each case, new recruits were 
groomed by senior rebels who taught them how to become respected members of the 
group. During this process, new recruits were frequently tested as to see whether they 
were trustworthy and if their behavior was in line with the group. Field research 
provided some particularly good examples of serial socialization within the LRA, 
LURD, and RUF, as child recruits reported they had to answer misleading questions 
to show they were becoming ‘real rebels’. Whatever they said was measured carefully 
to see whether the children were assimilating with the group. In general, child 
soldiers in each of the groups were considered full members and allowed across 
inclusionary boundaries only after they had proven that they had assimilated with the 
group. However, LURD did make some exceptions to this, as they recruited during 
combat and expected children to act as full members straight away. Some of these 
children went through serial socialization at later stages, but others never reported 
such experiences.  
 Divestiture socialization may be perceived as the most influential part of 
organizational socialization, having a particularly long-lasting effect by stripping 
away personal characteristics of the children and aiming for the adoption of a new, 
rebel identity. Not surprisingly, this tactic was at the heart of organizational 
socialization within each of the rebel groups. A good example is that within each of 
the groups, child soldiers were provided with new names. These names were intended 
to erase their civilian identities and provide them with a rebel identity instead, 
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indicating they belonged to the group. In addition, divestiture socialization rebuilt the 
self-images of child recruits, as they discovered to be capable of things they never had 
imagined. An example of this is that within each of the analyzed rebel groups, child 
soldiers were not just victims and witnesses to extreme violence: many started 
executing violence themselves. However, divestiture socialization cannot be isolated 
as the most important tactic of organizational socialization. As indicated in the case 
study chapters, organizational socialization within each of the rebel groups was a 
combination of the six different tactics of organizational socialization. The use, 
intensity and frequency of these six tactics varied within each group, with divestiture 
seeming to be particularly important. The combination of organizational socialization 
tactics was essential: they enhanced and reinforced each other, and appeared to 
provide each group with the glue that enabled the establishment of a cohesive 
organization within the harsh war contexts. Field research revealed that the 
combination of organizational socialization tactics within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and 
RENAMO made their child soldiers loyal to the groups, and contributed to the rebels’ 
adopting a common group identity.      
 
Skills 
Most child soldiers in the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO were taught and 
performed a large variety of skills. Some learned skills to engage in combat and were 
taught about military strategies and tactics, how to operate and dismantle arms, how 
to approach the enemy and set ambushes. Within every rebel group a select group of 
children learned the skills to protect their superiors so they could become their 
bodyguards. Children within the LRA and RENAMO were also taught how to lay land 
mines. Child soldiers who were not selected to become combatants developed skills to 
perform supportive tasks. Their roles were comparable in each of the rebel groups 
and ranged from those of cooks, recruiters, spies, cleaners, bush wives, porters, 
babysitters, nurses, escorts, looters to medics, forced laborers, guards, registrars 
and/or sex slaves. Most of my informants performed various roles and developed a 
set of skills over time.  
In each of the groups commanders discussed the assignment of tasks; they 
decided what kind of role a newly recruited child would perform and which skills they 
were to be taught. This is a common process within rebel groups which is also 
acknowledged by Andvig and Gates who describe that “officers of an armed force that 
employs children assess the relative capabilities of children and adults both in their 
recruitment and when allocating tasks” (2007:4). By assessing their capabilities and 
allocating the tasks, commanders ensured that recruits were taught the right skills 
and performed maximally. How well developed the skills of child soldiers were largely 
seemed to depend on the training they had participated in. Whereas the LRA, RUF, 
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and RENAMO seemed to invest in training quite seriously, this was different within 
LURD. This implied that the Liberian rebel group included numerous rather 
unskilled child soldiers prone to cause accidents. The other three rebel groups hence 
seemed to be more well-organized. 
 
Behavioral Patterns 
Teaching new recruits appropriate behavioral patterns was a significant aspect of 
socialization within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO. New recruits in each of 
these groups were taught a large set of rules when they became part of the group in 
order to make sure they behaved correctly. The (number of) rules varied slightly 
between the groups yet all sought to establish control as well as obedience to 
commanding officers. Whereas severe punishment would be inflicted upon those who 
disobeyed the rules, high levels of obedience were achieved among child soldiers. 
Wessells explains their obedience by stating that “a desire to survive is one of the 
main reasons child soldiers obey commanders. However, their obedience is also 
rooted in socialization and cultural processes antedating entry into the armed group” 
(2006:65). Interviews revealed that the rules were generally designed by LRA, LURD, 
RUF, and RENAMO top commanders and were to be obeyed by the entire group. 
However, it was common that the commanders would establish additional rules for 
the members of their own fighting units. All of the rebel groups can be perceived as 
highly disciplined yet for some this changed during the course of the war. For 
instance, LURD commanders seemed to have lost all control of their child soldiers 
towards the end of the struggle. Infighting started, rules were disobeyed and mayhem 
resulted. This was also the case within the RUF during times of their struggle. What 
all groups had in common was that the behavior and discipline of child soldiers was 
affected by and depended on their personal commanders. Some commanders within 
the groups were extremely strict, ensured that their child recruits were highly 
disciplined and tried to steer the group away from human rights violations. Other 
commanders had different interests, which in some cases implied that their child 
soldiers carried out brutal violence. This variety in discipline was found within each 
of the rebel groups.  
  
Values 
Values played an important role within each of the rebel groups. Respect for the 
hierarchical systems was one of those. New child recruits were at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and should always show respect to their superiors. Still, within each of the 
groups, these children could become commanders at a young age, which implied that 
the traditional social hierarchies of age were reversed by the LRA, LURD, RUF, and 
RENAMO. Field research indicated that each of the rebel groups were well structured 
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in hierarchical terms. They were for instance divided into battalions, companies, and 
platoons, which were under control of senior commanders who in turn had to report 
to the rebel leaders. None of the rebel groups seemed to be loose collections of 
gangs—not even RENAMO or LURD, which were groups often portrayed as such. 
Each of the rebel groups had an established hierarchy of ranks and effective systems 
of control and command, in most cases leading to relative coherence of military 
actions. The rebels were under strict military discipline within the LRA, LURD, RUF 
and RENAMO, which was based on a formal rank structure in each group and 
centralized coordination. Besides that, there was a relatively high social control 
among the rebels, which melted them into a cohesive group. 
 In addition, respect of spiritual beliefs was an important value emphasized 
within each rebel group. Newly recruited children were generally registered during 
spiritual ceremonies within the LRA, and RENAMO rebels stressed the importance of 
honoring the spirits of their ancestors. Within the RUF and LURD, traditional secret 
societies were reenacted to provide child soldiers with the rebel identity. According to 
my interviews, spiritual ceremonies and witchcraft were used mainly for protection 
and were often conducted before the rebels went to the frontline. Members of each 
rebel group believed that such practices protected them against bullets and other 
things that could harm them. It was also common to wear bracelets, necklaces, 
charms or other talisman for protection within each of the rebel groups. 
 Mutual respect between rebels seemed to be an important value and disrespect 
was often punished immediately. The rebels were expected to treat each other like 
family in all of the groups. In every case study, cannibalism was reported. Although 
this seemed most common and of particular spiritual value for LURD rebels who 
believed it would give them the powers of their enemy, incidents were reported by 
child soldiers who had been affiliated to the other groups as well. Within LURD a 
particular fashion sense was an important means to show that children belonged to 
the group. Within the LRA this was completely different, as children would simply 
just wear what they could find. 
 
Motivations 
Field research revealed that child soldiers within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and 
RENAMO had numerous motivations to join or remain with the rebels. Examples 
were food, education, individual or family protection, ideological goals, poverty, 
prestige, access to resources, weapons, scholarships, personal gain, respect, boredom, 
fear, revenge, hunger, peer pressure, grievances, equality issues, relationships, 
exploitation, promises, drugs, family separation, survival, control, power, economic 
prospects, jobs, and sometimes money. Looking at the often harsh circumstances of 
their recruitment into these groups, it may be hard to imagine child soldiers 
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becoming motivated to fight with the rebels. Andvig claims that “intrinsic motivation 
cannot be either bought or forced, it is either present or not” (2006:32). This 
assumption is incorrect: socialization within each of these rebel groups has made 
child soldiers change their norms, values, and even identities to such a large extent 
that their motivations have become intrinsic. This development was reported even 
among those children who had been forced to become part of the groups. 
 Some of my informants chose to join the LRA, LURD, RUF or RENAMO. Even 
though this is often referred to as voluntary recruitment, it may be better described as 
tactical agency or a “reasonable adaptive strategy or practical protection mechanism 
in situations of extreme danger or deprivation” (West, 2004:185). Living in conflict 
ridden countries, children had few opportunities for development. They faced 
mismanagement, a lack of educational opportunities, power abuse, bribery and 
corruption on a daily basis, which created motivations for them to take up arms. 
Some of my informants who had been part of the RUF and LURD particularly 
expressed they wanted to achieve change and no longer accepted to be marginalized. 
According to Bøås, “the state’s failure to provide for its population is largely 
responsible for creating the nearly permanent marginalization of large segments of 
the public in political and economic life. This leads to intensified political conflicts 
over the distribution of ideas, identities, resources, and positions.” He continues: “As 
states sank into seemingly permanent crisis, those hurt the most mentally were young 
people, emerging from an impoverished and tattered education system to seek an 
employment that the formal economy could not provide. The continued 
marginalization of young men in particular, created the vast pool of recruitment 
potential that has fed the rebel movements” (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:45). This 
statement can indeed be applied to the RUF, LURD, and RENAMO as the 
circumstances as described by Bøås created motivations to join for many of their 
recruits. 
 Although the motivations and causes of conflict are often a complex 
combination of factors, according to Bøås these have one thing in common: “Almost 
every movement, however distinctive, emerged as a corrupt and dysfunctional state 
receded, leaving behind disaffected youth with little means of achieving status or 
material improvement except as combatants…The bitter truth was that there was 
little left to do. So few alternatives seemed viable, and this realization must have led 
some, obviously not all, to develop a mindset of hatred against their society, their 
communities, their elders, even their parents, that was unleashed in anger when a 
gun came within their reach. The gun became their tool, their personal revolution, 
and by killing they could finally prove that even they mattered. These young men are 
the creation of damaged and broken societies, where there is little left to do” (Bøås 
and Dunn, 2007:46). Bøås certainly has a point here, yet he neglects the essential role 
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young women played within these movements; some of them were just as fed up with 
the circumstances in their countries. However, the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO 
indeed seem to have been established like this and for some of my informants this 
was a motivation to join the movements. This seemed to be the case particularly in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia; in Northern Uganda, relatively few children were motivated 
to join the movement—they were forced instead. 
Still, the LRA created a sophisticated socialization mechanism which created 
allegiance and fierce loyalty among its child soldiers. LRA child soldiers were 
generally motivated to remain part of the group because of promises made to them by 
Kony or their commanders. One of the most important motivators was the promise 
that they would get a position within the government if they won the war. As the 
children came from very poor backgrounds and many missed out on education, this 
seemed the most viable option for most of them. This was also seen within the other 
rebel groups, yet the use of rewards varied between the groups. Whereas the LRA 
mainly relied on non-pecuniary rewards, the LURD did offer pecuniary rewards such 
as jobs, money and food. At least, they promised to do so. In this regard, the rebel 
groups are very similar: they all offered child soldiers promises as a means to 
motivate them. In fact, these hardly ever came true.  
Another significant factor contributing to motivation within each of the rebel 
groups was the achievement of ranks. Ranks gave child soldiers a sense of control and 
power that was not likely to be experienced in civilian life. An additional motivator 
for male rebels was the fact that they were usually given bush wives when they stayed 
with the group, which contributed to the development of strong ties among the 
rebels. Besides that, the access to free food and other supplies emerged as a 
significant motivating factor for remaining with the rebel groups. Overall, many child 
soldiers expressed the feeling that life in the bush had significant advantages 
compared to civilian life. At home they simply did not have anything, due to the 
extreme poverty. Future expectations and opportunities were few, which made 
staying with the rebels seem like a good alternative. The belief that they would take 
over the government one day offered far brighter future prospects than if they stayed 
at home. As a result, many former child soldiers expressed high levels of motivation 
when they were part of the rebel groups. This demonstrates the efficiency of 
socialization: it transformed many terrified children into motivated, loyal fighters. 
 What should be kept in mind is that the rebel groups were not static 
organizations. They changed over time, as did the behavior and motivations of child 
soldiers. How these exactly evolved during different periods of the wars is difficult to 
determine as each of the rebel groups were to certain extents shrouded in mystery. 
The enigma surrounding the groups was particularly persistent in the cases of the 
LRA and RENAMO, as their respective leaders Kony and Dhlakama refused to meet 
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the press to provide statements about their struggles. Although each of the analyzed 
rebel groups seemed to have had relatively coherent political arguments and reasons 
to fight, these goals faded during the course of the wars. Using the RUF as an 
example: “What had started out as a social revolt ended up as a perverted version of 
the state the movement initially rebelled against. This is not unique to the RUF but 
seems to be a common pattern among current armed insurgencies all over Africa” 
(Bøås and Dunn, 2007:51). Although it is hard to draw such extensive 
generalizations, field research indicated that Bøås’ conclusion was at least valid for 
the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO. My informants stated that once they realized 
the rebel group could not achieve its objectives, this initially decreased their 
motivation to stay but when they found out there were few other opportunities, most 
remained with the group anyway. 
 
Means of Teaching 
The predominant means of teaching used within all four groups were training and the 
exposure to violence, fear and punishments. Fear and punishment taught children to 
become part of the group and transformed them into soldiers. Violent and public 
punishments took place within each of the rebel groups if child soldiers did not 
successfully complete their orders. Child soldiers were also punished when they broke 
rules or showed a lack of motivation. They were generally severely beaten but some 
children were even killed to set an example of what happened to children who did not 
behave as ‘good’ rebels. These examples taught other child soldiers to adjust their 
behavior in order to avoid punishment. Within the RUF, LURD, and RENAMO child 
soldiers were also punished by imprisonment. And whereas the RUF used branding 
to punish misbehaving children, RENAMO used starvation as well. Besides that, 
interviews revealed that rebels within each of the groups believed they would be 
punished anyhow, even if fellow rebels did not discover their misbehavior. Some of 
my informants expressed the belief they would be shot during combat if they 
disobeyed the rebel laws and nobody noticed. This once again shows that violence 
wielded, suffered and observed was an essential part of child soldier socialization 
within the rebel groups.   
Although these were prominent factors, fear, violence and punishments were 
not the only important means of teaching within the four groups. Each used rewards, 
ideological/political meetings, and/or spiritual beliefs and ceremonies to teach their 
child recruits about life as a rebel as well. Wessells explains how the use of rewards 
can lead to high levels of obedience: “By identifying with the commander, children 
gain a sense of power that they are otherwise denied. Identification can also have 
instrumental aspects, since children come to believe that if they do what the 
commander wants, they might get additional rewards. Commanders can further 
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amplify this loyalty by providing rewards that previously were unavailable to the 
child. These processes, backed by survival fears, typically instill high levels of 
obedience” (Wessells, 2006:66). Besides using rewards, the LRA and RENAMO had 
regular group meetings and assemblies during which child soldiers were instructed 
how to proceed the struggle or educated about the group. Within LURD children were 
taught to honor spiritual mediums as they would provide them with supernatural 
powers, and American movies were sometimes used to teach them about fighting. 
Within all of the groups, rewards were typically victory celebrations, promotions or 
wives. Again, the means of teaching varied between fighting units within the LRA, 
LURD, RUF, and RENAMO, as they were designed by the organizations but 
commanders had a certain freedom in the execution of the process. As Pugel notes: 
“the essence of a fighting unit is ultimately a reflection of its commander and the 
organization’s goals” (in: Gates and Reich, 2010:178). 
 
Internalization Type I and II 
As shown in the case-study chapters, some child soldiers within the four 
organizations studied here achieved internalization Type I, while others achieved 
Type II. The general patterns indicated were as follows: 
Most of my informants who had been part of the LRA, RUF, or RENAMO 
achieved Type II internalization. These informants expressed the belief that they were 
indeed doing the right thing by fighting with the rebels and they stated to have 
adopted the group’s identity. They perceived the group as their new family and the 
male commanders were generally accepted as their new fathers. This indicates that 
family ties had been replaced. This provided them with a strong motivation to 
continue the struggle and stay with the group; there seemed to be no point in 
returning home. Furthermore, my informants that achieved Type II internalization 
stated that they forgot about civilian life and had severe problems readapting to 
society once the war was over. They felt out of place as they considered themselves 
belonging to the rebel group, and experienced stigmatization by civilians. Most felt 
ostracized in their communities and decided to start a new anonymous life in urban 
centers where nobody knew about their past. 
 On the other hand, the informants who achieved Type I internalization stated 
they were just doing what they were told to do to survive. They adopted roles but 
never started feeling that they belonged in the bush. These informants said they were 
thinking about their families and homes during the war, and often daydreamed about 
escaping. Although they did become loyal to the groups, they did not express the 
same type of motivations as Type II internalization informants did. That LURD child 
soldiers less frequently seemed to reach Type II internalization may be because the 
war in Liberia was much shorter than the conflicts fought by the other rebel groups. 
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LURD child soldiers were generally subject to socialization processes for shorter 
periods of time. In addition, several informants entered the war at a very late stage, 
and were generally not provided with training and certain other types of socialization, 
because the fighting was simply too intense. This suggests that not only did they 
undergo briefer socialization than children within the other rebel groups, but also 
certain socialization processes were likely to be skipped. This may well have affected 
the internalization outcome. 
 Overall, the outcomes indicate that age played a significant role in achieving 
Type I or Type II internalization. The younger children were when they joined a rebel 
group, the more likely they seemed to be to reach Type II internalization. The older 
the children were at time of their recruitment, the more difficult it seemed to socialize 
them as they were less likely to achieve Type II internalization. This result may be 
explained by the fact that older children had already been exposed to socialization 
processes within their communities, which had shaped their identities. Young 
children on the contrary, had experienced relatively few socialization processes 
within their community and in comparison had a weaker sense of identity as well as a 
more flexible self-image. It seemed less complicated to socialize these children into 
the rebel groups and make them adopt new identities. Besides that, the field research 
indicated that the longer children spent within the LRA, LURD, RUF or RENAMO, 
the more likely they were to have achieved Type II internalization. This result can be 
explained by the length, depth and continuity of the socialization processes they 
experienced. 
 Gender also played a significant role during the internalization process. Within 
the LRA girl soldiers were less likely to achieve Type II internalization as compared to 
boys. This seemed due to the sexual violence they experienced within the group and 
their forced marriages to bush husbands, as this made them long to go home. My 
female informants who had been part of the RUF and RENAMO indicated the same. 
However, my informants stated that these feelings often changed when girls became 
mothers in the bush. The fact that they started a family of their own by having 
children in the bush also made them more open to accept the rebel group as the new 
family. LURD girl soldiers generally seemed to achieve Type I internalization as well. 
This was particularly due to their independent attitude and strategic choices. They 
did not perceive themselves as victims but instead developed an art to broaden their 
perspectives without losing their identities to the rebels. My female informants stated 
they “just played the game,” indicating that they only assumed a role for as long as 
they stayed with the rebel group. 
 As may be expected, motivations played a role in the outcomes of 
internalization. Children who were forcibly recruited were most likely to stick to Type 
I internalization. On the other hand, child soldiers who had chosen to join one of the 
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rebel groups because of several motivations seemed to achieve Type II internalization 
rather easily. Almost all of my informants who chose to join the rebels, reached Type 
II internalization. Among my informants who had been forcibly recruited, the 
majority reached Type I internalization, while some reached Type II internalization. 
This shows the strong effects of child soldier socialization within rebel groups, as it 
even manages to change the identities of some coerced children and transforms them 
into loyal soldiers. When internalization Type II was achieved, my informants 
reported having faced severe difficulties when trying to return to society. They still 
identified themselves as rebels and were feared by the communities. These former 
child soldiers said that they started feeling like civilians only months or even years 
after they had left the war behind them, often jeopardizing their attempts to 
reintegrate into society. 
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9 
Towards a New Future 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
  
Why do child soldiers remain with rebel groups? And what induces these children to 
live under the harsh conditions entailed in being part of a rebel group? This thesis has 
aimed to provide insights into these complex questions by analyzing the socialization 
of child soldiers within African rebel groups and thereby shedding light on some of 
many challenges that still surround this global phenomenon.  
 
 As explained in the introduction, I have sought to explain how the process of 
socialization provided child soldiers with the motivation to remain with the LRA, 
LURD, RUF, or RENAMO. Complementing previous child soldier research done by 
other scholars, I aimed to fill a knowledge gap by analyzing the dynamics found 
within rebel groups and explaining how their socialization processes are one of the 
most significant aspects in the transformation of a child into a soldier. Socialization 
implies that individuals acquire the culture of their group. The process inducts actors 
into the norms and values of the community and results in sustained compliance. 
Actors acquire new identities through socialization, leading to new interests. In 
emphasizing this, I have revealed how socialization created bonding among members 
of the LRA, LURD, RUF and RENAMO. I have also shown how socialization has been 
used as a tool to create allegiance and keep child soldiers within the rebel groups, 
preventing them from escaping. This thesis has underlined the rigorous 
developments that emerge in the course of the socialization processes used by all four 
rebel organizations studied here.  
 This thesis also has highlighted the challenges concerning child soldiering. The 
first chapters showed that it is difficult to define a child soldier, a phenomenon still 
surrounded by many myths. Further, the variety of views on rebellion and child 
soldiers put forth by prominent scholars was analyzed. This analysis of previous 
research focusing on the child soldiering phenomenon brought out the reasons why 
rebel groups recruit child soldiers, and the methods they employ. This thesis also 
presented the methods used by rebel groups to transform children into soldiers and 
create allegiance. However, the literature analysis also indicated some of the 
weaknesses of previous research and how this constrains our understanding of child 
soldiering. The lack of focus on socialization and dynamics within rebel groups has 
resulted in a gap in the literature, and, perhaps more seriously, has led to mismatches 
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in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former child soldiers as these 
children and their needs are not fully understood. This thesis has shown that 
depictions of child soldiers as either emotionally crippled victims or predatory killers 
are over-simplistic and erroneous. Socialization processes can effectively transform 
even forcibly recruited children into soldiers and make them loyal to rebel groups. 
Thus, child soldiers are sometimes victims, but not all the time; and they are 
sometimes perpetrators, but not all the time. Existence as a child soldier means 
maintaining a fragile balance between the two. 
The concept of socialization was introduced in this thesis to show its powerful 
capacities within rebel groups and to highlight the need to conduct future research on 
the topic. Extensive field research was necessary to study the socialization dynamics 
within rebel groups, as only (former) child soldiers can explain what they experienced 
within their organizations. For this reason, 260 interviews were conducted with 
former LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO child soldiers and commanders. The 
interviews gave these children a voice and revealed the role played by socialization in 
creating allegiance among rebels in each of the groups. The interviews showed that 
the rebel groups relied heavily on well-developed, efficient socialization processes; 
these processes served as the (social) glue through which the four rebel organizations 
managed to remain cohesive bodies. Moreover, the interviews clarified why previous 
research is indeed moving forward in attempting to understand the child soldier 
phenomenon yet fails to grasp an important aspect of the problem: the research 
community has not yet analyzed the influence and effects of socialization processes, 
and the dynamics of rebel groups. This neglect has resulted in a limited 
understanding of the entire problem of child soldiering, which has dramatic 
consequences for DDRR programs designed for former child soldiers. The programs 
often mismatch their needs as too little has been known about what these children 
experience in the bush and how their identities gradually change. Rehabilitating and 
reintegrating these children into society will require extensive knowledge about the 
mechanisms used to create child soldiers. This thesis has shown that socialization is 
an essential aspect of this, and should be further analyzed in future research. This 
thesis can be seen as a starting point for such a development. As child soldiering is 
still a global phenomenon, it is important to expand our focus beyond these four 
cases and study similar processes in other African, Asian, Latin American and Middle 
Eastern contexts.  
 Analysis of the role of socialization within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and 
RENAMO has shown that either/or portrayal of child soldiers—as either victims or 
perpetrators—is incorrect. In many forced recruitment cases socialization still 
manages to mold children into soldiers, melting their identity into the group identity 
of the rebels. We have seen that the change of identity is one of the most important 
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developments needed in order to create allegiance among child soldiers within rebel 
groups. By focusing on four rebel groups that have all managed to make loyal soldiers 
of abducted recruits, this thesis has shown the powerful, life-changing effects of 
socialization. We have noted several contributing factors that influence the allegiance 
of child soldiers within rebel groups, and the role of the process of socialization. 
Socialization processes change the behavior and identity of children affiliated with 
rebel groups by teaching them new skills, roles, norms, values, motivations, and 
rules. By using Checkel’s threefold analysis, I have highlighted the extent to which 
socialization led to internalization within the rebel groups. Internalization 
transformed the children into members of the LRA, LURD, RUF, or RENAMO with a 
sense of belonging in the bush. This makes clear the effectiveness and efficiency of 
socialization processes: children change their own identities into those of rebels and 
develop a strong sense of belonging to the groups. Moreover, my interviews showed 
that these new identities persisted, to varying degrees, also after the children had left 
the rebel groups. This posed critical challenges to their attempts to return to society 
and jeopardized the reintegration of thousands of former child soldiers. Many 
children continued to identify themselves as rebels and perceived the group as their 
family. This indicates that if socialization within the rebel group is not targeted in 
attempts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers, this may cause severe 
problems for the children as well as their communities. Negligence to do so may even 
pose threats to regional security as re-recruitment is looming. 
 This thesis has highlighted the importance of including socialization processes 
in future research concerning child soldiers. Uncovering how socialization 
mechanisms work within the LRA, LURD, RUF, and RENAMO offers a broader 
understanding of the phenomenon of child soldiering. Although we should not draw 
generalizations from these four cases, it is likely that similar mechanisms apply in 
other rebel groups as well. Unfortunately, research on socialization within rebel 
groups is still rather limited. If socialization is addressed at all, it is often covered 
superficially, without analysis of the in-depth processes and rebel group dynamics so 
essential for understanding the whole problem. As Checkel (2005) has argued, 
scholars tend to overlook and bracket the process that leads to internalization. It is 
vital to avoid this trap in future research, and efforts to understand the dynamics and 
processes taking places within rebel groups should be increased. It is important to 
study these phenomena further and to analyze the influence of socialization on child 
soldiers within other rebel groups, in order to deepen our knowledge and expand our 
capacities for dealing with related challenges. A better understanding of the problem 
cannot eliminate child soldiering—but it can contribute to the improvement of 
policies aimed at reducing child soldiering. Focusing on gaps within our knowledge of 
child soldiering will be of value, as it will indicate how to proceed in supporting these 
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children.  
Why is this important? One main reason is the current mismatch and failure of 
DDRR programs. The recovery of a child soldier’s lost childhood proves to be one of 
the most difficult challenges. Growing up within a rebel group estranges children 
from civilian life without war, and challenges their reintegration once they have come 
out of the bush. These children have grown up learning that violence is the means to 
get what you want or solve problems. In order for them to reintegrate into and 
function as part of society, these effects of socialization within the rebel groups must 
be reversed. Considering the influence that socialization has on children, while they 
are part of rebel groups but also after they have left these groups, I argue that it is 
essential to increase research and focus deliberately on rebel group socialization in 
programs designed to reintegrate former child soldiers. These programs need to 
tackle the challenges created by rebel group socialization and offer reverse intense 
socialization to give former child soldiers the opportunity to re-adapt to the civilian 
way of life. Only then may these programs be able to achieve what they are designed 
for, and work towards a brighter future for these children and their communities 
 To conclude: child soldiers are often portrayed as dangerous, merciless killers. 
However, interviewing former child soldiers in different African countries showed 
that they all had some things in common. They were fragile, felt betrayed, used, 
desperate, scared and lost. Existence seemed meaningless: the wars had not brought 
them what they had hoped for, promises were broken, families were lost, and most of 
them ended up in situations of desperation very similar to the situations they had 
hoped to escape by joining the rebels. Their trust in adults had been shattered by the 
war: they had put their lives in the hands of commanders who promised the world to 
them, and now they were left with nothing. Many had tried to find guidance in their 
struggle for a better life; most had failed. Opportunities for changing their lives were 
scarce, yet most child soldiers who did come across anything like this used it as a 
change catalyst. After the war, numerous child soldiers did not return home; they felt 
ostracized, stigmatized, demonized, and rejected by their societies. Many of these 
children have disappeared into the anonymity of urban centers where they continue 
to face hardship and look to one another for support, often sustaining the same 
hierarchical order as in the wartime group.  
It is necessary to restore the broken trust between former child soldiers and 
their societies in order to facilitate rebuilding the bridges between them, and to 
strengthen their positions, resources, and networks within the community. One way 
of achieving this are DDRR programs focusing on renewed cooperation, which can 
help to foster the re-establishment of ties between children and their communities. It 
can assist former child soldiers in creating new civilian identities and in finding 
respected and meaningful social roles within their communities. This will benefit the 
  
 
274 
communities as well, as many communities have been robbed of entire generations of 
young people due to the recruitment of children during the war. On the other hand, 
my field research has also shown that former child soldiers do not constitute one 
homogenous group: they have different ways and needs in coping with their past and 
trying to reintegrate. For instance, the needs of young children differ from those of 
older children. Whereas schooling may be beneficial for younger children, older 
children will benefit more from learning practical skills during vocational training, as 
this will help them to find employment and become self-sustaining. Here we should 
bear in mind that demands for skills vary, and offering large groups of former child 
soldiers the same type of training cannot improve the situation if there are few jobs 
available and an oversupply of youth with similar skills. In order to be able to offer a 
real future opportunity to former child soldiers, the types of training must be 
adjusted to local contexts and local demands. Local needs assessments before 
implementing DDRR programs are an important aspect of this. 
Similarly as regards former boy soldiers and girl soldiers: they have different 
needs as well. Assistance must be tailored to their specific needs in order to 
contribute to the establishments of new lives. One need that they all have in common 
is that, just as with socialization when entering a rebel group, civilian socialization 
processes must be exercised for re-entry to civilian life. This will aid former child 
soldiers in shedding their rebel identities, which is necessary to their successful 
functioning as members of their communities. Only by reversing the process of 
socialization within rebel groups and working to reconstruct the place and role of 
these children in the civilian world can they be led on the road to a better future. 
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Summary 
 
Why do child soldiers remain with rebel groups? What induces these children to live 
under the harsh conditions entailed in being part of a rebel group? This dissertation, 
“The Bullets Sound Like Music To My Ears,” provides insights into these complex 
questions by analyzing the socialization of child soldiers within African rebel groups. 
Even though child soldiering has become an extensively studied global phenomenon, 
myriad challenges still confront the researcher. Not only is it difficult to define a 
“child soldier,” depicting child soldiers as either emotionally crippled victims or 
predatory killers proves over-simplistic, with invalid conclusions, and the 
phenomenon is still surrounded by a mixture of myths and unknown terrain.  
 
Research on child soldiers has made significant strides during the last decade, but it 
has failed to grasp the entire problem. This dissertation combines in-depth analysis 
of previous research on child soldiers and rebellion with innovative data from 
extensive field research conducted by the author. Where previous research has 
tended to focus on recruitment and/or reintegration issues, the author’s field 
research sheds light on the period when child soldiers have become actively engaged 
within rebel groups. Drawing on hundreds of in-depth interviews with former child 
soldiers and commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and the Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, this study explores the methods used for 
transforming children into soldiers and creating allegiance within African rebel 
groups. 
 
The author’s field research indicates that socialization processes within each of the 
studied rebel groups played an important role in transforming children into soldiers, 
having robust effects even in cases of forced recruitment. Socialization, whereby 
individuals acquire the culture of their group, inducts child soldiers into the norms 
and values of the rebel group and results in sustained compliance. These children 
acquire new identities through socialization, leading to new interests, motivation, 
allegiance and loyalty to the group. Through this process, the rebel group eventually 
becomes perceived as the child’s new family. Hundreds of in-depth interviews show 
that all four rebel groups relied heavily on well-developed, efficient socialization 
processes, and discloses how these processes represented the (social) glue whereby 
the groups managed to remain cohesive bodies.  
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“The Bullets Sound Like Music To My Ears” explains in detail how socialization 
manages to mold children into soldiers, merging their identities into the group 
identity of the rebels. Analysis of these dynamics makes it clear that the change of 
identity is one of the most important developments needed in order to create 
allegiance among child soldiers within rebel groups. By focusing on the LRA, LURD, 
RUF, and RENAMO—four rebel groups which managed to gain the allegiance of even 
their abducted recruits—this thesis shows the powerful effects socialization can have. 
Socialization processes change the behavior and identity of child soldiers, teaching 
them new skills, roles, norms, values, motivations, and rules.  
 
The extent to which socialization led to internalization among child soldiers within 
these four rebel organizations is alarming. This field research makes clear the 
effectiveness and efficiency of socialization processes, showing that internalization 
transformed the majority of interviewed child soldiers into dedicated members of the 
rebel groups. These children affirmed a strong sense of belonging to the group, and 
these new identities often persisted after they had left the rebel group. Their accounts 
show how this posed critical obstacles to their attempts to return to society and 
challenged the reintegration of thousands of former child soldiers.  
 
Research on socialization processes within armed groups is still rather limited: 
scholars tend to overlook the dynamics within rebel groups and bracket the process 
that leads to internalization. As this pointed out in thesis, such neglect has had far-
reaching consequences for the post-war lives of child soldiers, and has limited the 
success of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) 
programs. Because so little is known about the socialization mechanisms that change 
children’s identities into those of rebels, DDRR programs are unable to target these 
changes sufficiently. Moreover, DDRR programs are often designed in ways ill-
matched to the needs of former child soldiers, failing to assist child soldiers in 
shedding their rebel identities. The consequences of socialization within rebel groups 
merits more research in different parts of the world and should be specifically 
addressed in future DDRR programs and research. Negligence to do so can cause 
severe problems for former child soldiers as well as their communities, and may even 
pose threats to regional security. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Waarom blijven kindsoldaten bij rebellengroepen? Wat beweegt deze kinderen onder 
de barre omstandigheden te leven die daarmee samengaan? Dit proefschrift, “The 
Bullets Sound Like Music To My Ears’’, geeft inzicht in deze complexe vraagstukken. 
Het geeft een analyse van socialisatieprocessen van kindsoldaten binnen Afrikaanse 
rebellengroepen en legt daarmee een basis voor nieuwe inzichten op dit terrein. Het 
onderwerp kindsoldaten is uitgegroeid tot een uitgebreid en wereldwijd bestudeerd 
verschijnsel. Desondanks zijn er nog steeds talloze uitdagingen en vragen rondom dit 
onderwerp. Het is moeilijk om de term ‘kindsoldaat’ te definiëren, en hen af te 
schilderen als emotioneel beschadigde slachtoffers of als roofzuchtige moordenaars is 
te simplistisch en leidt tot ongefundeerde conclusies. Dit fenomeen wordt nog steeds 
omgeven door een mengsel van mythen en onbekend terrein. 
 
Door onderzoek naar kindsoldaten is er het afgelopen decennium aanzienlijke 
vooruitgang geboekt in de kennis daarover, maar het probleem is nog steeds niet 
voldoende doorgrond. Dit proefschrift combineert analyses van eerder onderzoek 
over kindsoldaten en rebellie met innovatieve data, verkregen uit door de auteur 
verricht veldonderzoek. Waar vorige onderzoeken de neiging hebben zich te richten 
op vraagstukken met betrekking tot werving en/of re-integratie, belicht dit onderzoek 
de periode waarin kindsoldaten onderdeel zijn van rebellengroepen. Op basis van 
honderden diepte-interviews met voormalige kindsoldaten en commandanten van de 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Oeganda, de Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia , het Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra 
Leone, en het Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, 
beschrijft deze studie de methodes die worden toegepast bij het transformeren van 
kinderen in soldaten en het creëren van hun loyaliteit binnen Afrikaanse 
rebellengroepen. 
 
Veldonderzoek van de auteur toont aan dat socialisatieprocessen binnen elk van de 
bestudeerde rebellengroepen een belangrijke rol spelen in de transformatie van 
kinderen tot soldaten. Zelfs in gevallen van gedwongen rekrutering leiden de door 
rebellen gehanteerde socialisatiemethodes veelvuldig tot loyaal lidmaatschap van zo’n 
groep. Socialisatie, waardoor de cultuur van de groep wordt eigengemaakt, wijdt 
kindsoldaten in in de normen en waarden van de rebellengroep en resulteert in 
langdurige volgzaamheid. Deze kinderen nemen een nieuwe identiteit aan, wat leidt 
tot nieuwe interesses, motivatie, trouw en loyaliteit aan de groep. Door dit proces 
gaat het kind de rebellengroep uiteindelijk zien als zijn of haar nieuwe familie. 
Uit honderden diepte-interviews blijkt dat alle vier de rebellengroepen zwaar leunden 
op sterk ontwikkelde en efficiënte socialisatieprocessen. De interviews laten zien hoe 
deze processen de ‘(sociale) lijm’ vormen waardoor de groepen erin slagen om 
samenhangende organisaties te blijven. 
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’The Bullets Sound Like Music To My Ears’ legt in detail uit hoe socialisatieprocessen 
kinderen tot soldaten transformeert en hoe hun identiteit samensmelt met de 
identiteit van de rebellengroep. Een grondige analyse van deze dynamiek maakt 
duidelijk dat de verandering van identiteit een van de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen is 
die nodig is om loyaliteit van kindsoldaten aan rebellengroepen te creëren. Door te 
focussen op de LRA, LURD, RUF en RENAMO (vier rebellengroepen die erin 
geslaagd zijn om zelfs de trouw van door hun ontvoerde kinderen te winnen) toont dit 
proefschrift de krachtige effecten van het socialisatieproces aan. Deze processen 
veranderen het gedrag en de identiteit van kindsoldaten en leert hun nieuwe 
vaardigheden, rollen, normen, waarden, drijfveren en regels. 
 
De mate waarin socialisatie heeft geleid tot internaliseren van kindsoldaten binnen 
deze vier rebellenorganisaties is alarmerend. Het veldonderzoek maakt duidelijk hoe 
effectief en efficiënt deze socialisatieprocessen zijn. Het toont aan hoe de 
meerderheid van de geïnterviewde kindsoldaten veranderde in toegewijde leden van 
rebellengroepen. Deze kinderen ontwikkelden een sterk gevoel van verbondenheid 
met de groep en hielden vaak vast aan hun nieuwe aangenomen identiteit, ook nadat 
de rebellengroep was verlaten. Hun persoonlijke verhalen laten zien hoe dit de 
pogingen van duizenden ex-kindsoldaten om terug te keren en te re-integreren in de 
maatschappij ernstig belemmerde of zelfs verhinderde. 
 
Onderzoek naar socialisatieprocessen binnen gewapende groeperingen is nog steeds 
vrij beperkt: wetenschappers hebben tot nu toe weinig aandacht besteed aan de 
dynamiek binnen rebellengroepen en het proces dat leidt tot internalisering. Zoals 
opgemerkt in dit proefschrift heeft dit verzuim verstrekkende gevolgen voor het 
naoorlogse leven van kindsoldaten en heeft het het succes van ontwapening, 
demobilisatie, rehabilitatie en re-integratie (DDRR)-programma's beperkt. Omdat er 
zo weinig bekend is over de socialisatiemechanismen die de identiteit van kinderen 
veranderen in die van rebellen, zijn DDRR-programma's slecht in staat om deze 
kwesties aan te pakken. Bovendien worden DDRR-programma's vaak ontworpen op 
een manier die slecht afgestemd is op de behoeften van voormalig kindsoldaten. Ze 
slagen er daardoor niet in om kindsoldaten te helpen bij het afschudden van hun 
rebel-identiteit. De gevolgen van socialisatie binnen rebellengroepen verdient nader 
onderzoek in verschillende delen van de wereld en moet specifiek worden aangepakt 
in toekomstige DDRR-programma’s en onderzoek. Als dit niet gebeurt, kan dat 
ernstige problemen veroorzaken voor voormalig kindsoldaten en hun 
gemeenschappen, en kan zelfs de regionale veiligheid bedreigen. 
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Appendix: Informed Consent Form 
 
Research Project: Socialization of Child Soldiers in African Rebel Groups 
Researcher: Lotte Vermeij 
Email: vermeij.lotte@gmail.com   
Phone: +47 47 94 35 34 
Project housed at: Wageningen University, the Netherlands 
Field research period: January 2009 until April 2011 
 
Overview of the Project 
This project analyzes the socialization of child soldiers involved with rebel groups in 
Africa. The project first examines general motivations for child soldiers to remain 
with the rebel group. It then examines the particular role socialization plays in this 
decision. The objective is to create a broader understanding of the child soldiering 
phenomenon and to illuminate the processes child soldiers encounter while being 
part of a rebel group. This could indicate opportunities for improvements of 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs as specific areas that need to be addressed 
in these programs may be highlighted by the research. The following research 
questions will be addressed: 
How and why do child soldiers become involved with rebel groups? 
What happens once child soldiers have become part of a rebel group? 
Which mechanisms contribute to the decision to remain with a rebel group?  
What role does socialization play in the decision to remain with a rebel group? 
How does this strengthen the ties to a rebel group? 
 
Method and Output 
Data will be gathered through interviews conducted with former child soldiers who 
were involved in the conflicts in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Mozambique. 
These interviews will be conducted between January 2009 and April 2011. Academic 
publications will be produced from 2009 onwards using the data collected. The 
project aims to return the results to Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique 
for use by international organizations, non-governmental organizations, institutions 
of higher education, and government entities. 
 
Interviews 
The researcher involved with this project will ensure that all interviewees have the 
following rights: 
• To decline to participate in the study and interview, and to participate 
voluntarily, 
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• To withdraw from the interview and the study at any time, 
• To ask the researcher questions at any time, 
• To consent to any note-taking and audio recording by the researcher, and to all 
forms of information given to the researcher, 
• To have identity remain anonymous, and any personal details to remain 
confidential, 
• To understand the risks of participation in the study. 
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Lotte Vermeij 
PhD candidate, Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS) 
Completed Training and Supervision Plan 
 
 
Name of the activity Department/ 
Institute  
Year Credits 
(ECTS) 
Project related competences 
Writing of PhD Research Proposal PRIO/Wageningen 
University 
2009/10 6 
Giving presentations/workshops on the 
reintegration of children affected by armed 
conflict 
War Affected Children 
Association, Gulu 
2010 1 
Giving workshops on child soldiers 
socialization and DDRR programs 
Youth Dream Centre, 
Freetown 
2010 1 
“Child soldier socialization within the RUF and 
DDRR consequences” 
War Child Sierra Leone 2010 2 
"Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to 
Reintegration" 
Hotel de Wereld, 
Wageningen 
2011 1 
“Children and Armed Conflict on the African 
Continent” 
Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria 
2011 2 
"Child soldiers, Combat and International 
Humanitarian Law" 
Norwegian Armed 
Forces/Red Cross 
2013 1 
B) General research related competences 
Qualitative Methods and the Study of Civil War PRIO/University of Oslo 2009 6 
“Child Soldiers: Socialization within the 
Revolutionary United Front and its 
consequences for reintegration" 
Oxford University 2010 1 
Visiting Research Fellowship NUPI, Oslo 2012/13 6 
Publishing seminar NUPI, Oslo  2013 1 
Master class on Network theory NUPI, Oslo 2013 1 
"Child soldiers and DDRR initiatives"  University of Tromsø 2013 1 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
“Child soldiers and their socialization within 
armed groups” 
Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria 
2011 2 
"Child soldiers in Africa" War Child HQ, 
Amsterdam 
2012 1 
"Child soldiers and DDRR programs: how to 
move forward" 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, The Hague 
2012 1 
“Child Soldiers on the African Continent: How 
They Are Turned Into Soldiers Loyal to Armed 
Groups” 
NUPI, Oslo 2012 1 
Teaching Master students on field research in 
conflict zones 
University of Oslo 2012 1 
Teaching Master students on field research in 
(post-) conflict zones 
Wageningen University 2012 1 
“Children and Armed Conflict” and lecture on 
child soldiers 
NUPI, Oslo 2013 1 
 TOTAL   38 
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